La libéralisation des échanges a fait augmenter les richesses, mais en réalité, elles se sont concentrées dans les pays développés. La question de la distribution plus équitable des richesses s'est rapidement posée. Le système GATT/OMC a joué un rôle décisif dans la libéralisation des échanges et dans l'articulation des rapports entre les pays développés et les pays en développement (PED). L'émergence et l'incarnation juridique dans le système GATT/OMC d'un principe de justice distributive passe par l'évolution du traitement spécial et différencié (TSD). Sous le GATT, le TSD s'est d'abord manifesté par l'article XVIII et la Partie IV du GATT de 1947, la Clause d'habilitation et le Système de préférences de 1971. Le TSD ainsi proposé appartenait essentiellement à la sof law et a échoué dans sa tentative d'intégrer les PED au système SCM. Sous l'OMC, le TSD a changé de paradigme et de mandat. Le TSD est passé d'un outil voué à mettre au développement des PED à un mécanisme employé à aider les PED à mettre en œuvre les nouvelles politiques de libéralisation découlant des accords de l'OMC. Les dispositions TSD seront alors dispersées dans l'ensemble des accords de l'OMC, mais sans jamais transcender la forme «soft law» qui les caractérisait sous le GATT. L'échec de la Conférence de Seattle, en 1999, engendrera le «Programme de Doha pour le développement», en 2001. La Déclaration de Doha était alors perçue comme l'incarnation de la transformation de l'OMC en organisation qui se préoccupe désormais de justice distributive. En observant de près le texte de la Déclaration de Doha et en analysant sa valeur juridique, on ne constate pas de progrès significatifs. Encore une fois, les mesures proposées le sont sous forme de déclarations d'intention et de promesses, voire d'engagement à négocier. Actuellement, le Cycle de Doha tarde à aboutir et tout nous porte à croire que l'avènement de l'OMC n'a pas concrétisé la volonté des PED d'une répartition plus équitable des richesses. / Developed Countries are the main beneficiaries of Economic liberalism and reductions of tariffs. The GATT/WTO System played a key role in the global economic growth and in the re1ationship between Deve10ping Countries and Developed Countries. In the GATT/WOT System, the legal translation of Distributive Justice is represented by Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) in favour of Developing Countries. During the GATT (1947-1994), the most important SDT provisions were Article XVIII and Part IV of the 1947 GATT, the Enabling Clause and the Generalized Preferential System of 1971. Notwithstanding the GATT'S efforts, the STD was not efficient enough to he1p the situation of Developing Countries and was mostly considered as Soft Law. Under the WTO, the STD evolved and his mandate was modified. In fact, the STD became a tool to he1p Deve10ping Countries adopted the new WTO obligations, rather than being a tool for deve1opment. It is true that STD Measures during the Uruguay Round were spread through all of the Uruguay Round's Acts, but they never succeeded in coming out of the Soft Law stage. Following the Seattle Conference held in 1999, the WTO Members adopted the Doha Declaration and named the new Round of negotiation the «Doha Deve10pment Round». Initially, the Doha Declaration was perceived as a transformation of the WTO in a Distributive Organization. Rapidly, after studying the Round's Texts, it became obvious that, although the WTO had shown some openness towards Developing Countries' preoccupations and Distributive Justice, the Doha Declaration was in the direct continuity of the GATT. The SDT dispositions at Doha were still part of Soft Law and were mostly undertakings to negotiate in the future. At the present time, the Doha Program for Development is indefinite1y suspended. So far, the Doha Round did not meet the Deve10ping Countries' Expectations.

L’objectif de ce mémoire est de comprendre l’impact de la justice organisationnelle sur l’engagement organisationnel des travailleurs du secteur des technologies de l’information et des communications (TIC). Afin d’étudier ce sujet, trois hypothèses de recherche ont été formulés à partir des théories suivantes : 1- la théorie des attentes d’Adams (1965), 2- la théorie de l’échange social de Blau (1964) et 3- la théorie de Leventhal (1980). La première hypothèse stipule que, toutes choses étant égales par ailleurs, la justice distributive fait augmenter l’engagement affectif des travailleurs du secteur des TIC. La seconde hypothèse indique que toutes choses étant égales par ailleurs, la justice procédurale fait augmenter l’engagement affectif des travailleurs du secteur des TIC. La dernière hypothèse énonce que toutes choses étant égales par ailleurs, la justice procédurale a un impact plus important sur l’engagement affectif des travailleurs du secteur des TIC que la justice distributive. Les données utilisées proviennent d’une enquête par questionnaires électroniques auprès de l’ensemble des nouveaux employés d’une entreprise d’envergure internationale du secteur des TIC ayant un établissement à Montréal. Les employés ont été sondés à trois reprises. Les résultats indiquent que la justice distributive fait augmenter l’engagement affectif auprès des travailleurs, ce qui appuie la première hypothèse. Ils démontrent également qu’il n’existe aucune relation statistiquement significative entre la justice procédurale et l’engagement affectif. Seule la justice distributive a un effet sur l’engagement affectif du travailleur. Les résultats montrent l’existence de relations significatives et positives entre trois des variables de contrôle et l’engagement affectif. Il s’agit de : 1- travail sous supervision, 2- soutien organisationnel perçu et 3- satisfaction intrinsèque. / The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the impact of organizational justice on the organizational commitment of workers in the Information Technology and Telecommunications (ITC) sectors. In order to investigate this subject, we have formulated three hypotheses based on the following three theories: 1- Adams’ theory of expectations (1965), 2- Blau’s social exchange theory (1964) and 3- Leventhal’s theory (1980). The first hypothesis states that distributive justice increases worker’s affective commitment. The second hypothesis stipulates that procedural justice increases worker’s affective commitment. The last hypothesis states that distributive justice has a stronger influence on worker’s affective commitment than procedural justice. In order to test our hypotheses, we used data from an electronic-questionnaire. This questionnaire was addressed to all new hires of a global company in the ITC sector based in Montreal. Employees were surveyed at three separate occasions. The findings of this study confirm one of the research hypotheses. Indeed, results show that distributive justice increases worker’s affective commitment. Results also demonstrate that there is no statistically significant relationship between procedural justice and affective commitment. Only distributive justice has an effect on workers’ affective commitment. Finally, results show the existence of a significant and positive relationship between three control variables and affective commitment. These are: 1- Supervised work experience, 2- Perceived organizational support and 3-Intrinsic satisfaction.

With a projected increase in electricity demand and low-carbon energy generation in the UK, expansion of the existing transmission grid network is required. In going beyond the NIMBY concept, Devine-Wright (2009) posited a place-based approach that highlights the roles of place attachment and place-related symbolic meanings for understanding public responses to energy infrastructure proposals. This PhD research investigated two overarching and interrelated research aims. The first sought to enlarge our understandings of the processes of attachment and detachment to the residence place by investigating the dynamics of varieties of people-place relations across the life course (people's 'life-place trajectories'), thus addressing the limitation of studies adopting a 'structural' approach to the study of people-place relations. This research, in a second instance, sought to better understand the role of people's life-place trajectories and a range of project-based factors (i.e. procedural and distributive justice) in shaping people's responses to a power line proposal. This research focussed on the Hinckley Point C (HPC) transmission line proposal and residents of the town of Nailsea, South-West England. A social representations theory framework was usefully applied to this research by acknowledging that people's personal place relations and their beliefs about proposed place change, are situated and embedded within wider social representations of place and project. A mixed methods approach was employed comprising three empirical studies. The first consisted of twenty-five narrative interviews, the second a set of five focus group interviews, and the third a questionnaire survey study (n=264) amongst a representative sample of Nailsea residents. Triangulating findings across the three studies produced a novel set of key findings. By elaborating five novel 'life-place trajectories', this PhD research moved beyond structural approaches to the study of people-place relations and made a novel contribution to our understandings of the processes and dynamics of attachment and detachment to the residence place across the life course. This research further confirmed the existing typology of people-place relations and revealed a novel variety termed 'Traditional-active attachment'. Life-place trajectories were instrumental in informing divergent representations of the nearby countryside which were more or less congruent with objectified representations of the HPC project. Future studies investigating place and project meanings should be sensitive to these trajectories. Interestingly, place as a 'centre of meaning' rather than a 'locus of attachment' (or non-attachment) emerged as particularly salient for understanding responses to the project. Project-based factors were salient in informing participants' responses toward the project. A perceived imbalance between high local costs and an absence of local benefits was seen to result in distributive injustice and opposition toward the project. However, improved perceived procedural justice following National Grid's announcement of siting concessions in the spring of 2013, was seen to ameliorate local trust in the developer and project acceptance.

Le droit au partage est généralement présenté comme étant consubstantiel du droit de propriété. Ce dernier est garanti par des textes de valeur constitutionnelle. Or, sinon le caractère prétendument absolu du droit de propriété, du moins son rang dans la hiérarchie des droits réels, s'opposent à ce que ses titulaires se trouvent contraints de l’exercer selon des modalités non voulues. Il importe dès lors que l'opération de partage soit impérativement réalisée dans le respect du droit dont elle est le prolongement, c'est-à-dire conformément aux intérêts patrimoniaux des copartageants. C'est « l’égalité » du partage, entendue alors comme synonyme de neutralité économique de l’opération. Mais les relations entre égalité et partage excèdent largement la notion d'égalité face à l'opération de « conversion » que réalise le partage. L'égalité n'est pas seulement le critère et l'impératif du partage ; elle en est aussi la « cause-impulsive », et parfois le motif. En certaines occasions, c'est parce qu'une certaine forme d'égalité aura été voulue qu'un partage s'établira. A cet égard, l’égalité ne se borne alors plus à assurer la bonne fin du partage ; elle le suscite. Le partage ne saurait se réduire en effet à la simple réalisation d’une opération commutative. Il assure la réception, en droit privé et, plus particulièrement, au sein du droit patrimonial de la famille, d’une aspiration égalitaire transcendant la technique juridique. La convention de partage n’est pas seulement un contrat nécessairement « égalitaire » ; elle emporte « contractualisation de l’égalité ». L’égalité en constitue le principal objet / The right to an equal share in the partition / to equal partition is undisociable from the right to property which is garanteed by Constitutional law. So, If not because of the allegedly absolute right to property, at least because of its rank in the hierarchy of real rights, the right to division is contrary to any acceptance by the entitled (of the proceedings) on undesired modalities. This is equality in partition in the full sense of the word – a synonym, here, of economic neutrality of the operation. The relations between equality and partition go beyond the notion of equality as understood in partition proper. Equality, indeed, is not solely the criterium and imperative for the partition, it is also the cause and, at times, even, the mobile. It may happen that partitioning is made because a certain kind of equality is desired. In these cases, equality has not its goal limited in bringing about a partition; but partition finds its cause in equality. It can, thus, be said that partitioning sums up both the efficacy of the right to property and the enforcement of a principle of equality that far exceeds its legal technique. It is clear, indeed, that the partition can’t be reduced to the sole effectiveness of a necessarily accumulative operation. It helps acknowledge, within, the private law and the patrimonial family law, in particular, that aspiration for equality that far transcends legal procedures. In that sense, the partition agreement must not be regarded solely as a necessarily egalitarian contract; it entails that equality itself be a contract. Indeed, equality is not a characteristic of the operation but its main object

A partir da Constituição Federal de 1988, são introduzidos novos contornos ao ordenamento jurídico brasileiro. O texto constitucional incorpora diversos direitos sociais e dá caráter normativo a princípios de justiça social. No direito privado, verifica-se, também, a introdução de um conteúdo social por meio da inserção de cláusulas gerais na legislação infraconstitucional, especialmente no que diz respeito aos contratos. Nesse novo quadro institucional, o Poder Judiciário passa a ocupar lugar de destaque, pois há um deslocamento de decisões políticas e sociais dos Poderes Legislativo e Executivo para o Judiciário. Observa-se um crescimento exponencial da judicialização de casos envolvendo os direitos sociais, principalmente no que tange a questões relacionadas à saúde. A judicialização tem atingido também as relações contratuais entre particulares. Todavia, nessa atuação do Judiciário podem ser identificados problemas, como a falta de preocupação com os impactos produzidos pelas decisões na sociedade. Dentro desse contexto, o objetivo do presente trabalho é analisar empiricamente a forma como os ministros do Superior Tribunal de Justiça decidem conflitos contratuais no campo da saúde suplementar. Para tanto, a primeira parte do trabalho é dedicada à caracterização e contextualização do setor da saúde suplementar brasileiro. Após, relato de forma breve o histórico de sua regulamentação. A segunda parte do trabalho aborda os principais aspectos jurídicos e econômicos que envolvem os contratos de plano de saúde. Na terceira parte, são apresentados os resultados quantitativos obtidos a partir de coleta e sistematização de dados das decisões judiciais analisadas. Por fim, na quarta e última parte do trabalho, é feito um esforço de reflexão crítica acerca dos argumentos trazidos pelos ministros do STJ, a luz, principalmente, da literatura de análise econômica do direito, sendo verificado se há alguma relação, ainda que hipotética, entre a forma de decidir dos juízes e possíveis efeitos socioeconômicos apontados pela doutrina. / From the 1988 Brazilian Constitution, are introduced alterations in the Brazilian legal system. The Constitution incorporates many social rights and gives normative character to principles of social justice. In private law, there is also the introduction of a social content through insertion of general terms in the infra-constitutional legislation, especially as regards contracts. In this new institutional framework, the Judiciary holds a prominent place, because there is a shift of political and social decisions of the Legislative and Executive to the Judiciary. There is an exponential growth of judicialization of cases involving social rights, especially in regard to health issues. The judicialization has also reached the contractual relations among individuals. However, problems can be identified in this proceeding of the Judiciary, such as lack of concern about the impacts of the decisions in society. In this context, the aim of this study is to analyze empirically how the justices of the Superior Court of Justice decide contract disputes in the private healthcare sector. In order to do such, the first part of the work is dedicated to the characterization and contextualization of Brazilian private healthcare sector. After, it is briefly presented the history of its regulation. The second part addresses the main legal and economic aspects involving health insurance contracts. In the third part, I present the quantitative results obtained from data collection and systematization of judicial decisions analyzed. Finally, in the fourth and final part of the work, a critic effort is made to analyze the arguments brought by justices of the Superior Court of Justice, in the light of the economic analysis of law, and also examined whether there is any relationship, even though hypothetical, between how the judges decide possible socioeconomic effects pointed by doctrine.

Este trabalho trata da relação entre a teoria formalista do direito elaborada por Ernest Weinrib e sua teoria de fundamentação da responsabilidade civil derivada do formalismo. O objetivo do trabalho é mostrar que, apesar de o formalismo apresentar uma formulação distintiva e inovadora de racionalidade jurídica, que enfatiza a relação entre forma e conteúdo do direito, o modelo de racionalidade jurídica do formalismo não fornece uma explicação adequada para algumas áreas do direito e, especificamente no caso da responsabilidade civil, da responsabilidade objetiva, que, nessa visão, é considerada um erro jurídico. O formalismo jurídico weinribiano é um projeto teórico ambicioso que a um só tempo procura rechaçar posições céticas como os estudos críticos do direito (critical legal studies) e posições instrumentalistas, especialmente a análise econômica do direito e o positivismo jurídico. Ele apresenta uma teoria geral que mostra o direito como um lócus de racionalidade moral imanente e um método, fundado na inteligibilidade imanente, para compreender essa racionalidade e ver o direito como um fenômeno autônomo em relação à política e a outras esferas de racionalidade. O método formalista permite a intelecção do direito como um fenômeno imanentemente coerente por meio da apreensão das estruturas organizadoras e justificadoras implícitas nos arranjos jurídicos, isto é, as formas da justiça corretiva e da justiça distributiva. Com base nisso, o formalismo sustenta que a forma imanente ao direito privado e, consequentemente, à responsabilidade civil é a justiça corretiva. Este trabalho reconstrói criticamente as principais teses que integram o formalismo e que são fundamentais para entender a rejeição à responsabilidade objetiva, considerada uma monstruosidade conceitual, com especial ênfase na premissa epistemológica formalista da inteligibilidade imanente como a melhor maneira de se compreender o direito e na premissa da coerência estrutural que os arranjos jurídicos devem apresentar. A tese discute o modo como o formalismo jurídico se insere no debate metodológico contemporâneo, definindo o formalismo jurídico como uma teoria de avaliação e justificação jurídica e, portanto, dotada de uma dimensão prescritiva, e apresentando o impacto dessa definição na postura que o formalismo assume em relação à responsabilidade objetiva. A tese ainda analisa a relação entre essa dimensão prescritiva e o posicionamento do formalismo em relação à responsabilidade objetiva, rotulando-a de erro jurídico, e conclui com uma discussão sobre as razões desse posicionamento que, argumentase, é equivocado , que se baseiam na assunção das premissas da inteligibilidade imanente e do critério de coerência estrita que marcam o método de conhecimento formalista. / This dissertation focuses on the relationship between juridical formalism as elaborated by Ernest Weinrib and his theory of the foundation of tort law. The dissertation argues that despite formalisms distinctive and innovative account of legal rationality that emphasizes the relationship between laws form and substance, this account does not provide an adequate explanation for specific areas of law. Particularly in the case of tort law it does not adequately explain strict liability, which is deemed a juridical error. Weinribs juridical formalism is an ambitious theoretical project that challenges: skeptical accounts of law, such as critical legal studies; instrumentalists account of law exemplified by economical analysis of law; and juridical positivism. Weinribs theory attempts to explain law as a locus of immanent moral rationality. The theory is based on a methodology that adopts the premise of immanent intelligibility as a way to comprehend this rationality. This approach allows the theorist to grasp law as a phenomenon autonomous from politics and other spheres of rationality. The formalist method allows the intelligibility of law as an immanently coherent phenomenon through the apprehension of the organizing and justifying structures implicit in juridical arrangements, i.e., the forms of corrective justice and distributive justice with which formalism argues that the immanent form of private law and, therefore, of tort law is corrective justice. This dissertation reconstructs critically the main theses that support formalism, which are essential to understanding its rejection of strict liability considered a conceptual monstrosity. This dissertation focuses on the formalist epistemological assumption of immanent intelligibility as the best way of comprehending law and on the premise of internal structural coherence that juridical arrangements should display. This thesis discusses the way in which juridical formalism can be located within the contemporary methodological debate, and defines formalism as an evaluative and justificatory juridical theory. As such, formalism encompasses a prescriptive dimension. This dissertation also identifies how the definition of formalism as a prescriptive theory impacts on its analysis of strict liability. The dissertation then analyses the relationship between this prescriptive dimension and the formalist position regarding strict liability. It concludes that formalisms mistake regarding strict liability can be traced back to its epistemological assumptions regarding immanent intelligibility and coherence.

Esta tese tem o propósito de desenvolver uma argumentação normativa sobre justiça distributiva e saúde. São duas as questões que pautam a pesquisa: o que devemos uns aos outros, enquanto cidadãos de uma sociedade democrática, na promoção e proteção da saúde de nossos concidadãos? Quais obrigações e deveres de justiça que um Estado democrático possui perante a saúde de seus cidadãos? Para respondermos essas questões, inicialmente, buscamos apresentar um entendimento objetivo e publicamente acessível de necessidades de saúde. Essas necessidades estão relacionadas ao funcionamento normal das espécies e impactam o leque de oportunidades disponíveis ao longo de nossas vidas. Dialogando com a teoria da justiça como equidade, de Rawls, e com a extensão dessa teoria proposta por Daniels, defendemos que o conjunto das instituições, dos serviços, dos bens e dos recursos necessários à manutenção, ao reestabelecimento e à provisão de equivalentes funcionais ao funcionamento normal dos cidadãos devem ser distribuído de modo a respeitar o princípio de igualdade equitativa de oportunidades. Em sequência, desenvolvemos uma argumentação sobre o debate contemporâneo dedicado à definição e à defesa do princípio fundamental que deve balizar a justa distribuição dos mais variados distribuenda. Argumentamos que embora a justiça exija uma noção de igualdade (como a de igualdade democrática que defendemos) e não um patamar de suficiência ou um princípio de prioridade, esses critérios normativos podem auxiliar na formulação e na avaliação de políticas públicas e recomendações institucionais. Questionamos os ataques direcionados às teorias igualitárias, defendendo que essas teorias não podem ser reduzidas, nem obrigatoriamente exigem, a aplicação de princípios distributivos igualitários simples. Por fim, nos dedicamos a desenvolver uma argumentação sobre justiça e saúde centrada nas questões dos determinantes sociais da saúde e do gradiente social em saúde. Defenderemos, em diálogo com a literatura empírica sobre a questão, que políticas públicas de saúde devem ser baseadas em um ideal de igualdade democrática e devem assumir como uma pauta central a eliminação de iniquidades de saúde existentes entre grupos sociais, assim como combater injustiças estruturais presentes nas sociedades contemporâneas. / This thesis aims to develop a normative argument about distributive justice and health. Two questions underpin the study: what do we owe each other, as citizens of a democratic society, in the promotion and protection of the health of our fellow citizens? What justice obligations and duties does a democratic State have vis-à-vis the health of its citizens? Firstly, to answer these questions, we seek to present an objective and publicly accessible understanding of health needs. These needs are related to the normal functioning of species and impact the range of opportunities available throughout our lives. Drawing on Rawls\'s theory of justice as fairness, and on the extension to this theory, proposed by Daniels, we argue that the set of institutions, services, goods and resources necessary for the maintenance, reestablishment, and provision of functional equivalents to normal functioning, should be distributed in a way that respects the principle of fair equality of opportunity. Secondly, we develop an argument about the contemporary debate dedicated to the definition and defense of the fundamental principle that should mark the fair allocation of the most varied distribuenda. We argue that although justice requires a notion of equality (such as that the democratic equality we defend) rather than a threshold of sufficiency or a principle of priority, these normative criteria can aid in the formulation and evaluation of public policies and institutional recommendations. We question the attacks directed at egalitarian theories, arguing that these theories can not be reduced, nor do they necessarily require, the application of simple egalitarian distributive principles. Finally, we are dedicated to developing an argument about justice and health centred on the issues of social determinants of health and the social gradient in health. We shall argue, drawing on the empirical literature on the issue, that public health policies should be based on an ideal of democratic equality and should take the elimination of existing health inequities between social groups as a central guideline, as well as combatting present structural injustices in contemporary societies.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-03-04T21:02:08Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 17 / Milton Valente / Uma distribuição de renda mais justa tem sido debatida como forma de viabilizar as sociedades democráticas com características liberais. O problema a ser examinado nesta investigação é justamente as possibilidades que têm os governos chamados liberais, de promoverem reformas que resultem em tais possibilidades. Neste sentido, nós estaremos dando enfoque à obra Uma teoria da justiça do filósofo norte-americano John Rawls. Inserida na tradição contratualista, elabora uma proposta de justiça como eqüidade, colocando-se como uma alternativa à doutrina utilitarista. Governos democráticos, conforme Rawls, devem ser garantidores de políticas públicas que tenham como conseqüência uma firme justiça distributiva. Esses governos devem ser plurais, e conflitos de ordem filosófica, moral ou religiosa não devem impedir um acordo razoável como forma de viabilizar a estrutura básica da sociedade. Utilizando-se de um artifício racional, em que os acordos celebrados são válidos para todos, Rawls cria o artifício da posição ori / A fairer income distribution has been debated as a way of making viable the democratic societies with liberal characteristics. The problem to be examined in this investigation is exatly the possibilities that the governments called liberal have, promoting reforms that result in such possibilities. In this way, we will be giving focus on the work A theory of justice from the American philosopher Jhon Rawls. Inserted in the contractualist traditions, it elaborates a justice as fairness, placing itself as an alternative to the utilitarian doctrine. The democratic governments, according to Rawls, must ensure that public politics have a consistent distributive justice as a consequence. These governments must be plural, and conflits of philosophical, moral or religious order must not prevent a reasonable agreement as a way of making viable a basic structure of the society. Using a rational artifice in which the agreementes are valid for everyone, Rawls creates the artifice of original position. In this situation th

Chang Kwun-Hung. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2003. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 184-189). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Chapter 1. --- Introduction / Chapter 1.1 --- The approach of this thesis --- p.3 / Chapter 1.2 --- Criticisms on Rawls --- p.8 / Chapter 1.3 --- Influences from Marx --- p.13 / Chapter 1.4 --- "Socialism, market, and democracy" --- p.14 / Chapter 1.5 --- Why should we need equality? --- p.18 / Chapter 2. --- Complex Equality and Distributive Justice / Chapter 2.1 --- Social goods and distributive spheres --- p.22 / Chapter 2.2 --- Problems on simple equality --- p.26 / Chapter 2.3 --- Complex equality and reduction of dominance --- p.33 / Chapter 2.4 --- Blocked exchange and free exchanges --- p.37 / Chapter 2.5 --- Natural endowments and desert --- p.40 / Chapter 3. --- Criticisms on Walzer's theory of social goods / Chapter 3.1 --- Loose link between social meanings and distributive principles --- p.47 / Chapter 3.2 --- Moral considerations and principle of utility --- p.50 / Chapter 3.3 --- Basic needs and communal provision --- p.56 / Chapter 3.4 --- Unclear boundaries between social goods --- p.60 / Chapter 4. --- Citizenship and shared understandings of social goods / Chapter 4.1 --- Democratic citizenship and political power --- p.70 / Chapter 4.2 --- Decentralized democratic socialism --- p.77 / Chapter 4.3 --- Ruled by citizens or ruled by specialists? --- p.79 / Chapter 4.4 --- Shared understandings of social welfare --- p.81 / Chapter 4.41 --- Medical care / Chapter 4.42 --- Education / Chapter 4.5 --- Art of separation --- p.91 / Chapter 5. --- Interpretation and social criticism / Chapter 5.1 --- Interpretation thesis --- p.99 / Chapter 5.2 --- Social criticism --- p.111 / Chapter 5.3 --- Dworkin-Walzer debate --- p.118 / Chapter 6. --- Problems with Walzer's interpretation thesis / Chapter 6.1 --- The possibility of social criticisms made by another society --- p.132 / Chapter 6.2 --- Refutation of interpretation thesis --- p.139 / Chapter 6.21 --- Georgia Warnke's criticism / Chapter 6.22 --- Joshua Cohen's criticism / Chapter 6.23 --- Raw materials taking part in Walzer's interpretation / Chapter 6.24 --- Joseph Raz's criticism / Chapter 6.25 --- Social practices and underlying ideas / Chapter 6.3 --- Universal application of Walzer's particularism --- p.157 / Chapter 6.4 --- Thick and thin --- p.162 / Chapter 6.5 --- Improving Walzer's theory --- p.171 / CONCLUSION --- p.179 / BIBLIOGRAPHY --- p.184

Dans cette thèse, je tente d’établir les fondements normatifs d’une richesse maximale qui comprend deux mesures complémentaires : un revenu maximal qui peut être mis en œuvre au moyen d’un impôt sur le revenu et un capital maximal, au moyen d’un impôt sur les successions, dont le taux marginal est de 100 % dans les deux cas. Je soutiens en effet qu’une telle mesure est juste, puisqu’elle respecte les principes développés au sein de trois théories principales : le libertarisme, le suffisantisme et le prioritarisme. Puis, je soutiens aussi qu’une telle mesure est efficace d’un point de vue économique, puisqu’elle permet de mieux diffuser les incitations financières, ce qui peut avoir des effets positifs sur la production et la répartition de la richesse. D’abord, je soutiens qu’une richesse maximale respecte le principe fondamental défendu par les libertariens, c’est-à-dire la propriété de soi. Pour ce faire, je m’appuie surtout sur deux arguments : le proviso et la théorie des marchés où le gagnant rafle la mise. D’abord, je montre que si l’on associe les ressources naturelles au capital, l’application d’un proviso au principe d’acquisition interdit l’appropriation illimitée des ressources naturelles, ce qui permet de justifier un capital maximal. Ensuite, je montre que si l’on associe les fruits du travail au revenu, les marchés où le gagnant rafle la mise permettent à certains individus de recevoir des revenus qui sont supérieurs aux fruits de leur travail, ce qui viole par excès le principe de la propriété de soi et permet de justifier un revenu maximal. Ensuite, je soutiens qu’une richesse maximale respecte les principes développés au sein de deux théories faisant partie de la tradition égalitariste : le suffisantisme et le prioritarisme. Pour ce faire, je montre que ces deux théories ne sont acceptables que si elles intègrent une autre théorie que l’on appelle le limitarianisme. Selon cette théorie, toute richesse supérieure à celle dont un individu a besoin pour s’épanouir pleinement dans la vie peut être qualifiée d’immorale. Par conséquent, une telle théorie permet de justifier une richesse maximale, puisqu’elle ajoute un seuil de richesse au seuil de pauvreté que défendent déjà les suffisantistes et les prioritaristes.Enfin, je réponds à l’une des principales objections qui peuvent être soulevées contre une richesse maximale et qui porte sur l’efficacité économique du plafonnement des incitations financières. Je montre en effet qu’une richesse maximale, contrairement à ce que l’on pourrait croire, pourrait avoir des effets positifs sur la production et la distribution de la richesse. Pour ce faire, je m’appuie surtout sur trois arguments. D’abord, les incitations ont une importance surestimée en sciences économiques. Ensuite, il existe plusieurs formes d’incitations qui ne se réduisent nullement aux seules incitations financières. Enfin, il est préférable de diffuser largement les incitations financières plutôt que de les concentrer exagérément auprès d’une minorité d’individus. / In this thesis, I try to establish the normative foundations for a maximum limit on wealth that includes two complementary measures: a maximum on income that can be implemented by means of an income tax, and a maximum on capital, which can be attained through a tax on inheritance; the marginal rate being 100% in both cases. Indeed, I argue that such a measure is fair, since it respects the principles developed in three main theories : libertarianism, sufficientarianism, and prioritarianism. Next, I argue that such a measure is economically efficient, since it allows to better spread financial incentives, which can have positive effects on the production and distribution of wealth. First, I maintain that a maximum limit on wealth respects the fundamental principle defended by libertarians, that is, self-ownership. To do this, I rely mainly on two arguments: the proviso and the theory of winner-takes-all markets. First, I show that if we associate natural resources with capital, the application of a proviso to the principle of acquisition prohibits the unlimited appropriation of natural resources, which justifies a maximum on capital. Then, I show that if the fruits of labor are associated with income, winner-takes-all markets allow certain individuals to receive incomes that are superior to the fruits of their labor, which violates the principle of self-ownership, and thus justifies a maximum on income. Secondly, I maintain that a maximum wealth respects the principles developed within two theories within the egalitarian tradition: those of sufficientarianism and prioritarianism. To do this, I show that these two theories are acceptable only if they integrate another theory named limitarianism. According to this theory, any wealth superior to that which an individual needs to live a flourishing life can be qualified as immoral. Consequently, such a theory makes it possible to justify a maximum wealth, since it adds a wealth threshold to the poverty threshold already defended by sufficientarians, and prioritarians. Finally, I respond to one of the main objections that can be raised against maximum wealth and which deals with the economic efficiency of the capping of financial incentives. In fact, I show that maximum wealth, contrary to what one might believe, could have positive effects on the production and distribution of wealth. To do this, I rely mainly on three arguments. First, incentives are overestimated in economics. Second, there are several forms of incentives that are not limited to financial incentives alone. Finally, it is preferable to disseminate financial incentives widely rather than to exaggeratedly concentrate them on a minority of individuals.