Würzburg, Universiẗat, Diss., 2003.

[pt] O argumento dos zumbis surgiu em 1974 em um artigo de Robert Kirk, mas foi com o livro The Conscious Mind (1996), de David Chalmers, que ele ganha um papel de destaque dentro da filosofia da mente. Tal argumento, que tem várias versões diferentes, tem como principal objetivo uma refutação do materialismo. De maneira muito resumida, ele diz que se for possível pensar em um zumbi físico, ser que seria fisicamente idêntico a um ser humano, mas sem estados qualitativos conscientes, ou seja, sem qualia, então tais estados não podem ser físicos. Se tais estados fossem físicos teria que faltar algo a tal zumbi. Deste modo, a única coisa que precisaria ser feita para refutar o materialismo seria mostrar que tal ser é concebível. No entanto, várias críticas surgiram e seu principal crítico, Daniel Dennett, tem ganhado apoio em sua defesa de que tais zumbis são logicamente impossíveis, ou seja, são inconcebíveis. / [en] The zombie argument came to be in 1974, in a paper by Robert Kirk, but it was David Chalmers` book, The Conscious Mind (1996) that gave it a prominent place within philosophy of mind. This argument`s main objective, and that of its several different versions, is to refute materialism. In short, it says that, if it is possible to think of a physical zombie, a being physically identical to a human being, but lacking qualitative conscious states - that is, lacking qualia - then such states cannot be physical. If such states were physical, the zombie would have to lack something. This way, all that would be necessary to refute materialism would be to show that such a being is conceivable. However, several critiques arose and the main author of those, Daniel Dennett, has been gaining support in his defense of the view that zombies are logically impossible, that is, are unconceivable.

O debate da imagética mental consiste de uma controvérsia iniciada nos anos 1970 a respeito da forma das representações mentais, e foi travada principalmente entre Stephen Kosslyn, que propunha uma forma imagética, e Zenon Pylyshyn, que propunha um formato simbólico-estrutural, além de apontar falhas conceituais na teoria da afiguração implícita no modelo pictorialista. Nesta dissertação, apresenta-se um balanço filosófico deste debate, levando em conta também críticas adicionais de Daniel Dennett aos pressupostos da abordagem pictorialista. / The mental imagery debate is a controversy that began in the 1970s concerning the form of mental representation, and was carried out mainly by Stephen Kosslyn, who defended a picture-like representation, and Zenon Pylyshyn, who proposed a symbolic-structural format. The latter also pointed out conceptual problems of the pictorialist model. This thesis presents a philosophical discussion of the debate, also taking into account additional criticisms by Daniel Dennett to the presuppositions of the pictorialist approach.

O debate da imagética mental consiste de uma controvérsia iniciada nos anos 1970 a respeito da forma das representações mentais, e foi travada principalmente entre Stephen Kosslyn, que propunha uma forma imagética, e Zenon Pylyshyn, que propunha um formato simbólico-estrutural, além de apontar falhas conceituais na teoria da afiguração implícita no modelo pictorialista. Nesta dissertação, apresenta-se um balanço filosófico deste debate, levando em conta também críticas adicionais de Daniel Dennett aos pressupostos da abordagem pictorialista. / The mental imagery debate is a controversy that began in the 1970s concerning the form of mental representation, and was carried out mainly by Stephen Kosslyn, who defended a picture-like representation, and Zenon Pylyshyn, who proposed a symbolic-structural format. The latter also pointed out conceptual problems of the pictorialist model. This thesis presents a philosophical discussion of the debate, also taking into account additional criticisms by Daniel Dennett to the presuppositions of the pictorialist approach.

Název diplomové práce: Mysl a vědomí u zvířat Vedoucí práce: prof. Karel Thein, Ph.D. Vypracovala: Bc. Klaudie Richterová Abstract This thesis examines the issue of cognition, mind and consciousness of living beings other than humans. It starts with the attitudes of two contemporary thinkers: Thomas Nagel and Daniel C. Dennett. In connection with their opinions, this thesis examines a certain number of questions: Might there be something like a subjective experience of life or being? How can one know that others have mental states that are like one's own? How important is a fact that nonhuman animals cannot describe their mental states in language? Is it possible to connect the observable characteristics of animals (behavioral or neurological) to consciousness? Nagel assumes that individuals have a proprietary perspective on their own perceptual, cognitive and emotive processes. Dennett argues that consciousness is essentially an illusion created by language, which is why he concludes that consciousness is uniquely human. What complicates the whole issue is the essential inwardness of the conscious experience. We objectivize this inwardness per our aim to know, and thus deprive it of its essence. Thereby, very often, we lose sight of what we want to examine.

This essay examines and analyzes the debate between David Chalmers and Daniel Dennett about the nature of consciousness and how to proceed to explain its existence. They are two of the biggest names of philosophy of mind today and have been on opposite sides of the debate since the nineties. Chalmers has long advocated a modern dualistic view of consciousness while Dennett's theories move in a more physicalist and functionalist direction. Today, Chalmers calls himself a realist as a clear opposite to Dennett's illusionism. The essay begins with a short summary of the history of modern philosophy of mind and a presentation of Chalmers and Dennett. Then it goes into some of their most noted older theories and arguments and move on to two of the most famous thought experiments of philosophy of mind before going into their most recent theories and work. It concludes with summary of their development and with an analysis of the sustainability and significance of their theories for the development of the debate today together with some personal reflections.

The aim of this essay is to identify common problems associated with free will and determinism in two authors, originating from different social contexts. As well as different time perspectives. The authors and books chosen for this purpose is Brainstorms written by Daniel C. Dennett, and  The Free Choice of the Will by Augustine of Hippo. The essay identifies two problems: evil and beliefs, and examines how the authors approach these issues from a hermeneutic framework. With support in the method the essay has furthermore defined the concepts behind the words determinism and libertarianism, and used these to navigate the questions it means to present answers to. In addition to the theories above, an idea analysis has been applied to structure and examine whether the logic behind the arguments are reasonable. The essay presents the both authors' views on the problems whilst trying to maintain an objective viewpoint in the process.  The study has reached the following conclusions; The problem with evil is an issue discussed during a long period of time. Whether you consider yourself an atheist or a religious person the concern about evil is relevant. The difference of view depends on your philosophy of life. Daniel C. Dennett approaches the problem with scientific explanations, while Augustine tends to seek for answers in God. Augustine believes that the problem has its roots in free will, namely that we are free to choose either sin or virtue. Dennett identifies the same root to the problem but with a scientific point of view.  The problem with beliefs is approached by the authors with a different stance concerning both writers. Dennett examines the structure behind our opinions and beliefs, which leads him to the conclusion that often enough our opinions are not our own, but a product of our environment. The essay connects this with his view on the deterministic and free universe. Augustine draws on another aspect of the issue, his main focus is not belief in its broad meaning, but in the will and need to search for truth and virtue.

Student Number : 9112588A - MA Dissertation - School of Social Sciences - Faculty of Humanities / There is a concern that causal determinism might render free-will impossible. I compare some different perspectives, namely Compatibilism, Incompatibilism, Libertarianism, and Hard Determinism, and conclude that Hard Determinism is correct—we lack free-will. To further bolster the case, I consider the work of Libet, who has found neuropsychological evidence that our brains non-consciously cause our actions, prior to our being aware of it. Thus we are also not choosing consciously. I then consider Dennett’s work on the role of the conscious self. I defend his model—of a fragmented self—which could not cause our actions. Finally I argue that many things that free-will purportedly provides, eg., justification for the penal system and reactive attitudes, can be reconstructed without free-will. I then end with some speculations about why people still want free-will.

Submitted by Silvana Teresinha Dornelles Studzinski (sstudzinski) on 2016-11-17T11:27:37Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Arildo Luiz Marconatto_.pdf: 456462 bytes, checksum: ada4d37f03c42f006380ee1936b971c9 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-11-17T11:27:37Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Arildo Luiz Marconatto_.pdf: 456462 bytes, checksum: ada4d37f03c42f006380ee1936b971c9 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-08-31 / SEDUC - Secretaria de Estado de Educação de Mato Grosso / Esta dissertação é uma síntese das principais teses defendidas pelo filósofo Daniel Clement Dennett ao longo de sua trajetória intelectual. A finalidade da dissertação é entender a relação entre as diversas teorias de Dennett e tentar interpretá-la como um todo coerente. Os conceitos que fundamentam a teoria do autor serão apresentados de forma sucinta e sequencial, buscando uma linha de ligação entre si. Ao final, argumenta-se que Dennett apresenta uma das mais importantes concepções teóricas para as ciências cognitivas contemporâneas, conectando o processo de surgimento e evolução da vida ao aparecimento da mente. / This paper is a summary of the main arguments put forward by the philosopher Daniel Dennett Clement over his intellectual trajectory. The purpose of the dissertation is to understand the relationship between the various theories of Dennett and try to interpret it as a coherent whole. The concepts underlying the author's theory will be presented in a succinct and sequentially, seeking a connecting line between them. Finally, it is argued that Dennett has one of the most important theoretical concepts for contemporary cognitive science, connecting the process of emergence and evolution of life to the appearance of mind .

Submitted by Maicon Juliano Schmidt (maicons) on 2015-04-28T18:50:52Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Márcio Francisco Rodrigues Filho.pdf: 2008728 bytes, checksum: 55f666836e537fcdf2341ba136ee8f80 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-04-28T18:50:52Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Márcio Francisco Rodrigues Filho.pdf: 2008728 bytes, checksum: 55f666836e537fcdf2341ba136ee8f80 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-01-31 / Nenhuma / Esta dissertação é um estudo analítico de duas concepções muito influentes sobre a consciência na filosofia contemporânea da mente. O foco principal desta pesquisa é duplo. Primeiro, ela pretende descrever da forma mais detalhada possível as abordagens de John Searle e de Daniel Dennet sobre a consciência. Além disso, pretende apresentar as críticas de Searle à abordagem funcionalista da Dannett. Ambas as abordagens serão descritas e avaliadas e as diferenças mais relevantes entre esses dois autores serão postas em contraste. Por não fornecer um conceito que inclua a característica qualitativa da consciência, será argumentado que o funcionalismo de Dennett não é capaz de explicar a consciência humana. Sua filosofia da mente também não resolve o problema das outras mentes, uma vez que o conceito de consciência exposto por Dennett não diferencia seres humanos conscientes de zumbis inconscientes. / This dissertation is an analytical study of two very influential conceptions of consciousness in contemporary philosophy of mind. The main focus of this research is twofold. First, it intends to describe both John Searle's and Daniel Dennett approach on consciousness, and, second, to expose Searle's criticism to Dannett's functionalist approach. Both approaches will be described and evaluated, and the relevant differences between these two authors will be put in contrast. In not providing a concept that includes the qualitative characteristic of consciousness, it will be argued that Dennett's functionalism cannot explain human conscious experiences. His philosophy of mind also cannot solve the problem of other minds, since the concept of consciousness exposed by Dennett does not differentiate conscious human beings from unconscious zombies.