Studiens syfte är att få en djupare kunskap om hur ledande turismaktörer framställer Stockholm skärgård i deras marknadsföring genom ord, bild och film. Studiens ansats har varit av en kvalitativ sådan där en kombination av netnografisk samt visuell analys har hjälpt för att samla in datamaterial. Fyra turismaktörer valdes ut för att studera hur de framställer Stockholm skärgård i deras marknadsföring på sociala medier (Youtube och Instagram) och hemsidor. Till hjälp har författaren använt sig av teorin Imaginative Geographies för att förstå hur mytiska bilder av en plats kan få en så stor inverkan att de blir kollektivt delade meningar. Resultatet visar att olika framställningar som att Stockholm skärgård ingjuter frihet, upplevs som en helt annan värld och de fantastiska landskap är romantiseringar som marknadsförs på turismaktörernas sociala medier.

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal.

Dans cette thèse en psychologie morale, je m’intéresse au rôle de l’imagination dans la perception morale. Je soutiens que l’imagination y a une fonction épistémique dans la mesure où – en s’accompagnant ou non d’émotions – elle nous révèle des normes, des valeurs ou des vertus morales qui seraient autrement passées inaperçues. En simulant des croyances et des perceptions, l’imagination nous permet d’accéder à ces caractéristiques d’une situation moralement pertinentes, mais perceptuellement non saillantes. J’identifie trois modes de « perception morale imaginative » : 1) la prise de perspective qui consiste à endosser le point de vue d’autrui, 2) le cadrage imaginatif qui désigne le fait de voir un élément d’une situation comme autre qu’il n’est et, 3) la comparaison imaginative qui, grâce à la pensée contrefactuelle, éclaire le monde actuel à partir d’un monde possible imaginé. Chacun de ces modes contribue à enrichir notre connaissance morale, et partant, à améliorer notre délibération morale. J’appuie ma démonstration sur des travaux récents en philosophie de la psychologie, en psychologie cognitive et sociale, en neuropsychologie et, bien évidemment, en psychologie morale. / My thesis focuses on the role of imagination for moral perception. I argue that imagination – whether accompanied by emotion or not - has an epistemic role inasmuch as it can reveal moral norms, values, and virtues that might otherwise go un-noticed. On the simulationist account, belief-like imaginings and perception-like imaginings give us access to the morally relevant but perceptually non-salient features of a situation. I identify three types of “imaginative moral perception”: 1) the perspective taking that consists of putting yourself in someone else’s shoes; 2) the imaginative framing, which refers to seeing an element of a situation as something else; 3) the imaginative comparison, which sheds light on the actual world by using counterfactuals thinking that give us access to a possible world. Each of these types of moral perception contributes to enhancing our moral knowledge hence to improving our moral deliberation. My argument appeals to recent contributions from the fields of philosophy of psychology, cognitive and social psychology, neuropsychology and, of course, moral psychology.

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal

Dans cette thèse en psychologie morale, je m’intéresse au rôle de l’imagination dans la perception morale. Je soutiens que l’imagination y a une fonction épistémique dans la mesure où – en s’accompagnant ou non d’émotions – elle nous révèle des normes, des valeurs ou des vertus morales qui seraient autrement passées inaperçues. En simulant des croyances et des perceptions, l’imagination nous permet d’accéder à ces caractéristiques d’une situation moralement pertinentes, mais perceptuellement non saillantes. J’identifie trois modes de « perception morale imaginative » : 1) la prise de perspective qui consiste à endosser le point de vue d’autrui, 2) le cadrage imaginatif qui désigne le fait de voir un élément d’une situation comme autre qu’il n’est et, 3) la comparaison imaginative qui, grâce à la pensée contrefactuelle, éclaire le monde actuel à partir d’un monde possible imaginé. Chacun de ces modes contribue à enrichir notre connaissance morale, et partant, à améliorer notre délibération morale. J’appuie ma démonstration sur des travaux récents en philosophie de la psychologie, en psychologie cognitive et sociale, en neuropsychologie et, bien évidemment, en psychologie morale. / My thesis focuses on the role of imagination for moral perception. I argue that imagination – whether accompanied by emotion or not - has an epistemic role inasmuch as it can reveal moral norms, values, and virtues that might otherwise go un-noticed. On the simulationist account, belief-like imaginings and perception-like imaginings give us access to the morally relevant but perceptually non-salient features of a situation. I identify three types of “imaginative moral perception”: 1) the perspective taking that consists of putting yourself in someone else’s shoes; 2) the imaginative framing, which refers to seeing an element of a situation as something else; 3) the imaginative comparison, which sheds light on the actual world by using counterfactuals thinking that give us access to a possible world. Each of these types of moral perception contributes to enhancing our moral knowledge hence to improving our moral deliberation. My argument appeals to recent contributions from the fields of philosophy of psychology, cognitive and social psychology, neuropsychology and, of course, moral psychology.

This study is concerned with the role of contemporary Czech geographic and travel writing and its involvement with the creation and reproduction of spatialised identities and imaginative geographies as they relate to the 'developing world'. It employs the method of discourse analysis (mostly research tools taken from Critical Discourse Analysis) to examine the contents of articles from all issues of the magazines Koktejl and Lidé a Země for the year 2012. This is done in order to analyse the portrayals of such spaces within the context of imaginative geography and the post-development critique and bring attention to the kind of popular geopolitics that is being created. The main topics covered includes the construction of identity between the authors, readers and the objects of writing, the linear understanding of the flow of history and progress and the relationship between the writers and their objects (both places and people). The main findings of the research consist in the identification of the continued prevalence of the perception of linearity of history which constitutes the developing places as subjected to a universal historical process whith the European civilisation as the current endpoint of history. These places are therefore considered a legitimate domain of knowledge, appreciation...

Le nom d’Anatole France, l’écrivain qui fut célèbre, il y a un siècle, court le risque d’être oublié de nos jours. Fraichement nommé à l’Académie française, il a vu son nom briller pendant l’Affaire Dreyfus aux côtés de Zola et des autres dreyfusards. Il consacre Monsieur Bergeret à Paris entièrement à cette Affaire. Mais après la réhabilitation du Capitaine, lui, qu’il avait mis tant d’espoir dans cette affaire voit ses rêves s’effondrer. Nous percevons un changement après l’Affaire dans l’orientation de ses œuvres. Cette nouvelle orientation se fait ressentir surtout à partir de son roman Sur la pierre blanche dans lequel il bâtit une cité de rêve à la fin de son roman. Il devient un amoureux impénitent de l’imaginaire en quête de l’ « inconnaissable », le conteur du « merveilleux », le bâtisseur de « cité utopique ». Avec le temps et surtout vers la fin de sa carrière Il prend un ton plus amer avec une tendance contre-utopique. Il prend conscience de l’impossibilité de changer la société. Cette tendance va s’intensifier dans L'Île des pingouins et La Révolte des anges qu’on peut qualifier de contre-utopies avec des effets de Merveilleux. Pourtant il évite de prévoir une fin pour ses deux histoires dans l’espoir que peut-être les futures générations arriveront à écrire une fin heureuse pour l’histoire et l’humanité. / Anatole France, the French writer who was famous one century ago, risks to be forgotten nowadays. Freshly elected at the “Académie Française”, he saw his name shining during the Dreyfus Affair beside Zola and the other dreyfusards. The story of Monsieur Bergeret à Paris is completely dedicated to the Affair. But after the rehabilitation of the Captain Dreyfus, he, who had put so much hope in this Affair, sees his dream collapsed. After this period, we perceive a change in the orientation of his works. This new orientation is felt especially at the end of his novel Sur la Pierre Blanche in which he builds a dream city. He becomes an incorrigible lover of the imaginative world in search of the “unknownable”, a storyteller of the “magic”, the builder of an “utopian city”. Latter, especially towards the end of his career, he took a more bitter tone, a kind of “contre-utopia”. He became aware of the impossibility of changing the society. This trend is intensified in his two novels: L’Île des pingouins and La Révolte des anges which we can be qualified of “contre-utopia” with effects of magic. Nevertheless he avoid to plan the end of these two stories in hope that the future generations will manage, maybe, to write a happy end for the history and for the humanity.

Debate concerning the relationship between ethics and aesthetics has re-emerged in contemporary aesthetic literature. All of the major contemporary positions, I argue, treat this relationship as existing between the "moral value" of art and its aesthetic value. Throughout this thesis I analyse the various "value- based" positions (ethicism, moderate moralism, and contextualism) and examine whether their accounts of this relationship hold. My aim is to explore whether an alternative account - in which the aesthetic value of art can be enhanced or negated through its "moral significance", rather than its "moral value" - is plausible. I argue, that given the failure of these value- based positions we should favour a "significance- based contexutalist" approach that is better equipped to account for the complexity of both our engagement with art, and the moral reflection that it invites.

Popular geography magazines like National Geographic (NG) provide readers with a lens of the world around them. Yet sadly they often only serve a limited utilitarian purpose as dust collectors on coffee tables of hospital waiting rooms or doctors’ practices. It should be of little surprise then that the relative importance of geographic magazines as a representational forum has been underestimated historically. The importance of geographic magazines as an outlet for creating and disseminating preconceived visions of what may be termed ‘popular geographies’ has only become the subject of scrutiny in the last two decades. Authors including Lutz and Collins (1993) and Rothenberg (1994, 2007) have reflected critically upon the place of NG as a powerful ideological institution for legitimating particular visions of the world in the wider corpus of the discipline of geography. Yet while there has been a substantial volume of work dedicated to unravelling the situated lens of NG there has been no research devoted to deciphering the lenses of other geography magazines such as Canadian Geographic (CG), Australian Geographic (AG) or New Zealand Geographic (NZG). These magazines also embody the ideals of adventure, discovery and nature made famous by NG but purvey geography through distinctively national narratives. Through discourse analysis the thesis examines these three magazines in order to unravel geographic imaginations of nationalism in CG, AG and NZG and in the process challenge divergent conceptions of geography itself as both an academic discipline and popular subject.

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