Thèse réalisée en cotutelle avec l'Université de Lausanne / Cette thèse porte sur l’administration des demandes de mort à partir de deux modalités controversées, l’aide médicale à mourir au Québec (Canada) et l’assistance au suicide dans le canton de Vaud (Suisse). Au Québec, l’assistance à mourir est un service public médical, tandis que dans le canton de Vaud, elle est un acte privé toléré par l’État et mis en œuvre par des associations. Selon la façon dont la question de l’assistance à mourir est posée dans les deux contextes, différentes réponses y sont apportées qui reflètent des formes variées de concernement pour cette pratique. Je suggère que ces deux régimes contrastés d’assistance à mourir peuvent être compris dans un même mouvement analytique, malgré les différences qui les séparent. Suivant une perspective comparative et ethnographique, cette thèse explore les façons dont sont mises en œuvre les quatre conditions de possibilité de l’assistance à mourir que j’identifie, et ce à plusieurs échelles, des débats publics aux expériences immédiates des personnes directement concernées. L’enquête repose sur quatre années de recherche, croisant des entretiens, des observations, une revue de presse, ainsi que des analyses de sources documentaires. Cette thèse arrive au constat que les régimes québécois et vaudois d’assistance à mourir se rejoignent autour de maximes morales pratiques employées par les personnes concernées. Ces maximes, qui se matérialisent dans des paroles quotidiennes et des dispositifs institutionnels, encadrent le trouble suscité par l’assistance à mourir et répondent aux quatre conditions de possibilité identifiées. Cette éthique en actes balise l’espace étroit que les personnes concernées doivent naviguer pour rendre l’assistance à mourir possible. J’examine finalement ce qui guette les protagonistes, ainsi que la société, lorsque ces conditions ne sont pas réunies. Plus généralement, la comparaison de l’administration des demandes de mort dans ces deux régimes contrastés ouvre sur une interrogation des frontières de la médecine, du droit et de la vie. L’analyse des conditions de possibilité et des contours du trouble contribue également aux réflexions sur la mise en œuvre des droits, dont celui à la liberté de conscience. / This thesis is about the administration of death requests from two controversial modalities, medical aid in dying in Quebec (Canada) and assisted suicide in the canton of Vaud (Switzerland). In Quebec, assistance in dying is a public medical service, while in the canton of Vaud it is a private act tolerated by the state and implemented by associations. According to how the assistance to dying question is raised in both contexts, different answers are given which reflect different forms of concern for this practice. I suggest that these two contrasting regimes of assistance in dying can be understood in the same analytical movement despite their differences. From a comparative and ethnographic perspective, this thesis explores how the four conditions that enable the possibility of assistance in dying that I identify are put into practice at different scales, from public debates to the experiences of people who are directly involved. The research is based on four years of investigation relying on interviews, observations, a press review, and analyses of documentary sources. This thesis concludes that the assistance in dying regimes of Quebec and Vaud have practical moral maxims used by the people involved in common. These maxims, which emerge in everyday words and institutional arrangements, frame the trouble that arises from the confrontation with assistance in dying and meet the four enabling conditions identified. This ethics in action circumscribes the narrow space that the people involved must navigate to make assistance in dying possible. Finally, I examine what awaits the actors, as well as the society, when these conditions are not met. More generally, comparing the administration of death requests in these two contrasting regimes leads to questioning the boundaries of medicine, law and life itself. Analyzing these enabling conditions and the bounds of the trouble contributes to the reflections on the implementation of rights, including the right to freedom of conscience.

Reformed Christians utilise article 36 of the Belgic Confession (BC) to state the Godly calling of civil authorities. This confession may however be in conflict with the South African constitution. According to article 36 authorities have, in accordance with the keeping of order, a duty concerning the removal of false religion. The constitution guarantees everyone in South Africa freedom of religion. This study thus investigates the following stated problem: To what does God call South-African authorities within the constitutional democracy in the light of art. 36 and how can they fulfil this calling? The investigation has been undertaken in line with the argument that the principals of art. 36 are not only Biblical but should also still be used as a starting point to identify the calling of South African authorities concerning the keeping of order as well as the protection of the ministry of the Holy Word and the Christian life according to this Word. The following three investigations were then launched: * A dogmahistorical and theological-ethical investigation Chapter 2 focuses on the context in which the BC originated. It was drafted to convince Roman Catholic minded authorities to stop persecuting Reformed Christians as they - in contrast with some revolutionary Anabaptists - wanted to obey the government. Reformed Christians wanted to live according to the Word (which requires obedience to the authorities). If the authorities protected the ministry of the Word, peace and order would be promoted. Chapter 3 explains art. 36. This explanation is complicated by the fact that the article has been changed over time. In certain instances it has been interpreted to mean that God, in light of the close bond between church and state at that time, calls civil authorities to persecute heretics even with force. The article however actually calls authorities to protect the ministry of the Word and so doing support the removal of heresy. The article takes a narrow view of the true form of the true religion. * A constitutional investigation Chapter 4 describes the South African constitutional democracy as well as its origin and indicates what (sometimes unrecognised) role the Reformed tradition played in forging constitutional democracy. Subsequently the fundamental values and forthcoming stipulations concerning the freedom of conscience and religion are highlighted. Although authorities do not - in a juridical sense - contend with what would be the true form of the true religion, this study has found the constitutional values and forthcoming stipulations broadly agree with Biblical principles. Yet South African authorities interpret these values and stipulations in accordance with secularist / humanistic beliefs. * A contextual investigation This final chapter investigates how well the current constitutional framework enables (chapter 4) South African authorities to fulfil the calling (chapter 2 and 3).The final conclusion is that this framework does indeed enable these authorities to fulfil the calling by recognising, protecting and expanding the fundamental values, freedoms and rights which have been constitutionally entrenched in order that every one has the space and opportunity to utilise these rights and freedoms to live according to the gospel of Jesus Christ in all spheres of life This task undoubtedly includes that the authorities should protect the ministry of the Word by pertinently ensuring that churches have the opportunity to minister the Word to everyone. It has been found that authorities should preferably take up the attitude of the active plural option towards religion as this option is most suitable for fulfilling their calling. / Thesis (Ph.D. (Church and Dogma History))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2011.

Reformed Christians utilise article 36 of the Belgic Confession (BC) to state the Godly calling of civil authorities. This confession may however be in conflict with the South African constitution. According to article 36 authorities have, in accordance with the keeping of order, a duty concerning the removal of false religion. The constitution guarantees everyone in South Africa freedom of religion. This study thus investigates the following stated problem: To what does God call South-African authorities within the constitutional democracy in the light of art. 36 and how can they fulfil this calling? The investigation has been undertaken in line with the argument that the principals of art. 36 are not only Biblical but should also still be used as a starting point to identify the calling of South African authorities concerning the keeping of order as well as the protection of the ministry of the Holy Word and the Christian life according to this Word. The following three investigations were then launched: * A dogmahistorical and theological-ethical investigation Chapter 2 focuses on the context in which the BC originated. It was drafted to convince Roman Catholic minded authorities to stop persecuting Reformed Christians as they - in contrast with some revolutionary Anabaptists - wanted to obey the government. Reformed Christians wanted to live according to the Word (which requires obedience to the authorities). If the authorities protected the ministry of the Word, peace and order would be promoted. Chapter 3 explains art. 36. This explanation is complicated by the fact that the article has been changed over time. In certain instances it has been interpreted to mean that God, in light of the close bond between church and state at that time, calls civil authorities to persecute heretics even with force. The article however actually calls authorities to protect the ministry of the Word and so doing support the removal of heresy. The article takes a narrow view of the true form of the true religion. * A constitutional investigation Chapter 4 describes the South African constitutional democracy as well as its origin and indicates what (sometimes unrecognised) role the Reformed tradition played in forging constitutional democracy. Subsequently the fundamental values and forthcoming stipulations concerning the freedom of conscience and religion are highlighted. Although authorities do not - in a juridical sense - contend with what would be the true form of the true religion, this study has found the constitutional values and forthcoming stipulations broadly agree with Biblical principles. Yet South African authorities interpret these values and stipulations in accordance with secularist / humanistic beliefs. * A contextual investigation This final chapter investigates how well the current constitutional framework enables (chapter 4) South African authorities to fulfil the calling (chapter 2 and 3).The final conclusion is that this framework does indeed enable these authorities to fulfil the calling by recognising, protecting and expanding the fundamental values, freedoms and rights which have been constitutionally entrenched in order that every one has the space and opportunity to utilise these rights and freedoms to live according to the gospel of Jesus Christ in all spheres of life This task undoubtedly includes that the authorities should protect the ministry of the Word by pertinently ensuring that churches have the opportunity to minister the Word to everyone. It has been found that authorities should preferably take up the attitude of the active plural option towards religion as this option is most suitable for fulfilling their calling. / Thesis (Ph.D. (Church and Dogma History))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2011.

Le droit à la liberté de pensée, de conscience et de religion expressément reconnu à l’enfant par l’article 14 de la Convention internationale de New York adoptée en 1989 soulève de nombreuses questions. En raison de l’état de dépendance de l’enfant et de sa vulnérabilité, l’exercice de cette liberté apparaît particulièrement fragilisée. Les droits de l’enfant sont en effet menacés de toute part, tant par l’autorité publique, que par sa famille, ou par des tiers, voire par l’enfant lui-même. Les parents tout en étant les premiers protecteurs et les premiers « guides spirituels » de l’enfant pourront parallèlement représenter les premiers obstacles à l’exercice de sa liberté religieuse pleine et entière suscitant un conflit entre droits parentaux et droits de l’enfant. L’État s’érige d’ailleurs en protecteur lorsque ses parents lui font courir un risque au nom même de leurs convictions religieuses. Le juge pourra aussi connaître de conflits familiaux provoqués par un désaccord religieux. Garant de l’ordre public, l’État sera parfois amené à limiter la liberté religieuse de l’enfant et de ses parents en mettant en avant la primauté d’un intérêt social tel la sauvegarde du principe de laïcité. Il apparaît donc nécessaire de considérer la question de la liberté religieuse de l’enfant à la fois dans la sphère familiale et plus largement dans la société en nous interrogeant notamment quant à l’effectivité réelle du droit de liberté religieuse de l’enfant. Comme pour tout sujet touchant aux droits de l’enfant, la recherche de l’équilibre entre liberté et protection s’inscrit sur un chemin difficile dont témoigne l’étude du droit de l’enfant à la liberté religieuse. / The right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion expressly granted to the child under article 14 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child adopted in 1989 raises many questions. Regarding his particular dependence and vulnerability, the exercise of this liberty by the child appears particularly weaken. Children’s rights are indeed threatened from all quarters, so much by public authority as by their family or by third parties, if not by the child himself. Parents, while being his first protectors and first “spiritual guides”, can also represent the first obstacle to the full exercise of the child’s freedom of religion, therefore raising a conflict between parental and children’s rights. It is to be noticed that the State establishes itselfs as the protector of the child whenever parents endanger him even in the name of religious beliefs. The judge might also intervene within family conflicts resulting from religious disagreements. Ensuring public order as well, the State will in some cases subject child’s and parents’ freedom of religion to limitations deemed necessary in regard to the primacy of a particular social interest such as the protection of secularism. It seems therefore essential to consider the question of the child’s religious freedom within the family sphere as well as, to a larger extent, within society, while questioning the effectivity of the right of the child to religious freedom. As for any subject relating to children’s rights, the search for balance between freedom and protection is engaged on a difficult path as evidenced by this study on the right of the child to religious freedom.

Depuis l’arrêt Dagenais c. Radio-Canada, rendu en 1994, la Cour suprême du Canada n’a jamais remis en cause le principe selon lequel il ne doit exister aucune hiérarchie juridique entre les droits et libertés protégés par les chartes canadienne et québécoise. Or, une revue attentive de la jurisprudence canadienne en matière de protection des convictions religieuses nous a permis d’identifier une certaine réticence sinon un « certain malaise »  des institutions judiciaires lorsqu’elles doivent déterminer des limites claires au-delà desquelles les revendications fondées sur les convictions religieuses ne peuvent plus bénéficier d’une protection constitutionnelle ou quasi-constitutionnelle. Cette « réticence judiciaire » étant toute particulière aux dispositions protégeant les convictions religieuses au Canada, il nous a semblé plausible que ses impacts juridiques soient symptomatiques de l’établissement implicite – mais bien réel – d’une hiérarchie juridique matérielle (ou systémique) entre les différents droits fondamentaux protégés par les chartes canadienne et québécoise. En nous fondant sur un cadre d’analyse théorique inspiré par les travaux du professeur Rik Torfs, de l’Université catholique de Louvain en Belgique, et au moyen d’une étude focalisée sur le contexte des relations de travail, nous entendons démontrer que l’état actuel du droit canadien et québécois concernant les revendications fondées sur les différentes croyances et coutumes religieuses témoigne de l’application d’un modèle hiérarchique (le « modèle de confiance ») qui assigne aux dispositions concernant la protection des convictions religieuses individuelles une place parmi les plus élevées de cette même hiérarchie. Nous espérons ainsi contribuer de manière significative à la théorie du droit par l’atteinte de trois objectifs principaux : (1) Établir et mettre en œuvre une méthode permettant d’identifier une hiérarchie matérielle entre deux ensembles de droits fondamentaux ; (2) Mettre à jour l’étroite relation susceptible d’exister entre les différents modèles nationaux de gestion du pluralisme religieux et le concept de hiérarchie matérielle entre droits fondamentaux ; et (3) Établir l’existence d’une hiérarchie matérielle entre droits fondamentaux de nature constitutionnelle au Canada, par l’entremise de la démonstration du déséquilibre hiérarchique favorisant les dispositions protégeant les convictions religieuses au sein du plus large ensemble des droits et libertés de nature constitutionnelle au Canada / Since Dagenais c. Radio-Canada, rendered in 1994, the Supreme Court of Canada has never questioned the principle of “no legal hierarchy between the different Human Rights protected by the Canadian and Quebec charters. However, a careful review of Canadian jurisprudence on the protection of religious beliefs permits to detect a certain reluctance  if not a "discomfort"  of judicial institutions when they must identify clear boundaries beyond which the claims based on religious beliefs can not be constitutionnaly (or quasi-constitutionnaly) protected. This "judicial reluctance" being particular to provisions protecting religious convictions in Canada, it seemed possible to us that its impacts may be symptomatic of the implicit - but real - establishment a legal hierarchy between the various Human Rights protected by the Canadian and Quebec charters. Based on a theoretical framework inspired by the work of Rik Torfs, Professor in the Catholic University of Leuven in Belgium, and through a study focused on the context of labor relations, we intend to demonstrate that the current state of Canadian and Quebec law on claims based on different religious beliefs and customs underlies the application of a hierarchical model (the "trust model") which assigns to the provisions protecting individual religious beliefs a place among the highest in the same hierarchy. In doing so, we hope to contribute significantly to the theory of law by achieving three main objectives : (1) To establish and implement a method permitting to identify a material hierarchy between two sets of fundamental rights, (2) To expose the close relationship that may exist between the different national models of management of religious pluralism and the concept of material hierarchy among human rights, and (3) To establish the existence of a material hierarchy between constitutional Human rights in Canada through the demonstration of hierarchical imbalance favoring the provisions protecting religious beliefs within the broader set of constitutionnal Human Rights in Canada