Countries with proportional representation are increasingly introducing an electoral threshold to stop smaller parties from entering their parliaments. In this paper, I’m focusing on the  proportional electoral system and mainly why some countries choose to impose a barrier to their parliaments and others do not. First I did a survey to see which countries that are using it and after that I decided to do three case studies including: Sweden, The Netherlands and Turkey. I used Carles Boix theory on proportional electoral systems. The main variable in his theory is that the “threat” from the social democratic parties has an affect on the enforcement of a PRsystem. I wanted to examine whether it was possible to apply this theory on the implementation of thresholds. Finally, it is possible to conclude that Boix theory can be used even when studying the emergence of electoral barriers. Boix theory suggests that any "threat" from new parties makes the old, larger and established parties or other government organizations want to impose a threshold to secure their positions. This was the case in Sweden and in Turkey. In countries where this situation does not exist, it seems to be no need for an electoral barrier, as shown in the Netherlands.

Party membership levels in the new democracies of central and east European were predicted to remain universally low, stymied by post-communist legacies, the availability of state funding and the prevalence of mass media communications (van Biezen, 2003; Kopecký, 2007). However, more than two decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall, membership levels vary considerably between countries, and also between individual parties within party systems. Using freshly gathered party membership data, elite surveys and interviews, this thesis explores a number of institutional hypotheses to test whether, as in western democracies, electoral institutions influence how parties organise and campaign. This thesis finds that national electoral systems, municipal electoral rules and business funding regulations have an observable impact on how parties use their members. In particular, 'decentralised' electoral systems encourage greater involvement of members in voter contacting and other small campaign tasks. This thesis concludes that, contrary to the dominant literature, the availability of state funding has little impact on party membership recruitment. Instead, central and east European parties' attitudes to members are shaped by a complex interaction of institutional, cultural, ideological and strategic factors.

As regras eleitorais podem afetar o nível de proteção comercial em países democráticos? Estudos recentes indicam que, no que diz respeito ao protecionismo comercial, as instituições eleitorais importam. No entanto, diante de uma análise mais detalhada da literatura, é possível perceber que não há uma teoria prevalecente e que os resultados apresentados são ainda contraditórios. Nesta tese, objetiva-se resolver esse problema teórico e empírico que envolve representação política e protecionismo comercial testando pressupostos da literatura e apresentando explicações alternativas. A primeira parte do estudo aborda problema específico que, indiretamente, serviu de incentivo para a segunda etapa. A questão que se busca responder pode ser resumida na seguinte indagação: o tamanho do distrito eleitoral é um bom preditor para as preferências em matéria de política comercial do legislador? A pergunta trata, diretamente, da Constituency Size Assumption, um pressuposto que é amplamente aceito pela literatura de Economia Política Internacional (EPI). De acordo com essa abordagem, quanto maior o distrito, maior a probabilidade de o legislador se mostrar favorável ao livre-comércio, uma vez que ele estaria insulado em relação a grupos de interesses. Em distritos menores, no entanto, legisladores poderiam ser tornar, mais facilmente, reféns de interesses particularistas, fato que resultaria em posições protecionistas. Nesta parte, foi proposto o estudo dos casos brasileiros e chileno, levando em consideração as votações nominais de deputados e senadores. Corroborando os achados da literatura, também não foram encontradas evidências para validar a teoria diante da análise de votos nominais entre os anos de 1995 e 2010, para o Brasil, e entre 1996 e 2006, para o Chile. Na segunda parte, apresenta-se o modelo Stigler-Peltzman (S-P) de regulação, tal qual formalizado por Chang et al. em Electoral Systems and the Balance of Consumer-Producer Power, como uma possível solução para se entender a relação entre os incentivos gerados pelos sistemas eleitorais e os níveis de proteção comercial em democracias. Após adaptar o modelo para a área de política comercial, este foi testado empiricamente em 37 democracias entre os anos de 1995 e 2008, quando se estimou o efeito do nível de responsividade dos sistemas eleitorais - desproporcionalidade eleitoral - sobre o nível de proteção tarifária. Os achados indicam que quanto maior a taxa de proporcionalidade entre cadeiras e votos obtidos gerada pelos sistemas eleitorais, maior o nível de proteção que os governantes eleitos irão oferecer aos grupos de interesses, especialmente em democracias não-presidencialistas. / Do electoral rules affect the level of trade protection in democratic countries? Recent studies indicate that, when it comes to trade protection, electoral systems do matter; however, a thorough analysis of the literature unveils the fact that competing theories and mixed findings still prevail. In this dissertation, I intend to solve the empirical and theoretical puzzle involving political representation and trade policy by offering and testing an alternative explanation. In the first part, I investigate a more specific problem, which, indirectly, was an incentive to develop the second part. The question I attempt to answer is: Does the electoral district size affect legislator\'s preference in trade policy? The question is related to the Constituency Size Assumption, which is widely accepted in the International Political Economy (IPE) literature. Accordingly, the larger the constituency, the more prone the legislator will be to free trade, given that he will be insulated from special interests. Smaller constituencies, however, would lead to concern for particularistic interests, which would result in a protectionist position. Until recently, few studies have proposed empirical analyses of this relationship, and those who have accomplished the feat of presenting findings that cast doubt on the validity of this assumption, have been restricted to the US Congress. In this section, I test the constituency size theory in Brazil and Chile, contrasting vote preference with the trade policy of Representatives and Senators. I found no evidence of the theory\'s validity. The empirical analysis is based on rollcall votes from 1995 to 2010 (Brazil) and from 1996 to 2006 (Chile), in which we compared trade-related bills voted in both Houses. In the second part of this work, I present as an answer to the puzzle the Stigler-Peltzman (S-P) analysis of regulation, formalized by Chang et al. in Electoral Systems and the Balance of Consumer-Producer Power. Adapting their model, I evaluate the effect of electoral institutions on the level of trade protection. More specifically, I analyze 37 democracies from 1995 to 2008 and estimate the effect of electoral systems\' level of responsiveness - electoral disproportionality - on trade protection. The findings indicate that the higher the rate of proportionality created by electoral institutions, the greater the level of protection that politicians will provide for special interest groups, especially in non-presidential democracies.

This paper investigates the relationship between ethnic conflict, electoral systems, and power sharing in ethnically divided societies. The cases of Guyana, Fiji, Sri Lanka, Lebanon, Mauritius, and Trinidad and Tobago are considered. Electoral systems are denoted based on presidential versus parliamentary system, and on proportional representation versus majoritarian/plurality. The paper concludes that, while electoral systems are important, other factors like the power distribution between ethnic groups, and ensuring a non-zero-sum game may be as important.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-12-17T14:27:30Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 SivanildoAD.pdf: 2044307 bytes, checksum: 3d535f35ff0c6191d99eb97b38d3f628 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006-08-25 / The present work aims to analyze the several proportional electoral systems from the contemporaries democracies in order to, in the end, purpose a system that better fits to the constitutional Brazilian order. In this direction, we pursued to indicate the main virtues and imperfections in proportional electoral systems in use in more than two hundred countries, especially relating to the positive and negative effects that these systems inject in the party systems, in the governability and in the representativity. In order to collect elements, and also before getting to the work s main point, other issues were approached, even in a shortened way. Nevertheless, in a position taking, we conclude the work opting for a proportional electoral system that potencializes the constitutional principles of representativity and governability as well as prints a party system strong and strict, once these are the depositaries of a democracy compromised with the Brazilian society / O presente trabalho tem por objetivo analisar os diversos sistemas eleitorais proporcionais das democracias contempor?neas para, ao final, propor um sistema que melhor se adeq?e ao ordenamento constitucional brasileiro. Nesse sentido, buscou-se apontar as principais virtudes e imperfei??es dos sistemas eleitorais proporcionais atualmente em vigor em mais de duzentos pa?ses, principalmente no que diz respeito aos efeitos positivos e negativos que esses sistemas projetam no sistema partid?rio, na governabilidade e na representatividade. De forma a colher subs?dios e, antes de chegar ao tema central do trabalho, outras quest?es tamb?m foram abordadas, ainda que de forma abreviada. Por?m, numa tomada de posi??o, conclui-se o trabalho optando-se por um sistema eleitoral proporcional que potencialize os princ?pios constitucionais da representatividade e da governabilidade e imprima um sistema partid?rio forte e coeso, visto serem esses deposit?rios de uma democracia comprometida com a sociedade brasileira

As regras eleitorais podem afetar o nível de proteção comercial em países democráticos? Estudos recentes indicam que, no que diz respeito ao protecionismo comercial, as instituições eleitorais importam. No entanto, diante de uma análise mais detalhada da literatura, é possível perceber que não há uma teoria prevalecente e que os resultados apresentados são ainda contraditórios. Nesta tese, objetiva-se resolver esse problema teórico e empírico que envolve representação política e protecionismo comercial testando pressupostos da literatura e apresentando explicações alternativas. A primeira parte do estudo aborda problema específico que, indiretamente, serviu de incentivo para a segunda etapa. A questão que se busca responder pode ser resumida na seguinte indagação: o tamanho do distrito eleitoral é um bom preditor para as preferências em matéria de política comercial do legislador? A pergunta trata, diretamente, da Constituency Size Assumption, um pressuposto que é amplamente aceito pela literatura de Economia Política Internacional (EPI). De acordo com essa abordagem, quanto maior o distrito, maior a probabilidade de o legislador se mostrar favorável ao livre-comércio, uma vez que ele estaria insulado em relação a grupos de interesses. Em distritos menores, no entanto, legisladores poderiam ser tornar, mais facilmente, reféns de interesses particularistas, fato que resultaria em posições protecionistas. Nesta parte, foi proposto o estudo dos casos brasileiros e chileno, levando em consideração as votações nominais de deputados e senadores. Corroborando os achados da literatura, também não foram encontradas evidências para validar a teoria diante da análise de votos nominais entre os anos de 1995 e 2010, para o Brasil, e entre 1996 e 2006, para o Chile. Na segunda parte, apresenta-se o modelo Stigler-Peltzman (S-P) de regulação, tal qual formalizado por Chang et al. em Electoral Systems and the Balance of Consumer-Producer Power, como uma possível solução para se entender a relação entre os incentivos gerados pelos sistemas eleitorais e os níveis de proteção comercial em democracias. Após adaptar o modelo para a área de política comercial, este foi testado empiricamente em 37 democracias entre os anos de 1995 e 2008, quando se estimou o efeito do nível de responsividade dos sistemas eleitorais - desproporcionalidade eleitoral - sobre o nível de proteção tarifária. Os achados indicam que quanto maior a taxa de proporcionalidade entre cadeiras e votos obtidos gerada pelos sistemas eleitorais, maior o nível de proteção que os governantes eleitos irão oferecer aos grupos de interesses, especialmente em democracias não-presidencialistas. / Do electoral rules affect the level of trade protection in democratic countries? Recent studies indicate that, when it comes to trade protection, electoral systems do matter; however, a thorough analysis of the literature unveils the fact that competing theories and mixed findings still prevail. In this dissertation, I intend to solve the empirical and theoretical puzzle involving political representation and trade policy by offering and testing an alternative explanation. In the first part, I investigate a more specific problem, which, indirectly, was an incentive to develop the second part. The question I attempt to answer is: Does the electoral district size affect legislator\'s preference in trade policy? The question is related to the Constituency Size Assumption, which is widely accepted in the International Political Economy (IPE) literature. Accordingly, the larger the constituency, the more prone the legislator will be to free trade, given that he will be insulated from special interests. Smaller constituencies, however, would lead to concern for particularistic interests, which would result in a protectionist position. Until recently, few studies have proposed empirical analyses of this relationship, and those who have accomplished the feat of presenting findings that cast doubt on the validity of this assumption, have been restricted to the US Congress. In this section, I test the constituency size theory in Brazil and Chile, contrasting vote preference with the trade policy of Representatives and Senators. I found no evidence of the theory\'s validity. The empirical analysis is based on rollcall votes from 1995 to 2010 (Brazil) and from 1996 to 2006 (Chile), in which we compared trade-related bills voted in both Houses. In the second part of this work, I present as an answer to the puzzle the Stigler-Peltzman (S-P) analysis of regulation, formalized by Chang et al. in Electoral Systems and the Balance of Consumer-Producer Power. Adapting their model, I evaluate the effect of electoral institutions on the level of trade protection. More specifically, I analyze 37 democracies from 1995 to 2008 and estimate the effect of electoral systems\' level of responsiveness - electoral disproportionality - on trade protection. The findings indicate that the higher the rate of proportionality created by electoral institutions, the greater the level of protection that politicians will provide for special interest groups, especially in non-presidential democracies.

Abstract The topic of this thesis is electoral systems and electoral reform in Zambia. In Africa, democratization is on its way in many countries. However, the democratic upswing in the early 1990s was in most countries followed by a standstill. In recent years the tendency has been a renewal of democratization which makes it possible to reach new heights. As a part of this recent democratic progress questions regarding constitutional reform and electoral reform have been raised. It is within that context that this thesis has its setting. In search for the incentives behind electoral reform the purpose of this thesis revolves around what the consequences are of the current electoral system in Zambia. A complimentary purpose is how an electoral reform can take place and what it might result in. A qualitative literature study with a hermeneutic approach has been used in this thesis. A theoretical framework has been created which focuses on different types of electoral systems and their respective consequences on the political system. Important key points of electoral reform have been discussed to give an understanding and foundation for the analysis. The result of the study is that there are several negative consequences with the current electoral system in Zambia. The negative effects range from minority and gender marginalization, lacking representation, weak governments with lacking legitimacy and wasted votes. Some surprising positive traits include the absence of ethnic politization, from time to time a strong opposition and possibilities of coherent policing. It is also believed that there is a profound support for an electoral reform with in many levels of the country and there are. / Sammanfattning Denna uppsats tar sin start i valsystem och valreform i Zambia. Demokratisering är ett vanligt tema i Afrika och många länder är i full gång med att befästa sin nyvunna mark. Det demokratiska uppsving som kunde ses i början av 1900-talet följdes i många länder utav ett stillestånd i utvecklingen. På senare år har en tydlig tendens kunnat ses där demokratiseringen på nytt har tagit fart. Som en konsekvens av denna nytända demokratisering i Afrika har frågor kring valsystem, valreform och dess effekter på det politiska systemet börjat att cirkulera. Det är i det sammanhanget som uppsatsen finner sig. På uppdrag att finna vad som driver valreform, cirkulerar syftet med denna uppsats kring vilka konsekvenser det nutida valsystemet har i Zambia. Ett kompletterande syfte, eller frågeställning, för analysen vidare mot valreform och vilka utsikter som finns. En kvalitativ literaturstudie med en hermeneutisk ansats har använts i denna uppsatsen. Ett teoretiskt ramverk har skapats som fokuserar kring olika valsystem och deras respektive konsekvenser för det politiska systemet. Teorier kring valreform har också beskrivits och diskuterats fär att ge en förståelse och bakgrund till analysen. Slutsatsen för uppsatsen är att det finns många negativa kopplingar till valsystemet I Zambia. De tydligaste effekterna är att minoriteter och kvinnor blockeras från att delta i parlamentet, att svaga regeringar har funnits trots ett pluralistiskt valsystem som i sig självt har resulterat i en legitimitetsbrist och bortfallna röster. En del positiva inslag kunde även hittas, däribland en saknad av etniska konflikter, en stundom stark opposition och en möjlighet till sammanhängande politik. Som en del av resultatet verkar det också som att det finns ett stöd för en valreform på många olika nivår i Zambia. Detta anses vara nödvändigt om Zambia vill fortsätta att utveckla sin demokrati.

La révision des circonscriptions électorales consiste, dans le cadre des démocraties représentatives, à donner un ressort territorial à l’élection des membres des assemblées parlementaires. Loin de se réduire à une mesure neutre et purement administrative, comme en atteste l’histoire tourmentée des manœuvres électorales, cette opération entraîne de nombreuses conséquences sur la sincérité des résultats électoraux, les rapports de force entre partis politiques et la constitution des majorités gouvernementales ainsi que sur la représentation des intérêts, des idées et des valeurs. En lien avec l’évolution permanente des mentalités, les principes guidant la réalisation des découpages électoraux connaissent, dans la continuité de la mue séculaire des modes de gouvernement, une nouvelle métamorphose tendant à rapprocher gouvernants et gouvernés, en vue de répondre ultimement aux attentes des citoyens. Les circonscriptions électorales se trouvent ainsi amenées à devoir être en adéquation avec une vision plus ambitieuse de l’égalité de représentation, laquelle suppose non seulement une égalité devant le suffrage mais également une représentation effective et une délimitation des circonscriptions législatives soustraite aux pressions du pouvoir politique. Cette évolution, commune à plusieurs systèmes juridiques, ouvre la voie à une étude comparative centrée sur quatre pays aux traditions électorales différentes : Royaume-Uni, Canada, États-Unis et France. Au-delà des appréciations classiques, il sera ainsi possible, au carrefour du droit et de la politique, de faire ressortir les implications multiples que viennent induire ces mutations sur la consistance des circonscriptions électorales, sur la nature de la représentation politique et, finalement, sur l’affermissement et le renouvellement de la démocratie. / In the framework of representative democracies, the electoral redistricting aims to give jurisdiction to the election of members of parliamentary assemblies. Far from being a neutral and purely administrative measure, as evidenced by the tormented history of gerrymandering, this operation has many consequences on the fairness of election results, the balance of power between political parties, the formation of governmental majorities, and furthermore on the representation of interests, ideas, and values. In connection with the ongoing evolution of mentalities, the principles guiding the implementation of electoral constituencies are experiencing, in the continuity of secular change of government forms, a new metamorphosis tending to bring the people and the government closer together, so as to ultimately reach citizens’ expectations. Thus, electoral districts are expected to be in line with a more ambitious vision of equal representation, which requires not only voting equality but also effective representation and delimitation of parliamentary constituencies subtracted from pressures of political power. This trend, which is common to several legal systems, opens the way for a comparative study focused on four countries with different electoral traditions: the United Kingdom, Canada, the United States of America, and France. Beyond conventional opinions, it will be possible, at the intersection of law and politics, to bring out the many implications that these mutations induce on the consistency of electoral constituencies, on the nature of political representation and, ultimately, on the strengthening and renewal of democracy

This thesis deals with the possibilities of changing the electoral system to Czech municipal councils. It is an analytical case study with elements of a policy paper, i.e., a set of recommendations intended especially for legislators. The thesis has two main goals: (1) to identify and summarize aspects of the electoral system that experts call controversial and (2) to suggest possible solutions that would mitigate or eliminate these controversial variables. The work comes with three alternative solutions for changing the electoral system: (A) minor modifications to the existing system, which will facilitate the possibility of election because of preferential votes, and at the same time prevent local governments from performing electoral engineering by purposeful modifications of constituencies; (B) a variably mixed fusion system identical for all municipalities and (C) combination of two systems: unlimited vote for municipalities with less than 2,000 inhabitants and an open PR system for larger municipalities.

The subject of this diploma thesis is the usage of elements of political marketing in the Czech presidential campaign 2012/2013. The theoretical part of the thesis is focused on the general development of political communication and election campaigns, the principles considering the performing of political marketing, the basic formulas of voters' decision-making and models of coordinated behavior of the electorate and political representatives depending on the strategic effects of electoral systems. In a subsequent analysis of the election campaigns of selected presidential candidates - Miloš Zeman, Karel Schwarzenberg, Jan Fischer and Jiří Dienstbier - is monitored, how and under what circumstances the advancement of political marketing is applied, whether the candidates and their election team incorporate the assumed strategic effects of the election system into the planning process and implementation of election campaigns, hence if and how the campaign considers the voters' experienced ideas about the head of the state.