Quais os potenciais de transformação a Teoria Crítica poderia ainda suscitar em tempos de esvaziamento da ideia de proletariado? A teoria normativa precisa pressupor um ideal (expectacional) para amparar a prática emancipatória. Esse ideal precisaria, não obstante, para comportar certa dinâmica transformativa incluente da práxis, comprometer-se com a negação do campo das expectativas normativas, isto é, do plano da justificação das demandas por uma “vida boa”. Analisando essa dificuldade, própria de uma crítica com exigências de transcendência intramundana, especialmente pelo prisma da teoria do reconhecimento de Axel Honneth, verificamos que o autor buscaria juntar tanto a essencialidade dos conflitos como a ideia de normatividade na Luta por Reconhecimento a fim de poder fazer uma leitura racional e ainda fiel ao projeto de modernidade da sociedade. Verificamos assim que Honneth, apesar de agregar o conflito e a dinâmica de demandas possivelmente indeterminadas como questões para a teoria do reconhecimento e do processo de emancipação social, não se afasta plenamente do projeto de defesa da razão moderna como sustentáculo e princípio maior para amparar o progresso social seguro, tal como Habermas o sustenta na versão de uma ética do discurso. Para pôr esse projeto em perspectiva com o seu arquétipo de crítica, isto é, com o modelo que revela a necessidade de uma transcendência intramundana, buscamos interpretar o conceito de Pöbel (plebe) na Filosofia do Direito de Hegel. Esse conceito nos permite diferenciar dois tipos ideais no modo como se realiza e se ampara um juízo racional que tem por base a liberdade como chave de leitura do progresso. Com essa diferenciação tornamos mais claro o problema que envolve a relação entre teoria e práxis na efetividade da crítica social, pois os dois tipos ideais comportariam riscos assim como teriam seus benefícios, caso adotados em particular e em exclusão um do outro. A partir dessa identificação, procuramos elucidar que uma ética do reconhecimento deveria comportar uma meta-ética que lhe abrisse para momentos de questionamento do próprio conteúdo racional nas expectativas de justiça, dado que se abre a uma leitura em que a experiência tem primazia sobre a consciência, isso ao menos da perspectiva da “política”. Logo, sabendo que “a coruja de Minerva só alça voo ao entardecer”, não podendo assim ser guia último e absoluto do homem, o conceito de reconhecimento, caso queira ser base não só de uma ética, mas de uma política, necessitaria incluir um momento de “indeterminação produtiva” nos momentos lógicos que explicam sua dinâmica social. / What potential transformations could the Critical Theory still give rise to in times of emptying of the idea of the proletariat? Normative theory needs to presuppose an ideal (expectation) to support emancipatory practice. This ideal, however, would need to include some transformative dynamics of praxis, to be committed to the negation of the field of normative expectations, that is, of the plane of justification of the demands for a "good life." Analyzing this difficulty, typical of a critique with demands of intramundane transcendence, especially from the prism of Axel Honneth's recognition theory, we verified that the author sought to combine both the essentiality of the conflicts and the idea of normativity in the Struggle for Recognition, to do a rational and still faithful reading to the project of modernity of society. We thus find that Honneth, while adding the conflict and the dynamics of possibly indeterminate demands as questions to the theory of recognition and the process of social emancipation, does not depart fully from the project of defense of modern reason as a support and major principle to support the secure social progress, as Habermas maintains in the version of a discourse ethics In order to put this project in perspective with its critical archetype, that is, with the model that reveals the need for intramundane transcendence, we seek to interpret the concept of Pöbel (plebs) in Hegel's Philosophy of Right. This concept allows us to differentiate between two ideal types in the way how is realized and supported a rational judgment that is based on freedom as a key to reading of progress. With this differentiation we make clearer the problem of the relationship between theory and praxis in the effectiveness of social critique, since the two ideal types would entail risks as well as their benefits, if adopted in particular and in exclusion of one another. From this identification, we try to elucidate that an ethics of recognition should entail a meta-ethic that opens it to moments of questioning the rational content itself in the expectations of justice, given that Hegelianism opens to a reading in which experience takes precedence over consciousness, at least from the perspective of "politics". Therefore, knowing that "Minerva's owl only takes flight at dusk," and thus cannot be the ultimate and absolute guide of man, the concept of recognition, if it were to be based not only on an ethic but on a policy, would need to include a moment of "productive indetermination" in the logical moments that explain its social dynamics.

Neste trabalho são observados processos de trabalho envolvidos na criação musical dentro do que se pode chamar de música experimental, observando, particularmente, o trabalho de alguns grupos brasileiros realizado entre os anos de 2000 e 2016. O trabalho é dividido em três partes: na primeira, estabelece-se um contexto, por meio de uma discussão do termo \"música experimental\", da observação de práticas históricas e de uma análise das condições dessa produção no Brasil no período citado. Na segunda, são abordadas práticas desenvolvidas por alguns grupos / coletivos (Artesanato Furioso, Brechó de Hostilidades Sonoras, Circuito de Improvisação Livre, Hrönir, Orquestra Errante, QI) bem como práticas associadas ao tema nas quais o autor do trabalho participou, especialmente durante o período da pesquisa (2013-2016), junto a diversos artistas e grupos. Na terceira, são feitas reflexões sobre algumas características de tais práticas, trazendo à tona questões relacionadas a autoria, especificidade, identidade individual e coletiva, oralidade e relações de trabalho / In this thesis, the work processes involved in musical creation are observed within what may be called experimental music, observing, in particular, the work of some Brazilian groups between the years 2000 and 2016. The thesis is divided in three parts: in the first part, a context is established, through a discussion of the term \"experimental music\", the observation of historical practices and an analysis of the conditions of this production in Brazil within the above mentioned period. The second part deals with practices developed by some groups (Artesanato Furioso, Brechó de Hostilidades Sonoras, Circuito de Improvisação Livre, Hrönir, Orquestra Errante, QI) as well as practices in which the author of the work participated, especially during the research period (2013-2016), along a few artists and groups. In the third part, reflections on some characteristics of such practices are made, raising questions related to authorship, division of labor, identity, orality and specificity.

Neste trabalho são observados processos de trabalho envolvidos na criação musical dentro do que se pode chamar de música experimental, observando, particularmente, o trabalho de alguns grupos brasileiros realizado entre os anos de 2000 e 2016. O trabalho é dividido em três partes: na primeira, estabelece-se um contexto, por meio de uma discussão do termo \"música experimental\", da observação de práticas históricas e de uma análise das condições dessa produção no Brasil no período citado. Na segunda, são abordadas práticas desenvolvidas por alguns grupos / coletivos (Artesanato Furioso, Brechó de Hostilidades Sonoras, Circuito de Improvisação Livre, Hrönir, Orquestra Errante, QI) bem como práticas associadas ao tema nas quais o autor do trabalho participou, especialmente durante o período da pesquisa (2013-2016), junto a diversos artistas e grupos. Na terceira, são feitas reflexões sobre algumas características de tais práticas, trazendo à tona questões relacionadas a autoria, especificidade, identidade individual e coletiva, oralidade e relações de trabalho / In this thesis, the work processes involved in musical creation are observed within what may be called experimental music, observing, in particular, the work of some Brazilian groups between the years 2000 and 2016. The thesis is divided in three parts: in the first part, a context is established, through a discussion of the term \"experimental music\", the observation of historical practices and an analysis of the conditions of this production in Brazil within the above mentioned period. The second part deals with practices developed by some groups (Artesanato Furioso, Brechó de Hostilidades Sonoras, Circuito de Improvisação Livre, Hrönir, Orquestra Errante, QI) as well as practices in which the author of the work participated, especially during the research period (2013-2016), along a few artists and groups. In the third part, reflections on some characteristics of such practices are made, raising questions related to authorship, division of labor, identity, orality and specificity.

This PhD provides insight into designing. It offers a view on the nature and structures of design research proposing that design research occurs within the activity of designing. As a case study, the PhD provides an internal view of the emergent design process of a collaborative architecture design practice terroir. It proposes a way, (the 'design-place'), in which design by collaboration operates within complex and often contradictory contexts. The thesis deals with questions of design in a contemporary, cosmopolitan condition and proposes that within such a condition design is an ethical endeavour. A key underlying proposition of the thesis is that architecture is fundamentally a critical activity. The PhD concludes by demonstrating through design projects how terroir has explored these questions in producing designs that operate at the level of personal and subjective experience in opening up a public, cosmopolitan realm.

The aim of the present work is to describe the semantics and the discursive functions from a general cognitivist point of view of the usage of the Present Perfect in the spoken Spanish of Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay. It is argued that cross-linguistic values often ascribed to perfect, such as continuity, current relevance and recency to the speech time –ST– do not offer a consistent view of the actual usage. It is assumed that a basic meaning of the perfect operates in the studied dialects and is retrievable in all tokens, which differs significantly from the current descriptions of the perfect of “general” Spanish. The results show that the ST might very well be an inference of the basic meaning of the Perfect but it is not an intrinsic component of the Perfect’s semantics. Based mainly on Dahl & Hedin (2000), as well as on Langacker (1987), the revitalizing of the concepts type and token reference are suggested as key principles for identifying the respective domains of the Spanish Present Perfect and the Simple Past in the studied area. The Perfect, through type reference, makes an assertion of a situation as a representation of the class-type of the verbal semantics. The Simple Past, however, through token reference conceptualizes the situation as having explicit or implicit anchoring in the chronological axis of time. Three main kinds of contexts occur typically with the Perfect in the samples: detemporalized ascertainment, summary (in a broad sense of the word) and aspectual complexity. Summary scanning (Langacker, 1987), i.e. the schematic and holistic detemporalized conceptualization of the development of a given situation, is claimed to be used by informants for discursive purposes, granting a greater rhetorical weight to the Perfect. The results founded in this thesis indicate that the perfect tenses in Spanish have followed (and are following) different developmental paths that are not necessarily restricted to the same sequences and mode of grammaticalization.

This thesis analyzes the connection between monetary policies and belief-driven fluctuation, and discusses the effects of monetary policies in a small open economy. We construct an endogenous growth model that introduces the role of money into the production function and allows elastic labor supply. In departing from the findings proposed by Benhabib and Farmer (1994), we find that belief-driven fluctuation can be easily encouraged, as long as there is lower increasing return to scale under money growth rate targeting. However, if there is a higher level of increasing return to scale, the increase of the growth rate of nominal money supply will only increase the economic growth rate temporarily, and money is super-neutral in the long run. More importantly, we show that under inflation rate targeting, the central bank will eliminate possibilities of belief-driven fluctuation in the small open economy, but lose the efficacy of monetary policy on the short-term economic growth at the same time.

Dans Literal Meaning, François Recanati cherche à montrer que ce qui est dit lorsqu’une phrase est prononcée correspond à un contenu fondamentalement pragmatique. À cet effet, il propose deux arguments généraux qui consistent à faire valoir que ce qui est dit est indéterminé si l'on s'en tient aux règles de la sémantique. Le premier de ces deux arguments tente d’établir que dans bien des cas, le contenu sémantique supposément associé à une phrase ne correspond pas à ce qui est dit. Le second est plutôt une élaboration de la thèse wittgensteinienne suivant laquelle la signification des types linguistiques est indéterminée. Pour ma part, je soutiens que si nous adoptons effectivement une conception wittgensteinienne de la signification, certains des exemples supposés illustrer le premier de ces deux arguments peuvent et doivent être critiqués. / In Literal Meaning, François Recanati argues that what is said when a sentence is uttered corresponds to a content that is fundamentally pragmatic. To this end, he proposes two general arguments according to which what is said will be indeterminate if we stick to the rules of semantics. The first of these two arguments tries to establish that in many cases, the semantic content supposedly associated with a sentence does not correspond to what is said. The second one is rather an elaboration of Wittgenstein’s thesis to the effect that the meaning of linguistic types is indeterminate. As for me, I claim that if we indeed adopt a wittgensteinian conception of meaning, some of the examples that are supposed to illustrate the first of these two arguments can and should be criticized.

This thesis tackles three different issues of relevance for economic policy, with an explicit reference to the Euro area. Does the inclusion of monetary targeting in a monetary policy strategy improve macroeconomic stability? Which role does the banking sector play in the impulse and transmission of shocks? Which fiscal tools have the greatest and the most persistent impact on the real economy, helping effective stabilization policy design? Answers to each question, derived from data-matching dynamic general equilibrium models, imply noteworthy indications for policy-makers. / Esta tesis afronta tres temas de relevancia en lo que se refiere a la política económica en la zona euro. ¿Establecer un objetivo monetario en la conducción de la política monetaria contribuye a alcanzar una estabilidad macroeconómica? ¿Qué papel desempeña el sector banquero en el impulso y en la transmisión de choques macroeconómicos? ¿Cuales son los instrumentos de política fiscal con el mayor y más persistente impacto sobre la economía real, capaces de ayudar en el diseño de políticas de estabilización eficaces? Las respuestas a cada pregunta, derivadas desde modelos de equilibrio económico general dinámicos ajustados a los datos, permiten extraer indicaciones útiles para las autoridades responsables de las políticas económicas.

Le droit ne se réduit pas aux règles. Que cet ancien adage paraisse aujourd’hui sibyllin montre la difficulté des juristes face à ce qu’il faut appeler l’anomie. Le pouvoir confié à une autorité de surmonter cette absence de règles provoque l’émergence de l’arbitraire en droit. Depuis l’Antiquité, ses fonctions répressives et administratives témoignent de son utilité indéfectible. Sous l’emprise du déterminisme juridique intégral d’un Dieu (VIIIe-XIIIe) ou d’un Législateur (XVIIIe-XXe), l’arbitraire se réduit à l’interprétation des normes omniprésentes. Il peut également former une voie de droit extraordinaire en complément des règles fixes (XIIIe-XVIIIe). Son apogée comme principe général de gouvernement voire de répression n’est atteinte qu’à l’occasion du profond bouleversement moderne (XVIe). À travers ces variations, trois formes de légalité se côtoient et proposent les conditions du choix d’un arbitraire légal. / Law is not reducible to rules. The fact that this ancient adage now sounds intriguing points out jurist’s difficulties to face what must be called anomie. Arbitrariness refers to the power given to one authority to overcome this absence of rules. Since Antiquity, repressive and administrative functions shows its irreducible utility. Under the empire of an integral determinism of God (VIIIe-XIIIe) or a Legislator (XVIIIe-XXe), arbitrariness is confined to interprete omnipresent norms. It can also provide extraordinary means in complement of fixed rules (XIIIe-XVIIIe). Its apogee as general principle of government or punishment is only reached by the modern upheaval (XVIe). Through its variations, three forms of legality coexists and reveals the conditions surrounding the choice of a legal arbitrariness.

Submitted by Ana Caroline Costa (ana_caroline212@hotmail.com) on 2018-11-13T19:24:29Z No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação - Bruna Garcia da Silveira Miguel Elias - 2018.pdf: 1464993 bytes, checksum: 4fb42bf2c5bf3dba934d5546c6206189 (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Luciana Ferreira (lucgeral@gmail.com) on 2018-11-14T12:53:24Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação - Bruna Garcia da Silveira Miguel Elias - 2018.pdf: 1464993 bytes, checksum: 4fb42bf2c5bf3dba934d5546c6206189 (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-11-14T12:53:24Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação - Bruna Garcia da Silveira Miguel Elias - 2018.pdf: 1464993 bytes, checksum: 4fb42bf2c5bf3dba934d5546c6206189 (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-10-15 / This dissertation is an investigation of the notions of “indeterminacy”, “inexactness” and “vagueness” in the context of Wittgenstein's phenomenology during in the intermediary period of the author. The occurrence of vague terms in phenomenological expressions seems a problem to be solved, since it gives rise to some dissatisfaction with the lack of “precision” which should be a feature of any suitable language. We will deal with this “problem” about the vagueness expressions and some reflections about it, specifically as they were presented by Wittgenstein in the work Phenomenal Language. We explore in this dissertation some changes in the thought of this philosopher, from the Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus to the text Phenomenal Language, with the intention of identifying, clarifying and later proposing modes to overcome the mistakes from the new ideas of Wittgenstein throughout the intermediate period, as they are rejected by the philosopher himself in the mentioned text. Such illusions, according to Wittgenstein, would be responsible for certain illusory conceptions about “language” and “perception” itself. We shall deal with some of Wittgenstein's notes on these misleading conceptions, seeking to show their connection with an old Tractarian idea, called of “doctrine of the simple” by Fogelin, and which we‟ll refer to as the “paradigm of logical elementarity” in this dissertation. We will try to sort out how this paradigm about logical “simplicity” or “elementarity” would have led to a misunderstanding about the kind of “logical generality” involved in several domains, especially the empirical and the phenomenal, as in the intervening period. Our aim is to spot out and examine such misunderstandings with the intention of overcoming them, and thus perhaps offer a proper treatment of language and perception which would allow us to understand the kind of “logical generality” involved in the phenomenal realm, and thus understand what that is meant by “indeterminacy”, “inaccuracy” or “vagueness” in those contexts. / Esta dissertação é uma investigação acerca das noções de “indeterminação”, “inexatidão” e “vagueza”, no contexto da fenomenologia de Wittgenstein exposta no período intermediário do autor. A ocorrência de termos vagos em expressões fenomênicas parece um problema a ser resolvido, desde que ocasione certa insatisfação quanto à falta de “precisão” que deveria ser uma característica de qualquer linguagem adequada. Trataremos desse “problema” acerca da vagueza nas expressões e de algumas reflexões em torno disso, mais especificamente, como elas foram apresentadas no texto Linguagem Fenomenal por Wittgenstein. Exploramos nesta dissertação algumas mudanças no pensamento desse filósofo, desde o Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus até o texto Linguagem Fenomenal, com a intenção de identificar, esclarecer e, posteriormente, propor, a partir das novas ideias de Wittgenstein ao longo do período intermediário, modos de superar os enganos, denunciados por ele próprio no texto mencionado. Tais enganos, segundo Wittgenstein, seriam os responsáveis por certas concepções ilusórias acerca da “linguagem” e da própria “percepção”. Lidaremos com alguns dos apontamentos feitos por Wittgenstein sobre essas concepções ilusórias, buscando mostrar a conexão dessas com uma antiga ideia tractariana, chamada por Fogelin de “doutrina do simples”, e que nós chamamos nesse trabalho de “paradigma da elementaridade lógica”. Consideraremos, como no período intermediário, esse paradigma acerca da “simplicidade” ou “elementaridade” lógica teria ocasionado uma má compreensão acerca do tipo de “generalidade lógica” envolvida em diversos âmbitos, principalmente os âmbitos linguístico e o fenomênico. Visamos trazer à tona e examinar tais enganos, com a intenção de superá-los, e assim talvez oferecer um tratamento adequado à linguagem e à percepção, que nos permita compreender o tipo de “generalidade lógica” envolvida no âmbito fenomênico, e assim compreender o que se entende por “indeterminação”, “inexatidão” ou “vagueza” nesse contexto.