I develop a connection between Hegel's account of Ethical Life (Sittlichkeit) and his ontology, arguing that Ethical Life draws out some of the more intuitive and subtle sides of Hegel's ontology on the one hand, and some of its more ambitious and challenging aspects on the other. Ethical Life, for Hegel, signifies our lived, normative, concrete social reality; my central claim is that Hegel uses this account to illustrate (and support) some of his key ontological convictions. I begin by showing how Ethical Life figures centrally in Hegel's attempt to ontologically prioritize intelligibility. Chapter One is devoted to Hegel's case for this ontological priority: essentially, the argument is that we ought to accept (and implicitly already do accept) the adequacy of thought to being, and that this adequacy entails that the object in its fully experienceable multilayered depth is its fundamentally "real" form. I then argue, in Chapter Two, that Ethical Life develops an account of the Self-World relation better able to accommodate a world of such intelligible objects: Ethical Life premises itself on "Self-World mutual-constitution," where Self and World each are what they are in virtue of the greater relation between them. This integrated relationship, this greater whole, becomes the ground on and out of which such intelligible objects can emerge, develop, and sustain themselves. The dissertation's second half further defines key strands of Hegel's ontology, such as the demand that a philosophically viable ontological model be a wholly self-contained and self-explanatory, self-supporting and self-determining, intelligibility- and process-oriented totalistic whole. This demand comes out, for example, in Hegel's critique of Kant, which is the topic of Chapter Three. There, I argue that Hegel charges Kant with an ontological conservatism, with retaining "pure" forms of subjectivity and objectivity, the possibility of which had been made questionable by the transcendental turn. Hegel instead suggests that we drop such problematic notions as Things-in-themselves or Pure Concepts of the Understanding, opting instead to simply recast the experienced world as conceptually determined appearances per se. The conceptual self-determination of appearances, meanwhile, is something Hegel will associate with his notion of Reason, and in Chapters Four and Five, I consider the relation of Ethical Life to this notion of Reason. Hegel characterizes Ethical Life as "actual Reason," and I argue in Chapter Four that the currently prevalent, non-metaphysical readings of Hegel's social thought (what I call the rational justifiability reading) are incomplete to the extent that they fail to adequately integrate into their account the fact that Reason, for Hegel, is (among other things) an ontologically operative principle. Hegel identifies Reason with the experienced world's conceptual self-determination, or with the intelligible framework which structures, animates, and stabilizes the experienced world. This identification is essential to Hegel, in that it methodologically opens up the possibility of developing an account that not only can be intellectually identified with the experienced world, but can be directly, experientially recognized in (or as) the experienced world. In Chapter Five, I argue that Ethical Life plays a key role here by offering an account --even an illustration-- of Reason in its operation as the experienced world's conceptual self-determination. Custom and Fate, two concepts encountered in Ethical Life, portray an uncomprehending intuition of the experienced world's conceptual self-determination in the moment of its concrete operation; the "internal" experience of this process described in Ethical Life also displays how intelligible principles can immanently sustain and determine the experienced world. Ethical Life, I ultimately argue, brings Hegel's ontology down to earth, so to speak. Through Ethical Life, we come to see that a number of Hegel's less-familiar and more seemingly foreboding claims can be associated with recognizable phenomena, or even identified with the experienced world. Yet, simultaneously, recognizing this connection helps us appreciate the ambition of Hegel's challenge to us to reconsider our presuppositions: we experience reality to be richly complex yet intelligibly ordered --Hegel's ontology asks us now to take seriously the implications of the possibility of our experience's being a veritable revelation of reality. / Philosophy

This dissertation is about the theoretical foundation of Hegel’s political argument. Its goal is to comprehend the basic structure of that argument by articulating the conceptual framework Hegel employs when he asserts that the particular set of political institutions he is arguing for is rational. Its argument is that the criterion Hegel employs in his conception of rationality is that an object is rational if and only if it is comprehended by thought in and through the holistic inferential system of concepts he refers to as the Concept (der Begriff). Hegel’s final argument in the Science of Logic is that there can be no actual object that is not “rational,” i.e., that is not constituted, in all of its determinations, by the unified activity of thinking that is the Concept. Consequently, it is argued that the rationality, and therewith the actuality, of Hegel’s rational state depicted in the Philosophy of Right derives from the fact that it is comprehended by thought in and through the totality as thought that is the Concept. Further, because the Science of Logic demonstrates the totality of actuality to be the constituted reflection of the Concept itself to itself, and because the Philosophy of Right depicts the objectivemental form of actuality in particular, it is argued that the Philosophy of Right is nothing more than the determinate reflection of the Science of Logic, the repetition of the movement of the pure logical Concept depicted therein at its highest level of determinateness. The comprehension by thought of the object of right in and through the Concept in the Philosophy of Right is therefore the Concept’s comprehension of itself, and this rational comprehension is indicated by Hegel through his presentation of the Philosophy of Right as the determinate reflection of the Science of Logic. This unified logical interpretation of Hegel’s political philosophy is opposed not only to recent “practical” interpretations which dispense entirely with Hegel’s theoretical philosophy, but also to recent transcendental interpretations which incorrectly attribute to Hegel the position that the determining activity of thought is limited to the form of the object of its cognition. / Political Science

The main aim of this thesis is to present an account of Hegel's conception of the history of philosophy and to demonstrate its relevance to contemporary issues in the methodology of the history of philosophy both insofar as Hegel still has interesting things to say to contemporary historians, and insofar as an understanding of Hegel's views helps us understand later developments in the historiography of philosophy. In the first chapter, I present the conceptual scaffolding which enables us to compare Hegel's conception of the history of philosophy with contemporary approaches to the history of philosophy. I also criticize some of the myths that have developed around Hegel's conception of the history of philosophy. In the second chapter, I present the principles that constitute Hegel's evaluative framework: coherence or non-contradiction (in relation to the concept of Aufhebung), concreteness, systematicity, autonomy, and the use of clear conceptual language in philosophical discourse. Aside from these formal principles, I also identify a substantive philosophical thesis which Hegel seems to use in order to evaluate development in the history of philosophy, namely, the identity of thought and being. In the third chapter I attempt to attenuate the tension that exists between Hegel's methodological prescriptions, especially the claim that we should be on guard against anachronistic readings and that critique should be internal, with the manner in which he seems to consistently read past philosophers through his own system. I suggest two perspectives which can help attenuate this tension. First, I emphasize that Hegel is trying to write an anti-individualistic history of philosophy, where philosophical systems are presented as public culture achievements and the individual idiosyncrasies of philosophers are suppressed. Second, I show how Hegel's semantic and epistemic holism helps us make sense of the way that he approaches the history of philosophy. In the fourth and final chapter I discuss Hegel's conception of the relationship between philosophy and its socio-cultural milieu, and based on this discussion, I show that Hegel did not think that there is continuity in the kinds of problems that philosophers have been interested in, and that he thought that the main purpose of the history of philosophy is to provide metaphilosophical reconstructions and justifications of shifts in the kinds of problems that philosophers have been interested in. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA) / In this thesis I attempt to fill in a gap in Anglophone scholarship on Hegel by presenting an account of a much neglected aspect of Hegel's system, namely, Hegel's account and conception of the history of philosophy. I begin by attempting to dispel some misunderstandings that have distorted the Anglophone reception of this aspect of Hegel's thought, and by emphasizing the importance of understanding Hegel's views on the history of philosophy if one wishes to understand later developments in the historiography of philosophy. I then present the principles by which Hegel evaluates development in the history of philosophy, and I attempt to attenuate some of the tension which seems to exist between Hegel's methodological prescriptions and his actual practice as a historian of philosophy. I conclude with an account of Hegel's views on continuity in the history of philosophy, and their relation to contemporary views on continuity in the history of philosophy.

Kant is famous for his use of transcendental arguments in the transcendental deduction. This thesis examines how such a transcendental argument is used within Kant’s methodological framework. Following the work of Henrich and Walker, the paper asks whether transcendental arguments in the Critique of Pure Reason are compatible with Kant’s methodology in general. We find that these arguments and Kant’s methodology are compatible, and that transcendental arguments are indeed very weak arguments by Walker’s standards. However, the entire transcendental deduction should be understood as a deduction writing that uses transcendental arguments particularly effectively according to Kant’s own methodological standards.

The central aim of this thesis is to analyse the influence of Kierkegaard on Bonhoeffer. This relationship has been almost universally recognized. And yet this area has received no comprehensive study, limited within the secondary literature to footnotes, digressions, and the occasional paper. Furthermore, what little literature there is has been plagued by several stereotypes. First, discussion is often limited to Discipleship. Second, Kierkegaard has been identified as an individualist and acosmist who rejected the church, leading many to consider Bonhoeffer the ecumenist and ecclesiologist as selectively agreeing with Kierkegaard, but ultimately rejecting his overall stance. This thesis will argue that neither stereotype is true, and suggest (a), that Kierkegaard’s influence can be found throughout Bonhoeffer’s work, and (b) that although a more stereotypical perspective may be present in SC, by the end of his life Bonhoeffer had gained a far deeper understanding across the breadth of Kierkegaard’s work. The importance of this thesis is not simply to ‘plug the gap’ of scholarship in this area, but also to suggest the importance of analysing Kierkegaard and Bonhoeffer together. This will focus on three specific areas. First, alongside the influence of Kierkegaard on Bonhoeffer, it will argue for the importance of using Bonhoeffer as an interpretive tool for understanding Kierkegaard. This thesis will show how Bonhoeffer adopted and adapted Kierkegaard’s work to his own situation, forcing Kierkegaard to answer questions that were not present during his own life. In this way, we are led to compare Kierkegaard and Bonhoeffer as individuals, and not simply their static declarations. Secondly, against the tendency to consider Kierkegaard and Bonhoeffer’s final attacks on Christendom as unfortunate endings to otherwise profound careers, it will be suggested that these attacks stand as the fulfilment of their earlier thought. It will be argued that despite their different contexts, both Kierkegaard and Bonhoeffer were led to the same conclusions concerning Christendom. Thirdly, given Kierkegaard’s submission to indirect communication and his somewhat 'prophetic' proclamations concerning one who will come after him and reform, this thesis will ask whether Bonhoeffer stands as something of a fulfilment to Kierkegaard’s thought in the guise of a Kierkegaardian ‘reformer’.

Chacune des éditions de la Critique de la raison pure contient une preuve de la réalité du monde externe : la première se trouve dans le « quatrième paralogisme » et la deuxième dans la « Réfutation de l’idéalisme ». Ce travail examine l’évolution du premier argument vers le deuxième, en rendant compte de deux critiques importantes de la première édition qui ont influencé le second travail de Kant. La deuxième partie de ce travail se concentre sur des problèmes propres à la Réfutation, où sont traités des sujets particulièrement problématiques, tel que la structure de la conscience empirique déterminée, le rôle du permanent dans l’établissement de l’objectivité, ainsi qu’un argument secondaire présenté dans les notes de bas de page du texte principal et de la préface. / Each edition of the Critique of Pure Reason contains a proof for the reality of the external world: the first is located in the “Fourth Paralogism”, the second, in the “Refutation of Idealism.” This work examines the evolution from the first argument to the second, taking into account two significant criticisms of the first edition which influenced Kant’s second attempt. The latter half of this work treats topics particular to the Refutation only, focusing again on the issues which were stumbling blocks, namely the structure of determined empirical consciousness, the role of the permanent in establishing objectivity, as well as a secondary argument found in the footnotes of the main text and preface.

Este estudo procura levantar as divergências e convergências entre Oliveira Vianna e Raymundo Faoro. Suas teses divergem por serem paradigmáticas de duas linhagens opostas do pensamento político e social brasileiro respectivamente, a do idealismo orgânico e a do idealismo constitucional. Entretanto, ao mesmo tempo existem inúmeros pontos de cruzamentos entre essas linhagens: focalizamos, sobretudo, aqueles relacionados com o fato de Vianna e Faoro estarem vinculados a um debate jurídico sobre os limites do Estado Democrático de Direito, que perpassou a história do Brasil ao longo do século XX. Para tanto, analisamos a participação de Vianna no momento constituinte da década de 1930 e de Faoro na década de 1980 e o fato de ambos terem enfrentado o mesmo oponente, qual seja, a elite dirigente que, na visão dos dois autores, importava instituições políticas estrangeiras e imaginava ser possível mudar o país exclusivamente por meio de leis produzindo, assim, um país legal em descompasso com o país real. / This study explores the differences and similarities between Oliveira Vianna and Raymundo Faoro. Their theses diverge because they are paradigmatic of two opposing lines of the Brazilian political and social thought - respectively, the organic idealism and the constitutional idealism. However, there are numerous points of intersection between the lines mentioned. We emphasize the points of intersection related to the fact that Vianna and Faoro were both engaged in the legal debate about the limits of the democratic state; which pervaded the history of Brazil throughout the 20th century. More precisely, we analyze the participation of Vianna in the period of the constituent assemblies, in the 1930s, and the activities of Faoro in the 1980s, as well as the fact that they both faced the same opponent, that is, the ruling elite. In the opinion of both authors, this elite imported foreign political institutions, and considered it possible to change the country based exclusively on laws then creating a legal country that mismatched with the real country.

Chacune des éditions de la Critique de la raison pure contient une preuve de la réalité du monde externe : la première se trouve dans le « quatrième paralogisme » et la deuxième dans la « Réfutation de l’idéalisme ». Ce travail examine l’évolution du premier argument vers le deuxième, en rendant compte de deux critiques importantes de la première édition qui ont influencé le second travail de Kant. La deuxième partie de ce travail se concentre sur des problèmes propres à la Réfutation, où sont traités des sujets particulièrement problématiques, tel que la structure de la conscience empirique déterminée, le rôle du permanent dans l’établissement de l’objectivité, ainsi qu’un argument secondaire présenté dans les notes de bas de page du texte principal et de la préface. / Each edition of the Critique of Pure Reason contains a proof for the reality of the external world: the first is located in the “Fourth Paralogism”, the second, in the “Refutation of Idealism.” This work examines the evolution from the first argument to the second, taking into account two significant criticisms of the first edition which influenced Kant’s second attempt. The latter half of this work treats topics particular to the Refutation only, focusing again on the issues which were stumbling blocks, namely the structure of determined empirical consciousness, the role of the permanent in establishing objectivity, as well as a secondary argument found in the footnotes of the main text and preface.

Este estudo procura levantar as divergências e convergências entre Oliveira Vianna e Raymundo Faoro. Suas teses divergem por serem paradigmáticas de duas linhagens opostas do pensamento político e social brasileiro respectivamente, a do idealismo orgânico e a do idealismo constitucional. Entretanto, ao mesmo tempo existem inúmeros pontos de cruzamentos entre essas linhagens: focalizamos, sobretudo, aqueles relacionados com o fato de Vianna e Faoro estarem vinculados a um debate jurídico sobre os limites do Estado Democrático de Direito, que perpassou a história do Brasil ao longo do século XX. Para tanto, analisamos a participação de Vianna no momento constituinte da década de 1930 e de Faoro na década de 1980 e o fato de ambos terem enfrentado o mesmo oponente, qual seja, a elite dirigente que, na visão dos dois autores, importava instituições políticas estrangeiras e imaginava ser possível mudar o país exclusivamente por meio de leis produzindo, assim, um país legal em descompasso com o país real. / This study explores the differences and similarities between Oliveira Vianna and Raymundo Faoro. Their theses diverge because they are paradigmatic of two opposing lines of the Brazilian political and social thought - respectively, the organic idealism and the constitutional idealism. However, there are numerous points of intersection between the lines mentioned. We emphasize the points of intersection related to the fact that Vianna and Faoro were both engaged in the legal debate about the limits of the democratic state; which pervaded the history of Brazil throughout the 20th century. More precisely, we analyze the participation of Vianna in the period of the constituent assemblies, in the 1930s, and the activities of Faoro in the 1980s, as well as the fact that they both faced the same opponent, that is, the ruling elite. In the opinion of both authors, this elite imported foreign political institutions, and considered it possible to change the country based exclusively on laws then creating a legal country that mismatched with the real country.

In Sweden, after the Russian invasion of Ukraine 2022, the Social Democrats were inturmoil. Some factions had started openly advocating for Nato membership, while someremained staunchly opposed, favouring the status quo. This shift earned the partycriticism for having abandoned their last claim to any form of ideology. This studyproposes the use of politically aligned newspaper editorials as surrogates for studyingpolitical parties, gleaning insights into how stubborn or malleable the party isideologically, thus determining whether the Social Democrats lean more into idealism orrealism. Eight editorials are analysed and classified as Realist/Idealist andPro-/Anti-Nato. The tendency found is that there is a strong correlation between beingidealist and being against Nato-membership, and vice versa. This correlation is thenapplied to the Social Democrats, who voted for joining the alliance, to ultimately suggestthat the party today is more realist than idealist.