Le sens symbolique du corps, autour de 1900, change : son inscription sociale collective et sa valeur pour l’individu se transforment. On assiste dans les premières décennies du vingtième siècle à l’érosion d’un monde d’hier devant les audaces de pionniers réformateurs de la vie et des avant-gardes artistiques (danseurs, chorégraphes, metteurs en scène), qui repoussent les limites de ce que peut un corps – non seulement les normes de la morale, du bienséant, mais aussi l’inédit, lié à la possibilité de techniques nouvelles. Comment, dès lors, se traduit l’évolution du sens du corps ? A quoi ressemble le corps moderne par rapport à celui du dix-neuvième siècle – dans les façons d’être, mais aussi les façons d’être affecté et de s’exprimer ? Quelle incidence, enfin, a le changement de sens du corps sur la façon de concevoir le rapport à son propre corps comme à celui d’autrui ? Deux tendances sous-tendent le principe de malléabilité dans le bouleversement des formes de vie et des stratégies d’individuation de la société moderne, par-delà leurs disparités : la première correspond à une transposition de la pensée fonctionnaliste et de la fétichisation capitaliste de l’objet sur le corps, alors que la seconde cherche, au contraire, à ressaisir le corps sous l’aspect de la vie organique pour articuler matière et esprit dans une perspective vitaliste, davantage unitaire. Notre enquête suit le développement de ces deux tendances pour montrer comment elles s’articulent dans les deux sphères sociale et esthétique jusque dans l’entre deux-guerres. / Around 1900 the symbolic meaning of the body around 1900 changes : its collective social meaning, as well as its individual value, evolve. During the first decades of the 20th century, the world of yesterday erodes while daring reformers of life and avant-garde artists (dancers, choreographers, stage directors) try to push the limits of what a body can – not only the moral norms, of the decorous, but also the unprecedented of new possibilities brought by new technologies. What does this evolution of the meaning of the body result into? What does the modern body look like, as opposed to the 19th century – in the ways of being, of feeling and expressing oneself? How does that change affect the way of perceiving the body, the other’s and mine? Two tendencies underlie the principle of malleability in this upheaval of the forms of life and of the strategies of individualization within modern society, beyond their disparities: on the one hand, a transposition of the functionalist thought and fetish for the object induced by capitalism onto the body; on the other, an opposite tendency to take hold of the body as an organic living form, as an attempt to articulate matter and spirit in a more unitary and vitalist perspective. We will follow the development of both these tendencies and show how they develop within the social and aesthetic spheres until the end of the interwar period.

The graduation theses is engaged in theoretical and practical analysis of particular sorts of life insurance on Czech market. The theoretical analysis describes traditional and modern forms of life insurance. In the practical analysis are interpreted statistical data from The Czech association of insurance companies.

A proposta desta tese é interpretar os escritos de Georg Simmel (1958-1918) a partir de uma leitura cruzada entre dois momentos maiores de sua obra: as investigações sobre o dinheiro, cujos resultados mais substanciais foram reunidos em Filosofa do dinheiro (1900), e os argumentos de sua metafísica da vida, desenvolvidos em especial nos seus últimos anos e apresentados em suas consequências flosófcas no testamentário Visão da vida (1918). Essa perspectiva implica, no mesmo passo, uma segunda leitura cruzada. Pois uma instância central do desenvolvimento de um conceito enfático de vida, tal como aquele fornecido nos últimos escritos do autor, reside no âmbito de sua flosofa da arte: desdobradas em inúmeros ensaios ao longo de sua carreira intelectual, as refexões estéticas de Simmel culminaram na publicação de Rembrandt (1916), um livro também assentado no conceito de vida característico de suas últimas obras. Um primeiro resultado dessa leitura reside na constatação de que não se tem aí a mera relação entre uma flosofa do dinheiro e uma flosofa da vida concebida seja sob o signo da ruptura, seja da continuidade , mas entre duas flosofas da vida. A despeito das continuidades entre ambos os projetos por exemplo, o caráter relativista das duas flosofas, no interior das quais a vida é igualmente considerada como movimento, fuxo, vivacidade da interação , são aqui também destacadas suas cisões. Na Filosofa do dinheiro, a vida se manifesta sobretudo ali onde suas oposicoes chegam a uma tensao maxima, encontrando na circulação abstrata do dinheiro o símbolo de suas principais formas de movimento. Essa dinâmica se manifesta particularmente nos fenômenos paradoxais ou patológicos do valor, do desejo, da troca e da teleologia, que confguram em conjunto uma determinada forma de vida ou, nos termos da sociologia simmeliana, uma forma da socialização: a troca econômica ou troca-sacrifício. Nessa primeira perspectiva, as manifestações problemáticas da economia monetária e da cultura moderna encontram seu contraponto nas fguras positivas, em larga medida implícitas, do desejo racional e da ação teleológica razoável. Tais fenômenos serão posteriormente interpretados à luz da flosofa simmeliana da cultura, fundada na tradição alemã da Bildung e na qual a noção de cultivo, entendida como o desenvolvimento das potencialidades inerentes a cada sujeito, ocupa um lugar central. Os paradoxos da cultura se manifestam então como patologias do cultivo, como hipertrofa da cultura objetiva em relação à subjetiva, em suma, como alienação. Nos últimos escritos de Simmel, porém, a vida não surge mais ali onde os opostos convivem em máxima tensão, mas justamente onde tais oposições aparecem suspensas ou sequer são destacadas do movimento da vida, concebido agora como fuxo contínuo e indiferenciado. A despeito de sua relação necessariamente problemática com a forma, a vida pode agora encontrar uma expressão adequada para si mesma em certas modalidades de experiência artística ou social, nas quais se manifesta não somente outra concepção ou outro modo de expressão da vida, mas também outra forma de vida. Desse ponto de vista, as autocontradições da economia monetária e da cultura moderna não aparecem mais como desejo e ação irrazoáveis ou irracionais, nem como patologias do cultivo ou alienação, mas sob o signo do mecanicismo, como patologias da vitalidade / This thesis interprets the writings of Georg Simmel (1858-1918) from a reading that crosses two biggest moments of his work: the investigation into the money gathered in Philosophy of Money (1900) and the arguments of his metaphysics of life, presented in Vision of life. Four metaphysical essays (1918). This perspective led one second crisscross within the philosophy of art of the author, formulated primarily in Rembrandt. An essay in the philosophy of art (1916 ). The main )nding is that it is not the mere relationship between a philosophy of money and a philosophy of life, but more speci)cally the relationship between two philosophies of life. The concept of life plays a central role in the Philosophy of money, though not in the same terms of Simmel\'s later metaphysics. Despite the continuities between both projects it is also necessary to highlight their divisions. In that work, life is most clearly where their opposition reach a maximum tension or where it is presented in a dialectics without reconciliation that meets in the incessant movement of money the symbol of their main forms of movement. This dynamic is particularly manifested in speci)c categories of value, desire, exchange and of the discernible teleology from the money, which constitute in the aggregate a certain form of life or, in Simmel terms, a form of socialization. If such manifestations of monetary behavior, desire and teleology appear as problematic or pathological, it is in contrast to the positive )gures of a rational desire and a reasonable teleological action. Within his )rst philosophy of life, such phenomena would be conceived from the idea of culture itself, as the cultivation of the potential inherent in each subject; a framework in which the paradoxes and pathologies of culture emerge as conditions of cultivation, that is, as alienation. Already in his later philosophy of life, life no longer appears where it presents the coexistence of opposites in maximum tension, but precisely where such oppositions appear suspended or even highlighted the movement of life, now conceived as a continuous and undifferentiated fow. According to Simmel, this troubled relationship with form meets an adequate expression in certain modes of expression and artistic experience, from which protrudes another concept not only of life, but as another form of life, to the extent that the relationship between creator and receiver are given through certain art forms, corresponding to another mode of action (such as creation) and otherwise sensitive experience. The pathologies of modern monetary economics and culture arise, then, in a different light, not as inversions or interruptions of desire and reasonable or rational or as conditions of cultivation action, but as mechanical forma of life, as pathologies of vitality. Thus, in Simmels intellectual path, each time it comes to characterize the form of life symbolized by money, in its paradoxical character, self-contradictory or pathological, from different conceptions

A proposta desta tese é interpretar os escritos de Georg Simmel (1958-1918) a partir de uma leitura cruzada entre dois momentos maiores de sua obra: as investigações sobre o dinheiro, cujos resultados mais substanciais foram reunidos em Filosofa do dinheiro (1900), e os argumentos de sua metafísica da vida, desenvolvidos em especial nos seus últimos anos e apresentados em suas consequências flosófcas no testamentário Visão da vida (1918). Essa perspectiva implica, no mesmo passo, uma segunda leitura cruzada. Pois uma instância central do desenvolvimento de um conceito enfático de vida, tal como aquele fornecido nos últimos escritos do autor, reside no âmbito de sua flosofa da arte: desdobradas em inúmeros ensaios ao longo de sua carreira intelectual, as refexões estéticas de Simmel culminaram na publicação de Rembrandt (1916), um livro também assentado no conceito de vida característico de suas últimas obras. Um primeiro resultado dessa leitura reside na constatação de que não se tem aí a mera relação entre uma flosofa do dinheiro e uma flosofa da vida concebida seja sob o signo da ruptura, seja da continuidade , mas entre duas flosofas da vida. A despeito das continuidades entre ambos os projetos por exemplo, o caráter relativista das duas flosofas, no interior das quais a vida é igualmente considerada como movimento, fuxo, vivacidade da interação , são aqui também destacadas suas cisões. Na Filosofa do dinheiro, a vida se manifesta sobretudo ali onde suas oposicoes chegam a uma tensao maxima, encontrando na circulação abstrata do dinheiro o símbolo de suas principais formas de movimento. Essa dinâmica se manifesta particularmente nos fenômenos paradoxais ou patológicos do valor, do desejo, da troca e da teleologia, que confguram em conjunto uma determinada forma de vida ou, nos termos da sociologia simmeliana, uma forma da socialização: a troca econômica ou troca-sacrifício. Nessa primeira perspectiva, as manifestações problemáticas da economia monetária e da cultura moderna encontram seu contraponto nas fguras positivas, em larga medida implícitas, do desejo racional e da ação teleológica razoável. Tais fenômenos serão posteriormente interpretados à luz da flosofa simmeliana da cultura, fundada na tradição alemã da Bildung e na qual a noção de cultivo, entendida como o desenvolvimento das potencialidades inerentes a cada sujeito, ocupa um lugar central. Os paradoxos da cultura se manifestam então como patologias do cultivo, como hipertrofa da cultura objetiva em relação à subjetiva, em suma, como alienação. Nos últimos escritos de Simmel, porém, a vida não surge mais ali onde os opostos convivem em máxima tensão, mas justamente onde tais oposições aparecem suspensas ou sequer são destacadas do movimento da vida, concebido agora como fuxo contínuo e indiferenciado. A despeito de sua relação necessariamente problemática com a forma, a vida pode agora encontrar uma expressão adequada para si mesma em certas modalidades de experiência artística ou social, nas quais se manifesta não somente outra concepção ou outro modo de expressão da vida, mas também outra forma de vida. Desse ponto de vista, as autocontradições da economia monetária e da cultura moderna não aparecem mais como desejo e ação irrazoáveis ou irracionais, nem como patologias do cultivo ou alienação, mas sob o signo do mecanicismo, como patologias da vitalidade / This thesis interprets the writings of Georg Simmel (1858-1918) from a reading that crosses two biggest moments of his work: the investigation into the money gathered in Philosophy of Money (1900) and the arguments of his metaphysics of life, presented in Vision of life. Four metaphysical essays (1918). This perspective led one second crisscross within the philosophy of art of the author, formulated primarily in Rembrandt. An essay in the philosophy of art (1916 ). The main )nding is that it is not the mere relationship between a philosophy of money and a philosophy of life, but more speci)cally the relationship between two philosophies of life. The concept of life plays a central role in the Philosophy of money, though not in the same terms of Simmel\'s later metaphysics. Despite the continuities between both projects it is also necessary to highlight their divisions. In that work, life is most clearly where their opposition reach a maximum tension or where it is presented in a dialectics without reconciliation that meets in the incessant movement of money the symbol of their main forms of movement. This dynamic is particularly manifested in speci)c categories of value, desire, exchange and of the discernible teleology from the money, which constitute in the aggregate a certain form of life or, in Simmel terms, a form of socialization. If such manifestations of monetary behavior, desire and teleology appear as problematic or pathological, it is in contrast to the positive )gures of a rational desire and a reasonable teleological action. Within his )rst philosophy of life, such phenomena would be conceived from the idea of culture itself, as the cultivation of the potential inherent in each subject; a framework in which the paradoxes and pathologies of culture emerge as conditions of cultivation, that is, as alienation. Already in his later philosophy of life, life no longer appears where it presents the coexistence of opposites in maximum tension, but precisely where such oppositions appear suspended or even highlighted the movement of life, now conceived as a continuous and undifferentiated fow. According to Simmel, this troubled relationship with form meets an adequate expression in certain modes of expression and artistic experience, from which protrudes another concept not only of life, but as another form of life, to the extent that the relationship between creator and receiver are given through certain art forms, corresponding to another mode of action (such as creation) and otherwise sensitive experience. The pathologies of modern monetary economics and culture arise, then, in a different light, not as inversions or interruptions of desire and reasonable or rational or as conditions of cultivation action, but as mechanical forma of life, as pathologies of vitality. Thus, in Simmels intellectual path, each time it comes to characterize the form of life symbolized by money, in its paradoxical character, self-contradictory or pathological, from different conceptions

Cette thèse porte sur la question du temps social comme enjeu stratégique pour les communautés révolutionnaires métropolitaines en France à partir de l'étude de trois d'entre elles localisées à Caen, Rennes et Nantes. Ce travail s'attache à montrer les processus historiques d'institution du temps social et les tentatives visant sa destitution. Il s'engage par un retour epistémo-méthodologique sur la constitution de la sociologie à partir d'une discussion entre Durkheim et Marx. Nous défendons l'hypothèse selon laquelle la discipline se constitue davantage comme une science de l'ordre visant la stabilisation des institutions, puis avec d'autres auteurs nous essayons de dégager les voies d'une sociologie de la destitution qui assume une politique d'intervention. Partant, nous nous employons dans un premier temps (partie 2) à mener une sociologie critique classique basée sur une approche sociohistorique de la domination, en l'espèce une histoire de l'institution du temps social à partir d’une étude du travail, de la vie quotidienne, des rapports de pouvoir. Dans les parties 3 et 4 nous proposons une socioanthropologie de formes-de-vies communistes œuvrant à la fois dans la lutte contre le temps social institué (contretemps révolutionnaires, dimension négative) et affirmant un rapport au temps partant des usages (contre-temps révolutionnaires, dimension positive). L’objectif de cette thèse est de monter la façon dont un horizon post-capitaliste s’expérimente ici et maintenant, la façon dont il prend en charge ou non la question de la domination du temps social institué, la façon, aussi, dont il est réprimé. / This thesis deals with the question of social time as a strategic issue for the metropolitan revolutionary communities in France from the study of three of them located in Caen, Rennes and Nantes. This work seeks to show the historical processes of the institution of social time and attempts to destitute it. It begins by an epistemological and methodological return on the constitution of sociology through a discussion between Durkheim and Marx. We defend the hypothesis according to which the discipline is constituted more like a science of the established order aiming at the stabilization of the institutions. Then, with other authors, we try to clear the ways of a sociology of the destitution which undertakes a politics of intervention. Therefore, we begin at first (part 2) to investigate in a classical critical sociology’s way based on a sociohistorical approach of domination – in this case a history of the institution of social time through a study of work, of everyday life and power relations. In parts 3 and 4 we propose a socioanthropology of communist forms-of-life leading at the same time a fight against the instituted social time (revolutionary countertimes, negative dimension) and affirming a relation to the time starting from the activities (revolutionary counter-time, positive dimension). The aim of this thesis is to show how a post-capitalist horizon experiences itself here and now, the way in which it takes over or not the question of the domination of the instituted social time, the way, also, which it is repressed.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:27:00Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Jonnefer Francisco Barbosa.pdf: 1451287 bytes, checksum: 4a8ac398f7c4c388e91be584717c42ca (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-04-17 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / The present thesis aims to address the problem of the relations between politics and time in the work of the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben, which is situated within four thresholds where this question is further developed: a) the problem about bare life and forms-of-life; b) the community problem; c) the state of exception; d) the relation among time, memory and history. From the inventory that Agamben will make out of the originating concepts of the treaty of Aristotle Peris Psykhês as well as the archaic Roman Law towards the definition of bare life , to the Agamben s readings on the reflections of Walter Benjamin, Hannah Arendt and Michel Foucault, which will be tackled as biopolitical hypothesis , by going through surveys on the Schmitt s exception and the reine Gewalt in Benjamin s, the thesis is intended to expose the inevitable threshold of the political problems with the discussions on time and memory within Agamben s philosophy presented below, in addition to some of the main difficulties, implications and contradictions involving its formulation. Thresholds (Schwellen) must be understood herein not only in a methodological but also epistemological sense the way that Agamben thinks its philosophy, through ontology, politics, law and esthetics and the temporary sense, the specificity of the thresholding concept to characterize the unique relation about the human time with the memory, the history and the politics / A presente tese objetiva abordar o problema das relações entre política e tempo na obra do filósofo italiano Giorgio Agamben, situando-o a partir de quatro limiares onde esta questão é ali desenvolvida: a) a problemática da vida nua e das formas-de-vida; b) o problema da comunidade; c) o estado de exceção; d) a relação entre o tempo, a memória e a história. Do inventário que fará Agamben de conceitos oriundos do tratado aristotélico Peris Psykhês e do direito romano arcaico para a definição da vida nua , às leituras agambenianas das reflexões de Walter Benjamin, Hannah Arendt e Michel Foucault a partir do que chamaremos de hipótese biopolítica , passando pelas pesquisas sobre o estado de exceção schmittiano e a reine Gewalt em Benjamin, esta tese pretende expor a inevitável imbricação da problemática política com os debates em torno do tempo e da memória na filosofia agambeniana, apresentado, ademais, algumas das principais aporias, implicações e antinomias envolvendo sua formulação. Limiares (Schwellen) devem ser entendidos aqui tanto em um sentido metodológico e epistemológico a forma como Agamben pensa sua filosofia, na passagem entre a ontologia, a política, o direito e a estética quanto em um sentido temporal, a especificidade do conceito de limiar para caracterizar a singular relação do tempo humano com a memória, a história e a política

Trata-se, nesta dissertação, da análise do conceito de gramática, tal como Wittgenstein o usa no período de escrita das Investigações Filosóficas. Nesse sentido, mostra-se que ele não julga que a gramática seja essencial para a instituição de uma linguagem. Um corolário disso é que aquilo que Wittgenstein chamou, de modo bastante geral, de regras gramaticais tampouco o são. Veremos que esta posição é o resultado de uma virada importante no pensamento de Wittgenstein, a partir da qual os conceitos de forma de vida e prática, bem como o papel da experiência, em geral, assumem posição fundamental em sua apresentação do que seja a linguagem. Com efeito, é partir destes conceitos que poderemos apresentar com alguma perspicuidade as fontes da normatividade da linguagem, em geral, e da gramática, em especial. / The central topic of this dissertation is the analysis of the concept of grammar, as Wittgenstein uses it in the period of composition of the Philosophical Investigations. In this sense, we will show that he does not think that a grammar is an essential condition for the establishment of a language. A corollary of this latter point is that what Wittgenstein called, quite generally, rules of grammar does not constitute such a condition either. We will see that this position is the result of a major turning point in Wittgensteins thought, from which the concepts of form of life and practice, as well as the role of experience, in general, assume a key position in his presentation of what language is. Taking this concepts as point of departure, we intend to present with some perspicuity some sources of the normativity of language, in general, and of grammar, in particular.

Trata-se, nesta dissertação, da análise do conceito de gramática, tal como Wittgenstein o usa no período de escrita das Investigações Filosóficas. Nesse sentido, mostra-se que ele não julga que a gramática seja essencial para a instituição de uma linguagem. Um corolário disso é que aquilo que Wittgenstein chamou, de modo bastante geral, de regras gramaticais tampouco o são. Veremos que esta posição é o resultado de uma virada importante no pensamento de Wittgenstein, a partir da qual os conceitos de forma de vida e prática, bem como o papel da experiência, em geral, assumem posição fundamental em sua apresentação do que seja a linguagem. Com efeito, é partir destes conceitos que poderemos apresentar com alguma perspicuidade as fontes da normatividade da linguagem, em geral, e da gramática, em especial. / The central topic of this dissertation is the analysis of the concept of grammar, as Wittgenstein uses it in the period of composition of the Philosophical Investigations. In this sense, we will show that he does not think that a grammar is an essential condition for the establishment of a language. A corollary of this latter point is that what Wittgenstein called, quite generally, rules of grammar does not constitute such a condition either. We will see that this position is the result of a major turning point in Wittgensteins thought, from which the concepts of form of life and practice, as well as the role of experience, in general, assume a key position in his presentation of what language is. Taking this concepts as point of departure, we intend to present with some perspicuity some sources of the normativity of language, in general, and of grammar, in particular.

Le point de départ de ce travail est une réflexion sur le concept de l’événement dans la philosophie contemporaine. Nos recherches sur l’usage de ce concept révèlent la polysémie du terme et, pour la philosophie politique française notamment, deux défauts : une incapacité d’établir des critères opératoires pour la pratique de l’histoire; une tendance à réduire l’action politique à sa conjoncture historique. Hannah Arendt et Michel Foucault, plus particulièrement dans son « tournant éthique », se confrontent à ce dernier problème du rapport entre l’action politique et le temps historique : chez eux, le terme « événement » ouvre sur la participation politique du philosophe/théoricien qui se penche sur des événements particuliers et qui articule leur sens dans sa propre actualité. Mais pour penser cette relation entre action politique contemporaine et histoire, nos deux auteurs ne sont pas contentés de retravailler un concept de l’événement ν ils se sont tournés vers des concepts, des pratiques et des événements « prémodernes », élaborées notamment en Grèce et à Rome. De là, une question fondamentalement historique : étant donné la réinsertion de l’action dans l’histoire opérée par le topos contemporain de l’événement, étant donné la critique de l’histoire et du sujet modernes, quels sont les rapports principaux entre l’histoire et l’action dans la prémodernité ? Après avoir parcouru les topoï historiques des temps prémodernes, nous reviendrons vers Arendt et Foucault pour interroger leurs propres représentations de l’Antiquité et de ses « formes de vie » : le souci de soi et le philosophe, la polis, l’autorité et l’acteur. Ces descriptions mèneront à une analyse du tempshistorique que ces représentations présupposent, mais aussi celle de leur fonction performative, voire transformatrice. Ces analyses confirmeront notre hypothèse, à savoir que des concepts historiques prémodernes sont, à certains égards, reconduits sous la plume d’Arendt et de Foucault. / The starting point of our reflections here concerns the concept of the event in contemporary philosophy. After an evaluation of the many meanings reattached to the term, we isolate two related concerns within contemporary political philosophy’s use of it : the inability to produce effective criteria for determining specific “events”; a tendency to reduce political action to its emergence within a larger and all-pervading historical framework. Hannah Arendt and Michel Foucault (in his “ethical turn”) avoid these pitfalls, defining the term while at the same time reflecting upon the conditions of political participation, particularly the role of the philosopher/theorist attempting to understand specific events and determine their meaning. But in thinking about this relationship, the two authors do not focus their attention on the concept of the eventν they look to “pre-modern” concepts, practices and events, particularly in Greece and Rome.At this point we ask an essentially historical question: given the “event’s” reduction of political action within history, given the critique of the modern subject and of modern history what are some of the relationships between history and political action in Ancient and Medieval historical practices? After identifying a number of historical themes during these periods, we return to Foucault and Arendt to enquire about their own representations of ancient thought and “forms of life”: the care of self and the philosopher, the polis, Roman authority and the idea of the actor… These descriptions will lead to ananalysis of the historical time that these representations presuppose, on the one hand, and of theirperformative and transformative functions, on the other. These enquiries will confirm our hypothesis,to wit, some pre-modern historical concepts are in fact renewed in the writings of Hannah Arendt and Michel Foucault.

L'histoire est la connaissance de la vie des hommes du passé. Mais l'approche nécessairement rétrospective de l'historien est en contradiction avec la vie qui est, par définition, tournée vers l'avenir. Le savoir historique a donc comme condition de possibilité l'acte de pensée par lequel on imagine, ou l'on fait comme si on vivait à l'époque que l'on cherche à connaître. Or c'est dans le jeu que l'on fait « comme si » l'on vivait telle ou telle chose. Plus spécifiquement, le jeu vidéo fait entrer le joueur, par la représentation, dans un univers concret dont la consistance réside dans la résistance et les appuis qu'il offre à l'action du joueur. Le jeu vidéo est en cela susceptible de permettre au joueur de vivre, en actes, le passé au présent. Toutefois, comme cette forme spécifique de représentation n'a jamais été élaborée ni utilisée dans une perspective proprement savante, il ne va pas de soi pour l'historien d'en faire le médium de l'élaboration et de la transmission de son savoir. L'examen épistémologique de ses ressources propres nous conduit non seulement à remettre en cause la position de Ricoeur selon laquelle la forme exclusive de la connaissance historique est le récit, mais aussi à concevoir une nouvelle forme de jeu vidéo qui permette de faire véritablement l'expérience des formes de vie d'une société révolue. Le joueur doit pouvoir mener, dans cet espace social, un parcours individuel fait de ses interactions avec des personnages non joueurs dont le processus d'individuation procède, lui aussi, du jeu, c'est-à-dire de l'entrelacs, des initiatives des uns et des autres au sein de relations sociales dont les formes et le cadre sont historiquement définis. / History is the knowledge of men's life in the past. But the historian necessarily has a retrospective approach, in contradiction to life which is, by definition, forward-looking. In aiming to resolve this tension, historical knowledge involves the act of thought by which we act as if we were living in the era we seek to know. Acting "as if" we were living such and such an experience is playing. More specifically, the video game brings the player through representation in a particular universe whose consistency lies in the resistance and, on the other hand, the support it offers to the player's enterprises. The video game form is likely to allow the player to experience past times in the present. However, this specific form of representation has never been developed or used in a proper scholarly perspective, and it is far from being naturel for the historian to use it as the medium of development and transmission of knowledge. The epistemological review of its own resources leads us not only to question Ricoeur's position that narrative is the exclusive form of historical knowledge, but also to design a new kind of video game that allows us to experience ways of life of bygone societies ; the player's personal journey in this social space proceeds from interactions with non-player characters whose individuation process also results from the intertwining between enterprises of all characters in social relations which have historically defined forms.