Made available in DSpace on 2015-03-05T17:21:55Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 27 / Nenhuma / O trabalho teve como objetivos a investigação da evolução histórica e dos pressupostos do conceito de responsabilidade, bem como a reflexão acerca das possibilidades de limitação ética do desenvolvimento tecnológico a partir da ética da responsabilidade. Desde o seu aparecimento na modernidade, a ideia de responsabilidade se caracteriza como um elemento ético que atesta a liberdade do indivíduo e afirma a objetividade moral. Se compreendermos a responsabilidade neste horizonte, podemos concluir que está subjacente a esse conceito a ideia de uma medida reguladora possível da comunidade ética. Isto é, a responsabilidade surge como uma medida para o agir, sendo uma forma de conter a satisfação do interesse próprio face ao reconhecimento dos interesses alheios. Isto significa que as práticas hedonistas do indivíduo moderno são submetidas à medida do agir configurada pela responsabilidade, tornando as ações empíricas em ações éticas. Entretanto, com o desenvolvimento tecnológico, as práticas hedonistas se renovara / The research had as goals the inquiry of the historical evolution and the purposes of the responsibility concept, as well as the reflection concerning the possibilities of ethical limitation of the technological development from the ethics of the responsibility. Since its appearance in modernity, the responsibility idea is characterized as an ethical element that certifies the freedom of the individual and affirms the moral objectivity. If we understand the responsibility in this horizon, we can conclude that it is underlying to this concept the idea of a possible regulating measure of the ethical community. That is, the responsibility appears as a measure for the acting, being a form to contain the satisfaction of the own interest face to the recognition of the strange’s interest. This means that the hedonist practicals of the modern individual are submitted to the measure of acting configured by the responsibility, turning the empirical actions into ethical actions. However, with the technological developme

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:27:06Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Raimunda Diva de Vasconcelos Ribeiro.pdf: 2566714 bytes, checksum: f64ff183208f288f0c57fed1cc1d1f9d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-12-10 / This thesis revisits the concept of technical in Hans Jonas by looking to expand its evaluation as the dominant telos of contemporary society, that is, that technique is no longer a mere instrument and has increasingly become a human end in a technological world. The aim is to think of technique as a practice, in light of the conceptual contributions of Alasdair MacIntyre, in which the ethical dimension is a key feature, since every practice as a socially developed and organized activity has a teleological structure, and consequently mobilizes concepts of virtue and also of a greater human good as excellence. Thus, it is possible to achieve a distinct perspective from Jonas s, with the contribution of MacIntyre, to overcome partial difficulties of the Jonasian thought regarding his understanding of technoscience, which it seems to be still connected to the instrumentalist vision. Therefore, it is necessary to identify, clarify, understand, and reflect on technoscience in all its complexity, the benefits that supply many human needs, while remembering the need of seeing it not as a neutral instrument, but as a practice in the MacIntyrian sense, which it means that carries on an inescapable ethical dimension. Theoretical elements were sought to provide evidence for understanding the evolution and conceptual transformations in the fields of technical until becoming technoscience, in order to provide conceptual elements to make a case for a critical interpretation of the main ethical problems and challenges posed by the emergence of technoscientific society in the XXI century. Besides the philosophers mentioned above, some other contributions are discussed from authors who study contemporary issues relevant concerning the use of technoscience and its power of saving and destroying / Esta tese faz uma releitura do conceito de técnica em Hans Jonas buscando expandir sua avaliação como o telos predominante da sociedade contemporânea, isto é, que a técnica deixou de ser instrumento e passou a ser entendida como finalidade humana em um mundo cada vez mais tecnológico. O objetivo é pensá-la como uma prática, à luz dos aportes conceituais de Alasdair MacIntyre, na qual a dimensão ética é uma característica fundamental, já que toda prática como atividade socialmente desenvolvida e organizada possui uma estrutura teleológica e, por conseguinte, conceitos de virtude e de um bem humano como excelência maior. Assim, pode-se atingir um plano de reflexão distinto de Jonas e, deste modo, com a contribuição de MacIntyre, superar as dificuldades parciais do pensamento jonasiano no tocante à compreensão da tecnociência, ainda vinculada a uma visão instrumentalista. Para tanto, acreditamos ser necessário identificar, aclarar, compreender e refletir sobre a tecnociência como ela se faz em toda sua complexidade, os benefícios que suprem as necessidades humanas, sem deixar de lembrar a necessidade de vê-la não mais como um instrumento neutro, mas como prática no sentido dado por MacIntyre, portadora de uma dimensão ética que lhe é iniludível. Procurou-se apresentar elementos teóricos para a compreensão da evolução e das transformações conceituais nos domínios da técnica até transformar-se em tecnociência, visando fornecer elementos conceituais para defender uma interpretação crítica dos principais problemas e desafios de ordem ética, colocados pela emergência da sociedade tecnocientífica do século XXI. Além dos filósofos citados, discute-se também algumas contribuições de autores contemporâneos que estudam questões pertinentes à nossa reflexão sobre o uso da tecnociência no tocante ao poder da salvar e destruir que esta possui

Zugl.: Dortmund, Univ., Diss., 2006

La thèse cherche à mettre au jour le fil conducteur qui permet d’offrir une compréhension unifiée des différentes étapes de l’oeuvre de Hans Jonas, qui par ailleurs paraissent si diversifiées. Cet élément central est le traitement du dualisme. Par la discussion de son interprétation de l'histoire de la philosophie, tant par son étude du gnosticisme que par son analyse de la philosophie moderne, et par l'examen du développement de ses propres propositions philosophiques, tant celles de sa biologie philosophique que celles de son éthique de la responsabilité, cette centralité du thème du dualisme dans l'organisation de la pensée de Jonas et, du coup, la valeur interprétative d'une telle approche seront établies. L’originalité et la pertinence du parcours intellectuel jonassien pour les questionnements philosophiques contemporains seront ainsi démontrées, notamment par une discussion détaillée du fondement de son éthique de la responsabilité. / The central objective of my research is to underline the central element which allows us to provide a unified understanding of the otherwise diversified parts of Hans Jonas' work. This central element is the notion of dualism. I will demonstrate that, according to his interpretation of the history of philosophy, both related to his study of Gnosticism and modern philosophy, and according to his own philosophical reasoning, that is his philosophical biology and his ethics of responsibility, dualism is the main theme of Jonas' thought, and that such a perspective has intrinsic interpretative value. I will thus underline the value of Jonas' philosophical thesis for contemporary philosophical reasoning, partly by showing the foundation of his ethics of responsibility.

Technology has several advantages, but the growing fear is that the power of human beings over nature through technology is growing in an alarming rate so that, if not checked with a new ethics of responsibility, we may be heading to the destruction of nature and the annihilation of humanity. In response to this fear, Hans Jonas set a whole new debate into motion, both in Germany and America, when he argues (in his book entitled, The imperative of responsibility: In search of ethics for the technological age (1984) that the existing approaches to philosophical ethics, including theological ethics, are inadequate since they do not tackle the serious issues produced by the rapid expansion of modern technology. He then asserts that we must make a concerted effort to develop a theory of responsibility, so that humanity could be salvaged from future extinction. Whereas Jonas denies that religion could form the basis of a universal ethics of responsibility, Schweiker strives to prove him wrong by producing a Christian version of an ethics of responsibility from that of Jonas. Using Schweiker’s formulation of a Christian ethics of responsibility, this researcher aims at taking the debate to another level by engaging his Christian ethics of responsibility with African ethics to come out with an African Christian ethics of responsibility. The reason why we are formulating an African Christian ethics of responsibility is that if Africa is seen as the fastest growing Christian continent in the world, then formulating an African Christian ethics of responsibility is worthwhile since such an ethics addressing the negative impact of modern technology will be available and accessible to a substantial part of the world population. Although African and Christian in its point of departure, this ethics of responsibility claims to be universal in a normative sense of the word. It strives to provide moral guidance that should be heeded by everyone. This is because in our formulation, we will call Christians and non-Christians alike to emulate the altruistic love of Christ for the world as the core of an ethics of responsibility that is future-oriented. / Thesis (PhD)--University of Pretoria, 2013. / gm2014 / Dogmatics and Christian Ethics / unrestricted

[pt] Esta Dissertação de Mestrado da Área de Filosofia situa-se na Linha de Pesquisa de Filosofia e Questão Ambiental. A pesquisa concentra-se em dois núcleos, Ética e Metafísica, apresentando uma reflexão crítica sobre: (i) O período histórico em que vivemos, marcado pelo estrondoso perigo do caos ambiental; (ii) A necessidade de uma (nova) Ética que dê conta de (re)orientar o agir humano para enfrentar o novo cenário ecológico que se apresenta, para o qual as éticas tradicionais são insuficientes; (iii) A forma dessa nova ética: os princípios sobre os quais ela é construída, e o novo imperativo categórico que lhe resume; (iv) Por fim, a Fundamentação Metafísica que justifica as proposições éticas apresentadas, mostrando a sua racionalidade, de tal modo que a adesão a esta ética não seja motivada por crenças ou sentimentos, mas por uma necessidade de razão. Na parte final, a dissertação discute também a contribuição que o esvaziamento ontológico – promovido no pensamento contemporâneo sobretudo pelo evolucionismo darwinista, que acaba com a possibilidade de se falar em essências fixas – tem para o caos ético típico de uma sociedade niilista como a que vivemos. Todas as reflexões serão amparadas nas duas obras mais importantes do filósofo alemão Hans Jonas, a saber: O Princípio Vida (1966) e O Princípio Responsabilidade (1979). / [es] Esta Disertación de Maestria de la Area de Filosofía se encuentra en la Línea de Investigación de Filosofía y Cuestiones Ambientales. La investigación se centra en dos núcleos, Ética y Metafísica, presentando una reflexión crítica sobre: (i) El período histórico en el que vivimos, marcado por el peligro rotundo del caos ambiental; (ii) La necesidad de una (nueva) Ética que da cuenta de guiar la acción humana para abordar el nuevo escenario ambiental que se presenta, para los que las éticas tradicionales son insuficientes; (iii) La forma de esta nueva ética: los principios en que se construye y el nuevo imperativo categórico que la resume; (iv) Por último, la Fundación Metafísica que justifica las proposiciones éticas presentadas, mostrando su racionalidad, por lo que la adhesión a esta ética no está motivada por creencias o sentimientos, sino por una necesidad de razón. En la parte final, la disertación también analiza la contribución que la deflación ontológica – promovida en el pensamiento contemporáneo sobre todo por el evolucionismo darwiniano, que acaba con la posibilidad de hablar en esencias fijas - tiene para el caos ético típico de una sociedad nihilista como la que vivimos. Todas reflexiones se apoyarán en las dos obras más importantes del filósofo alemán Hans Jonas, a saber: El Principio Vida (1966) y El Principio Responsabilidad (1979).

[pt] A presente pesquisa tem o objetivo de aprofundar a compreensão do papel das imagens no pensamento de Hans Jonas através da reflexão sobre a influência que estas exercem na experiência de apreensão da realidade, pois, para o autor, a diferença antropológica reside justo na capacidade dos humanos em se relacionar livremente com as imagens. Ou seja, criar e reconhecer as imagens como representações do real, já que o homo pictor inaugurou uma nova maneira de se relacionar com os objetos pela liberdade galgada na expressão da faculdade da imagem. Em sua proposta ética, Hans Jonas postula que é um dever invocar imagens que conduzam a humanidade a agir de acordo com a preservação das condições de existência dos humanos no futuro. Desta maneira, apresenta-se como necessária a investigação do funcionamento da capacidade imaginativa para a compreender em que medida as imagens configuram um componente perceptual capaz de suscitar os afetos adequados à ação ética ecológica. Postulamos que, se para Jonas, a capacidade de produzir, reconhecer e se relacionar com imagens livremente é um atributo do ser humano, isto significa que o autor considera as imagens como executoras de uma função fundamental em nossa percepção do real e, por conseguinte, na concepção de realidade e de visão cosmológica que condicionam as nossas ações no mundo. / [en] The present research has the objective of deepening the understanding of the role of images in Hans Jonas thought through the reflection of their influence in the experience of apprehension of reality. Since, for Jonas, the anthropological difference lies right in the capacity of humans to relate freely to images. That is, to create and recognize the images as representations of the real, inasmuch as homo pictor inaugurated a new way of relating to the objects by the freedom achieved in the expression of the faculty of the image.In his ethical proposal, Hans Jonas postulates that it is a duty to invoke images that lead humanity to act in accordance with the preservation of the conditions of human existence in the future. From this, arises as necessary the investigation of the significance and the functioning of the images in the arousal of the affects for that purpose. We postulate that, if for Jonas the capacity to produce, recognize and relate to images freely is an attribute of the human being, this means that the author considers the images as executing a fundamental function in our perception of reality and, therefore, in the conception of reality and cosmological vision that condition our actions in the world.

This work aims to demonstrate that sustainability stands as a constitutional principle that is part of the regulatory framework of the constitution, limiting and conditioning spaces of state discretion. Therefore, this work begins arguing the constitutionalization of law, and its consequences to the knowledge of the legal system, such as: the recognition of the normative force of the constitution, which must be permanent and sustainable over time; the centrality of fundamental rights (in its vertical and horizontal effectiveness); and the approach of law with philosophy, where the constitution is perceived as a plexus of values, values which conform stability, dignity and development of the social body. This theoretical framework brings important consequences for the Administrative Law, because in this paradigm, state is seen not only as a large inductor and protagonist of public policies, but primarily also as the great conductor of constitutional design, inducing and encouraging state and private actions in favor of social development, now and in the future. What becomes even more important because future needs protection; claim what is justified based on the responsibility ethics of Hans Jonas, which warns that the indiscriminate use of technology and technique, irrationality of the management of state power and the uncertainty consequences of the changes inflicted on nature, bring a real danger to the continuity of human life on Earth. Thus, based on the paradigm of (perennial) normative force of the constitution and philosophical studies of Hans Jonas, this work defends the recognition of a fundamental right to the future, and more, the recognition of a constitutional principle derived from this fundamental right: the principle of sustainability. At this point, from the recognition of sustainability as a constitutional principle (and as a principle, it must shape the entire application of law), it is shown how this principle interferes with the perception of real public interest, and in this way, how it will be understood as an interest embodied to the constitutional project, in the present and in the future. At this point, any areas of decision-making can only be interpreted / understood from a frame of sustainability, what means a frame which would compel the continued implementation of the constitutional project, and continuous and increased realization of fundamental rights. In this context, it is proposed that legal interpretation is attached with the aforementioned frame, consolidating a hermeneutic with eyes on the future and on the sustainability of the constitutional project, which will restrict the freedom of decision-making action, particularly state discretion, in order to refrain selfish interests and situations of unsustainability; what will have a material impact on the understanding of institutes as existential minimum, reserve of the possible, and social setback prohibition, institutes that must be understood in the light of the sustainability here mentioned. / O presente trabalho visa a demonstrar que a sustentabilidade erige-se como um princípio constitucional que integra a moldura normativa da constituição, limitando e condicionando os espaços de liberdade para a decisão estatal. Para tanto, a presente dissertação inicia sua argumentação tendo por base a constitucionalização do direito e suas consequências para o entendimento do sistema jurídico, tais como: o reconhecimento da força normativa da constituição, que deve ser perene e sustentável no tempo; a centralidade dos direitos fundamentais, em suas eficácias vertical e horizontal; e a aproximação do Direito com a Filosofia, onde a constituição passa a ser percebida como um plexo de valores, valores estes que conformam (e direcionam) a estabilidade, dignidade e desenvolvimento do corpo social. Marco teórico que traz consequências relevantes para o Direito Administrativo e para o balizamento das decisões estatais, porque, neste novel paradigma, o Estado passa a ser visto não apenas como um grande indutor e protagonista das políticas públicas, mas principalmente como o grande maestro do projeto constitucional, induzindo e incentivando as ações estatais e particulares, em prol do desenvolvimento social no presente e no futuro. O que assume especial relevo na medida da necessidade de proteção do futuro, afirmação que se justifica com base na Ética da Responsabilidade do filósofo Hans Jonas, que alerta que o uso indiscriminado da tecnologia e da técnica, a irracionalidade do manejo do poder estatal e a incerteza em relação às modificações infligidas à natureza trazem um real perigo à continuidade da vida humana na Terra. Deste modo, defende-se, com base no paradigma da força normativa (perene) da constituição e dos estudos filosóficos de Hans Jonas, o reconhecimento de um direito fundamental ao futuro, e mais, o reconhecimento de um princípio constitucional derivado deste direito fundamental: o princípio da sustentabilidade. Neste ponto, a partir do reconhecimento da sustentabilidade como princípio constitucional (e como princípio, passando a conformar e condicionar toda a aplicação do Direito), demonstra-se como este princípio interfere na percepção do que seja o real interesse público, que longe de ser o interesse secundário do Estado, ou de uma maioria eventual, passa a configurar como o interesse consubstanciado na efetiva concretização, no presente e no futuro, do projeto constitucional. Neste ponto, os eventuais espaços de liberdade decisória somente poderão ser interpretados/compreendidos a partir de uma moldura de sustentabilidade, ou seja, uma moldura que preconize a efetivação contínua do projeto constitucional, e a concretização presente, contínua e crescente dos direitos fundamentais. Neste contexto, será proposto que a hermenêutica jurídica seja voltada ao cumprimento da moldura mencionada, consubstanciando uma hermenêutica com olhos voltados ao futuro, e à sustentabilidade do projeto constitucional, e que restringirá a liberdade de ação decisória, notadamente a discricionariedade estatal, impedindo que interesses egoísticos gerem situações de insustentabilidade; o que terá repercussão relevante no entendimento de institutos como: mínimo existencial, reserva do possível e vedação do retrocesso, que passarão a ser entendidos à luz da sustentabilidade aqui mencionada.

This thesis is a study of the Russian religious philosopher Nikolai Berdiaev (1874-1948). The aim of the thesis is to re-examine the alleged gnostic subtext in Berdiaev’s thought by exploring a number of interrelated motifs in his world outlook, teaching on man and theory of knowledge. The method employed is a close reading of Berdiaev's philosophical and autobiographical writings. In order to establish which motifs should be examined, how they are to be understood and the manner in which they are interconnected, a scrutiny is made of Hans Jonas’s phenomenological elucidation of ancient Gnosticism. A synthetic conception labelled Jonasian Gnosticism is proposed as the interpretive framework, in order to provide a unitary and consistent heuristic tool with which to investigate the topic, and to distinguish the specific proposed representation of Gnosticism from other existing ones. A chapter is devoted to an analysis of the concept of gnosis as employed by Berdiaev. Another key notion taken from the Jonasian framework is that of demundanization, which denotes among other things a rejectionary attitude towards the world grounded in a negative experience of evil and suffering. Varieties of dualism as well as Berdiaev’s doctrine of the human spirit’s otherworldly origin and non-belonging in the world, constitute other issues that are examined. In addition, both Berdiaev’s assessment of historical Gnosticism and his view of a gnostic return in modern times are examined. The study demonstrates the complexity of Berdiaev’s attitude towards the classic Gnostics, and his attempt to denounce Gnosticism while at the same time making a case for a Christian gnosis. The results suggest both affinities and divergences in the relationship between Berdiaev’s thought and Jonasian Gnosticism. Even though the doctrinal standpoints diverge on crucial points, it is argued that a suggestive affinity nevertheless exists in the shared existential attitude towards self and world.

The aim of the thesis is to systematically present, analyse and critically reflect Hans Jonas's (1903-1993) conception of moral responsibility with respect to his axiological ontology, anthropology, speculative theology and conception of modern technology with account of the most important topically relevant German secondary sources, including the latest ones. The first chapter maps the relevant Czech and Slovak secondary sources, whereby it evaluates to what extent Jonas's ethics of responsibility represented a general or applied approach, whether it was only an ethics of survival and whether in this context Jonas's thinking can be labelled anthropocentric. The second chapter offers insight primarily into Jonas's ethical thought in the chronological context of his life. The third chapter analyses Jonas's axiological ontology, anthropology, speculative theology and conception of modern technology. Against this philosophical and speculative-theological background the fourth chapter critically examines Jonas's conception of moral responsibility proper. The fifth chapter critically reflects on both the philosophical and speculative-theological background of Jonas's conceptions of responsibility and the conception itself. An excursus into applied ethics, which concludes the fifth chapter and the work as a whole, finally solves a topical ethical challenge in the sphere of assisted reproduction having to do with the categorical imperative of Jonas's responsibility for future generations. The main results of critical analysis and reflection: Jonas's ethics of responsibility is a supplementary applied conception, an ethics of survival, whose normative axiom commands the preservation (perpetuation) of the human capacity to responsibility. Jonas's thought is monistically anthropocentric. That follows from Jonas's integral monism, in which the difference between god and world, spirit and matter, reality and possibility is levelled out. These monistic confusions are more or less also projected into the ethical points of departure of Jonas's conception of responsibility, especially his specific axiological onto(theo)logy, in which the difference between ontology and axiology is levelled out. The main characteristic of Jonas's proper conception of responsibility consists in confusion (identification) of the object of responsibility with the instance of responsibility - from which at the level of theory of responsibility Jonas's specific two-place relationship of responsibility (subject - object=instance) follows. Although Jonas within his ethics of responsibility, in order to justify responsibility for future generations, broadened his specific two-place relationship to a three-place one, the author of this thesis finds none of the versions of Jonas's three-place relationship plausible - though the author agrees that an at least three-place conception of responsibility is necessary (instance - subject - object). However, for a more differentiated analysis of responsibility a five-place conception is suitable (normative standard - instance - subject - action - object affected by the action), with respect to the possibility of solving some of the problems of Jonas's responsibility for future generations a six-place conception (last instance - normative standard - instance - subject - action - object affected by the action).