La ricerca affronta una particolare forma di responsabilità concorsuale per crimini internazionali chiamata ‘joint criminal enterprise’ (JCE), creata dal Tribunale Penale Internazionale per l’ex-Yugoslavia. Il perno attorno al quale la ricerca si svolge è la suscettibilità di un tale criterio di imputazione di trasformarsi in un veicolo di responsabilità penale collettiva. Al fine di discutere dei punti di frizione di questo meccanismo ascrittivo con il fondamentale principio di responsabilità penale individuale e colpevole, l’autrice si propone di tracciare innanzitutto una cornice teorica più ampia. Il punto di partenza va individuato nella polarizzazione tra due forze che agiscono in senso opposto: una macro-dimensione, composta da fattori collettivizzanti (fattore storico, sistemico e teleologico), e una micro-dimensione che tenta di comprimere la responsabilità penale nei rigidi confini della colpevolezza. Collocata dunque al centro della “tensione” tra queste due forze opposte, la ‘joint criminal enterprise’ rivela i suoi caratteri più problematici, specialmente con riferimento ai requisiti di un nesso eziologico “indiretto” e a un elemento soggettivo fortemente indebolito. Addentrandosi infine nell’analisi comparata di sistemi di common law e civil law, l’autrice propone all’interprete internazionale diverse argomentazioni e correttivi al fine di un’applicazione della JCE che sia maggiormente conforme al principio di responsabilità penale personale e colpevole. / The thesis discusses a particularly problematic mode of liability for international crimes: the doctrine of ‘joint criminal enterprise’ (JCE) created by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. The core issue is the suitability of this mechanism of attribution to turn into a vehicle of collective criminal responsibility. In order to discuss its points of friction with the principle of individual culpability, the author designs a broader theoretical framework. The point of departure is a polarization between two opposing forces: a macro-dimension of collectivizing factors (historical, contextual and teleological) and a micro-dimension that strives to contain liability into the strict boundaries of individual guilt. Placed within the “strain” between these two opposing forces, JCE reveals its highly problematic features, especially in relation to the requirements of an indirect causal nexus and a very weak mens rea. Finally, by venturing into a comparative analysis of common law/civil law domestic systems, the author proposes to the international interpreter several arguments and correctives in order to apply JCE liability in a manner that is more consistent with the fundamental principle of individual culpability.

Les conflits armés non internationaux dominent de plus en plus la scène internationale, particulièrement en Afrique. Durant la période de violence, plusieurs crimes graves sont commis, ce qui n’a pas laissé la communauté internationale indifférente. De ce fait, des mécanismes ont été mis en place afin de, non seulement prévenir de tels actes, mais également de les réprimer. C’est dans cette logique que le principe de la Responsabilité pénale du Supérieur hiérarchique a été inventé afin, notamment, de mieux répondre au caractère collectif de la criminalité internationale. Autrefois applicable uniquement au sein des forces armées étatiques, cette doctrine est actuellement appliquée tant aux supérieurs hiérarchiques civils qu’à ceux des forces armées non étatiques. En ce qui concerne cette dernière catégorie, la question de l’effectivité de la doctrine se pose et plus particulièrement s’agissant de groupes armés qui mènent leurs opérations en RDC. En effet, selon la jurisprudence de la CPI, l’application de la RPSH est soumise à six conditions cumulatives qui doivent être remplies pour qu’on arrive à la condamnation d’un accusé. Or, pour ce qui est des groupes armés en RDC, il y a certaines questions d’ordre organisationnel telles que l’existence d’une hiérarchie claire et d’un système de discipline qui se posent. Cet état de fait soulève des difficultés quant à l’identification du suspect dans la hiérarchie et à la détermination des éléments pouvant permettre d’apprécier la capacité de ce dernier à exercer un contrôle effectif sur ses subordonnés. Il s’en suit que l’obligation de prévenir et de sanctionner, qui pèse sur le supérieur, n’est pas bien remplie durant la période de crise. En effet, la mauvaise organisation des institutions administratives et sécuritaires sur la partie du territoire contrôlée par les rebelles ne permet pas une bonne administration de la justice. De ce fait, certains droits fondamentaux de la personne tels que le droit à un procès équitable et la présomption d’innocence risquent de ne pas être respectés. Or, le non-respect de ces principes peut mener à commettre des violations qui relèvent du statut de Rome. De même, l’assimilation des supérieurs des groupes armés à ceux des supérieurs militaires des forces armées nationales telles que préconisée par la CPI, crée deux catégories de protagonistes qui sont soumis aux mêmes obligations alors qu’ils n’ont pas tous les mêmes capacités. Cette situation pourrait faire en sorte que l’on se retrouve avec une norme non applicable lorsque les groupes armés sont en cause et en conséquence encourager l’impunité. Dès lors, dans le but d’éviter ces effets pervers, cette étude suggère l’abandon, par le procureur de la CPI, de l’application de la RPSH aux groupes armés en RDC. Il est plutôt suggéré d’utiliser les autres modes de participation criminels qui s’adaptent mieux à ces organisations et qui feront en sorte que les auteurs des crimes graves ne continuent pas d’échapper à la justice. De ce fait, la complicité au sens de l’article 25-3-b et c du statut de Rome semble appropriée au contexte des groupes armés en RDC. / Non-international armed conflicts increasingly dominate the international scene especially in Africa. During this period of crisis, several serious crimes were committed and prompted the international community to act. As a result, mechanisms have been put in place to not only prevent such acts, but also to punish them. It is in this logic that the principle of the command responsibility was established. Formerly this doctrine was applicable only within state armed forces, but currently it is applied to both civilian superiors and those of non-state armed forces. Concerning superiors of non-state armed groups, the question of effectiveness arises, and more particularly to armed groups operating in the DRC. Indeed, according to the case law of the ICC, the application of the command responsibility is subject to six cumulative conditions. However, in case of armed groups in the DRC, there are organizational issues such as the existence of a clear hierarchy and a system of discipline that arise. This situation raises difficulties in identifying the hierarchical superior and in determining the elements that may allow an assessment of his ability to exercise effective control over his subordinates. The command's obligation to prevent and punish is not easy to carry out because during this period of crisis, the poor organization of institutions in the part of the territory controlled by the rebels does not allow for the proper administration of justice. As a result, some fundamental human rights such as the right to a fair trial and the presumption of innocence, may not be respected. Yet, failure to respect these principles can lead to other violations of international nature. Likewise, the assimilation of superiors of armed groups to those of military superiors of national armed forces as recommended by the ICC, creates two categories of protagonists who are subject to the same obligations although they do not all have the same capacities. This situation could result in an unenforceable standard when armed groups are involved and therefore encourage impunity. Hence, in order to avoid these perverse effects, this research suggests the application of other modes of criminal participation which adapt to armed groups in the DRC and which will ensure that those prosecuted do not escape justice. As a result, complicity within the meaning of article 25-3-b and c of the Rome Statute seems appropriate in the context of the armed groups operating in the DRC.

An important change wrought by the post-1994 South African Constitutions is the attempt to have South Africa recognised as a democratic and sovereign state in the "family of nations." The new Constitutions make extensive reference to the state's international obligations and represent an endeavour to [re]define the status of international law vis-a-vis national law. Some provisions utilise international law in the interpretation and formulation of national jurisprudence and represent an [albeit not totally successful] endeavour to attain greater harmonisation between international and national law. This is an attempt to systematize the various criticisms levelled against these provisions to date, and to highlight certain interpretational difficulties and problems that present themselves in the process. The distinction between the various terminologies and branches of international law is also taken to task. Lastly, this paper attempts to determine the extent to which international law is applied at national level under the post-1994 constitutions. / Jurisprudence / LL. M.

This limited scope dissertation deals with the protection against torture in international law. The mechanisms which have been established over the years to protect individuals against torture are analysed. The principles of international customary law dealing with torture and the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (UNCAT) have been examined against the failure by States to honour their obligations under the Treaty and other legal normative rules. This required deep exploration of the definition of torture and how States can compromise the rule of law by manipulating the definition of torture as contemplated by the Treaty or other instruments. Examples from the former US government highlight the ways in which domestic laws can be used and are continued to be used to allow the use of torture. Measures by South Africa in joining the international community in the fight against torture are also discussed as a case study. While all efforts have been made by the South African system to adopt desirable frame works on the protection of individuals against torture, the lack of education on torture remains the down fall of the system. The dissertation clearly explains that universal jurisdiction applies in respect of torture and this is recognised by both treaty law and customary law. Indeed despite all the current measures in place the use of torture persists. The research clearly reveals that countries hide behind their own laws to perpetrate acts of torture. It is then recommended that proper implementation of the legal structures, informed of the objectives of the structures, is essential in completely eradicating torture. / Public, Constitutional, and International Law / LLM

En 1951, le droit international des réfugiés voyait le jour avec la Convention relative au statut des réfugiés. Cette convention ainsi que son Protocole stipulent la définition contemporaine de cette notion et les obligations de l'État d'accueil à l’égard des réfugiés mais y prévoit aussi une exception. En effet, les rédacteurs de la Convention de 1951, percevant que certains bourreaux tenteraient d'user de ce mécanisme pour échapper à des poursuites en trouvant refuge à l'étranger, y ont intégré une dérogation à la définition de réfugié qui a pris la forme d’une clause d'exclusion. Celle-ci permet à tout État ayant adhéré à cet instrument de refuser d'accueillir sur son territoire les individus à l'origine des plus grands crimes internationaux et nationaux. Le Canada, en ratifiant la Convention de 1951 et son Protocole en 1969, a incorporé dans sa législation nationale cette clause d'exclusion dans l'article 98 de la Loi sur l'immigration et la protection des réfugiés. Le présent mémoire porte sur l'application de cette clause d'exclusion en droit canadien. Nous proposons une analyse de l'application de cette disposition en droit interne. L’objectif général est de montrer que les cours de justice favorisent une interprétation trop large de la clause d’exclusion, dénaturant ainsi son statut de règle d’exception. En effet, cette interprétation jurisprudentielle a pour conséquence d’attribuer un poids prépondérant à la sécurité nationale aux dépens du caractère humanitaire qui imprègne le droit d’asile depuis ses origines. / International refugee law emerged in 1951 with the adoption of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. This instrument, along with its Protocol, defined the contemporary notion of “refugee” and established the rights of these individuals as well as State obligations towards them. However, this international protection was not absolute. Suspecting that many oppressors would attempt to use this mechanism to escape prosecution by finding refuge abroad, the authors of the 1951 Convention introduced a derogation to the definition of refugee by way of the exclusion clause. As such, this article allows States to refuse to extend refugee protection to individuals responsible for the most serious international and national crimes. Canada, which ratified the 1951 Convention and its 1969 Protocol, incorporated the exclusion clause in its national legislation through article 98 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. The present thesis wishes to examine the application of this exclusion clause in Canadian law. In doing so, we will analyze the understanding of this provision in domestic law. Our objective is to demonstrate that our judicial courts favor a large interpretation of this clause, thus straying from its exceptional nature. This approach results in overweighing the importance of national security against the humanitarian nature of the refugee protection system.

L'incorporation du Statut de Rome de la Cour pénale internationale dans l’ordre juridique d'un État partie représente pour celui-ci un énorme engagement envers la justice, la protection et la garantie des droits fondamentaux de la personne humaine. La situation est particulièrement préoccupante dans le cas de la Colombie où la violation de ces droits fondamentaux a historiquement été notoire au cours du conflit armé interne qui sévit encore dans le pays aujourd’hui. Du fait de la ratification du Statut de Rome par l'État colombien, ce pays a le devoir de privilégier la recherche de la vérité, de la justice, de la réparation intégrale et les garanties de non-répétition pour les victimes du conflit armé. Ce traité international vise à empêcher la mise en place de règles consacrant l'impunité et empêchant de connaître la vérité de faits, comme ce qui a longtemps été le cas dans ce pays et qui a entraîné la prolongation du conflit pendant tant d'années. L'adoption du Statut de Rome par l'État colombien a produit différents effets juridiques dans le droit interne colombien. Certains de ces effets peuvent être observés dans les lois adoptées par le Congrès de la République ainsi que dans les arrêts de la Cour constitutionnelle et de la Cour suprême de justice où s'expriment les obligations internationales de l'État, rattachées au respect du système universel des droits de l'homme. Ce mémoire vise ainsi entre autres à exposer de quelle manière les dispositions sur les amnisties et la Loi Justice et paix rendent inefficace la mise en œuvre législative du Statut de Rome en Colombie. / The incorporation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court into the domestic legal system of a State Party constitutes an enormous commitment to justice and the protection and guarantee of fundamental human rights. This situation is especially interesting in Colombia, where the violation of human rights has been historically well-known during the internal armed conflict in which the country has gone through for several years now. Since its ratification of the Rome Statute, Colombia has a duty to search for truth and justice, as well as providing for integral repair and guarantees of non-repetition for the victims of the armed conflict. The treaty does not allow the creation of rules that allow for impunity and prevent knowledge of the truth which can explain that the conflict has persisted for so many years. The implementation of the Rome Statute by Colombia adjustment has produced different legal effects into its legal system. Some of these effects can be observed in certain laws adopted by the Congress of the Republic and in the Constitutional’s Court and the Supreme Court of Justice’s judgements. These laws and judgments have relied on the international obligations of the country contained in human rights treaties and the Statute of Rome. This master thesis exposes, among other things, how the provisions of laws relating to amnesties and the Law Justice and peace make the Rome Statute inefficient in Colombia.

En 1951, le droit international des réfugiés voyait le jour avec la Convention relative au statut des réfugiés. Cette convention ainsi que son Protocole stipulent la définition contemporaine de cette notion et les obligations de l'État d'accueil à l’égard des réfugiés mais y prévoit aussi une exception. En effet, les rédacteurs de la Convention de 1951, percevant que certains bourreaux tenteraient d'user de ce mécanisme pour échapper à des poursuites en trouvant refuge à l'étranger, y ont intégré une dérogation à la définition de réfugié qui a pris la forme d’une clause d'exclusion. Celle-ci permet à tout État ayant adhéré à cet instrument de refuser d'accueillir sur son territoire les individus à l'origine des plus grands crimes internationaux et nationaux. Le Canada, en ratifiant la Convention de 1951 et son Protocole en 1969, a incorporé dans sa législation nationale cette clause d'exclusion dans l'article 98 de la Loi sur l'immigration et la protection des réfugiés. Le présent mémoire porte sur l'application de cette clause d'exclusion en droit canadien. Nous proposons une analyse de l'application de cette disposition en droit interne. L’objectif général est de montrer que les cours de justice favorisent une interprétation trop large de la clause d’exclusion, dénaturant ainsi son statut de règle d’exception. En effet, cette interprétation jurisprudentielle a pour conséquence d’attribuer un poids prépondérant à la sécurité nationale aux dépens du caractère humanitaire qui imprègne le droit d’asile depuis ses origines. / International refugee law emerged in 1951 with the adoption of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. This instrument, along with its Protocol, defined the contemporary notion of “refugee” and established the rights of these individuals as well as State obligations towards them. However, this international protection was not absolute. Suspecting that many oppressors would attempt to use this mechanism to escape prosecution by finding refuge abroad, the authors of the 1951 Convention introduced a derogation to the definition of refugee by way of the exclusion clause. As such, this article allows States to refuse to extend refugee protection to individuals responsible for the most serious international and national crimes. Canada, which ratified the 1951 Convention and its 1969 Protocol, incorporated the exclusion clause in its national legislation through article 98 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. The present thesis wishes to examine the application of this exclusion clause in Canadian law. In doing so, we will analyze the understanding of this provision in domestic law. Our objective is to demonstrate that our judicial courts favor a large interpretation of this clause, thus straying from its exceptional nature. This approach results in overweighing the importance of national security against the humanitarian nature of the refugee protection system.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:30:16Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Paula da Rocha e Silva.pdf: 1542612 bytes, checksum: bfae4f7af597ccdf8e68c968a8d0b2b8 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-05-11 / The incorporation of the Treaty of Rome, through Decree No. 4388/02, at the Brazilian legal system, represented the acquiescence of Brazilian State to the creation of a permanent International Criminal Court, able to judge the severe crimes with international reach. However, despite the tremendous advance for the protection of human rights, since the incorporation, a situation of conflict has iniciated: the Treaty of Rome has human rights precepts in legal antinomy with fundamental rights precepts established in the 1988 Federal Constitutionº It discusses, so, if the internal sovereignty is placed in check by international sovereignty. In addition, there are doubts about the own conflicts itself: would these conflicts be real or merely apparent? This dissertation wished to resolve the tension between the precepts, which are: prescrition of crimes vs. non-applicability of statute of limitations; nonextradition vs. delivery; imprisonment for a specific number of years versus a tearm of life imprisonment, less onerous way possible / A incorporação do Tratado de Roma, por meio do Decreto nº 4388/02, ao ordenamento jurídico brasileiro, representou o assentimento do Estado brasileiro à criação de um Tribunal Penal Internacional permanente, apto para julgar os crimes de maior gravidade com alcance internacional. Contudo, apesar do enorme avanço à proteção dos direitos humanos, a partir de tal incorporação, instaurou-se uma situação conflituosa: o Tratado de Roma possui normas de direitos humanos em antinomia jurídica com as normas de direitos fundamentais previstas na Constituição Federal de 1988. Discute-se, assim se a soberania interna é colocada em xeque pela soberania internacional. Além disso, surgem dúvidas acerca dos próprios conflitos em si: seriam os conflitos reais ou meramente aparentes? A presente dissertação pretendeu resolver a tensão entre as normas quais sejam: prescritibilidade versus imprescritibilidade; não-extradição versus entrega; prisão por tempo determinado versus prisão perpétua, da maneira menos gravosa possível

La criminalisation de l’agression et l’établissement de la compétence de la Cour pénale internationale sur ce crime obligent à donner une définition de ce crime, de même qu’à déterminer les conditions dans lesquelles la Cour exercera sa compétence sur ce crime. Cette tâche n’est cependant pas aisée en raison de la « nature particulière » du crime d’agression. Le problème majeur qui se pose est celui de la difficulté à définir et à encadrer le crime d’agression tout en respectant les règles cardinales du droit international pénal d’un côté et les exigences du droit de la Charte ou du droit international du maintien de la paix de l’autre côté.En raison de la nature juridique de l’agression et plus précisément du positionnement atypique qui caractérise le crime d’agression, crime à la croisée du droit international du maintien de la paix et du droit international pénal, sans oublier le fait que ce crime vise exclusivement les personnes « effectivement en mesure de contrôler ou de diriger l’action politique ou militaire d’un État », le régime juridique du crime d’agression va être assez particulier, ceci en comparaison de celui des autres crimes internationaux contenus dans le Statut de Rome. / The criminalization of aggression and the establishment of the International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction over this crime make it necessary to provide a definition for this crime, and to determine the conditions under which the Court shall exercise its jurisdiction over this crime. However, this task is not an easy one given the ‘’particular nature’’ of the crime of aggression. The major challenge we are faced with lies in the difficulty to define and circumscribe the crime of aggression while abiding by the cardinal rules of international criminal law on the one hand, and the requirements of the law of the Charter or the law of the international Peacekeeping on the other. Due to the legal nature of the aggression, more precisely the atypical positioning characteristic of the crime of aggression, a crime which is halfway between the law of the international peacekeeping and the international criminal law, not forgetting the fact that this crime targets exclusively individuals who are ‘’ actually able to control or lead the political or military action of a State,’’ the legal regime of the crime of aggression is going to be fairly peculiar, in comparison with that of the other international crimes provided for by the Rome Statute

An important change wrought by the post-1994 South African Constitutions is the attempt to have South Africa recognised as a democratic and sovereign state in the "family of nations." The new Constitutions make extensive reference to the state's international obligations and represent an endeavour to [re]define the status of international law vis-a-vis national law. Some provisions utilise international law in the interpretation and formulation of national jurisprudence and represent an [albeit not totally successful] endeavour to attain greater harmonisation between international and national law. This is an attempt to systematize the various criticisms levelled against these provisions to date, and to highlight certain interpretational difficulties and problems that present themselves in the process. The distinction between the various terminologies and branches of international law is also taken to task. Lastly, this paper attempts to determine the extent to which international law is applied at national level under the post-1994 constitutions. / Jurisprudence / LL. M.