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Bedingungen der Personalität : Daniel C. Dennett und sein naturalistischer Personenbegriff /Forcher, Gerd. January 2007 (has links)
Universiẗat, Diplomarbeit, 2004--Innsbruck.
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Dennett's compatibilism consideredPuttergill, Julian Gatenby January 1997 (has links)
My basic concern in this thesis is to examine the details behind Dennett's attempt to reconcile the notions of mechanism and responsibility. In the main this involves an examination of how he tries to secure a compatibilism between mechanistic and intentional explanations by developing a systematised conception of intentional explanation. I begin by briefly discussing the various notions needed for understanding what is at stake in the area and where the orthodoxy on the matter lies. As such the first three sections of the work are not focussed on Dennett's work itself and playa stage-setting role for the deeper work to follow. These notions include the likes of the rationale behind attributing moral responsibility, agency and action, mechanism and mechanistic explanation, and intentional explanation. I suggest that the basic intuition regarding mechanism and responsibility is such that the two are seen to be incompatible with each other. The main reason for this lies in an intuition that mechanism undermines intentional explanation and so renders the notion of action largely empty. Action, I show, is at the heart of our attribution of responsibility and is dependent on intentional explanation. Having presented these issues, I turn to the details of Dennett's 'intentional systems theory'. I argue that Dennett attempts to avoid the intuition that mechanism is incompatible with responsibility by developing a specialised account of intentional explanation. Dennett calls it the intentional stance. r highlight the two important features of this intentional stance, namely rationality and intentionality. r show that Dennett's position on rationality and intentionality is such that it does allow him to secure an explanatory compatibilism between mechanism and his sort of intentional explanation. I argue, however, that his sort of intentional explanation does not fulfil our requirements for ascribing agency or moral responsibility. This is accomplished in part by developing alternative conceptions of the two notions. Out of this I develop a different sort of intentional stance, which I call the folk stance. I show finaIly that Dennett's compatibilist move is incapable of being applied to the folkstance from which we do in fact make attributions of responsibility, and so conclude thatDennett fails to make the case for reconciling mechanism and responsibility.
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A critical assessment of the influence of scientism in contemporary philosophy of mindFitter, Robert Harold January 2000 (has links)
No description available.
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A consciência vista de fora : a perspectiva de DennettFagundes, Juliana de Orione Arraes January 2009 (has links)
Dissertação (mestrado)—Universidade de Brasília, Instituto de Humanidades, Departamento de Filosofia, Programa de Pós-Gradução, 2009. / Submitted by Elna Araújo (elna@bce.unb.br) on 2010-05-06T20:07:12Z
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Previous issue date: 2009 / Esta dissertação discute alguns dos problemas contemporâneos da consciência. Não basta a consciência ser evidente de um ponto de vista de primeira pessoa. Uma explicação do mental deve passar pela compreensão de seu lugar na natureza. Para Chalmers, a consciência não pode ser explicada a partir dos conceitos e teorias científicas atuais. Ele sugere sua incorporação em nossa ontologia como uma propriedade fundamental. Dennett, por outro lado, defende a possibilidade de uma explicação da consciência a partir de uma perspectiva de terceira pessoa. Para isso, o trabalho das diversas disciplinas científicas deve ser levado em consideração. Como Dennett, a autora desta dissertação acredita que uma explicação apropriada da consciência deve partir da compreensão do ser humano em suas dimensões biológica e cultural. A primeira parte deste trabalho discute criticamente as idéias de Chalmers. A segunda apresenta as propostas de Dennett para tratar do tema, além de dois modelos apresentados pelo autor. A última parte trata da evolução cultural e da sua relevância para a discussão sobre a mente humana. _________________________________________________________________________________ ABSTRACT / This thesis discusses some of the contemporary problems of consciousness. It's not enough for consciousness to be evident from a first person point of view. An explanation of consciousness depends on a comprehension of its place in nature. According to Chalmers, consciousness cannot be understood in terms of the present scientific concepts and theories. Instead, it must be assimilated into our ontology as a fundamental property. Dennett, on the other hand, argues that it is possible to give an account of consciousness in terms of the current scientific framework. In order to accomplish this, scientific advances in many disciplines must be taken into consideration. For him, the correct perspective should be the third person point of view. Like Dennett, the author of the present work thinks that a proper theory of consciousness must be based on an understanding of how human beings fit in both their biological and cultural dimensions. The first part of this thesis tackles Chalmers’s ideas on consciousness and its shortcomings. The second part of the thesis deals with Dennett's views on consciousness and two models he advances. Its last part discusses cultural evolution and its relevance to the discussion concerning the human mind.
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Jaké je to být vědomý? Možnosti poznání subjektivního charakteru zkušenosti / Subjective character of experience: What is it like to be a conscious agent?Kožíšek, Jakub January 2019 (has links)
In his article What is it like to be a bat? Thomas Nagel defines consciousness by subjective character of experience. An organism is conscious if there is something that it is like to be that organism. Science describes the world objectively, from the third person perspective. That is the reason why it fails to cope with consciousness - it misses the subjective character of experience. In spite of that, Nagel proposes a new method for studying subjectivity of consciousness, which he calls "objective phenomenology". In my thesis, I want to find out if Daniel Dennett's heterophenomenology is or could be that method. Key words: Nagel, Dennett, consciousness, subjective character of experience, heterophenomenology.
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[en] CAUTIOUS REDUCTIONIST OR SCIENTIFICIST USURPER? DANIEL DENNETT´S THEORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS / [pt] REDUCIONISTA PRUDENTE OU USURPADOR CIENTIFICISTA?: A TEORIA DA CONSCIÊNCIA DE DANIEL DENNETTGABRIEL JUCA DE HOLLANDA 28 May 2007 (has links)
[pt] Daniel Dennett, um dos mais controversos filósofos
contemporâneos,
propõe uma teoria materialista da consciência, segundo a
qual a subjetividade
humana pode ser reduzida a fenômenos físicos. Alguns
filósofos consideram
esta perspectiva uma impostura, um tipo de reducionismo
nocivo e deturpador.
A teoria de Dennett também atraiu críticas de filósofos
materialistas como Paul
Churchland e de adeptos da fenomenologia husserliana. Este
trabalho visa
investigar quão bem a teoria de Dennett se sai diante
destas objeções. / [en] Daniel Dennett, one of the most controversial contemporary
philosophers,
advances a materialistic theory of consciousness,
according to which human
subjectivity can be totally reduced to physical phenomena.
Some philosophers,
such as David Chalmers and John Searle, consider this
perspective an imposture,
a harmful and distorting kind of reductionism. Dennett´s
theory has also attracted
criticism from materialistic philosophers such as Paul
Churchland, and from
enthusiasts of husserlian phenomenology. This work aims to
investigate how
well Dennett´s theory does when facing such objections.
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Simulando Dennett: ferramentas e construções de um naturalista / Simulating Dennett: tools and constructions of a naturalistCaleiro, Diego 19 March 2014 (has links)
A dissertação pretende permitir ao leitor simular a forma de pensar de Daniel Dennett, e perpassa toda sua filosofia, com ênfase em seu tratamento de o que são padrões, o algoritmo evolutivo, intuition pumps, consciência, e seu uso dos conceitos de illata, abstracta, semântica e sintaxe para compreender a natureza, a biologia e a mente humana. O trabalho reapresenta, sob nova luz, grande parte das ideias mais importantes de Dennett, e procura fazer a engenharia reversa de o que o levou a pensar de determinadas maneiras, guiando o leitor através de caminhos similares, procurando fomentar um aprendizado ativo de uma forma de pensar, acima e além de uma exposição dos resultados obtidos ao longo de décadas desse pensamento no próprio Dennett / This dissertation intends to provide the reader with an inner simulation of Daniel Dennetts form of reasoning, spreading over his whole philosophy, emphasizing his treatment of patterns, the evolutionary algorithm, consciousness, and his use of illata, abstracta, semantic, and synthax, to carve nature at its joints, especially biology and the human mind. It recasts, in a new light, great part of his most important ideas, and reverse engineers what made him think in particular ways, walking the reader through similar pathways, fostering an active learning of a thinking style, above and beyond a mere exposition of the results obtained by this thinking style over the years
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Simulando Dennett: ferramentas e construções de um naturalista / Simulating Dennett: tools and constructions of a naturalistDiego Caleiro 19 March 2014 (has links)
A dissertação pretende permitir ao leitor simular a forma de pensar de Daniel Dennett, e perpassa toda sua filosofia, com ênfase em seu tratamento de o que são padrões, o algoritmo evolutivo, intuition pumps, consciência, e seu uso dos conceitos de illata, abstracta, semântica e sintaxe para compreender a natureza, a biologia e a mente humana. O trabalho reapresenta, sob nova luz, grande parte das ideias mais importantes de Dennett, e procura fazer a engenharia reversa de o que o levou a pensar de determinadas maneiras, guiando o leitor através de caminhos similares, procurando fomentar um aprendizado ativo de uma forma de pensar, acima e além de uma exposição dos resultados obtidos ao longo de décadas desse pensamento no próprio Dennett / This dissertation intends to provide the reader with an inner simulation of Daniel Dennetts form of reasoning, spreading over his whole philosophy, emphasizing his treatment of patterns, the evolutionary algorithm, consciousness, and his use of illata, abstracta, semantic, and synthax, to carve nature at its joints, especially biology and the human mind. It recasts, in a new light, great part of his most important ideas, and reverse engineers what made him think in particular ways, walking the reader through similar pathways, fostering an active learning of a thinking style, above and beyond a mere exposition of the results obtained by this thinking style over the years
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Is what you see what you get? : the "filling in" debate and its implications for the conception of mindCrawford, Lyle Owen. 10 April 2008 (has links)
No description available.
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Language and consciousness : what can we learn about feral children? /Butler, Terry J. V., January 2003 (has links)
Thesis (M.A.)--Memorial University of Newfoundland, 2004. / Bibliography: leaves 88-89.
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