Den mänskliga rättigheten till en rättvis rättegång utgör en grundpelare i en rättsstat och regleras i såväl artikel 6 EKMR som 2 kap. 11 § 2 st. RF. Rätten till en rättvis rättegång i enlighet med både EKMR och RF tar sikte på att en rättegång dels ska genomföras inom skälig tid, dels att rättegången ska genomföras inför en oavhängig och opartisk domstol. För att rättigheten ska uppfyllas i enlighet med EKMR och RF, föreligger vägledning samt principer utformade av Europadomstolen som måste beaktas vid bedömningen om en rättegång bedrivits rättvis eller inte. Rätten till en rättvis rättegång kan omfatta flera olika element, varav ett av elementen är tillfredsställande handläggning. För att en rättegång ska uppfylla sitt syfte, krävs att rättegången genomförs under sådana former att parterna kan följa det som sker under förfarandet. Till bedömningen om en rättvis rättegång genomförts ska dessutom målets karaktär tas i beaktandet. Detta innebär att mål som förutsätter särskild skyndsam handläggning, till exempel ungdomsmål, särskilt måste uppfylla kraven i artikel 6.1 EKMR. Då barn anses utgöra en särskilt utsatt grupp krävs det speciellt skydd i syfte att värna om deras rättigheter. I BK stadgas barns rättigheter och konventionen är tillämplig på alla individer under 18 år. De stater som ratificerat BK måste således respektera konventionen och rapportera vilka åtaganden som vidtagits för att efterleva den. Barns rättighet att komma till tals och uttrycka sina åsikter tillfaller alla barn under 18 år och innebär att såväl domstolar som andra beslutsfattande organ måste anpassas i avsikt att inkludera barnen. Det kan till exempel handla om särskilda förberedelser för barn innan en rättegång och att anamma ett barnrättsperspektiv i syfte att genomsyra verksamheterna med en förankring i BK. Inom nationell rätt föreligger ett skyndsamhetskrav i ärenden som rör unga lagöverträdare och en allmänt vedertagen princip är att tiden mellan samhällets reaktioner och den unga lagöverträdarens brott bör vara så kort som möjlig. Samhällets inställning gentemot unga lagöverträdare ska även vara konsekvent och tydlig samt ska handläggningen av pedagogiska skäl bedrivas skyndsamt. I en rapport från Brå och i en granskning från Riksrevisionen har det framgått att det förekommer svårigheter i att leva upp till det lagstadgade skyndsamhetskravet för handläggning av ungdomsärenden i 4 § LUL. Riksrevisionen fann att den totala handläggningstiden är alltför långdragen. Polisen drar ut på tiden vid förundersökningen, åklagaren tar lång tid på sig att fatta beslut i åtalsfrågan och TR överskrider tidsfristen genom långdragna mål. Utöver det redovisade, förlängs handläggningstiderna ytterligare genom att socialtjänsten tar lång tid på sig att författa sina yttranden till TR. Europakommissionen har uttalat att i de fall en ung person är brottsmisstänkt, ska denna behandlas utifrån hans eller hennes ålder och mognad. Domstolsförfarandet måste således anpassas i avsikt att trygga den unges möjlighet att förstå och delta i rättegången. Om en ung person inte förstår förfarandet medför det att han eller hon inte kommer vara tillräckligt delaktig under rättegången, vilket påverkar den unges rätt att göra sin röst hörd och komma till tals i enlighet med BK. Unga lagöverträdare särbehandlas inom straff- och processrätt i förhoppning om att motverka att ungdomar identifierar sig som kriminella samt därigenom dras till ett umgänge med andra kriminella personer. Det finns även förhoppningar om att rättsprocessen ska fungera som en markör med en preventiv verkan. Brottmålsrättegångar är dock i huvudsak utformade av vuxna och för vuxna. Barn och unga brottsmisstänkta är således föremål för samma rättsprocess som vuxna utan någon faktisk anpassning efter deras ålder samt mognad. Under år 2002 gjorde Brå en utvärdering av reformen för påföljdssystemet beträffande unga lagöverträdare som trädde i kraft år 1999. Utvärderingen utmynnade i en rapport där Brå intervjuade sju ungdomar om deras upplevelser kring rättegången. Brå uppmärksammade särskilt två uppfattningar genom att lyssna till ungdomarna. De unga anförde att de inte alltid kände sig införstådda på hela förfarandet och på vad som sades samt att de inte ansåg sig komma till tals i tillräcklig stor omfattning. Uppsatsen undersöker huruvida unga lagöverträdares upplevelser av rättegångar kan anses vara stridande mot rätten till en rättvis rättegång och når slutsatsen att unga lagöverträdare inte får sin rätt till rättvis rättegång helt tillgodosedd. Rättigheten, som består av kriterierna skälig tid och oavhängig samt opartisk domstol, kan med anledning av bristerna som konstaterats i uppsatsen anses vara kränkt. Den oskäliga handläggningstiden i kombination med risk för att domare skapar sig förutfattade meningar om de unga tilltalade, kan anses strida mot rätten till en rättvis rättegång i enlighet med såväl EKMR som RF. I uppsatsen undersöks även domstolens möjlighet att förmedla de fundamentala straffrättsprinciperna till unga lagöverträdare i avsikt att åstadkomma en preventiv effekt mot ungdomskriminalitet. Till följd av att rättegångarna i huvudsak är utformade efter en vuxen person, blir slutsatsen att domstolen inte kan förmedla de fundamentala straffrättsprinciperna till unga lagöverträdare i tillräckligt hög utsträckning. Avsaknaden på ett barn- och ungdomsperspektiv under rättegångar kan därmed hindra att den preventiva straffrättsliga effekten gentemot ungdomskriminalitet vinner slagkraft. Det krävs att straffrätten uppfattas som trovärdig för att domstolen ska kunna uppnå en preventiv effekt gentemot ungdomskriminalitet; domstolens agerande och behandling av unga lagöverträdare är således en avgörande faktor i hur straffrätten uppfattas. De ungas upplevelser av rättegångar kan därmed indikera på att domstolen inte till fullo lyckas förmedla de fundamentala straffrättsprinciperna. I fråga om vilken effekt som unga lagöverträdares upplevelser av rätt rättegångar kan medföra, dras slutsatsen att en stor risk för stigmatisering och fortsatt brottsbenägenhet föreligger. Genom att försumma de ungas rättigheter under en rättegång, förblir risken stor att de lämnar rättssalen utan någon påverkan på deras framtida beteende. Sammantaget avrundas uppsatsens slutsats med att framhålla att det krävs mer forskning beträffande ungas upplevelser av rättegångar inom ramen för rätten till en rättvis rättegång. Mer forskning skulle resultera i en vidare inblick i den problematik som det nyliga nämnda innebär. Denna forskning bör vara väsentlig då det behandlar unga individer och deras framtid. / The human right to a fair trial is a cornerstone in a constitutional state and is regulated in both article 6 of the ECHR and in RF, the Swedish constitution chapter 2, paragraph 11, section 2. The right to a fair trial according to both the ECHR and RF requires that a public trial is to be held within a reasonable time and that the trial is to be held before an independent and impartial court. In order for the right to be met in accordance with the ECHR and RF, there are guidelines and principles formulated by the European Court of Human Rights, which must be taken into consideration when assessing whether a trial has been held fairly or not. In order for a trial to be assessed as fair, the minimum guarantees in Article 6.3 ECMR must be met. The right to a fair trial includes several different elements; one of the elements is fair dealing. In order for a trial to fulfill its purpose, it is required that the trial is held in such a way that the parties can follow what is happening during the proceedings. In the assessment of a fair trial, the type of the trial has to be taken into consideration. This means that trials that require special urgent procedures, such as trials concerning juvenile offenders, must especially meet the requirements of article 6 of the ECHR. Children are considered a particularly vulnerable group and are therefore in need for special protection in order to guard their rights. The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (the Child Convention) regulates children's rights and applies to all individuals under the age of 18. The states that have ratified the Child Convention, must respect the Convention and give an account of the commitments that have been made to comply with it. A child’s right to speak and express its views applies to all children and means that both courts and other decision-making intuitions must be adapted for the purpose of including the children. This could for example include special preparations for children. According to Swedish national law there is an urgency requirement in cases involving juvenile offenders and the time between reactions from society and the juvenile’s crime should be as short as possible. Both a report from Brå and a review by Riksrevisionen, has shown that there are difficulties in complying with the urgency requirement for dealing with youth cases in 4 § in LUL. The European Commission has stated that in cases where a young person is suspected of a crime, the trail should be adapted according to his or her age and maturity. The court procedure must therefore be adapted in order to ensure the young person's ability to understand and participate in the trial. If a young person does not understand the procedure, he or she will not be involved during the trial, which affects the right of the young person to have his hear voice heard and speak in accordance with the Child Convention. Young offenders are treated differently in criminal and procedural law in the hope of preventing young people from identifying themselves as criminals. Criminal proceedings are however, mainly designed by adults and for adults. Children and juvenile offenders and victims of crime are therefore subject to the same legal process as adults without any actual adaptation. In 2002, Brå interviewed seven young people about their experiences of the trial. Attention was drawn to two perceptions by listening to the young people. The young people said that they did not always feel fully aware of the whole procedure and what was said and that they did not consider themselves being heard during the proceedings. This essay investigates whether juvenile offenders’ experiences of their trials can be regarded as conflicting with the right to a fair trial. The essay reaches the conclusion that juvenile offenders do not get their right to a fair trial fully met. The right consisting of the criteria of reasonable time and independent and impartial court may, as a result of the faults found in the essay, be considered to be violated. The unreasonable processing time combined with the risk that judges create prejudiced opinions about the young offenders can be considered to conflict with the right to a fair trial in accordance with both the ECHR and RF. The essay also studies the Court's ability to communicate the fundamental principles of justice to juvenile offenders in order to achieve a preventive effect against juvenile crime. The conclusion is that the trials are mainly designed for adults, which can result in difficulties for the court in communicating the fundamental criminal justice principles to juvenile offenders. The neglect of a child and youth perspective during trial may therefore prevent the preventive criminal justice effect against juvenile crime. Concerning the effect of trial for juvenile offenders, the conclusion is that there is a high risk of stigmatization and continued crime. By neglecting the rights of the young people during a trial, the risk remains high that they leave the courtroom without any effect on their future behavior. All in all, the essay finds that more research is needed on the experiences of juvenile offenders in the context of the right to a fair trial. More research would result in a larger insight into the problem.

Access to justice and the right to a fair trial are basic human rights explicitly stipulated in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) as well as in the Swedish constitution. The fundamental meaning of these rights is that everyone should have an effective option for bringing their case to a court governed by the rule of law. Counsel fees and other process-costs may constitute a significant barrier to entry for an individual bringing his or her case to the court. Consequently, such cost-related barriers may deprive individuals of their right to a fair trial in practice. This fact is recognised in many legislations through legal aid provisions, reimbursement rules or similar mechanisms with the common purpose of eliminating, or at least lowering, the cost-barrier in question for the individual. Tax cases are often complex, and the average taxpayer would typically need to obtain legal counsel to vindicate his or her rights in a dispute with the tax authority. The taxpayer’s costs for such vindication may consequently be high. Swedish legislation stipulates that such costs under certain circumstances can be reimbursed by the state. In practice, however, the taxpayer seldom gets reimbursed for the full cost or even the majority of the cost, regardless of the outcome of the case. Even if the taxpayer wins the court case against the tax authority, it is not unusual that the taxpayer gets no reimbursement at all. This thesis analyses the Swedish reimbursement model for process-costs in tax cases and how it relates to the right to a fair trial. The question is whether the relevant legislation, and/or the courts’ application of it, risks being in breach of the ECHR’s and/or the Swedish constitution’s stipulated right to a fair trial. This thesis argues that it does; not as a result of the legislation itself, but because of the courts’ application of it. The risk of violating the right to a fair trial correlates primarily with two factors. These are what are at stake for the taxpayer (typically the disputed tax amount) and the complexity of the legal issues involved in the case. Trigger points for when the respective factor comes into play from a human rights perspective are analysed and discussed in the thesis. When they do, the absence of real possibilities of reimbursement of process-costs in a given tax case may constitute an unacceptable barrier for the individual to access justice and get a fair trial.

Lorsque les fonctionnaires adoptent des comportements fautifs, qui entravent le bon déroulement des missions publiques, l’Administration est en droit d’exercer une action disciplinaire à leur encontre. Par ce biais, l’Administration contrôle, compense ou neutralise les déviances risquant de nuire à l’action publique et à son image. En toute logique, les modalités d’exercice des pouvoirs disciplinaires varient selon les États, conformément aux dispositions propres à chaque fonction publique. Il est rare de trouver une conformité absolue entre les divers régimes disciplinaires. L’objet de la présente thèse est de comparer et d’identifier les caractéristiques propres à l’action disciplinaire applicable dans la fonction publique en France et au Liban, en faisant un rapprochement entre cette dernière action et l’action pénale. Il s’agit ainsi d’observer dans quelle mesure les principes généraux régissant l’action pénale peuvent fournir des éléments de perfectionnement du régime disciplinaire, que ce soit français ou libanais, en le rendant plus équitable. / When public civil servants engage in misconduct, which hinders the proper conduct of public duties, the Administration is entitled to exercise disciplinary action against them. In this way, the Administration controls, compensates or neutralizes the deviations likely to harm the public action and its image. Logically, the procedures for the exercise of disciplinary powers vary according to the state, in accordance with the provisions of each civil service. It is rare to find absolute conformity between the various disciplinary systems. The purpose of this thesis is to compare and identify the characteristics of the disciplinary action applicable in the civil service in France and Lebanon, bringing the latter action closer to criminal action. It is thus necessary to observe to what extent the general principles governing criminal prosecution can provide elements for the improvement of the disciplinary system, whether French or Lebanese, by making it more equitable.

Le traitement des questions scientifiques est aujourd'hui un enjeu majeur pour les acteurs du contentieux interétatique : au-delà de son coût, il s'avère souvent décisif lorsqu'il s'agit pour les états de défendre leurs intérêts et pour le juge international de promouvoir la légitimité et la pérennité de son institution. La science est en effet considérée comme un gage d'objectivité, un outil capable de dire "le vrai" qui s'avère d'autant plus précieux pour les acteurs du contentieux interétatique que l'ordre juridique international est décentralisé. Pourtant, l'on ne peut manquer de constater le profond désenchantement suscité par la science au cours des dernières décennies : outre l'allongement souvent indu des délais, la multiplication des batailles d'experts dans le prétoire a fait naître un sentiment de méfiance grandissant à l'égard de la preuve scientifique, un doute quant à la part de vérité intrinsèque qu'elle est supposée pouvoir revendiquer. Pour déstabilisante qu'elle puisse être au regard de l'enjeu particulier du maintien de la paix, cette constatation ne doit néanmoins pas conduire à dénier à la science sa place et sa pertinence dans le cadre du règlement des différends interétatiques. La présente étude montrera ainsi que, dépouillé de toute prétention particulière à la vérité, l'expertise est susceptible de s'illustrer (et s'illustre parfois déjà) comme un outil utile et productif dans le cadre du règlement juridictionnel des différends entre états ; au-delà, l'on montrera encore que, dans certaines circonstances, l'expert possède même le pouvoir d'apaiser et de rapprocher les parties, favorisant ainsi l'émergence d'un règlement amiable entre elles / Dealing with scientific issues is nowadays a major concern in inter-state disputes : beyond the question of costs, these issues are often decisive for states in succeeding to defend their case and they are no less critical for international tribunals when it comes to promote their legitimacy and ultimately, their survival. Science is indeed perceived as possessing extraordinary qualities for the pursuit of the truth (in the widest sense of this word) and for this reason, it has traditionally been considered a very powerful and precious instrument, mostly in the international legal order which is naturally decentralized. Nevertheless, one cannot but notice the disenchantment science has given rise to over the last decades : the multiplication of expert battles in court has frequently induced an undesirable loss of time as well as a growing feeling of mistrust, both the litigants and the international judiciary finally doubting the power of science for ascertaining the real truth. However destabilizing this reality may be in the particular context of the maintenance of the peace, this study is dedicated to show that science is definitely relevant in the settling of inter-state disputes. Most often deprived nowadays of their alleged (and misleading) capacities for perfect objectivity and the search for truth, experts will be shown to be paradoxically useful and productive actors in the course of international judicial settlement ; moreover, they will be shown to possess, under certain circumstances, a real power for relieving pressure and promoting appeasement between the litigants, thus making it easier for them to reach an amicable settlement of their conflict

"Rwanda was largely destroyed in 1994. Among an endless host of problems, highly complex questions and dilemmas of justice, unity, and reconciliation haunt Rwanda to this day. A basic question confronting Rwanda is how to deal with the legacy of the conflict that culminated in the genocide of the Tutsi and in the massacres of Hutu opponents of the genocide. The UN set up an International Criminal Tribunal in Arusha, Tanzania, and Rwanda has its own courts. In both cases, the process of trying accused genocidaires is long, laborious, and frustrating. Only eight convictions have been handed down in Arusha after five years of work, while in Rwanda only some 3,000 cases have been disposed of. At least 120,000 detainees are in prisons around the country, the vast majority of whom are accused of participation in the genocide. At the present rate it is estimated that it will take anywhere between two and four centuries to try all those in detention. The Rwandese government has developed a new procedure called “gacaca,” lower-level tribunals that attempt to blend traditional and contemporary mechanisms to expedite the justice process in a way that promotes reconciliation. The impact of gacaca remains to be seen, and as a process, it certainly needs an evaluation or, at least, an attempt to evaluate its possible contribution to the perplexing questions of justice, unity and social reconstruction in the aftermath of genocide. This paper mainly aims to analyse the draft legislation on the gacaca jurisdictions. Further, this essay attempts to examine the impact of criminal trials in the aftermath of mass violence and genocide. Although conventional wisdom holds that criminal trials promote several goals, including uncovering the truth; avoiding collective accountability by individualising guilt; breaking cycle of impunity; deterring future war crimes; providing closure for the victims and fostering democratic institutions, little is known about the role that judicial intervention have in rebuilding societies. The present essay deals only with criminal trials. By definition, these are focused on the perpetrators of abuses and their allies. Although not examined in the essay, a comprehensive and holistic approach to dealing with a legacy of past atrocities should also include range of victim-focused efforts, such as programs for compensation and rehabilitation, the establishment of memorials, and the organisation of appropriate commemorations. The main sources of this study are textbooks, articles from journals and official documents of national and international bodies. Since this essay aims at evaluating the gacaca proposals, a great deal of attention is paid to the terms of the draft legislation. It is certainly premature to make an in-depth assessment of a draft law and the merits and flaws of the legal institution it is designed to set up. Only gradually and over a period of time can the gacaca become effective and credible. Further research aimed at gathering data through interviews, field observations, participant observation, study and analysis of the implementation can also illuminate experience in ways that analysis of published sources do not. A thorough and sound appraisal of this new institution must therefore wait some time. I shall nevertheless attempt in this essay to set out some initial and tentative comments on some of the salient traits of the future gacaca tribunals. This paper makes a preliminary “human rights impact assessment” of the implementation of the draft law establishing “gacaca jurisdictions”. The potential role of the new institution in rebuilding the Rwandese society is also discussed. Considering the many complex issues which still surround the process of justice in Rwanda six years after the genocide, as well as the continuing challenge to the judicial system in terms of the inadequacy of resources for dealing with such an enormous caseload, recommendations to help the process follow the analysis of the gacaca proposals (Chapter Three). To end impunity, it is necessary to respond in accordance with human rights law to the genocide and mass killings. Therefore, the starting point for our evaluation of the gacaca proposals will be an analysis of the proposals in human rights law. Does human rights law impose any affirmative duties to punish genocide and other mass killings that occurred in Rwanda? In addition, for the “gacaca jurisdictions” to be effective, they should not be viewed in isolation, as their performance will depend to a large extent on whether other judicial mechanisms and institutions are functioning properly. The relationships between the gacaca jurisdiction and other mechanisms are thus reviewed. In particular, the process of setting up the gacaca jurisdictions should include an evaluation of the genocide trials which have taken place to date both at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and in the domestic courts and apply the lessons learnt (Chapter Two). An evaluation of the potential contribution of the use of gacaca courts needs to be put into the broader context of the conflict in Rwanda. Thus, an analysis of the conflict in Rwanda is necessary to grasp the challenges facing the questions of justice and social reconstruction in the aftermath of genocide in Rwanda (Chapter One)." -- Introduction. / Prepared under the supervision of Professor Jeremy Sarkin, Faculty of Law, University of the Western Cape / Thesis (LLM (Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa)) -- University of Pretoria, 2000. / http://www.chr.up.ac.za/academic_pro/llm1/dissertations.html / Centre for Human Rights / LLM

"This paper deals with the prosecution of a crime of crimes, genocide, at international and national levels. The international community has shown interest in penalizing perpetrators of gross human rights violations since the Nuremberg trial, and then the adoption of the 1948 UN Genocide Convention. After these times, significant numbers of international tribunals, although at an ad hoc level, have been established to punish gross violations of human rights including the crime of genocide. Along with these tribunals, quite a number of national courts have engaged in the prosecution of genocide. Nevertheless, due to legal and practical problems, the two legal systems are adopting different approaches to handle the matter, although the crime is one and the same. Therefore, the objective of this paper is to assess critically where the difference lies, the cause and impact of the disparity on the rights of the accused to fair trial. Moreover, the study will posit some recommendations that might assist to ameliorate this intermittent situation." -- Synopsis. "This work consists of five chapters. Chapter one is addressing the general introduction of the work, and it has already been discussed. Chapter two deals with the crime of genocide and its criminal responsibility as indicated under different national and international laws. The third chapter is devoted to focus on the right to fair trial and the prosecution of genocide, and specifically addresses the issues of the right to legal assistance, speedy trial, obtain and examine evidence, and sentencing. In chapter four the role of the Rome Statue in protecting the rights of the accused, its impact on on national laws, the complementarities of the International Criminal Court and national courts will be discussed. Finally, the work will come to an end by giving concluding remarks and recommendations under the fifth chapter." -- Introduction. / Thesis (LLM (Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa)) -- University of Pretoria, 2003. / Prepared under the supervision of Dr. Henry Onoria at the Faculty of Law, Makerere University, Kampala / http://www.chr.up.ac.za/academic_pro/llm1/dissertations.html / Centre for Human Rights / LLM

"As already mentioned, gauranteeing the right to a fair trial aims at protecting individuals from unlawful and arbitrary curtailment or deprivation of other basic rights and freedoms. The fundamental importance of the right to a fair trial is illustrated not only by international instruments and the extensive body of interpretation it has generated, but most recently, by a proposal to include it in the non-derogable rights stipulated in article 4(2) of the ICCPR. Standards for a fair trial may stem from binding obligations that are included in human rights treaties to which a state in examination is a party, but they may also be found in documents and practices which, though not binding, can be taken to express the direction in which the law is evolving. One of the problems is that law and human rights have been viewed largely as Western concepts, and are therefore defined and valued by Western criteria. This leads to a number of difficulties. First, there are many non-Western societies in which law and human rights thus defined, is impractical and mechanisms of protecting human rights in non-Western justice systems are not recognised as comparable counterparts to those in Western societies. Secondly, African states have failed to abide by their international fair trial obligations because, probably, these standards are impractical given the realities like poverty, illiteracy and strong cultural beliefs that characterise most African communities. As a result, the law applied by the Western style courts is felt to be so out of touch with the needs of most African communities, and coercion to resort to them amounts to denial of justice. This explains why communities, especially in the rural Africa, resort to indigenous African justice systems irrespective of state recognition or otherwise. Upon realisation that the Western style of justice did not respond to the prevailing post-genocide situation for example, the government of Rwanda re-established traditional courts to help deal with the crime of genocide and foster reconciliation. A Gacaca court is constituted of a panel of lay judges who coordinate a process in which genocide survivors and suspected perpetrators and the latter between themselves confront each other. They, and the community, participate by telling the truth of what happened; who did what during the genocide, and then the judges, based on the evidence given to them, decide on the case. These judges are elected by their respective communities for their integrity, not their learning. However, human rights organisations argue that Gacaca proceedings violate the accused persons's fair trial rights. They question among other things capacity of lay judges who make decisions in these courts, to conduct a fair trial. They also contend that Gacaca does not guarantee the right to be presumed innocent because it requires confessoins and that defendants are denied legal representation. In South Africa, traditional courts (konwn as chiefs' courts) exist. They have played a crucial role in dispensing justice in the indigenous communities and are prototypes of the kind of dispute resolution mechanisms desirable in a modern society. They apply 'people's law', which developed as a result of lack of legitimacy of the Western system of justice among the indigenous South Africans. However, critics see them as conservative and unable to render justice in the modern social, economic and political climate in South Africa today. As a result, Western style court proceedings that are conducted in foreign languages to indigenous communities, and thus have to rely on inaccurate and unreliable interpreters in addition to costs for legal counsels and subjection to very technical and formal procedures, are the only alternative in criminal matters. Briefly, the major problem is to ascertain whether indigenous African criminal justice systems do, or otherwise conform to fair trial standards. If they do not, according to who are they not fair? In other words, is there a universal measure of fairness or does appreciation depend on people's enviornment and their socio-economic backgrounds, in which case, the beneficiaries of indigenous African criminal justice systems should be the ones to appreciate its fairness?" -- Introduction. / Thesis (LLM (Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa)) -- University of Pretoria, 2004. / Prepared under the supervision of Prof. Nii Ashie Kotey at the Faculty of Law, University of Ghana / http://www.chr.up.ac.za/academic_pro/llm1/dissertations.html / Centre for Human Rights / LLM

No description available.

No description available.

Text in Afrikaans / Artikel 35(5) van die Grondwet 108 van 1996 handel oor die uitsluiting van ongrondwetlike getuienis en bepaal dat sodanige getuienis uitgesluit moet word indien toelating daarvan sal lei tot 'n onbillike verhoor of tot nadeel sal strek vir die regspleging. Uit die bewoording van die artikel blyk dit dat die howe geen diskresie het ten opsigte van die toelaatbaarheidsvraag nie en 'n streng uitsluitingbenadering moet volg. Die doel van hierdie verha• ndeling is om ondersoek in te stel na die mate van diskresie .en die wyse ·waarop diskresie toepas word in hierdie besluitnemingsproses. Twee benaderings is deur die howe gevolg, naamlik 'n benadering waar 'n wye diskresie uitgeoefen word en 'n benadering waar 'n beperkte diskresie uitgeoefen word, dus 'n gekwalifiseerde uitsluitingsbenadering. Die skrywer doen aan die hand dat beide gronde vir uitsluiting van belang is en dat die howe verkeie faktore moet oorweeg ten einde 'n beslissing te vel oor die insluiting of uitsluiting van ongrondwetlike getuienis. 'n Balans moet dus gehandhaaf word tussen die belang van die beskuldigde op 'n billike verhoor en die belang van die gemeenskap daarin dat regspleging nie benadeel moet word nie en dat reg en geregtigheid moet geskied / Section 35(3) of the Constitution Act 108 of 1996 deals with the exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence and stipulates that such evidence must be excluded if the admission would render the trial unfair or be detrimental to the administration of justice. From the wording of the section it seems that the courts have no jurisdiction in regard to the admissibility question and that a strict exclusionary approach must be followed. The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the amount of discretion that the Courts have, and the manner in which this discretion is applied in the process of decision making. Two approaches were followed by the courts namely a wide discretionary approach and an approach where a strict discretion was applied. It is submitted that botR grounds for exclusion are of importance and that the courts must consider a variety of factors in deciding the question on the inclusion or exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence. A balance must be struck between the interest of the accused in a fair trial and the interest of the community that the administration of justice must not be prejudiced and that justice must prevail. / Criminal & Procedural Law / LL.M. (Law)