<p>Förändringar i den svenska säkerhetspolitiken under 2000-talet har gjort att Försvarsmakten i större utsträckning bidrar med trupp till internationella fredsfrämjande insatser världen över. Dessa har endast varit i konfliktområden med så kallade irreguljära aktörer. Förändringarna har gått fort och det finns delar av Försvarsmakten som inte hunnit med i omställningen. Reglementen och doktriner är ett av dessa områden. Arbetet med doktrinerna har precis börjats men det finns idag inget arbete som påvisar hur relevanta doktrinerna är för den verksamhet som Försvarsmakten bedriver i internationella insatser idag.</p><p>Syftet med uppsatsen är att börja fylla detta kunskapshål och undersöka i vilken grad Försvarsmaktens militärstrategiska doktrin är tillämpbar för irreguljära konflikter och besvara frågeställningen: Är <em>Militärstrategisk doktrin</em> relevant som vägledning för att lösa Försvarsmaktens uppgifter i irreguljära konflikter?</p><p>I uppsatsen beskrivs irreguljära konflikters bakgrund och karaktär samt aspekter som anses viktiga för att insatser skall lyckas med att skapa fred i konflikterna. Utifrån teorin formas operationella indikatorer vilka används i en kvalitativ textanalys för att undersöka den militärstrategiska doktrinen. Resultatet visar att Försvarsmaktens Militärstrategiska doktrin inte är relevant som vägledning i irreguljära konflikter. Den innehåller inte tillräckligt mycket information som anses vara viktig för att insatser skall lyckas. Doktrinen fyller inte längre sitt syfte utan behöver revideras.</p> / <p>Changes in the Swedish security policy during the 21^st century have made the armed forces extending their international peacekeeping efforts worldwide. These missions have only been in conflicts with so-called Irregular armed forces since year 2000. The changes have been rapid and there are areas within the Armed Forces who haven’t kept up with them. Regulations and doctrines is one of those areas. The work with revising these doctrines has just begun but there is currently no efforts being made to demonstrate the relevance of the doctrines for the work the Armed Forces is undertaking in international operations.</p><p>The purpose of the paper is to start the process of amending this lack of knowledge and to examine to what extent the Armed Forces military strategic doctrine is applicable for conflicts with irregular armed forces and also to answer the question: Can the military strategic doctrine be considered a relevant guide in solving the tasks of the Armed Forces in conflicts with irregular armed forces?</p><p>The paper describes the background and characteristics of conflicts with irregular armed forces. It also describes aspects of these conflicts which are considered essential for the efforts to succeed in establishing peace. Using this theory as a starting point, operational indicators are formed that can be textually analysed qualitatively to investigate the military strategic doctrine. The result shows that the Armed Forces Military Strategic doctrine cannot be considered a relevant guide when dealing with conflicts with irregular armed forces. The doctrine does not contain enough information deemed essential for success. The doctrine no longer fills its purpose, but needs to be revised.</p>

Förändringar i den svenska säkerhetspolitiken under 2000-talet har gjort att Försvarsmakten i större utsträckning bidrar med trupp till internationella fredsfrämjande insatser världen över. Dessa har endast varit i konfliktområden med så kallade irreguljära aktörer. Förändringarna har gått fort och det finns delar av Försvarsmakten som inte hunnit med i omställningen. Reglementen och doktriner är ett av dessa områden. Arbetet med doktrinerna har precis börjats men det finns idag inget arbete som påvisar hur relevanta doktrinerna är för den verksamhet som Försvarsmakten bedriver i internationella insatser idag. Syftet med uppsatsen är att börja fylla detta kunskapshål och undersöka i vilken grad Försvarsmaktens militärstrategiska doktrin är tillämpbar för irreguljära konflikter och besvara frågeställningen: Är Militärstrategisk doktrin relevant som vägledning för att lösa Försvarsmaktens uppgifter i irreguljära konflikter? I uppsatsen beskrivs irreguljära konflikters bakgrund och karaktär samt aspekter som anses viktiga för att insatser skall lyckas med att skapa fred i konflikterna. Utifrån teorin formas operationella indikatorer vilka används i en kvalitativ textanalys för att undersöka den militärstrategiska doktrinen. Resultatet visar att Försvarsmaktens Militärstrategiska doktrin inte är relevant som vägledning i irreguljära konflikter. Den innehåller inte tillräckligt mycket information som anses vara viktig för att insatser skall lyckas. Doktrinen fyller inte längre sitt syfte utan behöver revideras. / Changes in the Swedish security policy during the 21st century have made the armed forces extending their international peacekeeping efforts worldwide. These missions have only been in conflicts with so-called Irregular armed forces since year 2000. The changes have been rapid and there are areas within the Armed Forces who haven’t kept up with them. Regulations and doctrines is one of those areas. The work with revising these doctrines has just begun but there is currently no efforts being made to demonstrate the relevance of the doctrines for the work the Armed Forces is undertaking in international operations. The purpose of the paper is to start the process of amending this lack of knowledge and to examine to what extent the Armed Forces military strategic doctrine is applicable for conflicts with irregular armed forces and also to answer the question: Can the military strategic doctrine be considered a relevant guide in solving the tasks of the Armed Forces in conflicts with irregular armed forces? The paper describes the background and characteristics of conflicts with irregular armed forces. It also describes aspects of these conflicts which are considered essential for the efforts to succeed in establishing peace. Using this theory as a starting point, operational indicators are formed that can be textually analysed qualitatively to investigate the military strategic doctrine. The result shows that the Armed Forces Military Strategic doctrine cannot be considered a relevant guide when dealing with conflicts with irregular armed forces. The doctrine does not contain enough information deemed essential for success. The doctrine no longer fills its purpose, but needs to be revised.

John A Warden III har en teori om hur luftkrig ska genomföras, som sedan slutet på 80-talet influerat bland annat USA i deras planering och genomförande av luftoperationer. Denna teori var som mest aktuell under Gulfkriget 1990-1991, där luftstridskrafterna genom ett agerade enligt Wardens teori gav stora effekter på konfliken. Detta arbete syftar mot att undersöka om Wardens teori fortfarande används, och vilka effekter detta agerande medför. Arbetet presenterar de begrepp som kan ses som centrala i Wardens teori och analyserar dessa mot en fallstudie som rör flygstridskrafternas agerande under inledningen av Operation Enduring Freedom i Afghanistan år 2001. Slutsatsen är att det finns spårbarhet av Wardens tankar om luftöverlägsenhet under hela perioden som arbetet berör. Däremot finns det endast spårbarhet av att koalitionen agerade enligt tyngdpunktsbegreppet, parallell attack och fienden som ett system under den inledande fasen av konflikten. Därför kan det inte sägas att koalitionen agerade enligt Wardens teori under konflikten.

After the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, and the war in Iraq and Afghanistan that followed, the debate about counterinsurgency (COIN) has once again been stirred up. Some researchers claim that the old proven theories and methods of successful COIN are still relevant. Other researchers, however, consider that today's opponents have developed and differ compared to the earlier, claiming that yesterday's theories are out dated and inadequate in a modern context. Today's view of successful counterinsurgency is heavily influenced by David Galula, whose theories were developed in the 1950s and 1960s. The purpose of this study is to investigate whether past theories are useful in contemporary insurgency. To investigate the question, the study examines whether the United States followed Galula's strategies in practice during the counterinsurgency in the Al-Anbar province (2003–2008). The study's findings indicate that there are similarities between U.S. action in Al-Anbar and Galula's models for successful COIN. Galula implies that the local population's support needs to be gained in order to achieve success in counterinsurgency. The focus on the population is clearly reflected in the U.S. approach and can be interpreted as the cause of success. In addition to similarities regarding the central parts of the theory, differences can also be found. In the two cases studied, the importance of cooperation with local armed forces and the media's role in the conflict is clearly highlighted, which is not mentioned in Galula's theory. Therefore, it cannot be excluded that other aspects not declared in Galula's theory might have influenced the outcome of the conflict as well. To be able to determine the usefulness of Galula's theory in modern time with greater certainty, further research is proposed to investigate more recent cases, using the results of this study as a starting point.

Guerrilla warfare in the Baltic- How to trade space for time, and use the time to produce will. 1944-1952; a fierce battle against the Soviet occupations of the Baltic states elapsed. The Baltic resistant organization named The Forest Brothers fought against overwhelming Russian security force for almost a decade. This thesis analyzes the guerilla warfare fought by The Forest Brothers in Lithuania. The study uses the central meaning of Mao Tse-Tung theory On Guerrilla Warfare, how to trade Terrain for Time and how to produce Will. This is a case study to enhance the knowledge about the guerrilla warfare in Lithuania 1944-1952 and to test the validity of Mao Tse-tung theory On Guerilla Warfare. In 1991 the former Soviet archives was opened to the public which gives comprehensive material to source from. Despite the range of background material available there are still a lot to learn from the guerilla warfare conducted during the Soviet occupation of the Baltic states. A wide range of material on guerilla warfare is used in this study. This study shows on both similarities and differences with Mao´s theories about guerrilla warfare. The study identifies the importance of a guerilla to be a legitimate security provider for the people to be able to gain the support from the people over a long time. It shows on difficulties for a regular force to adapt and understand guerilla warfare.

Since 1949, irregular conflicts have been the primary type of conflict. Although the Swedish government has found that a restructuring of focus from international operations to national defence is fundamental for Swedish security policy, the Swedish Armed Forces are still engaged in several irregular conflict arenas around the globe.By applying a theoretical framework based on counterinsurgency theory, this study ventures to explore whether this theory has been implemented in the main Swedish armed forces policy documents. The purpose of this is to facilitate an understanding for the potential strengths and weaknesses that these documents have when implementing counter insurgency in irregular conflicts.This study finds that there exists an implementation of counter insurgency theory in these policy documents as a prerequisite for Swedish operations in irregular conflicts. Furthermore, this proves a correlation between theory and policy something that may be a positive prerequisite for this kind of operations.Furthermore, this study finds that future studies in to the relevance of COIN theory in potential conflicts to come.

In the aftermath of operation iraqi freedom, the world has seen the rise and fall of an entirely new kind of enemy, the islamic state. The field of research can be viewed as divided and a discrepancy can be seen upon whether to face this threat with counterinsurgency-campaigns or conventional means depending on if the islamic state is to be considered a proto-state or not.   This thesis aims at establishing a profound understanding on how the fall of this organization could be understood in accordance with the coalition and U.S foreign policy including its decisionmaking. This has been achived by examining the U.S strategy towards ISIS in order to gain understanding on wheter David Galulas theory on COIN or David J. Lonsdales theory on conventional strategy is the preferred means to an end on such organizations.     The result of the analysis shows that the coalition was successful fighting ISIS with conventional means and not due to well conducted COIN. Although it could be argued that the coalition reached the first step of a COIN-campaign, the U.S has declined a long-term commitment in the middle-east. The contributions made with this study lays mainly in the understanding of strategic concepts and assessing the opponent.

Research in the area of irregular naval warfare has been found to be deficient. Therefore, this essay aims to contribute to broaden the theorizing within this area. Arreguin- Toft´s Strategic interaction theory in force- asymmetric conflicts, involves the use of irregular warfare as a relatively weak actor in an asymmetric conflict. This theory, along with essential element of Sea Power theory, creates the theoretical framework. To examine its explanatory power in an naval context, the study was conducted as a theory testing case study. The to cases are the Tanker War 1984-1988 and the Battle at Okinawa, Ryukyu Islands, 1945. The results showed that the Strategic interaction theory, to some extent, possessed the ability to explain the outcome in both cases. One conclusion that can be made, is that a relatively weak naval actor can benefit from the use of irregular strategies to prevent a relatively strong navy’s attempt to secure command of the sea.

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<p>Den svenska marinen likväl som världens handels sjöfart nyttjar alltmer satellitnavigering för sin positionering. Enligt totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut kan sådana system störas med förhållandevis enkla medel. Nu när den svenska marinen alltmer engagerar sig i insatser utomlands mot irreguljära motståndare väcks frågan om hur en irreguljär motståndare kan påverka den svenska marinen och den svenska marinens taktik. I denna uppsats kommer frågor kring en irreguljär motståndares förmåga att påverka GNSS att ställas. Samt frågan om vilken påverkan detta har för såväl den svenska marinens fartyg som handelssjöfarten. Uppsatsen kommer även att behandla möjligheterna till skydd mot störning samt hur den svenska marinens taktik kommer påverkas om en irreguljär motståndare försöker störa ut GNSS-system.</p> / <p>The Swedish Navy as well as the worlds shipping industries use more and more satellite navigation for positioning purposes. According to the Swedish Defence Research Agency, those types of systems can relatively easily and at a low cost be jammed. With the Swedish Navy becoming more and more involved in missions overseas against insurgents, the question is whether an insurgent can affect the Swedish Navy and its tactics. This paper investigates the questions about what opportunities an insurgent have to affect the GNSS-system and how that can affect the Swedish Navyas well as the shipping industries. This paper is also about how the tactics of the Swedish Navy will be affected if an insurgent attempts to jam the GNSS-systems and the possibility of protection against jamming.</p>