This study seeks to clarify the identities of the Almoravid and Almohad Berber movements in the larger Crusade narrative. The two North African Islamic groups are often carelessly placed within the group identified as “Islam” in discussions about the series of military campaigns that took place not only in the traditional Holy Land but also throughout regions of the Mediterranean such as Spain; this generalized identifier of “Islam” is placed against a much more complex group of generally Christian parties, all of them seen as separate, unique groups under the umbrella identifier of Christianity. This foray into a late 13thcentury North African Arabic history of the two groups will attempt to build a more robust identity for the two groups. The way in which they were remembered by their immediate successors will reveal far more interesting parties than simply zealous Muslims waging jihad. Their presence in the region is primarily remembered by their military involvement with Christian forces in the region, though the history of Muhammad ibn Idhari, written around 1295, reveals the groups and their ideologies to be far more complicated than simply meets the eye.

The purpose behind this theses is to introduce the doctrine of jihad as a legal concept established in Muslim jurisprudence [fiqh] through the analysis of Arabic primary medieval legal sources and the writings of contemporary Islamic intellectuals. Firstly, its author will focus on the notion of jihad in classical Muslim jurisprudence and then proceed to examine the modern reinterpretations of jihad. The introduction provides and insight into the basic features of the religious law of Islam and its system. The second chapter is concerned with the definition of jihad and siyar in the books of fiqh as a regulatory basis governing the conduct of military expeditions. Then, it reviews the interpretative issues faced by Muslim exegets of the Quran and hadith posed by the application of abrogation mechanism [nasch] and analyses the early writings on jihad with respect to their structure, areas of regulation covered and the use of legal arguments and sources by their authors. The analyzed works include hadith collections of Al-Bukhari, Abu Dawud and Ibn Majja and the books of Malik and Al-Shaybani considered as the first codifications of Islamic laws of war. The third chapter presents the substantive rules of jihad as discussed by ibn Rushd in his legal handbook Bidayat al mujtahid which entails limits on...

In the Islamic world, the term Jihad bears intricate meaning, and its rightful interpretation has occupied many scholars and Muslims across the globe. For some, it relates to the personal struggle that one may have to deal with on a regular basis. For others, the term operates on the basis of a willingness to fight. While the latter interpretation seems to be shared by extremist terrorists of organisations such as ISIS and Al Qaeda, the majority of Muslims have an entirely different interpretation of jihad. This essay wishes to delve deeper into this intricate term in order to come closer to an understanding of Jihad. This is done by conducting a qualitative and comparative analysis of three magazines of propaganda: the Ahmadiyya Community, the Islamic State and Al Qaeda respectively. The results of the study showed that the Ahmadiyya Community claim that a vital aspect of jihad is “jihad-of-the-pen”, a concept which aims to educate other people on the peaceful nature of Islam. Because of the wrongful interpretation of Jihad by extremist organisations, the Ahmadiyya Community take to the pen in order to battle these misinterpretations while also wanting to show that Islam is a peaceful religion. Furthermore, they claim that this wrongful interpretation affects the way ordinary law-abiding Muslim citizens are being viewed upon. Moreover, the findings also showed that ISIS and Al Qaeda interpret jihad as being the “jihad-of-the-sword”, whereby it is considered to be the sixth pillar. While ISIS use the concept of jihad to justify its fighting of the disbelievers, including Muslims who deal with ‘Crusader’ Western democracies, Al Qaeda aims their jihad towards the United States, whom they feel are the root to everything terror. The essay concludes with a the notion that research on this topic should focus more on peaceful jihad, the kind of personal and inner struggle that is being advocated by the Ahmadiyya communities. Literature, such as Understanding Jihad, Field of Blood, and The Secret History of Al Qaeda, has all too much tended to the violent-nature of jihad and left the peaceful, inner struggle out of the discussion. More research can be conducted on this topic to further paint the picture of peaceful struggle, which is a struggle that is felt for the absolute majority of Muslims throughout this world.

Since 2010 The Islamic State (IS) has resurrected from virtual extinction and has conquered vast territories in Iraq and Syria. It has transformed from a simple group of insurgents to a conventional army which has claimed to be a state of its own since it announced the for-mation of the Caliphate in mid-2014. Researchers have used many different theories to un-derstand the success of IS which has increased our knowledge of the phenomenon. Even so there are still questions that need to be answered in order to fully understand what we are facing in the Middle East (ME) today and what we might encounter in other parts of the world tomorrow. This essay uses revolutionary theories about Communism and Nationalism with the intent to expand our view of modern insurgencies. More precisely it investigates why IS has been so successful in its conquests, which are done through the narrative of its attitude towards the population of Iraq and Syria. The result reveals that IS uses a combination of the two above-mentioned ideologies. IS keeps conflicts going through constant terror against specific groups thus creating a gap be-tween the governments and the Sunnis in the region. Simultaneously it is trying to create an environment where the inhabitants can experience normal living conditions. The future of the ME is worrying since IS and its way of gaining conquests is hard to battle for whoever is intervening.

The diploma thesis deals with the circumstances of origin of the terrorist organization Islamic State in its theoretical part. It focuses on the religious context of the ideology of the Islamic state and the origins of the organization. The so-called Islamic State can currently be considered one of the most acute security threats of the 21st century. The war with the so- called Islamic State is also a media war, a war taking place in the media and global cyberspace. An important mean of this war is propaganda. The work is also focused mainly on the propaganda of the so-called Islamic State with a focus on video production. With the influx of brutal videos from IS production, the question arises which way media should handle this material. Obviously, the videos were designed for media, among others. To be distributed and viewed by as many recipients as possible. In the practical part selected videos from the IS production are analyzed and their example shows what topics are present in IS video production and how the Islamic State propaganda works with the video.

Uppsatsen Läroboks-muslimer behandlar postkoloniala föreställningar och stereotyper i läromedel avsedda för den svenska gymnasieskolan. Studiens syfte har varit att kartlägga och analysera hur islam och muslimer framställs i fyra av gymnasieskolans läroböcker; tillvägagångssättet studien använt sig av har varit att genom diskursanalysen som metod och med avstamp i den kritiska postkoloniala teoribildningen, kartlägga och analysera postkoloniala typifieringar av islam och muslimer med avgränsning på om och i sådana fall hur, läromedelsförfattarna skildrar: 1. Jihad, och 2. Islams kvinnosyn. Resultatet visar att den historiska västerländska diskurs, vilken porträtterar islam och muslimen som blodtörstig, våldsbejakande, kvinnoföraktande och misogyn, fortfarande dominerar och florerar i de granskade läroböckerna. Beträffande skildringen av jihad går det att finna en märkbar utveckling i en av läroböckerna som framställer begreppet komplext och nyanserat. Vad gäller islams kvinnosyn så präglas porträtteringen, i likhet med jihadbegreppet, i mångt och mycket av stereotypt och tendentiöst urval. Studiens analys- och diskussionsavsnitt behandlar hur dessa fynd kan sättas i ett större historiskt sammanhang och kopplas till en postkolonial epistemologisk produktion som stakat ut riktlinjerna för en dominerande samhällsdiskurs om islam och muslimer.

Othering is central in the rhetoric of both Abu Bakr Naji and Anders Breivik throughout their works. Both authors use it as a device to drive a psychological wedge between the groups of ‘us’ and ‘them’. In the case of Naji, the in group is made up of violence oriented takfiris such as Al Qaeda, but Breivik hoped to appeal to other violence oriented far right groups and individuals, disillusioned with what he perceived to be a slow erosion of ‘traditional’ European life by the far left, feminism and other forces. My research question will revolve around how a use of othering by the authors can reveal what they regard as the major threat to their groups. Superficially, there seem to be many similarities in how each author uses othering to alienate and dehumanise different groups. However, closer inspection reveals entirely different priorities and different methods of othering in play. By examining how othering is used throughout the works, it is possible to see which outside groups are perceived to present the biggest threat to the inside groups and the results are perhaps surprising. Given that The Management of Savagery has been seen as the ISIS strategic manual and the key message throughout the work is try and bring the USA and her allies into a catastrophic war of attrition from which the violence oriented takfiris would rise, I had assumed that the USA, or the ‘Far’ enemy would take the brunt of Naji’s othering drive. Instead, the Shia and all Muslims who are unaligned with Al Qaeda, plus those Muslims closely aligned with the West or Western ideals are the key target for Naji. Likewise, I had expected most of the vitriol from Breivik’s right wing ‘manifesto’ to be directed at Muslim immigrants to Europe. However, his key concern, as evidenced by the othering used throughout his work, is in fact with what he terms ‘cultural Marxists’ – left leaning groups and political parties, which he sees as weakening Europe and allowing outsiders to take over.

The influence of the role identity expectations of Turkish Hizbullah's leadership on actual members' terrorist identities was documented in this dissertation. This study explored the leadership's identity expectations from members through content analyses of four books written by major figures of Hizbullah. Those books were selected following comments of the literature and expert suggestions. Eleven identity features stood out. These content analyses also revealed that leadership had different expectations from political wing members and military wing members. The following six identity features were listed as expected more from military wing members: belief in jihad and resistance, desire for martyrdom, embracing the hierarchical structure, depersonalization, hatred against enemies of God, and aloneness. Whilst cemaat (religious congregation), being religiously educated, patience (gradualism), dedication to a Muslim brotherhood, and being politically active were listed as expected identity attributes of political wing members. Qualitative analyses investigated these identity features using the available literature and 144 handwritten reports of actual Hizbullah members. To confirm the findings of content and qualitative analyses, quantitative analyses were conducted on the relatively representative sample (144 reports). The results of cross-tabulation and logistic regression demonstrated that two (out of 6) military wing and two (out of 5) political wing identity expectations were not manifested on actual members' Hizbullah identities.

The presented doctoral thesis examines character and significance of the culture of martyrdom (farhang-e shahadat) in contemporary Iranian society with a particular emphasis on delimitation religious-political dimension of this phenomenon and determination of causes and implications of relatively recent reinterpretation which has radically shifted this culture from the religious-spiritual sphere to the political-ideological and even revolutionary. On the one hand, the thesis deals with a complex view of mechanism and manners of the utilization of the Karbala paradigm as the instrument for formulation of politically (and otherwise) motivated aims by different spectres of power structures of the ruling establishment and diverse oppositional social movements and on the other hand it reflects its apolitical standpoint associated with a spiritual experience of believers, which proceeds from the popular religion. These aspects of the political and religious boundary of the culture of martyrdom are examined in detail and given in the context of current socio-political reality. The thesis also strives for presenting of arguments founded on the premise which defines the culture of martyrdom as an essential source for constructing of identities and strengthening of solidarity among Iranian Imami Shi'ites,...

La tesi ha un duplice obiettivo. Innanzitutto, aspira ad illustrare i cambiamenti avvenuti nella concezione di jihad tra due forme di jihadismo distinte, quella che puó essere definito “nazionale” - esemplificato dalla Ğamā’a al-Islāmiya (Gruppo Islamico) e dal Jihad al-Islāmy (Jihad Islamico) - e quello globale, esemplificato da al-Qa’ida e dalla seconda fase del pensiero e dell’azione di Ayman al-Zawahiri. Il secondo obiettivo è verificare l’ipotesi secondo la quale, a seguito dell’emersione di al-Qa’ida come attore regionale ed internazionale, un processo di de-radicalizzazione come quello attuato dai due gruppi jihadisti egiziani in esame non può più avere luogo. Fino ai tardi anni novanta del ventesimo secolo il jihad nazionale, caratterizzato da constituency uniforme per provenienza, rivendicazioni e fattori scatenanti eminentemente nazionali, nonchè da un nemico identificato nell’establishment al potere in un determinato stato, è stato la norma e non l’eccezione. “La strada per Gerusalemme doveva passare dal Cairo” e il movimento jihadista, con pochissime eccezioni, dava priorità al Nemico Vicino (i governanti arabi percepiti come corrotti ed occidentalizzati e le minoranze religiose) sul Nemico Lontano (Israele, gli Stati Uniti, i loro alleati e in generale il cosiddetto Occidente). Il lavoro si propone di dimostrare che i processi di de-radicalizzazione dei gruppi egiziani analizzati sono stati possibili proprio grazie alla dimensione nazionale della loro lotta e che, una volta che il jihad diventa globale, tali processi non sono più possibili. Con la transnazionalizzazione del jihad infatti, vengono a mancare i requisiti fondamentali di un autentico processo di de-radicalizzazione collettiva e politica, quali in particolare interessi e motivi di frustrazione unitari e comuni, un nemico comune e interno al proprio orizzonte nazionale e una leadership del gruppo nazionale, in grado di creare un terreno comune – tanto di scontro quanto di dialogo – con le istituzioni del proprio paese. / The objective of this project is twofold. First, it aims at illustrating the changes that have occurred in the conception of jihad between two distinct forms of jihadism in the MENA region, i.e. national and global jihadism. Second, it aspires to verify the research hypothesis according to which, once jihad goes global, it is no longer possible for an organic process of collective and political de-radicalization to happen, because global jihad does not possess a set of prerequisites that allow the process to occur. From a geographical perspective, Egypt will be chosen as the reference country. The national conception of jihadism will be exemplified by al-Ğamā ͑a al-Islāmiya (Islamic Group, IG) and al-Ğihād al-Islāmy (Islamic Jihad), the two major Egyptian jihadi groups of the twentieth century. Symmetrically, the so-called global jihad and the parabola of Ayman al-Zawahiri (Ayman al-Ẓawāhiri) and his thought will represent the second approach to violent jihadism. The two abovementioned groups, which were active during the last three decades of the twentieth century, constitute ideal case studies because they all performed a process of collective disengagement and de-radicalization that led them to abandon violence. Moreover, the Egyptian cases represent the most telling instances of de-radicalization because they involved comprehensive de-radicalization, i.e. successful de-radicalization processes completed on three levels: organizational, behavioral, and ideological. This is the main reason why Egypt will be preferred to disengagement processes that taken places in other countries, such as Algeria, which seems to partly lack the ideological component. At the same time, the beginning of global jihad in general and the figure of al-Zawahiri in particular will be chosen as the second basis for comparison because they represent the fundamental turning point from national to global jihadism. Indeed, until the late 1990s, when he joined Bin Laden’s World Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders, Zawahiri faithfully adhered to the strategic principle of making jihad against the Near Enemy and kept his focus on overthrowing the Egyptian government. He used to say that “the road to Jerusalem went first through Cairo” confirming the hypothesis that from the 1970s until the mid-1990s the jihadi movement, with few exceptions, did not pay much attention to the Far Enemy – the West and its allies - and focused on the national horizon. In this respect, the second objective of the present research is to demonstrate that, after the emergence of al-Qa‘ida as a regional and international player, a similar process of de-radicalization could no longer occur. The global project of al-Qa‘ida excludes every chance of undertaking a de-radicalization process in which a group effectively negotiates with a nation-state.