The present study covers the causes of victory and defeat in the light of chapter eight of the Holy Qur'an. It has been prompted by the current situation facing Muslims in many parts of the world, which is characterized by despair, reversals and loss, This study is thus reflexive in nature. In order to obtain a satisfactory response to this predicament, the relevant text in addition to several of its commentaries were scrutinized. The latter search remained unsatisfactory since their focus of inquiry was merely exegetical and failed to reveal any didactic element, which is crucial for obtaining guidance. This work has successfully managed to deduce this aspect from the text which amplifies the importance of extensive sacrifice for gaining glory. / Religious Studies and Arabic / M.A. (Islamic studies)

The Arab-Israeli conflict is examined from its religious aspect, presenting people's experience of religion without passing judgement. Selected concepts are compared and contrasted and interpreted hermeneutically. The roots of the antagonism are traced back historically, showing that it comprises more than a claim to the same geographical territory. Each religion's notion of statehood is described. Internally Jewish-Zionist friction over the ceding of territory arises through divergent interpretations of the same texts; Islam, Nationalism and religious rivalry, being at variance, have engendered Arab tensions. Their respective doctrines on war and peace suggest, broadly speaking, a Jewish-Zionist leaning to shalom, and Islam-Arab Nationalism to jihad (struggle). While the religious perspective does leave an opening for a solution to the conflict, pragmatism may lead to compromise. Finally the suggestion is made that the religious dimension is necessary for a holistic understanding of political issues / Religious Studies and Arabic / M.A. (Religious Studies)

In early 2001, as I began exploring the role of religion in conflict, I came across a declaration by a then little-known leader, Osama bin Laden, and his fellows. That declaration was of the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders. Many analysts now see it as one of the founding documents of al Qaeda, the amorphous terrorist umbrella group. The purpose of the declaration was to issue a fatwa that, because United States troops were stationed in the holy Arabian peninsula and threatened Muslims, particularly in Iraq, it was every Muslim's duty 'to kill the Americans and their allies - civilians and military - ... in any country in which it is possible to do it'. Of course, the first thing that struck me, as an American, was that here was a group that wished to kill me solely because of my birthplace. They did not seem to care that I might not support specific actions of my government, even if I supported that government generally. Nor was there any discussion of whether methods other than violence might be more useful in persuading my fellow citizens as to the justice of their cause. I wondered, as a student of peace studies, what I could do in the face of such seemingly implacable hatred. The second thing that struck me about the declaration was its language. I noticed, in particular, a certain flourish that one does not often find in political analysis. The image that 'nations are attacking Muslims like people fighting over a plate of food' has always stayed in my mind because the simple image has such rhetorical power. I also noticed, in accordance with my research interests, the use of religious teachings as a justification for violence. Yet poetic rhetoric and religious dogma were not the only contents of that declaration. Bin Laden and his fellows made coherent political points. They cited as examples of the harm caused by the United States: the post-Gulf War presence of US troops in Saudi Arabia, 'dictating to its rulers [and] humiliating its people;' the continued bombing of Iraq 'even though all [Saudi] rulers are against their territories being used to that end;' and, finally, the way that these actions contributed to the security of Israel by weakening Arab nations. Thus, beneath its religious expression the declaration contained political points with which I could engage. Now, as I categorically oppose the use of violence, I unreservedly reject the conclusion of the fatwa. Moreover, I do not assume that a single statement is evidence of this group's true intent. It may very well be the case, as analysts more versed in their politics than I have argued, that al Qaeda's real goal is the establishment of an Islamic caliphate. Its affiliation with Afghanistan's Taliban certainly supports this argument. In spite of these things, though, their use of political arguments meant they were trying to reach an audience that cared about such things. I could address that audience as well, and try to propose different courses of action that would address the same concerns. Thus, I could step outside of my original framework, in which I envisioned implacable hatred, and argue for nonviolent ways of addressing the issues. Yet the religious idiom of the declaration was also an important factor. Given that the declaration addressed Muslims as Muslims, by only trying to argue political points with them I might alienate people for whom the religious language meant a great deal. Already in my research I had come to the conclusion, drawing on R. Scott Appleby's The Ambivalence of the Sacred, that the people best placed to show the peaceful potential of a religion are believers in that religion. I am not, however, religious. Thus, this conclusion left me with no recourse in the face of the religious aspects of conflict. I began to wonder what role a nonreligious - or, as I came to think of myself, a secular - person could play in peacemaking when religion is an element of a conflict. Moreover, I saw that different seculars would have different reactions to bin Laden's arguments. Some would reject the message because of the religious medium. Some, like I first did, would perceive the sociopolitical elements but continue to ignore the religious language. Others, as I also briefly did, might consider the religious element but leave out the issue of their own secular nature. Yet no perspective provided a good model for what I, as a secular, might do. Thus, the goal of my thesis became to analyze the various models of secularity, find the most beneficial principles, and construct from these a model for secular best practice. That Osama bin Laden's words should catalyze this thesis brings me to two important points. First, this is not a thesis about Islam. If a disproportionate number of the examples that I use throughout the thesis focus on Islam, this should not indicate that Islam deserves special attention concerning conflict and violence. Rather, the focus here is always on secularity and secular responses to religion in situations of conflict. However, particularly after September 11th, the largely secular policy and scholarly establishments of Europe and North America have produced a great deal of material concerning Islam. Thus, while I sought out more diverse sources dealing with secularity, I often used the religion most commented on by secular sources as an exemplar. That leads to the second point, which is that this is not a thesis about terrorism. Given its scope and the place of religion in it, most obvious case study to use in this thesis is the 'war on terror' - which I call such for ease of use, as that is what the Western media generally call it, not because I think it is an adequate designation. I will cover this topic in the final chapter, but because the thesis is about peace and violence in conflict, and not about specific forms of violence, it will not figure elsewhere. Because this thesis is concerned with violence and, specifically, with the promotion of peace, it has an overt prescriptive element. This stems in large part from my Peace Studies background. Peace Studies entails a normative commitment to pursue peaceful situations through nonviolent means. Thus, at several points I actively enjoin readers to take or not take certain types of action because, by my analysis, that is the best way to promote peaceful relationships. More generally, by the title of this thesis, I ask readers to 'rethink secular and sacred' - both what these terms mean, and more importantly how they relate to one another. In particular, this goal leads me to avoid discussing the concept of tolerance. Tolerance is often held to be a virtue by those who seek to promote nonconfrontational religious interaction. However, as many other writers have pointed out, the word 'tolerance' itself stems from physiological and biological studies, where it means the ability to withstand negative factors, such as poisons or drugs. Thus I find that its social meaning is essentially negative, denoting forbearance of what one finds repugnant. While in a very limited sense I feel that tolerance is necessary, it is only as a first step to actively engaging with what one might at first find off-putting.

Le présent travail se veut être une tentative pour dé-couvrir un canal de dialogue interculturel et interreligieux, en prenant comme plate-forme et terrain de discussion le jihad et une perspective inspirée de la psychanalyse freudienne et lacanienne qui discute du rapport entre le sujet-chercheur et l’objet de recherche. Pour cela, la présente recherche tente de désengager une compréhension du jihad qui serait subvertie par un héritage colonial dénoncé par Edward Said sous l’appellation d’ « orientalisme », et dont l’empreinte académique circonscrirait le jihad à « ce qu’on lui permet d’être ». Ceci amène donc la recherche à questionner le statut ontologique de l’objet jihad, statut que l’articulation linguistique du présent travail fait glisser de celui de concept vers celui de signifiant. Ce signifiant est alors conceptualisé par une opération de « retour à la lettre », qui fait réapparaitre « un signifiant arabe » longuement oublié se structurant à partir de la racine trilitère JHD ainsi que l’élaboration d’un nouvel outil conceptuel dit de « nuage sémantique ». Ce signifiant est ainsi réinséré dans son environnement naturel qu’est le Qur’ān en langue arabe et dont l’analyse est utilisée pour tester l’hypothèse : Il existe dans le Qur’ān un signifiant arabe se structurant à partir de la racine JHD, déterminé par l’article al- et qui prend la forme/structuration « al-jihād ». / This research is an attempt to unveil a channel for interreligious and intercultural dialogue by using the jihad as common ground for discussion using a perspective inspired by Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis which discusses the relation between the subject-researcher and the object of research. Thus, this scientific endeavour tries to disengage an understanding of jihad that would be subverted by a colonial legacy identified by Edward Said as “orientalism”, legacy that circumscribes the object jihad in “whatever is allowed it to be”. This leads the research to question the ontological status of the object jihad, and shifts this status from concept to signifier due to the linguistic nature of this work. Signifier which is conceptualised by a “retour à la lettre” from which emerges a long forgotten “Arabic signifier” constructed from the trilateral root JHD and the development of a new conceptual tool: the “semantic cloud”. This signifier is hence inserted in its natural environment which is defined as the Qur’an in the Arabic language and is analysed to test the hypothesis: There is in the Arabic Qur’an a signifier constructed from the root JHD determined by the definite article al- which takes the form “al-jihād”.

L'un des défis sécuritaires majeurs auxquels le Nigéria a dû faire face au cours de la dernière décennie a été l'insurrection de Boko Haram dans le nord du pays. L'attention portée par de nombreux chercheurs aux récits relatifs à l'insurrection dans le nord-est, en particulier le Borno, doit son impulsion intellectuelle au climat de violence dont cette zone a été le théâtre. Cette focalisation excessive, aussi valide soit-elle, relègue quelque peu au second rang les recherches pouvant porter sur d'autres zones septentrionales, où les facteurs de risques de l'insurrection sont similaires à ceux du nord-est. Dans le cas particulier de l'État de Sokoto au nord-ouest, la capacité à endiguer la montée des violences perpétrées par Boko Haram s'organise autour du récit d'une synergie sociétale entre différentes communautés. Bien qu'existant en milieu contemporain, cette synergie tire son inspiration de l'héritage historique unique du Sokoto et de son djihad au XIXe siècle, autour duquel certaines communautés se sont tissées. L'étude entière a essayé de permettre une meilleure compréhension des liens entre les récits djihadistes, l'insurrection, les acteurs sociaux locaux, la puissance de l'histoire et l'expérience de la résilience et de la résistance contre l'une des plus célèbres insurrections africaines des dernières décennies. / Over the last decade, a predominant feature of counter-insurgency scholarship in Africa has been the articulation of ideas based on troubling accounts in the north-east zone of Nigeria. The multiple enquiries by scholars owe their intellectual momentum to the sheer level of violence instigated by a group known as "Boko Haram". Few studies focus on the (counter-) insurgency narratives linked to states in other northern Nigerian zones where the Boko Haram crisis reached and where there are indeed risk factors for insurgency. Using the case of Sokoto, a state in Nigeria's north-west zone, this study addresses the principal question of what intervening variables have deterred a fuller expression of the Boko Haram crisis in Sokoto's societal context. In the particular case of Sokoto, the capacity to deter the escalation of Boko Haram's violence is framed around the narrative of a synergy among societal structures, which although located in the contemporary milieu, draw inspiration from Sokoto's unique historical legacy of the 19th century jihad. This study opens up understanding to the linkages between jihad narratives, insurgency, local societal actors, the potency of history and the experience of resistance against one of the world's most notorious insurgencies in recent decades.

O objetivo desta dissertação é efetivar um estudo de casos acerca da atuação das três principais organizações terroristas islamitas atuantes na região da Caxemira, uma região disputada por Paquistão e Índia, no período que vai de 1989 a 2009. O conflito pela Caxemira persiste há pouco mais de seis décadas e pelo seu domínio foram travadas duas grandes guerras, em 1947-1948 e em 1965, alguns conflitos efêmeros e embates recorrentes. Como resultado prático dos conflitos, o território da Caxemira foi dividido entre os contendores, tendo por referência limítrofe uma Linha de Controle reconhecida bilateralmente em 1972. A hipótese que orienta a dissertação defende que, seguindo as diretrizes de uma estratégia de política externa do Paquistão, de Guerra por Procuração, em finais dos anos oitenta atores privados religiosos fundamentalistas islâmicos passaram a atuar no conflito utilizando técnicas de ataque terrorista contra autoridades e população civil habitantes da porção caxemir administrada pela Índia. Ademais, estas organizações receberam o patrocínio e foram controladas pelo principal Serviço Secreto militar paquistanês, o ISID – Diretoria de Serviços de Inteligência Interligados. Assim, contando com o respaldo de setores do Estado paquistanês, como o referido Serviço Secreto, estas organizações terroristas aumentaram seu poder relativo dentro do Paquistão e no contexto regional da Ásia Meridional, trazendo problemas relacionados ao incremento da ingovernabilidade do poder central e das disputas sectárias no Paquistão, bem como, a disseminação da ação terrorista transnacional no subcontinente indiano e no Oriente Médio. / This dissertation presents a case study on the performance of three major Islamic terrorist organizations operating in the region of Kashmir, a region disputed by Pakistan and India from 1989 to 2009. The conflict over Kashmir lasts for more than six decades now and two major wars were fought over its control, in 1947-1948 besides other ephemeral conflicts and clashes. As a practical result of conflict, the territory of Kashmir has been divided between the contenders, the 1972 Line of Control being a reference frontier acknowledged bilaterally. The hypothesis that guides the dissertation argues that, following the guidelines of a Pakistani foreign policy strategy, the “war by proxy”, civil religious Islamic fundamentalists started, in the late eighties, to launch terrorist attacks against authorities and the civilian population of the territory under Indian control. These organizations received the patronage and were controlled by the main military Secret Service of Pakistan, the ISID - Inter-Services Intelligence Directorade. With the support of sectors of the Pakistani state, such as the Secret Service, these terrorist organizations have increased their relative power within Pakistan and in the regional context of Southern Asia, bringing problems related to a growing crisis of governability and sectarian disputes in Pakistan, as well as the spread of transnational terrorist action in the Indian subcontinent and the Middle East.

Le Mali est apparu pendant longtemps comme un ‘’bon élève’’, un modèle de démocratie du continent africain. Sa société, avant l’éclatement de la crise de 2012, se caractérisait par une vie religieuse exempte de violences, réunissant harmonieusement les diverses tendances doctrinales (musulmans orthodoxes, hérétiques et non-musulmans). A la faveur de la crise, la segmentation de l’islam malien, bien que s’étant auparavant pacifiquement exercée, s’est manifestée sous une violence inédite, par les armes. À la fois révélateur des limites de la démocratie, d’un dépérissement de l’Etat, de maux sociaux/sociétaux critiques, d’importants dysfonctionnements dans le mode de gouvernance, la crise de 2012 a également dévoilé de nouveaux types de rapports liant la sphère islamique au domaine politique malien. Ces rapports sont dominés par l’omniprésence, l’influence islamique dans la sphère politique. Les mouvements religieux tirent cette influence de leur capacité à exprimer et à produire du politique, combinée à leur solide ancrage auprès des populations, au travers d’œuvres sociales considérables. Cette dynamique islamique dans l’espace public politique malien sera très vite exploitée par les élites politiques, faisant des élites musulmanes des partenaires, notamment en périodes électorales. / Long appeared as a ‘’good student’’ of African continent, as a model of democracy – with a religious life free of violence, which blends harmoniously orthodox religious, heretics and non-Muslims – the year 2012 marked a turning point in the history of Mali. Thanks to the crisis, the segmentation of Malian Islam, although having peacefully exercised previously, will manifest in an unprecedented violence, with arms. Revealing, both, the limits of democracy, the withering away of the state, some critical social ills, significant shortcomings in the governance, the crisis of the year 2012 also unveiled new types of connections, linking the Islamic sphere to the politic. These links are dominated by the omnipresence, Islamic influence in the political sphere. Religious movements derive their influence from their ability to express and produce policy, combined with their strong anchor near to the population, through significant social works. This Islamic dynamic in the Malian political public space, will be exploited by the political elites, making Muslim elites partners, particularly in election periods.

The oral traditions in the Islamic world presented only the moral benefits of Jihad. Yet, the fact is that, though the moral benefits continued to exist before and after the First Crusade, though the interest seemed to have been present and the necessary intellectual theories continued on, Muslims did not advance the practical Jihad. Nonetheless, the disastrous Second Crusade struck a powerful chord among Muslims. It forced Muslims to battle for their very survival, and to do so they would have to adapt, but equally they could only survive by drawing on their imperial inheritance built up over centuries. A number of concerns identified with the “golden age” of the Islamic empire influenced the Jihad movements for Muslims associated the imperial traditions with Islam itself. Given the examples of the First and Second Crusades, this study proposes that the idea of “Islamic Empire” constituted Muslims’ practical response to the crusades.

Review Essay of Y. Aboul-Enein, Militant Islamist Ideology: Understanding the Global Threat, Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2013; J. Deol and Z. Kazmi, eds. Contextualising Jihadi Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012; M. H. Hassan, The Father of Jihad:’Abd Allāh ‘Azzām’s Jihad ideas and Implications to National Security. London: Imperial College Press, 2014; J. Wagemakers, A Quietist Jihadi: The Ideology and Influence of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi. Cambridge, England and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012; A. Moghadam and B. Fishman, eds., Fault lines in global jihad: Organizational, Strategic, and Ideological Fissures, New York and London: Routledge, 2013.

Despite his importance as a senior Al-Qaeda spokesman, no detailed examination exists of Adam Yahiye Gadahn’s employment of fiqh al-jihad—that branch of Islamic jurisprudence regulating the lawful waging of jihad—to condemn or condone violence committed in the name of Al-Qaeda. This article first provides a detailed exposition of Gadahn’s sharia-based critique of affiliates’ conduct deemed by him in violation of Islamic law and involving the commission of major sins. Second, Gadahn’s conception of fiqh al-jihad is contextualized and contrasted with the comprehensive fiqh al-jihad-based critiques produced by respected militant Islamist scholars. A key finding here is that Gadahn (unlike these scholars) illicitly truncates the application of fiqh al-jihad with the result that he demands sharia-compliance when criticizing intra-Islamist violence yet ignores sharia-compliance when targeting America and Americans. Third, reasons are considered for this incoherent application of fiqh al-jihad and attempted Islamic legalization of anti-American mass casualty terrorist attacks. Finally, the discussion concludes with implications for counter-Al-Qaeda strategy.