Civil Affairs and its more robust sibling, Military Government, were military organisations designed to ensure that basic civil order and welfare were maintained in those allied and enemy states encountered on operations during the Second World War. In so doing, they enabled formation commanders to focus on defeating enemy forces without being distracted by possible civilian problems. Using the battle of Normandy as a case study, this research assesses the utility of Civil Affairs in supporting military needs during operations. This contrasts with previous studies that concentrate on aspects of social and diplomatic history. If the need for Civil Affairs was generally axiomatic, there was much debate as to the extent and method of delivery required. Civil Affairs quickly recognised that in dealing with direct problems such as “disorganisation, disease and unrest” it was necessary for seemingly indirect aspects of civilian life to be maintained. Various forms of bureaucratic friction resulted and several Civil Affairs approaches were used, before the model for the North West Europe campaign was agreed. Nevertheless, the organisation employed in Normandy was arguably the most extensive and best prepared of the war. However, it also had to deal with many different civilian problems and in trying military circumstances. Consequently, the battle is fertile ground for the examination of the extent and nature of the organisation’s operational utility. Using primary and secondary sources, this paper argues that Civil Affairs was militarily both useful and necessary. Furthermore, it was able to provide wider diplomatic and political benefits as well as serving core military needs. The research concludes by acknowledging that whilst mistakes were made, the various improvements made to Civil Affairs in preparation for, together with the lessons learnt during, Normandy stood the organisation in good stead for the significantly larger problems encountered later in the war.

A colonização de Brasil e África do Sul por países diferentes acabou por afetar na dimensão do Atlântico Sul para ambos. De fato, enquanto Portugal aproximou seus territórios africanos ao brasileiro via compra e venda de mão de obra escrava, transformando o Atlântico Sul como elo entre tais territórios; Holanda e, posteriormente, Inglaterra, enquadraram o território sul-africano a uma dinâmica afro-asiática, mantendo esta colônia voltada ao Oceano Índico. Posteriormente, já durante a Guerra Fria tal distanciamento se transformou em opção por tais países. Em defesa do regime apartheid, a África do Sul desejava enquadrar o Atlântico Sul no conflito Leste-Oeste via criação da Organização do Tratado do Atlântico Sul. Já o Brasil buscava manter a região desmilitarizada, defendendo a criação da chamada Zona de Paz e Cooperação do Atlântico Sul. Ainda que as transformações ocorridas nos anos 1990 indicassem a possibilidade de maior alinhamento acerca da importância do Atlântico Sul, o que predominou foram três momentos diferentes. O primeiro ocorreu durante as administrações Cardoso e Mandela, quando a desvalorização da bacia sul-atlântica foi preponderante para Brasil e África do Sul. Ao longo dos governos Lula e Mbeki houve a maior integração entre Brasília e Pretoria, e, consequentemente, maior similaridade com relação ao Atlântico Sul. Já nas administrações Rousseff e Zuma, o impasse envolvendo o Atlântico Sul passou a ser a tônica na interação entre Brasil e África do Sul Diante disso, o seguinte questionamento torna-se pertinente: por que, mesmo havendo a intensificação nas relações entre Brasil e África do Sul no Pós-Guerra Fria, o interesse pelo Atlântico Sul ainda se mantém descompassado quando comparado às visões brasileira e sul-africana? É pautado nos métodos analítico e indutivo de análise, em vasta revisão da literatura e na estruturação desta tese em duas partes contendo, respectivamente, dois e três capítulos, que se busca responder tal questionamento defendendo a hipótese de que o descompasso entre Brasil e África do Sul com relação ao Atlântico Sul ocorre, principalmente, no âmbito político-economico, visto que as distintas dinâmicas colonizadoras impostas aos países, bem como a adoção de determinadas políticas externas, levaram a interação Brasil, África do Sul e Atlântico Sul ser marcada pelo distanciamento. No entanto, diferentemente disso, as escolhas realizadas a partir das administrações Lula e Mbeki no âmbito securitário, demonstram certa continuidade no interesse de ambos em ser cada vez mais atuante no Atlântico Sul. / The colonization of Brazil and South Africa by different countries affected the dimension of the South Atlantic for both. Indeed, while Portugal brought its African territories closer to the Brazilian ones through the purchase and sale of slave labor, transforming the South Atlantic as a link between these territories, Holland and, later, England, framed the South African territory to an Afro-Asian dynamics, keeping this colony facing the Indian Ocean. Later, during the Cold War, such detachment became an option for such countries. In defense of the apartheid regime, South Africa wanted to frame the South Atlantic in the East-West conflict through the creation of the South Atlantic Treaty Organization. Brazil, meanwhile, sought to keep the region demilitarized, defending the creation of the so-called Zone of Peace and South Atlantic. Although the transformations which occurred in the 1990s indicated the possibility of greater alignment on the importance of the South Atlantic, what predominated were three different moments. The first moment occurred during Cardoso’s and Mandela’s administrations, when the devaluation of the South Atlantic was preponderant for Brazil and South Africa. Throughout Lula’s and Mbeki’s governments there was the greatest integration between Brasília and Pretoria, and, consequently, greater similarity with respect to the South Atlantic During Rousseff’s and Zuma’s administrations, the impasse involving the South Atlantic became the focus of the interaction between Brazil and South Africa. In view of this, the following questioning becomes pertinent: Even though there is intensification in relations between Brazil and South Africa in the post-Cold War period, why is the interest in the South Atlantic still remains out of step compared to the Brazilian and South African visions? Concerning this, based on the analytical and inductive methods of analysis, in an extensive review of the literature, this thesis, which is structered in two parts, two and three chapters, respectively, attempts to answer such questioning by defending the hypothesis that the gap between Brazil and South Africa in relation to the South Atlantic occurs mainly in the political-economic sphere, since the different colonizing dynamics imposed on the countries, as well as the adoption of certain external policies, led to the interaction between Brazil, South Africa and South Atlantic is marked by distance. However, unlike this, the choices made by the Lula and Mbeki administrations in the security sphere show certain continuity in the interest of both in being more active in the South Atlantic.

The purpose of this essay is to investigate what kind of motives where behind the long term decisions for the Swedish military defense in 2000 and 2004. This leads to the questions that the essay is meant to answer; 1. Were the motives behind the two decisions for the Swedish military defense of economic character or an adjustment of security and defense policy? 2. Was the parliament united in the two decisions and if they were not, why? 3. Were there any differences in motive between the two decisions? To answer these questions I have investigated the government bills, private member bills and the parliament debate concerning the two decisions. The result of the essay is that the decision of 2000 was a compromise between security and state finances. The essay can’t define the motives for the later decision. There was a greater understanding in the parliament in the later decision and the biggest difference between both decisions is that the parties who made the decisions in the parliament were not the same at both events.

Civil Affairs and its more robust sibling, Military Government, were military organisations designed to ensure that basic civil order and welfare were maintained in those allied and enemy states encountered on operations during the Second World War. In so doing, they enabled formation commanders to focus on defeating enemy forces without being distracted by possible civilian problems. Using the battle of Normandy as a case study, this research assesses the utility of Civil Affairs in supporting military needs during operations. This contrasts with previous studies that concentrate on aspects of social and diplomatic history. If the need for Civil Affairs was generally axiomatic, there was much debate as to the extent and method of delivery required. Civil Affairs quickly recognised that in dealing with direct problems such as “disorganisation, disease and unrest” it was necessary for seemingly indirect aspects of civilian life to be maintained. Various forms of bureaucratic friction resulted and several Civil Affairs approaches were used, before the model for the North West Europe campaign was agreed. Nevertheless, the organisation employed in Normandy was arguably the most extensive and best prepared of the war. However, it also had to deal with many different civilian problems and in trying military circumstances. Consequently, the battle is fertile ground for the examination of the extent and nature of the organisation’s operational utility. Using primary and secondary sources, this paper argues that Civil Affairs was militarily both useful and necessary. Furthermore, it was able to provide wider diplomatic and political benefits as well as serving core military needs. The research concludes by acknowledging that whilst mistakes were made, the various improvements made to Civil Affairs in preparation for, together with the lessons learnt during, Normandy stood the organisation in good stead for the significantly larger problems encountered later in the war.

I denna uppsats undersöks förändringarna i Sveriges och Finlands försvarsekonomi i relationtill respektive lands säkerhetspolitiska doktrin under perioden 1989–2009, i syfte att analyserahur dessa samvarierar. Uppsatsen bidrar till ekonomisk-historisk forskning med en empirisktgrundad diskussion om hur försvar, hotbild och tillförda ekonomiska resurser relaterar tillvarandra. Resultatet av undersökningen visar att Sveriges försvarsdoktrin inte följs av enkoherent försvarsekonomi. Sverige kombinerar en realistisk försvarsdoktrin med en liberalförsvarsekonomi, och Finland gör tvärtom. Relationen mellan försvarsvarsekonomi ochförsvarsdoktrin är ett resultat av många komplexa processer. / This thesis treats the complex relationship between defence expenditures, defence doctrinein relation to the internal and external politics of a nation. The subject of the thesis is Sweden’sdefence policy and its defence expenditures compared to those of Finland during the turbulentyears between 1989 and 2009. The empirical part of the thesis is based on defence expendituresand the official statements made by both Finland’s and Sweden’s governments respectively.This thesis shows that both Sweden’s and Finland’s defence doctrine during the analysed periodis inconsistent with the development of the country’s defence expenditures. The politicallydecided defence expenditures are not consistent with the defence doctrine.

The present thesis deals with the changing status position of the army in the French defence policy according to the expanded security concept of the Copenhagen school. The concept of security in France has changed after the end of the Cold War, the consequent disappearance of the threat represented by the clash of the East and West and with the expansion of the threat sector and referent objects. It was necessary that the role of the state and its army has to change based on the newly defined threats. Throughout French history its army occupied an important position as it ensured France its independence and grandeur. However, events associated with the end of the Cold War have resulted in changes in the French defence policy. There is an expansion in the tasks that the military must assume to protect its state. On the basis of three factors (France's approach to the international system, the protection of the individual and the receding role of the army) the present thesis analyzes the changing role of the army in the defence of France.

This Master thesis examines reasons of Czech politicians to decide on sending armed forces of the Czech Republic into military missions and operations of the European Union. The Czech Republic in researched years 2003-2016 took part in six out of twelve EU's military missions and operations. During these years, the support at the Czech political scene towards said missions and operations changed many times, depending on the position of certain party in the government or in the opposition. Thesis uses content analysis of discussions for its research. These discussions took place in the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic between years 2003 and 2016 and were associated with government's proposals on the deployment of the Czech armed forces abroad. Each Member of the Chamber of Deputies' contribution is assigned into one of defined categories: Security, Profitability and Appropriateness. The main hypothesis is that the majority of contributions in the researched debates belongs into Appropriateness category, largely due to importance of commitments towards allies in the EU. The second hypothesis is that the amount of arguments belonging into Security category will rise in the last couple of years, mainly because of the worsening security situation in the European Union and the...

The aim of my work is to apply the political-geographical or geopolitical optics to a specific foreign security activities of the EU, i.e. to put political aims and activities of political-geographical framework. In geopolitical terms, it is necessary to assess the potential and the current deployment of civilian missions. For this purpose, in accordance with the hypothesis of my work, that the civilian aspects of crisis management CSDP are based mainly on the willingness and desire of Member States in a given area or country involved should be analyzed for the three major priorities of Member States (UK, Germany and France) in civilian areas (see National Security Strategy). The work compares the current activities of EU civil security-CSDP and geopolitical intentions of the three great European powers, Germany, France and Great Britain. Civilian CSDP should concentrate in geographic areas that are of key importance to most member states and especially for three large powers. The question is whether the major European powers reflect their priorities in EU policy in its entirety or whether there are other factors that prevent them from doing so. Such factors include decisions based on consensus and the growing power of the European Commission, which defends its interests very hard in the CSDP. Large Member...

Cette thèse étudie la dynamique entre les États-Unis et ses alliés privilégiés lorsque la coopération militaire est en jeu. Nous y proposons que les attentes de l’allié principal déterminent le niveau de coopération des autres pays mais que deux variables intermédiaires - la cohésion du gouvernement et la capacité militaire de l’allié - en déterminent l’exécution. Cette analyse porte aussi sur les stratégies utilisées par les états secondaires pour accroître leur pouvoir dans cette relation asymétrique : initier des négociations bilatérales dans le but d’obtenir des concessions stratégiques, faire valoir leur point de vue par le biais d’organisations internationales ou, encore, évoquer des principes d’ordre éthique et moral. Même si les alliés secondaires peuvent rarement influencer l’allié dominant, ils ont néanmoins la capacité d’agir de façon autonome et de résister aux pressions du plus fort. L’argument de la thèse repose sur trois propositions : dans une alliance asymétrique, les pays ne partagent pas nécessairement la même perception des menaces au niveau international; en cas de désaccord, le résultat des négociations entre alliés ne favorise pas toujours le partenaire dominant ; au moment de la prise de décision en matière de politique étrangère, l’allié secondaire doit protéger sa réputation en tant qu’allié fiable face à l’allié dominant, mais il doit en peser l’impact politique au niveau national. L’analyse théorique de ces alliances asymétrique s’inspire du réalisme néoclassique ce qui nous permet de mieux comprendre la relation entre les variables systémiques et étatiques. L’apport de cette recherche se situe au niveau de l’étude théorique des alliances militaires et de la prise de décision en politique étrangère et de défense. La recherche porte sur le comportement des alliés secondaires qui doivent réagir aux décisions prises par les États-Unis en temps de menace, en étudiant l’interaction entre variables étatiques et contraintes systémiques. Afin de préciser le lien causal entre la perception des menaces, les attentes de l’alliance et les contraintes du pays secondaire nous avons appliqué une méthode comparative en étudiant trois cas : La Grande Bretagne, le Canada, et l’Australie, et la réponse de chacun à l’appel de participer à la guerre en Afghanistan et en Iraq de 2001 à 2003. L’étude cible la prise de décision devant le choix de participer ou de ne pas participer dans une mobilisation conjointe avec les États-Unis. Le processus décisionnel est observé du point de vue de l’allié secondaire et nous permet de mesurer les facteurs explicatifs qui ont motivé la décision en vue d’une coopération militaire. / This dissertation focuses on military cooperation between the United States and its special allies. It argues that alliance expectations determine the level of military cooperation, while two intervening variables - the level of government cohesion and military capabilities - determine its implementation. This study also shows how secondary states deploy strategies to overcome power asymmetries through bilateral concessions, international organizations and by appealing to principle. The focus of the research is on special allies, as they have the most to gain or lose by going along with American plans. My contention is that secondary allies can rarely influence the dominant ally decisively, but they can act autonomously and resist to pressures exerted by the stronger alliance partner. The argument builds on three central claims. First, power asymmetries between allies translate into different assessments of international threats. Second, when disagreements over threats arise, the outcome of intra-alliance bargaining is not necessarily dictated by the preferences of the stronger power. Third, secondary states, as opposed to the dominant partner, face unique constraints when facing major foreign policy decisions, i.e. they face a trade-off between establishing a credible reputation as an alliance partner in a politically feasible way while minimizing domestic audience costs. To examine the theoretical puzzle presented by asymmetric military cooperation, I introduce a causal explanation that builds on neoclassical realism, to zone in on the interaction between systemic and domestic variables. My research makes a contribution to alliance theory and foreign policy decision-making by studying how special allies respond to American decisions in times of threat and how systemic constraints are channeled through state-level variables. To investigate the causal link between threat perception, alliance expectations and domestic constraints, this study relies on the method of structured focused comparison with three detailed case studies. The focus is on the initial decision made by special allies regarding whether or not to participle in joint mobilization with the United States. The decision-making process is presented from the perspective of secondary allied states and measures the explanatory factors that motivated the decision on military cooperation. The case studies are the UK, Canada and Australia’s response to the war in Afghanistan and the war in Iraq during the period of 2001 to 2003.

One of the major analytical shortcomings regularly made by EU and NATO experts today lies with exclusively seeing the European defence project as a post-World War II (WWII) phenomenon and the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) as mainly a post-Cold War product. No analyst has so far seriously explored the idea of European defence predating WWII and the 20th century. Instead, since 1999 one frequently reads and hears about the ‘anomalous,’ ‘elusive’ CSDP suddenly complicating transatlantic relations. But the CSDP is hardly an oddity or aberration, and it is certainly not as mysterious as some might suggest. Drawing extensively from primary sources and predicated on an overarching evolutionist approach, this thesis shows that the present CSDP is an ephemeral security and defence concept, only the latest of its kind and full of potential. Drawing its deepest ideational roots from the (pre-)Enlightenment era, the CSDP leads to a pan-European defence almost irreversibly. A common defence for Europe is quite possible and, due to the growing impact of the exogenous (multipolar) momentum, can be realized sooner rather than later even without a full-fledged European federation. / May 2016