Thesis advisor: Harold Petersen / According to the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), speculative bubbles do not exist and are impossible. We disagree. If prices are the only observable component of an asset’s value, and they themselves are an aggregated consensus of perceived value, then what about the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) is testable? Rather than assume that prices always reflect value (i.e. perfect market efficiency), we maintain that markets are efficient to the extent that one can be confident that tomorrow’s prices will not diverge dramatically or arbitrarily from today’s prices, absent significant new information. Speculative bubbles are not materializing every day, every month, or even every year. But they do have the potential and indeed a tendency to occur from time to time. If markets are efficient, what explains all the trading? Rather than assume rational expectations and a homogenous investor class, we assume four investor classes that diverge in their perception of value (i.e. in their expectation of future returns) and thus trade with each other. Using insights from Hyman Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis (FIH), we develop a theoretical framework for how a speculative bubble might materialize within a modern capitalist economy with securities markets’ that follow a random walk. Obviously, there is no “bubble” variable. We use Tobin’s Q, the ratio of the price of an asset to its replacement cost, and Shiller’s cyclically adjusted P/E ratio as proxy variables for bubbles. We find statistically significant, negative relationships between both of these proxy variables and our dependent variable, Ten Year Cumulative Returns, thereby providing evidence against the EMH and suggesting the possibility of speculative bubbles. / Thesis (BA) — Boston College, 2014. / Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Economics Honors Program. / Discipline: Economics.

La persistance des fraudes financières depuis les origines de la création de la bourse conduit au constat selon lequel la sanction est un élément fondamental du bon fonctionnement des marchés financiers. En l’état actuel du droit positif, notre système de sanction repose pour l’essentiel sur l’Autorité des marchés financiers. À première vue, le droit français offre le visage d’une architecture moderne. Pourtant, l’actualité n’en finit pas de démontrer l’existence d’affaires et de fraudes sensibles affectant drastiquement la confiance des investisseurs dans le système. En vue d’une amélioration de notre système de sanction, la comparaison avec le droit canadien se révèle très enrichissante. Il en ressort que le système de sanction en droit des marchés financiers français pourrait être rendu plus efficace par la création d’une juridiction spécialisée à laquelle serait confiée l’ensemble du contentieux relatif aux marchés financiers. Une telle réforme favoriserait l’harmonisation et la cohérence du système de sanction. / The persistence of financial frauds since the creation of the stock exchange has made it clear that sanctions are a fundamental aspect to ensure the effective functioning of financial markets. Currently, our sanction system relies, for the most part, on the action of the financial regulator, the Autorité des marchés financiers. At first sight, French law offers a very modern system. However, frauds keep on happening, affecting drastically the trust of the investors in the system. In order to improve our sanction system, the comparison with Canadian law has revealed to be very rewarding. It is possible to make our system more efficient by implementing a special jurisdiction, which would be responsible for all the financial markets disputes, in order to make our sanction system more coherent and unified.

O presente estudo tem dois objetivos. O primeiro (1) é substantivo: contribuir com o debate sobre globalização financeira, ajudando a nele incorporar uma dimensão que parecia um pouco fora de foco em diversas discussões a dimensão jurídico-institucional empírica. O segundo (2) é metodológico, e não se relaciona diretamente com o objeto da pesquisa: ajudar a incorporar ao estudo do direito no Brasil a utilização de certas técnicas empíricas que permitiriam o exercício mais freqüente do que se será chamado aqui de ceticismo esclarecido pela empiria o salutar questionamento de afirmações doutrinais peremptórias com o auxílio de evidência empírica. Em relação ao objetivo (1), apresenta-se a seguinte tese. A globalização financeira é produto de diversos processos heterogêneos de cooperação internacional, políticas governamentais, reformas legislativas e estratégias políticas. Tais processos têm determinantes diversos, e objetivos variados, não apenas liberalização. De fato, mera liberalização unilateral não daria suporte suficiente ao aumento de fluxos financeiros transfronteiriços a globalização só pôde e só pode ocorrer em vista da criação de uma diversidade de estruturas internacionais, incluídas aí as bilaterais, plurilaterais e multilaterais. Estas resultaram em uma densa malha jurídico-institucional que, para ser criada, demandou mudanças por diversas vezes dolorosas e custosas aos países que as implantaram, assim como grandes esforços de negociação. Somente porque existe essa malha jurídica, cuja origem é a atividade política dos governos nacionais, é que investidores e empresas financeiras puderam e podem cruzar fronteiras, deter ativos no estrangeiro, e fazê-los circular em nível global. A globalização é resultado, não da abdicação e retração dos Estados, mas do ativo engajamento de seus governos na persecução de objetivos de política pública. Trata-se, portanto, de uma reação a interpretações concorrentes, segundo as quais a globalização financeira estaria sendo causada pela retração dos Estados Nacionais, que estariam se retirando da atividade regulatória, de forma geral, e da regulação das finanças, de formas mais específicas. A primeira parte consiste de dois capítulos discutindo os arranjos jurídico-institucionais que geraram a globalização financeira. A metodologia utilizada foi primordialmente qualitativa. Realizaram-se reconstruções institucionais comparadas, discutindo a evolução de certos arranjos de governança do sistema financeiro. Dois conjuntos de análises de casos foram realizados: (a) uma sobre a formação comparada de Sistemas Financeiros Nacionais, e (b) outra sobre processos comparados de integração financeira. A segunda parte consiste de um capítulo discutindo correlações entre indicadores econômicos e processos de globalização financeira. Aplicaram-se métodos econométricos sobre uma grande base de dados reunida e criada exclusivamente para esta pesquisa. / This study has two objectives. The first (1) is substantive: to contribute to the debate on globalization by helping to incorporate to it a dimension that has been somewhat left aside in many discussions the legal-institutional dimension. The second (2) is methodological, and not directly related to the subject of research: to help incorporating to the study of law in Brazil the use of certain empirical techniques that allow the exercise of what can be called a skepticism enlightened by the empiricism - the healthy questioning of doctrinal statements with the aid of empirical evidence. In relation of (1), the following thesis is advanced. Financial globalization is the product of several heterogeneous processes of international cooperation, government policies, legislative reforms and legal strategies. These processes have several determinants, and varied objectives, not just liberalization. In fact, a mere unilateral liberalization process would not give enough support to increase cross-border financial flows - globalization could only and may only occur in view of a diversity of international structures, including bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral agreements. These resulted in a dense mesh of legal and institutional structures, that to be created, demanded changes several times painful and costly to the countries that have implemented, as well as major efforts to negotiate. Only because of such legal tissue, whose origin is the political activity of national governments, is that investors and financial institutions could and can cross borders, holding assets abroad, and circulate them globally. Globalization is the result, not the abdication of the retraction, but the active engagement of governments in their pursuit of public policy objectives. The thesis is therefore a reaction to competing interpretations, under which financial globalization was being caused by the retraction of nation states, they were withdrawing from regulatory activity, in general, and regulation of finance, more specific forms. The first part consists of two chapters discussing the legal and institutional arrangements that led to financial globalization. The methodology was primarily qualitative. There were institutional compared reconstructions, discussing the evolution of certain governance arrangements of the financial system. Two sets of case studies were conducted: (a) training on a comparison of national financial systems, and (b) the other on the comparative analysis of financial integration. The second part consists of a chapter discussing correlations between economic indicators and processes of financial globalization. Were applied econometric methods on a large database collected and created exclusively for this research.

Depuis la mise en place des marchés financiers dans l’espace OHADA, les autorités communautaires ont entrepris de sérieuses réformes visant à assurer la protection de l’épargne publique et éventuellement la confiance des investisseurs. À ce titre, l’instauration d’un climat des affaires fiable et efficace constitue l’un des défis majeurs posés par le marché financier de l’UEMOA, de la CEMAC et du Cameroun. Il apparaît dès lors indispensable d’envisager un modèle d’organisation et de fonctionnement ainsi que des règles de marché apte à répondre à la fois au souci légitime de développement des marchés concernés et au besoin de sécurité des investisseurs nationaux et étrangers conformément aux standards financiers internationaux. Il faut noter que les marchés financiers dans l’espace OHADA présentent des acquis considérables en termes de sécurisation des acteurs et des opérations financières, même si beaucoup reste à faire surtout dans le cadre de la répression des délits boursiers. L’étude de ce sujet était aussi une occasion d’aborder la diversité des sources applicable aux différents marchés financiers dans l’espace OHADA. Un simple regard sur le droit OHADA à travers le prisme de l’acte uniforme relatif au droit des sociétés, laisse apparaitre une faible implication de cet organe dans le processus de sécurisation des marchés financiers dans l’espace intégré. Dans un souci d’harmonisation, il est souhaitable que l’OHADA adopte un acte uniforme relatif au droit des marchés financiers. Un tel instrument juridique est destiné non seulement à assurer l’uniformisation du droit applicable à tous les marchés financiers mais aussi à pallier aux systèmes de renvoi réciproque / Since the establishment of financial markets in the OHADA zone, the community authorities have undertaken serious reforms to ensure the protection of public savings and possibly investor confidence. As such, the creation of a reliable and efficient business climate is one of the major challenges facing the financial markets of WAEMU, CEMAC and Cameroon. It therefore seems essential to consider an organisational and operational model as well as market rules capable of responding to both the legitimate concern for the development of the markets concerned and the need for the security of domestic and foreign investors in accordance with International financial standards. It should be noted that the financial markets in the OHADA zone have made considerable progress in terms of the security of stakeholders and financial transactions, although much remains to be done, especially in the context of the combat against stock market crimes. This study also provided an opportunity to address the diversity of sources applicable to different financial markets in the OHADA zone. An examination of the OHADA law through the prism of the uniform act on company law reveals the low level of involvement of this body in the protection of financial markets in its integrated area. For harmonization purposes, OHADA needs to adopt a uniform act on financial market law. Such a legal instrument is not only intended to ensure the standardization of the law applicable to all financial markets but to also offset mutual referral systems

Les sociétés cotées constituent un monde à part. Il existe environ 5 000 sociétés cotées sur les marchés réglementés des bourses de l’UE. Même si elles représentent moins de 1 % des entreprises européennes, leur capitalisation boursière s’élève à plus de 70 % du PIB. Parce que ces sociétés ont une importance systémique pour l’économie, la compréhension de leur régime juridique s’avère cruciale. Nous traçons d’abord les contours du droit qui leur est applicable, en partant du niveau supranational parce que le droit européen est la plus importante source à la fois de convergence et de divergence. Cette approche nous permet de discuter si le niveau supranational devrait s’investir de nouveaux secteurs ou pousser l’harmonisation dans ceux déjà réglementés et de faire des prédictions quant à la direction probable ou souhaitable des réglementations. Nous analysons ensuite la causalité de la convergence, ce qui fait ressortir trois types de convergence : imposée, par pression et par rapprochement des circonstances factuelles dans lesquelles les sociétés cotées de l’UE exercent leurs activités. Nous concluons qu’il existe à présent une convergence en matière de droit applicable aux sociétés cotées de l’UE en dépit d’une harmonisation seulement partielle opérée au niveau supranational et que cette convergence s’approfondira sous l’impulsion des forces et des facteurs qui en servent de cause. Cette conclusion appuie la systématisation future des droits nationaux en fonction d’une nouvelle summa divisio entre sociétés cotées et sociétés non cotées. / Listed companies are a world apart. There are approximately 5 000 companies listed on the regulated markets of the EU stock exchanges. Although they represent less than 1 % of the European businesses, their market capitalization amounts to more than 70 % of GDP. Because they have a systemic importance for the economy, the comprehension of their legal regime is crucial. We first establish the boundaries of the applicable law, starting from the supranational level because EU law represents the most important source of both convergence and divergence. This method allows us to establish if the supranational level should extend to new areas of regulation or push for further the harmonization in the areas already regulated and to make predictions regarding the probable or desirable future directions of the regulations. We then analyze the causality of convergence, which shows three main types of convergence : imposed, by pressure and by approximation of the factual circumstances of the environment in which EU listed companies operate. We conclude that presently there is a convergence of national regulations applicable to EU listed companies despite only partial harmonization at the supranational level and that this convergence will deepen as a result of its forces and factors of causality. This conclusion reinforces the arguments for a reorganization of national laws based on a new summa divisio between listed companies and non-listed companies.

<p>Financial speculation has increased dramatically over the last 30 years. This means that a practice that used to be viewed as immoral <i>gambling</i> has become legitimate financial <i>trade</i>. This book explores the<i> genealogy</i> of the coexisting<i> insider trading laws</i>. The insider regulation prohibits trade based on privileged information in order to create equal trading conditions, and in this way uphold confidence in the financial markets among the general public. However, this study shows that the existing view of the insider regulation is <i>misleading</i> and that the regulation is best understood as a <i>game rule</i> aiming to <i>stimulate</i> financial speculation. The protection interest is therefore not primarily the general public, but the financial system as such: the professional market actors sustaining the speculative activities and a growing financial sector. </p><p>The consequence of stimulating financial speculation is that today’s authorities are attempting to make the financial markets into a lotto-like game, rather than a market for long-term investment. To make the financial markets into liquid and volatile public “games” means that the <i>risks</i> involved in the financial speculation are created by the human hand and the economic system<i> itself</i> rather than being naturally given. This places <i>desire</i> rather than rational <i>needs</i> as the fundamental ground of the economy. The concluding question is; why are we making our economy into a game? </p>

Finansvärlden är avantgardistisk i sitt höga arbetstempo och i att bana väg för en abstrakt informationsekonomi, och pengar styr verksamheten på ett sätt som föregripit förändring i samhället i denna riktning. Svenska finansmänniskor uppvisar en urban, stockholmsk övremedelklasskultur men är samtidigt del av en framåtriktad,västerländsk elitkultur. Nationella drag slätas ut efter en amerikansk modell. Svensk finansmarknad kan ha mer av amerikansk, kalvinistiskt-puritansk arbetsetik än med luthersk av svenskt snitt. Mina intervjupersoner bär på protestantisk arbetsetik i form av individualism, flit och asketism. Finansmänniskors nyktra affärssinne liknar puritanens tidigkapitalistiska mentalitet. Individer på finansiella marknader kan svårligen se konsekvenser av sina handlingar. Finansmarknaden är en amoralisk näring, där många aktörer avstår från att ta moralisk ställning. / Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2001

This dissertation consists of four self-contained essays primarily concerned with incorporating the objectives of real world top managers, as revealed by the available empirical evidence, in supergame-theoretic analyses of long-term competition between oligopolistic firms. The first essay, "Ownership, Control, and Collusion", considers how the separation between ownership and control affects firms' competitive attitudes when top managers have the preference for smooth profit streams revealed by the evidence on "income smoothing" and when managerial compensation has the low pay-performance sensitivity found in many empirical studies. In a similar fashion, the second essay, "Stock-Related Compensation and Product-Market Competition", deals with the effects of the apparently more aggressive managerial incentives linked to stock price (e.g. stock options), which have become increasingly common in the U.S., on long-term oligopolistic competition. In the third paper, "Debt as a (Credible) Collusive Device", shareholders’ commitments to reduce conflicts with debtholders by choosing a top manager with a highly valuable reputation or with "conservative" incentives are considered. These forms of commitment have been shown to reduce the (agency) cost of debt finance; this paper characterizes their effects on the relation between firms' capital structure and product market competition. The fourth paper, "Multimarket Contact, Concavity, and Collusion", addresses the relation between multimarket contact and firms’ ability to sustain collusive behavior in repeated oligopolies. It explores how this relation is affected by the strict concavity of firms’ objective function induced by managerial objectives and by other features of reality, discusses the effects of conglomeration and horizontal mergers, and extends the results to non-oligopolistic supergames. / <p>Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 1999</p>

Financial speculation has increased dramatically over the last 30 years. This means that a practice that used to be viewed as immoral gambling has become legitimate financial trade. This book explores the genealogy of the coexisting insider trading laws. The insider regulation prohibits trade based on privileged information in order to create equal trading conditions, and in this way uphold confidence in the financial markets among the general public. However, this study shows that the existing view of the insider regulation is misleading and that the regulation is best understood as a game rule aiming to stimulate financial speculation. The protection interest is therefore not primarily the general public, but the financial system as such: the professional market actors sustaining the speculative activities and a growing financial sector. The consequence of stimulating financial speculation is that today’s authorities are attempting to make the financial markets into a lotto-like game, rather than a market for long-term investment. To make the financial markets into liquid and volatile public “games” means that the risks involved in the financial speculation are created by the human hand and the economic system itself rather than being naturally given. This places desire rather than rational needs as the fundamental ground of the economy. The concluding question is; why are we making our economy into a game?

The thesis is divided into three chapters.1) I study how monetary policy should be optimally designed when households show financial wealth heterogeneity.Main results: thanks to its ability to affect interest payments volatility, monetary policy has real effects even in a flexible-price cashless-limit environment; second, in a setup with nominal rigidities, price stability is no longer optimal. The extent of deviation from price stability depends on the initial level of debt dispersion.2) I assess the role of housing price movements in influencing the optimal design of monetary policy. Under the optimal simple rule, housing price movements should not be a separate target variable in addition to inflation. Furthermore, the welfare loss arising from targeting housing prices becomes quantitatively more significant the higher the degree of access to the credit market.3) I analyze the effects of fiscal policy in a currency area. Results: a public spending shock in one region increases private agents demand for imports and appreciates the terms of trade; second, a countercyclical fiscal rule can restore the Taylor principle, the uniqueness of the equilibrium and reduce macro-volatility.