[pt] O presente trabalh o investiga o pensamento teológico político de Johann Baptist Metz, em diálogo com filósofos judeus século XX enfatizando a memória subversiva da s vítimas, como um critério comum de autoridade. Fundamenta a busca por transformação de estruturas sociais injustas no retorno às tradições judaico cristãs e m harmonia com o e spírito do Concílio Vaticano II, assum indo o projeto do Reino de Deus para a paz no mundo Os pontos convergentes incluem a Alteridade a Responsabilidade Ilimitada, o Rosto do Outro, o diálogo do Eu e Tu, a Linguagem Profética e a pol í tica engajada pela paz. A tese possui três partes: a bi ografia do autor, a Teologia do Mundo, o tempo ilimitado, história e relação da humanidade com Deus; a práxis da Teologia Fundamental, a mudança hermenêutica e a sua eficácia teológic a O segundo bloco apresenta os pensadore s de origem judaica, que sofreram com a perseguição nazista Abraham Heschel, Emmanuel Levinas, Hans Jonas e Martin Buber, relacionando suas experiências e contribuições teológicas e filosóficas. A última parte aborda o silêncio de Deus, a autoridade da vítima, o sofrimento humano, a anamnese no cristianismo, a didática narrativa, a compaixão e a responsabilidade do cristianismo na Shoá. A tese busca enfatizar o diálogo entre esses autores, rec onhecendo a relevância de suas contribuições para aproximar judaísmo e cristianismo e refletir sobre questões injustas da sociedade. Espe ra se que o trabalho desperte o interesse pelo pensamento de Metz e suas contribuições para a teologia da América Latina e do mundo, encorajando reflexões sobre importantes questões frequentemente desconsideradas. / [en] The present work investigates the theological-political thought of Johann Baptist Metz in dialogue with 20th century Jewish philosophers, emphasizing the subversive memory of the victims as a common criterion of authority. It grounds the search for the transformation of unjust social structures in return to Judeo-Christian traditions. In harmony with the spirit of the Second Vatican Council, embracing the project of God s Kingdom for peace in the world. Converging points include Otherness, Unlimited Responsibility, the Face of the Other, the dialogue of Self and Thou, Prophetic Language, and peace-engaged politics. The thesis is divided into three parts: the author s biography, the Theology of the World, unlimited time, history, and humanity s relationship with God; the praxis of Fundamental Theology, hermeneutical change, and its theological effectiveness. The second section presents thinkers of Jewish origin who suffered under Nazi persecution: Abraham Heschel, Emmanuel Levinas, Hans Jonas, and Martin Buber, relating their experiences and theological and philosophical contributions. The final part addresses the silence of God, the authority of the victim, human suffering, anamnesis in Christianity, narrative didactics, compassion, and Christianity s responsibility in the Shoah. The thesis aims to emphasize the dialogue among these authors, recognizing the relevance of their contributions to bringing Judaism and Christianity closer together and reflecting on unjust issues in society. It is hoped that this work will spark interest in Metz s thought and his contributions to Latin American and global theology, encouraging reflections on important and often overlooked questions.

Persistent Pasts: Historical Palimpsests in Nineteenth-Century Prose traces Victorian historical discourse with specific attention to the works of Thomas Carlyle and George Eliot and their relation to historicism in earlier works by Sir Walter Scott and James Hogg. I argue that the Victorian response to the tense relation between the materialist Enlightenment and the idealist rhetoric of Romanticism marks a decidedly ethical turn in Victorian historical discourse. The writers introduce the dialectic of enlightened empiricism and romantic idealism to invoke the historical imagination as an ethical response to the call of the past. I read the dialectic and its invitation to ethics through the figure of the palimpsest. Drawing upon theoretical work on the palimpsest from Carlyle and de Quincey through Gérard Genette and Sarah Dillon, I analyze ways in which the materialist and idealist discourses interrupt each other and persist in one another. Central to my argument are concepts drawn from Walter Benjamin, Emmanuel Levinas, Richard Rorty, and Frank Ankersmit that challenge and / or affirm historical materiality.

This research project investigates Confucian thinker Dai Zhen (1724-1777) and Jewish thinker Emmanuel Levinas’s (1906-1995) philosophical discourses on desire from a comparative perspective. First, I look at Dai Zhen and Levinas individually each in their own philosophical contexts, while framing my readings with parallel structure that pivots on a hermeneutic strategy to examine their ideas of desire within the larger prospect of the human relation with transcendence. Then, my inquiry leads to a critical analysis of several interesting issues yielded in my interpretive readings of the two thinkers as regards transcendence and immanence and the self-other relationship. Methodologically, my study combines careful textual analysis, philosophical reflection, and historical sensitivity. We might want to say that there is in fact no correlative of the Levinasian desire in Dai Zhen’s philosophy. Dai Zhen’s notion of desire perhaps comes closer to Levinas’s concept of need. However, the disparity of their conceptual formulations does not keep us from discerning their shared ethical concern for the other, the weak, marginalized, and underprivileged group of society, which provides me the very ground for a dialogical comparison between the two thinkers. Henceforth, my writing is hinged on a comprehension of their conception of desire as an articulation of human striving for what is lying beyond themselves, as a redefinition of the being or essence of humankind in relation to the transcendent which in both philosophers’ ethical thinking is translated into a sympathetic understanding of and care for the other, particularly the stranger, the widow, the orphan, the young, the weak and the like. Through the comparative study of the two thinkers’ ideas of desire, I want to argue that “desire,” which is most readily directed to human egoism and instinctive propensity in both Confucian and Western philosophical traditions, can be at once the very driving force to open us to the other beyond ourselves and an actual moral creativity to produce ethical being out of material existence.

This doctoral thesis explores the literarity of reportage, with a focus on the 20th century and modern reportage. The aim is to describe the literary strategies used in modern text-based reportage and how these strategies relate to journalistic standards of credibility and ethics. A primary focus is the question of what the reportage is looking for in the literary, what happens to this literarity when it is used for journalistic purposes, and, in turn, how the literary establishes ethics in the text.        By suggesting that a piece of reportage is a journalistic text that simultaneously tells the story about the reporter’s encounter with the event, this dissertation sheds light on possible approaches to the concept of literarity: Subjectivity, narrativity, meta-narrative aspects, the poetic function of language and the performative movements in the text. The ethics of reportage is also to be derived from the encounter, and this thesis implements a concept of ethics in conversations with Emmanuel Levinas and dialogical philosophy. It provides an opportunity to separate ethics from moral, ideological and political dimensions of responsibility in the encounter. This aspect of ethics, where literarity and counter-movement operate beyond the direct intention, is what is needed to understand the reportage genre.      The dissertation also includes six longer reportage analyses embodying its results: Djuna Barnes’s, Vagaries Malicieux, Ryszard Kapuściński’s Another Day of Life, Truman Capote’s In Cold Blood, Hanna Krall’s A Tale for Hollywood, Sven Lindqvist’s Kina nu: Vad skulle Mao ha sagt? and Joan Didion’s, Slouching towards Bethlehem.

This research project investigates Confucian thinker Dai Zhen (1724-1777) and Jewish thinker Emmanuel Levinas’s (1906-1995) philosophical discourses on desire from a comparative perspective. First, I look at Dai Zhen and Levinas individually each in their own philosophical contexts, while framing my readings with parallel structure that pivots on a hermeneutic strategy to examine their ideas of desire within the larger prospect of the human relation with transcendence. Then, my inquiry leads to a critical analysis of several interesting issues yielded in my interpretive readings of the two thinkers as regards transcendence and immanence and the self-other relationship. Methodologically, my study combines careful textual analysis, philosophical reflection, and historical sensitivity. We might want to say that there is in fact no correlative of the Levinasian desire in Dai Zhen’s philosophy. Dai Zhen’s notion of desire perhaps comes closer to Levinas’s concept of need. However, the disparity of their conceptual formulations does not keep us from discerning their shared ethical concern for the other, the weak, marginalized, and underprivileged group of society, which provides me the very ground for a dialogical comparison between the two thinkers. Henceforth, my writing is hinged on a comprehension of their conception of desire as an articulation of human striving for what is lying beyond themselves, as a redefinition of the being or essence of humankind in relation to the transcendent which in both philosophers’ ethical thinking is translated into a sympathetic understanding of and care for the other, particularly the stranger, the widow, the orphan, the young, the weak and the like. Through the comparative study of the two thinkers’ ideas of desire, I want to argue that “desire,” which is most readily directed to human egoism and instinctive propensity in both Confucian and Western philosophical traditions, can be at once the very driving force to open us to the other beyond ourselves and an actual moral creativity to produce ethical being out of material existence.

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Avec la phénoménologie, naît une nouvelle idée de la raison qui, au-delà de l’alternative du rationalisme et de l’irrationalisme et contre sa réduction kantienne à une faculté, est redéfinie à l’aune de l’expérience qu’elle permet de décrire. Mais la difficulté survient lorsqu’il s’agit d’atteindre la raison de l’expérience sensible elle-même, en son irréductibilité à toute exigence rationnelle - en son caractère particulier, complexe, lacunaire ou indéterminé. Dès lors, à quelles conditions peut-on penser une logique du sensible, sans aussitôt trahir le sensible ou perdre la raison ? Le projet husserlien d’une « logique-du-monde » exige en sa compréhension comme en son renouvellement, une réévaluation des concepts de « raison » et de « sensibilité ». Notre travail consiste donc en l’étude problématique et critique de ces concepts, depuis deux moments de leur déploiement :leur inauguration husserlienne et leur radicalisation lévinassienne. Le choix de ces deux oeuvres a pour intérêt historique de mesurer l’ampleur de l’élargissement phénoménologique de la raison – d’une conception« intellectualiste » de la sensibilité chez Husserl à sa profondeur lévinassienne ; et pour intérêt problématique de mener le problème à son terme et dans ses dernières contrées, là où le sensible n’apparaît plus comme pétri de sens mais dans son irrationalité même, là où la sensibilité n’est plus la saisie perceptive d’une identité mais l’expérience affective radicale d’une exposition à l’altérité. C’est donc en sa fondamentale équivocité que la sensibilité doit se faire le lieu d’une épreuve renouvelée de la raison, le principe critique de la rationalité mobilisée par sa description. / A new idea of reason was born with phenomenology. Beyond the opposition between rationalism andirrationalism, and against its Kantian reduction to a faculty, reason is redefined in the light of the experiencethat it enables to describe. But the difficulty arises when we attempt to reach the rationality of the sensibleexperience itself, in its own irreducibility to the demands of reason - in its irreducible peculiarity, complexity,lack and indetermination. Under which conditions can we think a logic of the sensible without betrayingsensibility or compromising reason? Husserl’s project of a “logic-of-the-world” requires, in its understandingas in its renewal, a reevaluation of the concepts of “reason” and “sensibility”. This dissertation consists in acritical study of these concepts, from these two main moments of their unfolding: their Husserlian inaugurationand their Levinassian radicalization. From a historical point of view, this choice enables us to assess thisphenomenological extension of reason - from an intellectual conception of sensibility in Husserl, to itsLevinassian depth. From a problematical point of view, this choice enables us to lead the problem to its finalterms, where the sensible is not made of meaning anymore, but appears in its very irrationality - whensensibility is not the perceptive grasp of an identity, but an affective exposure to otherness. Thought in itsfundamental equivocity, sensibility must be the place of a renewed challenge of reason, the critical principle ofthe rationality used by its description.