Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:26:45Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2011Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T20:34:37Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 licorio_go_me_mar.pdf: 317852 bytes, checksum: a799c0e090df360207e895c3e35ab573 (MD5) / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) / A presença chinesa na África nos últimos cinco anos deixou de ser pautada na solidariedade e tomou características de posicionamento estratégico internacional. A China alcança em média 70 bilhões de dólares ao ano (Huang, 2008) em negociações comerciais com o continente Africano, incluindo países que enfrentam situação de instabilidade civil, como Sudão e Nigéria. Essa interação não impõe condicionalidades políticas, o que permite à China manter sempre relações vantajosas financeira e politicamente, independente de qual seja o regime vigente. O objetivo desse trabalho é analisar esse novo posicionamento chinês no continente Africano, buscando entender as conseqüências dessa aproximação para ambos os lados e sua relação com o aprofundamento das situações de conflito / The Chinese presence in Africa over the past five years has ceased to be based on solidarity and took strategic international positioning characteristics. China has achieved an average 70 billion dollars per year (HUANG, 2008) in trade negotiations with the African continent, including countries facing situations of civil unrest, such as Sudan and Nigeria. This interaction does not impose conditionalities, which allows China to always maintain advantageous relationships financially and politically, regardless of what is the current regime. The aim of this study is to analyze this new Chinese position on the African continent, seeking to understand the consequences of this approach for both sides and their connection with the deepening of the conflict

Orientador: Reginaldo Mattar Nasser / Banca: Carlos Eduardo Ferreira de Carvalho / Banca: Igor Fuser / O Programa de Pós-Graduação em Relações Internacionais é instituído em parceria com Unesp/Unicamp/PUC-SP, em projeto subsidiado pela CAPES, intitulado "Programa San Tiago Dantas" / Resumo: A presença chinesa na África nos últimos cinco anos deixou de ser pautada na solidariedade e tomou características de posicionamento estratégico internacional. A China alcança em média 70 bilhões de dólares ao ano (Huang, 2008) em negociações comerciais com o continente Africano, incluindo países que enfrentam situação de instabilidade civil, como Sudão e Nigéria. Essa interação não impõe condicionalidades políticas, o que permite à China manter sempre relações vantajosas financeira e politicamente, independente de qual seja o regime vigente. O objetivo desse trabalho é analisar esse novo posicionamento chinês no continente Africano, buscando entender as conseqüências dessa aproximação para ambos os lados e sua relação com o aprofundamento das situações de conflito / Abstract: The Chinese presence in Africa over the past five years has ceased to be based on solidarity and took strategic international positioning characteristics. China has achieved an average 70 billion dollars per year (HUANG, 2008) in trade negotiations with the African continent, including countries facing situations of civil unrest, such as Sudan and Nigeria. This interaction does not impose conditionalities, which allows China to always maintain advantageous relationships financially and politically, regardless of what is the current regime. The aim of this study is to analyze this new Chinese position on the African continent, seeking to understand the consequences of this approach for both sides and their connection with the deepening of the conflict / Mestre

PhD Thesis Abstract: John Michael Quinn V In the 21st century, the prevention of illness, disease and risks to health ushered in public health and medical practice with mixed results. War, hybrid warfare, conflict, complex emergencies and disasters remain significant public health risks and areas of strategic concern; focused epidemiological study in health policy remains elusive. The paradigm shift from major world powers leading global affairs and affecting global health to multiple state and non-state actors vying for power and influence regionally has possibly led to an increase in small scale and low intensity conflict with high morbidity and mortality, including both noncommunicable (NCD) and communicable diseases. The basic research carried out for this PhD project includes: 1) mental health surveys and trauma associated with war; 2) the migration of, and the need for, advanced medical personnel and their services in war and hybrid warfare, including how the negative movement or adverse flow through 'brain drain' of doctors affects disaster; 3) a quantitative study of infectious diseases, health and human security associated with state stability and the mitigation of state failure; 4) a qualitative food security review, the origins of food security and its impact; and 5) the general concepts of...

The Arab Spring led to the overthrow of multiple authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and North Africa and to the flow of arms and fighters from Libya to Western African countries, triggering the crisis in the Sahel and altering the security landscape of the region. The Sahel, a quite stable region, became vulnerable to the rise of terrorism due to political instability, internal conflicts dynamics and power vacuum which led to ungoverned spaces to be seen as safe havens to terrorist groups. The international community, fearing the spread of terrorism, initiated multiple operations in the region such as an UN mission in Mali – MINUSMA – and the French-led intervention in the G5 – operation Barkhane. After 9/11, a change in perception took place and terrorism now came to be seen as a transnational threat to world peace and stability, leading to the inclusion of a new role during peacekeeping operations – stabilisation – achievable by the use of military power. This study, based on secondary data research, aims to understand the transformation of peace and counterterrorism operations in the Sahel region. The study notes that the view of Sahelian states as fragile and weak and due to that the perfect target for transnational terrorism justifies the West interventions in the region. However, even under a development-security nexus, all interventions were carried out with only one purpose – fight against terrorism – as the global war on terror was seen as required to reinstate security in the Sahel. In this sense, MINUSMA can be seen as a laboratory test, also because it was working side by side with French troops which were under a counterterrorism mandate, which goes completely out of UN’s character. This mission created a dangerous precedent as it goes beyond the normal understanding of peacekeeping missions. This thesis argues that the change of peace and counterterrorism operations in the region happened due to the perception of terrorism as a transnational threat and of the Sahel region as a safe haven for the proliferation of terrorism. Moreover, all interventions had Western interests in mind and not even one was focused on addressing the underlying causes of the conflicts such as political instability, climate change and food insecurity which enlarged the humanitarian challenges in the Sahel.

Thesis (MA )--Stellenbosch University, 2011. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The issue of democratic consolidation has become an important field of study in relation to developing states, especially with regards to Southern Africa. The region’s history of liberation struggles and the emergence of liberation movements as ruling parties are vital factors to take into account when investigating democracy and, more specifically, democratic consolidation in these countries. However, there are only a few comparative studies that have looked at the effects of liberation movement governance on democracy. Therefore, in this study two case studies – Zimbabwe and South Africa – are compared in an effort to offer more insight into this topic. The focus of the study was placed on how the behavior of liberation movement governments has affected the rule of law in order to assess their impact on democratic consolidation in general. This study follows the premise of studies in political behavior that actors’ attitudes (in this case, liberation movements’ political cultures) affect their behavior or actions that in turn have an influence on democratic institutions that eventually impacts democratic stability. In order to investigate this, the two case studies were compared and discussed in terms of the following themes: firstly, the respective liberation struggles and transitions to majority rule; secondly, the political cultures that have developed within ZANU-PF and the ANC during the liberation struggles; and lastly, the effect of the two parties’ behavior – informed by the political cultures – on the rule of law, a central feature of democratic consolidation. The findings indicate that in Zimbabwe, the rule of law disintegrated and democracy faltered largely due to the behavior of ZANU-PF. In South Africa, on the other hand, the rule of law has so far been upheld and the prospects for democratic consolidation seem more positive than in the case of Zimbabwe. In the last few years, though, the ruling ANC has shown tendencies that could prove to be detrimental to the future of democracy in South Africa. The ANC and ZANU-PF have both exhibited an authoritarian political culture, a desire to capture the state, tendencies towards centralization of power and the delegitimation of opposition. However, perhaps the key explanation for the protection of the rule of law in South Africa and the disintegration thereof in Zimbabwe has less to do with the political culture than the constraining influence of the international context with a renewed focus on democracy and human rights and internal factors such as the constitution, civil society and a robust media. Furthermore, Zimbabwe experienced a watershed moment in the 2000 with the constitutional referendum which the Mugabe regime lost. With the loss of the referendum, ZANU-PF’s democratic credentials were tested and it failed. In South Africa, such a watershed moment has not happened yet – the ANC’s democratic credentials have yet to be tested like this. Therefore, the future of democracy is still uncertain even though in comparison with Zimbabwe, the prospects of democratic survival seem to be more positive. In conclusion, it is not possible to claim that liberation movement governance in general negatively affects democratic consolidation. The findings of the study indicate that this has definitely been the case in Zimbabwe, but so far not in South Africa. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die kwessie van demokratiese konsolidasie het ‘n belangrike veld van studie geword in verband met ontwikkelende lande, veral met betrekking tot Suider-Afrika. Die gebied se geskiedenis van bevrydingstryde en die opkoms van vryheidsbewegings as regerende partye is belangrike faktore om in ag te neem wanneer demokrasie en, meer spesifiek, demokratiese konsolidasie ondersoek word. Tog is daar sover net ‘n paar vergelykende studies wat gekyk het na die effekte van bevrydingsbewegings se regeerkunde op demokrasie. Gevolglik, in hierdie studie is twee gevallestudies – Zimbabwe en Suid-Afrika – vergelyk in ‘n poging om meer insig te bied met betrekking tot hierdie onderwerp. Die fokus van die studie is geplaas op hoe die gedrag van regerende bevrydingsbewegings die oppergesag van die reg beïnvloed in ‘n poging om te bepaal hoe hulle demokratiese konsolidasie in die algemeen affekteer. Die studie volg die veronderstelling van studies in politieke gedrag dat akteurs se houdings (in hierdie geval die politieke kulture van die bevrydingsbewegings) beïnvloed hul gedrag of aksies wat weer ‘n invloed het op demokratiese instellings wat uiteindelik ‘n effek het op demokratiese stabiliteit. Om dit te ondersoek is die twee gevallestudies vergelyk en bespreek met betrekking tot die volgende: eerstens, die onderskeidelike vryheidstryde en oorgange tot meerderheidsregerings; tweedens, die politieke kulture wat ontwikkel het binne ZANU-PF en die ANC gedurende die vryheidstryde; en laastens, die effek van die twee partye se gedrag – geïnspireer deur die politieke kulture – op die oppergesag van die reg, ‘n sleutel kenmerk van demokratiese konsolidasie. Die bevindinge dui daarop dat die oppergesag van die reg in Zimbabwe in duie gestort het en demokrasie gefaal het grootliks as gevolg van ZANU-PF se gedrag. In Suid-Afrika, aan die anderkant, is die oppergesag van die reg sover gehandhaaf en die vooruitsigte vir demokratiese konsolidasie blyk om meer positief te wees as in die geval van Zimbabwe. Tog het die ANC oor die laaste paar jaar tendense getoon wat skadelik kan wees vir die toekoms van demokrasie in Suid-Afrika. Die ANC en ZANU-PF het beide ‘n outoritêre politieke kultuur geopenbaar, ‘n begeerte om beheer oor die staat oor te neem, tendense tot die sentralisering van mag en om opposisie te ondermyn. Alhoewel, die moontlike sleutel verklaring vir die beskerming van die oppergesag van die reg in Suid-Afrika en die disintegrering daarvan in Zimbabwe minder te doen het met die politieke kultuur as die beperkende invloed van die internasionale konteks met ‘n hernude fokus op demokrasie en menseregte en interne faktore soos die grondwet, die burgerlike samelewing en ‘n robuuste media. Verder, Zimbabwe het ‘n keerpunt beleef in 2000 met die konstitusionele referendum wat die Mugabe regime verloor het. Met die verlies van die referendum, is ZANU-PF se demokratiese getuigskrifte getoets en dit het gefaal. Suid-Afrika het nog nie so ‘n keerpunt beleef nie – die ANC se demokratiese getuigskrifte moet nog op so ‘n wyse getoets word. Daarom is die toekoms van demokrasie steeds onseker, maar in vergelyking met Zimbabwe, blyk dit dat die vooruitsigte vir demokratiese oorlewing meer positief is. Ter slotte, is dit nie moontlik om te verklaar dat bevrydingbewegings se regeerkunde demokratiese konsolidasie oor die algemeen negatief beïnvloed nie. Die bevindinge dui daarop dat dit definitief die geval in Zimbabwe is, maar sover nie in Suid-Afrika nie.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-29T13:48:35Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Tomaz Oliveira Paoliello.pdf: 761489 bytes, checksum: 275a7feae0dded7e385ae9ca9032b10e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-06-09 / Fundação de Amparo a Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo / Nowadays, one of the phenomena that draws attention and raises the debate within the discipline of international relations is the rise of the so-called private security companies. The present dissertation studies the inclusion of such companies in the Angolan context during the 1990s. This inclusion is marked by two moments, the first one paradigmatic for the literature on the subject, the particular action of the company Executive Outcomes. Secondly, we discuss the development of a local market for private security, built by a series of devices that make the Angolan landscape a unique and poorly studied model. Angola was a testing ground for the actions of the private security companies, but turned out to be an exceptional case with a number of local companies providing security for the country during its own internal conflict, and making them fundamental for the design of Power in Angola. This situation is derived from a number of specific features of the Angolan history, especially the continued violence and the perpetuation of state fragility. We further explore the discussion on the role of private security companies as new actors in the international system, and observe the range of findings about these companies when confronted with the case of Angola / Nos dias de hoje, um dos fenômenos que chama atenção e suscita o debate no âmbito da disciplina de relações internacionais é a ascensão das chamadas empresas de segurança privada. A atual dissertação se dedica ao estudo da inserção de tais empresas no contexto angolano durante os anos 1990. Essa inserção é marcada por dois momentos, um primeiro, paradigmático para a literatura sobre o tema, trata da ação particular da empresa Executive Outcomes. Num segundo momento, abordamos o desenvolvimento de um mercado local para a segurança privada, construído por uma série de dispositivos que fazem do panorama angolano um modelo único e ainda pouco estudado. Angola foi um campo de teste para a atuação das empresas de segurança privada, mas acabou se transformando num caso excepcional, com uma série de empresas locais provendo a segurança para o país durante o conflito interno, e tornando-se fundamentais para o desenho de poder em Angola. Essa situação é derivada de uma série de especificidades da história angolana, notadamente a permanente violência, e a perpetuação da fragilidade do Estado. Desenvolvemos a discussão sobre o papel das empresas de segurança privada como novos atores no sistema internacional, e observamos o alcance das descobertas sobre tais empresas quando confrontadas com o caso de Angola

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-29T13:48:39Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Leandro Nogueira Monteiro.pdf: 1532739 bytes, checksum: 1829c6063e48148d176e826d971e723c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007-04-19 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / The concepts of state weakness and failure as used nowadays in academic debates and in political discourse have been evolving since the 1980 s. These concepts were based on the ideas proposed by Robert H. Jackson in his 1982 article with Carl Rosberg Why Africa s Weak States Persist and in his 1990 book Quasi-states. Nevertheless, it was after the end of the Cold War that conjuncture contributed to structure the concept of failed state , and to turn it into regular language in both academic and political entourages. These factors were namely the influence of liberal paradigms in the immediate post-Cold War times, and the consequent debates on sovereignty, intervention and human rights, as well as the aftermaths of the events of September 11th, 2001, with the securitisation of the failed state idea. This paper seeks, firstly, to exhibit a brief history of the use of the failed state concept in the post-Cold War era. Secondly, it seeks to present the conceptualisation of state failure such as used by the literature, throwing some light over those conceptual cores that provide unity to the diverse definitions of state failure. Thirdly, it seeks to present some implications of the development of the Failed state concept to the broader theoretical field of International Relations, especially regarding Liberalism, Realism and Post-Positivism / As concepções de fraqueza e de fracasso estatais, nos moldes das acepções utilizadas atualmente no debate acadêmico e no discurso político, vêm-se desenvolvendo desde a década de 1980, fundadas mais especificamente nas idéias apresentadas por Robert H. Jackson em seu Why Africa s Weak States Persist: the Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood , de 1982 (em parceria com Carl Rosberg), e seu Quasi States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World , de 1990. Não obstante, foi no pós-Guerra Fria que importantes fatores conjunturais contribuíram para a estruturação do conceito de Estado fracassado e para a popularização de seu uso, em ambos ambientes acadêmico e político. Entre esses fatores destacam-se, nomeadamente, a influência dos paradigmas liberais no imediato pós-Guerra Fria e os conseqüentes debates sobre soberania, intervenção e direitos humanos, que forneceram uma base intelectual consistente; e os eventos do 11 de setembro de 2001 e seus desdobramentos, que reforçaram a securitização do termo. Este trabalho procura, em primeiro lugar, traçar um breve histórico da utilização do conceito de Estado fracassado no pós-Guerra Fria. Em segundo lugar, busca apresentar a conceituação do fracasso estatal tal como desenvolvido pela literatura, iluminando aqueles eixos conceituais que provém unidade às diferentes definições de fracasso estatal. Em terceiro lugar, pretende apresentar algumas das implicações do desenvolvimento desse conceito sobre o corpo teórico da disciplina de Relações Internacionais, com ênfase no Liberalismo, no Realismo e no Pós- -Positivismo

La guerre de 33 jours qui s’est déroulée au Liban en juillet-août 2006 a donné lieu à une panoplie de questions sur la légitimité du recours à l’usage de la force dont a fait preuve Israël au nom de son droit à la légitime défense. La problématique découlait surtout du fait que l’attaque initiale ayant déclenché cette guerre, en date du 12 juillet 2006, avait été menée par le Hezbollah, un groupe armé dont le statut étatique ou non étatique demeure difficile à cerner. Cette étude propose d’analyser si le Liban doit être tenu responsable pour le comportement du Hezbollah. Un survol de l’histoire du Liban et de la création du Hezbollah illustrera que la relation existant entre ces deux acteurs est d’une rare complexité, faisant en sorte que le rôle du Hezbollah au Liban est contesté de toutes parts. Ce débat aura une incidence certaine sur la question à savoir si le comportement du Hezbollah est attribuable à l’État libanais. Une étude approfondie des règles internationales régissant l’acte « d’attribution », notion centrale au droit de la responsabilité internationale des États, démontrera que la détermination de la nature du lien existant entre un État et une entité dont le comportement est contesté est d’une importance fondamentale. Dans une ère où les acteurs non étatiques sont devenus omniprésents sur la scène internationale et dans le cas du Hezbollah au Liban – une milice armée opérant au sein d’un État particulièrement à souveraineté limitée – le concept de l’attribution lui-même deviendra peut-être obsolète. / The 33 days of war that took place in Lebanon in the months of July and August 2006 have given rise to a wide range of questions about the legality of Israel’s use of force on behalf of its so-called right to self-defence. The issue at stake is mostly the result of the fact that the attack which provoked the beginning of the hostilities, on 12 July 2006, was performed by Hezbollah, an armed group whose status as a State or non-State actor remains difficult to pinpoint. This study puts forward the analysis of whether Lebanon must be held accountable for Hezbollah’s actions. A review of the history of Lebanon and of Hezbollah’s creation illustrates that the relationship between these two actors is particularly complex and that Hezbollah’s status is still widely contested. This will directly influence the answer to the question of the attribution of Hezbollah’s actions to the Lebanese State. An in-depth study of the international principles regulating the act of « attribution », a pivotal concept in the international law on the responsibility of States, will reveal that discerning the nature of the link between a State and an entity whose actions are contested is extremely important. In today’s world, where non-State actors have a major role on the international scene, and in the case of Hezbollah in Lebanon – an armed militia operating from within a State with limited sovereignty – the notion of attribution itself might lose much of its significance.

La guerre de 33 jours qui s’est déroulée au Liban en juillet-août 2006 a donné lieu à une panoplie de questions sur la légitimité du recours à l’usage de la force dont a fait preuve Israël au nom de son droit à la légitime défense. La problématique découlait surtout du fait que l’attaque initiale ayant déclenché cette guerre, en date du 12 juillet 2006, avait été menée par le Hezbollah, un groupe armé dont le statut étatique ou non étatique demeure difficile à cerner. Cette étude propose d’analyser si le Liban doit être tenu responsable pour le comportement du Hezbollah. Un survol de l’histoire du Liban et de la création du Hezbollah illustrera que la relation existant entre ces deux acteurs est d’une rare complexité, faisant en sorte que le rôle du Hezbollah au Liban est contesté de toutes parts. Ce débat aura une incidence certaine sur la question à savoir si le comportement du Hezbollah est attribuable à l’État libanais. Une étude approfondie des règles internationales régissant l’acte « d’attribution », notion centrale au droit de la responsabilité internationale des États, démontrera que la détermination de la nature du lien existant entre un État et une entité dont le comportement est contesté est d’une importance fondamentale. Dans une ère où les acteurs non étatiques sont devenus omniprésents sur la scène internationale et dans le cas du Hezbollah au Liban – une milice armée opérant au sein d’un État particulièrement à souveraineté limitée – le concept de l’attribution lui-même deviendra peut-être obsolète. / The 33 days of war that took place in Lebanon in the months of July and August 2006 have given rise to a wide range of questions about the legality of Israel’s use of force on behalf of its so-called right to self-defence. The issue at stake is mostly the result of the fact that the attack which provoked the beginning of the hostilities, on 12 July 2006, was performed by Hezbollah, an armed group whose status as a State or non-State actor remains difficult to pinpoint. This study puts forward the analysis of whether Lebanon must be held accountable for Hezbollah’s actions. A review of the history of Lebanon and of Hezbollah’s creation illustrates that the relationship between these two actors is particularly complex and that Hezbollah’s status is still widely contested. This will directly influence the answer to the question of the attribution of Hezbollah’s actions to the Lebanese State. An in-depth study of the international principles regulating the act of « attribution », a pivotal concept in the international law on the responsibility of States, will reveal that discerning the nature of the link between a State and an entity whose actions are contested is extremely important. In today’s world, where non-State actors have a major role on the international scene, and in the case of Hezbollah in Lebanon – an armed militia operating from within a State with limited sovereignty – the notion of attribution itself might lose much of its significance.

Depuis la fin de la guerre froide, la notion de Failed State est utilisée dans les relations internationales pour décrire des États rencontrant des difficultés à exercer un monopole de la violence légitime sur leur territoire. La thèse se pose la question de savoir dans quelle mesure cette notion a pu jouer un rôle dans les rapports de domination en cours dans les relations internationales. L’étude montre que la notion a été créée par un communauté épistémique et des entrepreneurs de sens avant tout américains et proposait en effet un système de représentation selon lequel le salut des Failed State reposerait avant tout sur la mise en place de politiques très intrusives de la part des États les plus puissants de la planète. L’étude poursuit en montrant que ce système de représentation, créé à grands frais par un ensemble d’acteurs académiques, médiatiques et philanthropiques, n’a toutefois pas toujours réussi à justifier la mise en place des politiques intrusives souhaitées. A travers de nombreuses études de cas (Afghanistan, Haïti, Irak, Somalie, Palestine, Liban, Libéria, Soudan, Zimbabwe, Bolivie, Pakistan, Colombie, Burundi, Sierra Leone, Guinée-Bissau et République centrafricaine), le travail démontre que la notion de Failed State n’a pas toujours eu l’efficacité souhaitée et a au contraire été détournée, parfois avec succès, pour résister aux politiques perçues comme intrusives par des acteurs prétendument dominés. L’étude conclut que si il est théoriquement possible de dominer par les idées, il est aussi possible de résister aux idées par les idées.<p>//<p>Since the end of the Cold War, the notion of Failed State is used in international relations in order to describe States that have difficulties to exercise a monopoly of legitimate violence on their territory. The thesis raises the question of how this concept influenced the relations of domination in the international relations. The study shows that the concept of Failed State was created by an epistemic community and a group of entrepreneurs primarily based in the United States. The notion promoted a system of representation based on the idea that the salvation of the Failed States rested on their acceptance of very intrusive policies leaded by the most powerful States of the world. The study also shows that this representation system, created at great expense, has not always been able to justify the intrusive policies it was designed to legitimize. Through numerous case studies (Afghanistan, Haiti, Iraq, Somalia, Palestine, Lebanon, Liberia, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Bolivia, Pakistan, Colombia, Burundi, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau and Central African Republic), it is shown that notion of Failed State has not always reached the efficiency desired by its creators and has instead been used, sometimes successfully, to resist policies perceived as intrusive by the allegedly “dominated” actors. The study concludes that while it is theoretically possible to rule with ideas, it is also possible to resist ideas with ideas. / Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished