Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2017-04-06T12:48:43Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Julia Gomes Pereira Maurmo.pdf: 2000890 bytes, checksum: 17aa3f13d871de6cf2c0758a98308db1 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-04-06T12:48:43Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Julia Gomes Pereira Maurmo.pdf: 2000890 bytes, checksum: 17aa3f13d871de6cf2c0758a98308db1 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-02-14 / The purpose of the present study is to cast a new light on the classic debate involving the apparent conflict between the right to be forgotten and the rights to freedom of expression and to memory, so that other elements can be considered when analyzing the concrete case. In addition to demonstrating the possibility of fulfilling all rights to their maximum extent possible, interdisciplinarity was used in order to evidence the importance of adding to the discussion the perspective of the indispensability of forgetting as a way of ensuring individual health and the dignified life of the citizens. Finally, decisions involving the “Candelária Massacre” and the “Aída Curi Case” were brought to discussion in order to demonstrate that, regarding the right to be forgotten, the inclusion of a perspective concerning health itself not only contributes to fairer decisions, but also provide more objective criteria to the implementation of such right / O presente estudo tem como objeto central lançar um novo olhar sobre a clássica discussão que envolve o aparente conflito entre o direito ao esquecimento e os direitos à liberdade de expressão e à memória, a fim de que outros elementos sejam considerados quando da análise do caso concreto. Para além de demonstrar a possibilidade de realização de todos os direitos envolvidos dentro de uma máxima medida possível, foi utilizado o recurso da interdisciplinaridade, a fim de se demonstrar a importância de se acrescentar à discussão a perspectiva da imprescindibilidade do esquecimento para assegurar a saúde individual e a vida digna dos cidadãos. Por fim, foram trazidas à colação recentes decisões envolvendo a “Chacina da Candelária” e o “Caso Aída Curi” com o intuito de se demonstrar que a inclusão do ponto de vista da saúde não apenas torna as decisões mais justas, como trazem critérios mais objetivos à aplicação deste direito

Prenant pour point de départ les controverses contemporaines sur la liberté d’expression et la vie privée à l’ère numérique, cette thèse propose de revisiter l’histoire d’Internet au croisement de l’histoire du droit, des théories politiques et de l’histoire des sciences et des techniques. À travers une enquête de temps long sur l’affrontement des stratégies de pouvoir et de résistance associées aux techniques de communication, elle se veut une contribution à l’histoire de l’espace public et de l’activisme numérique. À partir de la « naissance » de l’imprimerie, la première partie retrace les formes de contrôle de l’espace public qui se structurent en même temps que l’État moderne, et la manière dont elles sont reconduites dans le cadre des régimes représentatifs-libéraux (XVe-XXe siècle). Dans un deuxième temps, l’étude suit l’émergence des projets antagonistes qui ont présidé au développement des réseaux informatiques, et ce afin d’expliquer la profonde ambivalence des appropriations politiques de ces technologies, à la fois instrument de la domination technocratique et outil d’émancipation (1930-1990). La troisième partie revient sur les premières controverses autour des libertés sur Internet et la structuration de l’activisme numérique, Internet étant bientôt investi comme un espace et un objet de luttes politiques, dans une période marquée par la mondialisation néo-libérale (1990-2001). La quatrième illustre, à travers les mesures de contrôle d’Internet adoptées au nom de la « guerre contre le terrorisme » et à travers la répression de certaines franges de l’activisme numérique, les mutations illibérales des États (2001-2017). L’étude entend ainsi contribuer à une réflexion collective sur l’un des en jeux identifiés par Michel Foucault dans ses écrits sur le pouvoir, à savoir : « comment déconnecter la croissance des capacités » – en l’espèce, les capacités associées aux « techniques de communication » – « et l’intensification des relations de pouvoir » ? / Taking contemporary debates on freedom of expression and privacy in the digital age as a starting point, this thesis revisits the history of the Internet at the intersection of legal history, political theory and history of science and technology. Through a long-time study of the clash between power and resistance strategies associated with communication technologies, it aims to contribute to the history of the public sphere and of digital activism. From the inception of the printing press on, the first part provides an overview of the forms of control of the public sphere developed under the modern state power, and of their extension under liberal-representative regimes (15th 21st century). In the second part, the study follows the antagonist utopias that shaped the development of computing technologies to explain the pro found ambivalence of their political appropriations, these technologies being construed both as an instrument of technocratic domination and a tool for emancipation (1930-1990). The third part analyses early controversies around the protection of civil rights online and the growth of digital activism, as the Internet becomes a locus of political struggles in a period marked by neoliberal globalization (1990-2001). Finally, the fourth part surveys recent Internet control measures adopted in the name of the "war on terror" and the repression of some segments of digital activism to illustrate the illiberal drift in state practices (2001-2017). The study thus aims to advance a collective thinking on one of the key questions identified by Michel Foucault in his writings on power: "How can the growth of capabilities" – and more specifically those brought about by "techniques of communication" – "be disconnected from the intensification of power relations?"

Dans le contexte de la convergence, où une seule « plate-forme » est capable de fournir toutes les formes de communications possible, se pose la question de la fusion des organismes de réglementation distincts qui régulent, d’une part la communication audiovisuelle, d’autre part les télécommunications. C’est ainsi que fut créée une nouvelle institution par la loi n° 8867 du 29 février 2008 relative à la gestion et à l’installation de la Korea Communications Commission (KCC) en remplacement les deux autorités de régulation préexistantes qui dirigeaient l’audiovisuel et la télécommunication. Parallèlement, en France, depuis 2007, suite au rapport du sénateur Bruno RETAILLEAU, les pouvoirs publics se sont positionnés en faveur d’une éventuelle fusion à terme entre le CSA et l'ARCEP, la fusion de ces deux autorités de régulation permettant la gestion de l’audiovisuel et de la télécommunication par une même autorité de régulation. Pour autant, un tel projet de réforme n’est pas encore à l’ordre du jour et laisse de nombreuses questions en suspend, questions que la fusion coréenne n’est justement pas parvenu à répondre. Entre un système coréen qui joue le jeu de la convergence, sans pour autant que soit garanti l’indépendance du régulateur vis-à-vis du pouvoir exécutif, et un système français, garantissant autant ce faire se peut cette indépendance, tout en maintenant une séparation de la régulation de la communication audiovisuelle et des télécommunications, on peut s’interroger sur l’opportunité de chacun des deux régimes et sur le modèle le plus performant pour assurer la régulation du secteur de la communication audiovisuelle, tout en préservant la liberté de la communication, liberté fondamentale essentielle pour nos démocraties / In this convergence environment, only the « plate-forme » could be supply all of the communication formats. We wonder a question about the organization meltdown of the regulation, in the one side, the audiovisual communication and in the other side, the telecoms sector. Thus, a new institution has been created by the 29th February 2008 law n°8867 in matter of the setting and the management of the Korea Communications Commission (KCC) in place of the two preexisting regulation authorities whom run the audiovisual communication and the telecoms. In the same time, since 2007 in France, in consequence of the Senator Bruno RETAILLEAU report, the authorities took one’s stand for a possible fusion between The CSA and the ARCEP. This meltdown shall allow managing the audiovisual communication and the telecoms by the same regulation authority. However, this reform proposal is not still in the agenda, and raises new issues those even the Korean merger was not able to answer. Both the Korean system which runs with the convergence without a guarantee of the regulation independence in front of the State power, and the French system who guaranteed as possible this independence by separating the audiovisual communication regulation from the telecoms. We wonder on the appropriateness of the two systems, and which is the best performing to run the audiovisual communication regulation, to guarantee the independence of communication and the fundamental liberties which rule our democracies

[pt] O poder judiciário é o principal agente da censura, atualmente, no direito brasileiro. Apesar de a Constituição e a Convenção Americana sobre Direitos Humanos reconhecerem a liberdade de expressão como direito fundamental e a proibição da censura como garantia absoluta desse direito, a jurisprudência do Supremo Tribunal Federal vem admitindo e chancelando a imposição deste grave meio de restrição à manifestação do pensamento por juízes e tribunais. Nesta dissertação, procurou-se verificar se é legítima a possibilidade de o poder judiciário proibir a manifestação do pensamento em caso de violações à honra ou à privacidade. Estudou-se a jurisprudência da Corte Interamericana de Direitos Humanos, da Corte Suprema da Nação e do Supremo Tribunal Federal sobre o tema da censura judicial a fim de verificar o que esses tribunais efetivamente entendem por censura e, ainda, se consideram legítima a sua imposição pelo poder judiciário. Considerando que a censura caracteriza a completa supressão da liberdade de expressão, foram identificados e comparados os standards normativos e padrões argumentativos adotados pelas referidas cortes nos julgamentos de casos que envolviam a proibição da livre manifestação do pensamento. Promoveu-se também um estudo dos fundamentos da liberdade de expressão e uma crítica à jurisprudência do Supremo Tribunal Federal a respeito da possibilidade de imposição de censura por meio de decisão do poder judiciário. / [en] Nowadays, the judicial branch is, in the Brazilian legal system, the most important source of censorship. Despite the recognition of freedom of expression as a fundamental right by the Brazilian Constitution and the Inter-American Convention of Human Rights and the complete prohibition of imposing censorship as a way to enforce freedom of expression, the Brazilian Supreme Court (Federal Supreme Court) has been ruling as according to the law the decisions made by inferior courts imposing censorship. One of the aims of this dissertation is to verify if it is legitimate that judges impose censorship in case expressions violate the honor or the privacy of others. The decisions taken by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the Supreme Court of the Argentinian Nation and the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court about judicial censorship were studied and described to check how they interpret the norms about it, what exactly they consider censorship and if they agree with it when imposed by judges as according to the law. Considering that censorship means the complete suppression of freedom of expression, the dissertation identified and compared the normative standards and the legal argument patterns adopted by these courts when ruling about cases involving the prohibition of free speech. In addition, the dissertation went through a study of the ground and philosophical foundations of the freedom of expression and a critical analysis of the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court rulings regarding censorship decisions taken by judicial branch members.

The present paper is part of a project carried on by the Swedish Section of the International Commission of Jurists. Sweden has ratified several major international human rights instruments. Most of the rights are covered by national law, and only in exception is there a discrepancy between national and international law. Such a discrepancy is found in the UN Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination, in which the State parties agree on penalizing and prohibiting the founding of and participation in racist organizations. Sweden is not complying with this statute, despite the fact that the government has ratified the convention. The Swedish government states that national laws prohibit the activities of these organizations, and therefore it is not necessary to reform the legislation. The National Council for Crime Prevention (Brottsförebyggande rådet) presents an annual report on hate crime in Sweden. Between the years 2005 and 2009 the number of reported hate crimes almost doubled. To some point the increase can be explained by a widened definition of hate crime, but the reports have increased in real terms as well. The Swedish government is combating human rights violations, and the long term objective is to ensure full respect for human rights. Critique raised against Sweden in international reviewing institutions indicates that Sweden has some ground to cover before reaching such an objective. Most of the presented critique concerns the non-existing ban of racist organizations, increased reports of hate crime as well as racist influences within Swedish politics and society as such. Prohibiting racist organizations constitutes limitations in the freedom of expression and the freedom of association. Ever since Sweden incorporated the European convention for the Protection of Human Rights, freedom of expression has been given a unique position within the national legal system. This position is strengthened even further through different judgments in the Swedish Supreme Court, in cases on agitation. The questions raised in this paper are consequently: Is it possible to ensure full respect for human rights, or can you only come near such an ensuring? Does Sweden live up to its international obligations? How does the Swedish government weigh the different rights against each other? Should the rights be differently balanced? The purpose of this paper is, therefore, to establish Sweden’s international obligations, to highlight the possibility of limitations in the freedom of expression and to look at the occurrence of and legislations against hate crime. / Uppsatsen utgör en del av projektet "Implementering av kritik i internationella organ mot Sverige och Rätten till kompensation" som drivs av Internationella Juristkommissionen - Svenska avdelningen. / Implementering av kritik i internationella organ mot Sverige och Rätten till kompensation

January 7, 2015, the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo, which among other things has published satirical images of the Prophet Muhammad, became a victim of a terror attack where 12 people lost their lives. This horrible act was performed to avenge Islam and the Prophet Muhammad, something that aroused reactions all over the world. In the media a debate began whether to re-publish the drawings that might have caused the attack or not. Despite the fact that freedom of expression has an important role in the society there were different opinions on the matter.   The aim of this study is to identify how the swedish newspapers Svenska Dagbladet and Dagens Nyheter and the turkish newspapers Today’s Zaman and Hürryiet Daily News framed the circumstances around the terror attack against Charlie Hebdo. By applying a framing analysis on 40 columns with various authors, 20 from each country, we could discern five dominant frames within the texts: Je suis Charlie, why publish/not publish caricatures, motives behind the attack, impacts of the attack and solutions. Our theoretical basis of the study include the concepts of freedom of expression, cultural differences and framing. The results showed similarities as well as differences between the turkish and the swedish journalists ways of framing the circumstances around the attack. In each frame we have identified what the authors consider to be the main issue, the underlying cause and suggestions on how to solve the problem. Here we saw patterns between the different frames, where many of the subjects were demonstrated in several frames.

No description available.

This work considers the legal impediments to farming in an urban environment with a particular focus on the municipal bylaws that prohibit the keeping of hens in Saskatoon. The jurisdictional competency of Saskatoon to prohibit the keeping of urban hens is challenged under both municipal law and constitutional law, and more broadly, under the general premise that liberty interests should often prevail where a bylaw is arbitrary, misinformed, and restricts the pursuit of truth and human flourishing. Saskatoon’s urban hen prohibition is argued to be premised more on a form of moral reasoning that unnecessarily distinguishes between rural and urban environments, and less, if at all, on empirical evidence. Urban agriculture is often undertaken to address the environmental and social shortfalls of the global food system, such as the system’s connection with climate change, animal welfare issues, and challenges associated with the distribution of food. Moreover, urban agriculture is a means of protecting the rights of producers and consumers, as articulated by the food sovereignty movement. In this work, a claimant’s desire to advance food rights (including food sovereignty) through the keeping of urban hens is argued to engage the guarantee to freedom of expression and freedom of conscience under Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This work explores the possibility of protecting the manifestation of social and environmental action through the guarantee to freedom of conscience. This work develops a cursory test for determining where a claimant’s guarantee to freedom of conscience is violated, drawing on the well established protection of freedom of expression and freedom of religion.

New technologies have transformed the traditional ways in which people develop and express themselves. In that context, the internet has meant a revolution in different spheres of society, in which the users and network providers are developed. Faced with this, the question arises: Should the relations that are presented in the network be regulated?.In this article, the author develops the principle of net neutrality as the basis of the protection of the fundamental rights from the different agents that are related by this means. It will be exposed the current regulation of the matter and its scope, which finds its support in the constitutional regulation. / Las nuevas tecnologías han transformado las formas tradicionales en las que se desarrollan y expresan las personas. En ese contexto, internet ha significado una revolución en diferentes ámbitos de la sociedad, en los cuales los usuarios y proveedores de la red se desenvuelven. Ante ello, surge la interrogante: ¿deben regularse las relaciones que se presentan en la red?.En el presente artículo, el autor desarrolla el principio de neutralidad de la red como base de la protección de los derechos fundamentales de los diferentes agentes que se relacionan por este medio. Se expondrá la regulación vigente de la materia y sus alcances, la cual encuentra su sustento en la regulación constitucional.

It is growing the support to the theory that considers the necessary connection among Right and Moral, particularly when we spoke about the Fundamental Human Rights - while an ideal to be reached by all the people and for all the nations. The existence of other values is discussed for the validity of the juridical system, referring to the doubts up to where it can the moral precepts to influence of the juridical system. The present work search to study the existent dialogue between the moral norms and the juridical norms, besides the use of the moral precepts as instrument for limitation of the fundamental right to the freedom of expression, with relationship to the popularization of the speech of the hate. The systems juridical North American and German present very different solutions for cases in what the ideas racists' manifestation, prejudices and hostile to certain groups, due to race, color, religion, sex, etc. Though, as the Brazilian treatment is revealed for such a such delicate subject in a concrete way? In fact, it is making the analysis of the judgment of HC nº 82.424- 2/RS in the Supreme Federal Tribunal that she intend to verify the ministers they are used of moral arguments to limit the right to the freedom of expression and if such restrictions are legitimate, after all, if on a side we have the protection to the human dignity, not being " morally acceptable " the hostile speech and prejudice against groups of minorities, as it happened with the Jewish community, on another side, we would also have the freedom of manifesting opinions and of possessing certain ideology. In that sense, is a conciliation possible? It is in the investigation of the philosophical currents, doctrines, in the compared right and in the votes of the ministers of the Supreme Federal Tribunal that it'll look for to clear the treatment of the referred constitutional rights. / É crescente o apoio à teoria que considera a ligação necessária entre Direito e Moral, particularmente quando falamos dos Direitos Humanos Fundamentais – enquanto um ideal a ser atingido por todos os povos e por todas as nações. Discute-se a existência de valores suprapositivos necessários para a validade do ordenamento jurídico, rementendo aos questionamentos até onde pode os preceitos morais influir do ordenamento jurídico. O presente trabalho busca estudar o diálogo existente entre as normas morais e as normas jurídicas, além da utilização dos ditames morais como instrumento para limitação do direito fundamental à liberdade de expressão, quanto à divulgação do discurso do ódio. Os sistemas jurídicos norte-americano e alemão apresentam soluções muito diferentes para casos em que se discute a manifestação de ideias racistas, discriminatórias e hostis a determinados grupos, por conta de raça, cor, religião, sexo, etc. Todavia, como se revela o tratamento brasileiro para tal assunto tão delicado de modo concreto? De fato, é fazendo a análise do julgamento do HC nº 82.424-2/RS no Supremo Tribunal Federal que se pretende verificar se os ministros se utilizam de argumentos morais para limitar o direito à liberdade de expressão e se tais restrições são legítimas, afinal, se de um lado temos a proteção à dignidade humana, não sendo “moralmente aceitável” o discurso hostil e preconceituoso contra grupos de minorias, como ocorreu com a comunidade judaica, de outro lado, também teríamos a liberdade de manifestar opiniões e de possuir certa ideologia. Nesse sentido, é possível uma conciliação? É na investigação das correntes filosóficas, doutrinárias, no direito comparado e nos votos dos ministros do Supremo Tribunal Federal que se buscará esclarecer o tratamento dos referidos direitos constitucionais. .