Il primo capitolo offre un sommario della letteratura teorica ed empirica relative ai cicli di bilancio a livello nazionale e locale, iniziando dai primi cicli politici di bilancio detti “tradizionali” fino ad arrivare ai modelli detti di “political agency”. Viene discusso il filone di letteratura che scaturisce da quest’ultimo tipo di modellistica, cominciando dai primi modelli di segnalazione fino ai più recenti modelli teorici sull’effetto di selezione e di disciplina svolto dalle elezioni politiche. Un’enfasi particolare viene data alla rassegna dei test empirici basati su quest’ultimo tipo di modellistica e, in particolare, sul nesso tra decentralizzazione e trasparenza a livello locale. Il secondo capitolo è incentrato sulle tematiche del ciclo elettorale relativo alla tassazione e alla spese in un campione di comuni italiani. Le stime econometriche indicano un forte ciclo elettorale relativo alla tassa comunale sugli immobili (ICI) e, utilizzando le predizioni teoriche dei modelli a informazione incompleta sul differente comportamento dei sindaci che possono correre per un secondo turno e di quelli che sono invece impossibilitati a ricandidarsi, viene mostrato come i sindaci al primo turno che possono ricandidarsi manipolano in maniera più intensa l’imposta comunale sugli immobili applicata alla prima casa. Le stime effettuate sul comportamento differente dei sindaci con limite di mandato e senza limite di mandato, relative alle scelte di tassazione applicate alla base imponibile ICI ordinaria, indicano pure la presenza di un effetto di disciplina di partito. Questo capitolo, inoltre, compie un passo avanti rispetto a precedenti stime sui cicli elettorali fondati solo sulla dinamica delle spese correnti e in conto capitale senza tenere in considerazione la natura di competenza o cassa delle poste di bilancio corrispondenti. Sono presentate alcune evidenze in merito all’esistenza di un ciclo elettorale nella spesa in conto capitale registrata in contabilità come di cassa. Viene fornito anche un test econometrico sull’effetto dei vincoli del patto di stabilità interno sui comportamenti di spesa dei comuni. Nell’ultimo capitolo, sono ulteriormente approfonditi i risultati presentati nel secondo capitolo relativi alle scelte differenti dei comuni sulle aliquote ICI ordinaria e prima casa, esplorando il nesso tra cicli opportunistici razionali e trasparenza degli strumenti fiscali. Viene presentato un modello formale a informazione incompleta che predice come gli incentivi politici per usare due diversi strumenti fiscali possono essere diversi, a seconda delle caratteristiche di trasparenza annesse ai medesimi strumenti. Le predizioni teoriche sottoposte a stima empirica sono le seguenti: 1) i sindaci al primo mandato utilizzano maggiormente l’addizionale IRPEF introdotta per i comuni nel 1999 rispetto ai sindaci che non possono più correre; 2) il turnover politico dovrebbe diminuire dopo la riforma che ha introdotto l’addizionale IRPEF e, in particolare, per i sindaci che usano maggiormente tale strumento; 3) la riforma dovrebbe agevolare la decisione dei sindaci di correre per un secondo mandato, essendo agevolata la probabilità di rielezione. I test empirici presentati utilizzando un campione di comuni italiani confermano le predizioni teoriche contenute nel modello. / The first chapter reviews the theoretical and empirical literature about political budget cycles at national and local level, starting from earlier traditional political business cycles models to political agency models. This last strand of literature is discussed, starting from earlier signalling models to the more recent advancements in theoretical predictions about the selection and disciplining effect of elections on politicians. A particular emphasis is given to the full review of empirical tests based on political agency models predictions about the links between accountability and decentralization, especially at the local level. The second chapter focuses on the issues of electoral cycles in taxes and expenditures for a sample of Italian municipalities. Econometric estimates show a strong electoral cycle on municipal property tax, and extending political agency models' implications about the differences in tax-setting behavior between first- and second-term mayors, evidence is shown of a stronger electoral manipulation of property rates applied to main residence tax base when mayors run for re-election. Estimation of property tax rates' sensitivity to term-limited mayors' fiscal behaviors also uncovers a party discipline effect on tax rates applied to business and non homeowner property tax base. Furthermore, this chapter goes beyond previous econometric estimates of expenditure cycles focusing solely on the dynamics of current and capital expenditures without taking into account the basis on which outlays are recorded in local budgets. Some preliminary evidence points to the existence of an electoral cycle in cash-recorded budgetary investment outlays. An econometric test on the effect of formal expenditures restraints on municipal spending behaviors concludes the chapter. In the last chapter, results from the second chapter relative to business and main residence property tax rates’ choices are further investigated, exploring the link between opportunistic rational cycles and accountability of tax instruments. A formal political agency model predicts that the political incentives for using the two different property taxes may be different, according to their level of transparency. Three empirically testable implications derives from theoretical predictions: 1) first-term mayors should use a local income tax surcharge, introduced in 1999 in Italy, more than second-term mayors; 2) political turnover should be lower following the reform, and in particular for mayors using more the local income tax surcharge and 3) the reform might also affect the decision to run again by mayors, as it should be easier to get re-elected after the reform. Empirical estimates using a sample of Italian municipalities are presented, confirming theoretical predictions of the model.

In Canada, the duty to consult doctrine has been articulated as a legal remedy to address the potential infringement of Aboriginal and treaty rights by the Crown. The political dimension and implications of this legal duty on the evolving federal relationship between First Nations and the provincial Crown concerning lands and resources have yet to be fully explored. This research presents the argument that the duty to consult jurisprudence and the new relationship policy in British Columbia are moving towards the articulation of a treaty federalism relationship between the Crown and First Nations. The implications of these findings are then analyzed within the Saskatchewan policy environment, and a potential consultation framework is offered for this province. Crucial linkages between duty to consult jurisprudence and Aboriginal governance, and their implications for policy are highlighted, which contribute to further understanding the complex relationship between First Nations and the Crown in Canada on land and resources.

La presente Tesis Doctoral realiza un estudio serio y riguroso de la Unión Europea concebida como entidad política sui generis, original, desde una perspectiva eminentemente jurídica a la que se suma también la visión histórica y la política.Tras poner de manifiesto en los capítulos introductorios que la vocación política de la Unión Europea se remonta incluso tiempo atrás al nacimiento de las primeras Comunidades, el núcleo de la investigación se prodiga a analizar la naturaleza política del edificio europeo. En particular, se sostiene la dimensión materialmente constitucional de la construcción europea, ya defendida por el Tribunal de Justicia de las Comunidades Europeas en reiterada jurisprudencia. La metodología que se sigue resulta de aplicar categorías y conceptos clásicos del Derecho constitucional a la Unión. A este respecto, se presta especial atención al reparto de poder, a la arquitectura institucional, a los derechos fundamentales, al funcionamiento democrático. Asimismo, el Tratado constitucional merece en nuestro trabajo una consideración especial y diferenciada toda vez que representa el paradigma de la profundización política pues toda Constitución, por definición, es el texto legitimador de una comunidad política. Entre las aportaciones más originales, cabe señalar un modelo de organización política bosquejado por nosotros al que denominamos Federalismo supranacional cooperativo, que reformula el Federalismo supranacional asociando al método comunitario los mecanismos cooperativos. Este modelo que acuñamos nos permite aproximarnos al sistema político europeo en nuestros días. Nuestras conclusiones subrayan que la UE, desde sus orígenes, ha aspirado a la construcción política; que las aspiraciones a la construcción política han cristalizado en un proyecto europeo singular que reproduce con matices las estructuras estatales tradicionales; que el Tratado constitucional encarna ese proyecto europeo singular. Representa un modelo de comunidad política europea de vocación democrática, que asocia elementos federales y con-federales, enraizado en valores compartidos, derechos fundamentales, principios y libertades; que el Tratado que establece una Constitución para Europa, comúnmente conocido como Constitución Europea, no puede ser calificado como un Tratado más. Tiene naturaleza materialmente constitucional, es una Constitución material de naturaleza singular para la Unión Europea; que el Tratado constitucional representa un peldaño más en el proceso de construcción europea, de carácter dinámico, evolutivo, no acabado. Los resultados de la Cumbre de junio de 2007 no colman las expectativas iniciales del periodo constituyente; que la unión política es indispensable para que Europa se convierta en un actor político mundial y pueda contribuir a la resolución de los retos a los que se enfrenta la sociedad internacional del siglo XXI. La adopción de un Tratado de reforma no es la más plausible a medio-largo plazo; que el éxito de la unión política reposa en la adhesión ciudadana al proyecto europeo. Es necesario promover entre los ciudadanos de la Unión el europeísmo, el sentimiento de unidad europea, la conciencia de compartir un destino común.Parece conveniente resaltar que el Tratado constitucional no ha entrado en vigor, de un lado, porque la aceptación del carácter federal de la UE, superador de las instancias estatales, exige un proceso de asimilación lento; de otro, porque la ciudadanía no lo ha respaldado, al estar todavía distanciada del proyecto europeo, de su magnitud y alcance, en suma, de los beneficios de la Unión Europea.En todo caso, la Constitución Europea no está muerta pues el Tratado de Lisboa, pese a desprenderse de los símbolos políticos, recoge las principales aportaciones de la Constitución Europea.La Relevancia y la Actualidad de nuestro trabajo son fruto de replantearse el papel de la Unión Europea en el siglo XXI y la viabilidad de realizar con éxito su cometido -afrontar los desafíos de la globalización-, para lo que resulta conveniente consumar la integración adoptando un modelo federativo. Ciertamente, la sociedad internacional del siglo XXI es extremadamente compleja y los desafíos exigen acciones en común, coordinadas. El Estado-nación se perfila como una estructura algo trasnochada y frágil. Tan sólo las asociaciones de Estados -en sus múltiples variantes- pueden dar respuesta a la globalización y encauzar problemas como la pobreza, el desarrollo sostenible, la energía, el terrorismo internacional, los flujos migratorios, el narcotráfico, las catástrofes naturales, etc.

En aquesta tesi s'estudia el federalisme executiu canadenc. Entenem per aquest concepte el model de relacions intergovernamentals caracteritzat pel fet que les relacions entre els diferentes nivells de poder a l'interior d'una federació estan monopolitzades pels respectius executius, en detriment d'altres institucions polítiques - parlaments, partits polítics. La hipòtesi que sostinc és que, al Canadà, aquest model de relacions intergovernamentals s'ha vist influenciat per la centralitat que històricament ha tingut en la dinàmica política interna, el debat entorn la qüestió nacional. Aquest debat sorgeix arran de la voluntat política d'una part de la societat quebequesa, i en conseqüència dels governs quebequesos, d'autogovernar-se i d'evitar el risc de la minorització. Això no obstant, els successius governs federals tracten el Quebec com "una província més", igual que la resta de províncies. La negativa d'Ottawa a reconèixer el Quebec com a nació ha reforçat els partidaris de l'accessió a la sobirania. / In this thesis it is studied Canadian Executive Federalism. We define this concept as an intergovernmental relation's model characterized by the fact that relations between different levels of power within a federation are monopolized by executives, rather than by other political institutions -such as parliaments or political parties. The hypothesis defended is that, in Canada, this intergovernmental relation's model has been influenced by the centrality that the national question debate has play historically. This debate starts as part of Quebec's society will, and consequently, of Quebec executives will, of self-government as a measure to avoid minorisation risks. However, successive federal governments treat Quebec as a province like the rest. The Ottawa opposition to recognize Quebec as a nation has reinforced those who prone for accession to sovereignty.

In Canada, the duty to consult doctrine has been articulated as a legal remedy to address the potential infringement of Aboriginal and treaty rights by the Crown. The political dimension and implications of this legal duty on the evolving federal relationship between First Nations and the provincial Crown concerning lands and resources have yet to be fully explored. This research presents the argument that the duty to consult jurisprudence and the new relationship policy in British Columbia are moving towards the articulation of a treaty federalism relationship between the Crown and First Nations. The implications of these findings are then analyzed within the Saskatchewan policy environment, and a potential consultation framework is offered for this province. Crucial linkages between duty to consult jurisprudence and Aboriginal governance, and their implications for policy are highlighted, which contribute to further understanding the complex relationship between First Nations and the Crown in Canada on land and resources.

The contemporary phenomenon of the global rush for farmland has generated intense debate from different actors. While the proponents embrace it as a 'development opportunity', the critics dub it 'land grabbing'. Others use a neutral term: 'large-scale land acquisitions'. Whatever terminology is used, one fact remains indisputable - since 2007 vast swathes of farmlands in developing countries have been sold or leased out to large-scale commercial farmers. Ethiopia is one of the leading countries in Africa in this regard and, as a matter of state policy, it promotes these investments in peripheral regions that are predominantly inhabited by pastoralists and other indigenous communities. So far, the focus of most of the studies on this phenomenon has been on its economic, food security and environmental aspects. The questions of land rights and political implications have been to a great extent overlooked. The purpose of this thesis is to contribute to this knowledge gap by drawing upon the experience of the Gambella regional state - the epicentre of large-scale land acquisition in Ethiopia. To this end, this thesis argues that large-scale land acquisitions in Ethiopia is indeed redefining indigenous communities' right to land, territories and natural resources in fundamental ways. By doing so, it also threatens the post-1991 social contract - i.e. ethnic federalism - between the envisaged new Ethiopian state and its diverse communities, particularly the peripheral minorities and indigenous ethnic groups.

Staatliche Innovationsförderung erklärt Firmen, besonders kleinere Unternehmen, die Hindernissen zur Innovationstätigkeitgegenüberstehen, zu unterstützen. Frühere Studien haben gezeigt, dass staatliche Programme diese Ziele nicht erreichen. Aber in der Vergangenheit wurde hierbei selten die Differenzierung unterschiedlicher politischer Ebenen analysiert. Dieses Projekt analysiert deshalb die unterschiedlichen Eigenschaften von geförderten Firmen, die entweder von der regionalen, der nationalen oder der europäischen Ebene unterstützt wurden und verknüpft dies mit der theoretischen Literatur und Erkenntnissen zu Föderalismus. Die Evaluation nutzt dabei zuerst Daten des Mannheimer Innovation Panel für die Untersuchung in Deutschland und später Daten der Community Innovation Survey für die Untersuchung in Europa. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die drei verschiedenen Ebenen der Förderung Unternehmen mit unterschiedlichen Charakteristika erreichen. Die regionale Ebene in föderalen und semiföderalen Ländern erreicht dabei KMU als Unternehmen mit Problemen bei der Innovationstätigkeit signifikant besser als andere Ebenen dies tun. Aber die Effektivität der staatlichen Innovationsförderung ist nach der Analyse sehr zweifelhaft. Deshalb muss seitens der Politik ein Zielkonflikt zwischen einer größeren Vielfalt an geförderten Firmen und höherer Effektivität der Förderung berücksichtigt werden.

This thesis explores the political economy aspects of the provision of local public goods by higher levels of government. Chapter 1 focuses on local public goods as instruments for special interest politics at the supra-local level, with an emphasis on public infrastructure. To capture the implications of long-run relationships between political parties and their loyal supporters, I set out a dynamic probabilistic voting model which predicts that the geographic pattern of spending depends on the way the government balances long-run `machine politics' considerations with the more immediate concern to win over swing voters. To assess the empirical relevance of both forces, I analyse rich data on road spending from a panel of electoral districts in Québec. Empirical results exploiting the province's linguistic fragmentation provide robust evidence that partisan loyalty is a key driver of the geographic allocation of spending. Chapter 2 proposes a theoretical framework to analyse the coexistence of multiple tiers of government in local public good provision. I study the effects of such partial decentralization on accountability using a two-period political agency model, in which two levels of government are involved in public good provision and voters are imperfectly informed about each government's contribution to the public good. The model predicts that the net effect of a departure from complete centralization (or decentralization) balances the benefits of vertical complementarity against the loss of accountability following from imperfect information and detrimental vertical interactions. Chapter 3 investigates the impact of partial decentralization on local electoral accountability in the context of California's school finance system. I exploit the peculiarities California's school finance system and the federal No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 to estimate the extent to which politicians are punished or rewarded for observed policy outcomes, and how this channel is affected by the degree of centralization. Results show that voters are responsive to differences in dropout rates and pupil-teacher ratios, and that incumbents are less likely to be reelected when a district's degree of centralization is high. Increased federal involvement after 2001 is associated with sharper local electoral accountability.

This thesis explores the political economy aspects of the provision of local public goods by higher levels of government. Chapter 1 focuses on local public goods as instruments for special interest politics at the supra-local level, with an emphasis on public infrastructure. To capture the implications of long-run relationships between political parties and their loyal supporters, I set out a dynamic probabilistic voting model which predicts that the geographic pattern of spending depends on the way the government balances long-run `machine politics' considerations with the more immediate concern to win over swing voters. To assess the empirical relevance of both forces, I analyse rich data on road spending from a panel of electoral districts in Québec. Empirical results exploiting the province's linguistic fragmentation provide robust evidence that partisan loyalty is a key driver of the geographic allocation of spending. Chapter 2 proposes a theoretical framework to analyse the coexistence of multiple tiers of government in local public good provision. I study the effects of such partial decentralization on accountability using a two-period political agency model, in which two levels of government are involved in public good provision and voters are imperfectly informed about each government's contribution to the public good. The model predicts that the net effect of a departure from complete centralization (or decentralization) balances the benefits of vertical complementarity against the loss of accountability following from imperfect information and detrimental vertical interactions. Chapter 3 investigates the impact of partial decentralization on local electoral accountability in the context of California's school finance system. I exploit the peculiarities California's school finance system and the federal No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 to estimate the extent to which politicians are punished or rewarded for observed policy outcomes, and how this channel is affected by the degree of centralization. Results show that voters are responsive to differences in dropout rates and pupil-teacher ratios, and that incumbents are less likely to be reelected when a district's degree of centralization is high. Increased federal involvement after 2001 is associated with sharper local electoral accountability.

Busca a presente dissertação examinar a regra de competência do ISSQN e os principais conflitos de competência tributária que podem surgir entre o aludido imposto municipal e o IPI, o IOF e o ICMS - como também os conflitos existentes entre dois municípios que detenham a pretensão de tributar o mesmo serviço. Visando alcançar tal objetivo, examina a estrutura, função e hierarquia das normas de competência dos impostos, o modo de interpretação do texto constitucional, o método pelo qual devem ser construídas as regras de competência tributária e a autonomia dos municípios diante do federalismo brasileiro. / The current dissertation intends to examine the rule of competency of ISSQN (Services Tax) and the main conflicts over tax jurisdiction that may emerge between the said municipal tax and the IPI (Excise Tax), the IOF (Tax on Financial Operations), and the ICMS (Value-Added Tax on sales and services) – as well as the conflicts that may arise between two municipalities that detain the intention to tax the same service. To attain such goal, the research examines the structure, the function and the hierarchy of the rules of tax competency, the means of interpretation of the constitutional text, the method by which the rules of tax competency must be built and the autonomy of the municipalities in sight of brazilian federalism.