This thesis will provide readers with an in-depth understanding of the root causes and risks factors of Islamic radicalisation in France. It argues that Islamic radicalisation in France cannot solely be explained through one factor. This research argues that mental illnesses, deception, trauma and relative deprivation do not give a solid impetus for individuals to radicalize. Rather, radicalisation in France should be understood as an association of socio-economic, psychological, and political factors. Given the misuse of the term, the first chapter has been dedicated to its definition and to the differences between cognitive and behavioural radicalisation. Such differentiation is necessary for a thorough understanding of the topic. The second chapter gives a clear and concise overview of the different models and theories of radicalisation, contributing to a quick introduction to the different root causes and risk factors of radicalisation. The third chapter consists of a review and analysis of the available literature on the risk factors of radicalisation while the fourth and final chapter consists of an analysis of said factors in light of the French case, ultimately aiming to understand which root causes and risk factors are of high relevance in the case of France. All in all, this thesis sheds...

Terrorism is a global problem and the existence of IS has been of global concern. People from all over the world have travelled to the caliphate to fight for IS, and 79 countries and organizations with USA in the lead has fought the battles against IS. This research looks into how the role of women has changed due to the military and territorial development. This is a hypothesis-testing case study where the method process tracing is used. Feminist theory is used to categorize the different roles of women, which are searched for in open sources that by the media house of IS were published in English. The findings show that the narrative of a woman as a mother and wife is seen as the most important task throughout the whole existence of the caliphate, even if women in 2015-2016 are described more as objects. In 2017-2018, women are described more as actors and even allowed to participate in combat ’under certain circumstances’. The morality codes are though maintained. Women are, for example, seen in a video participating in combat in a fully covering niqab. The main body of the thesis contains 18 407 words.

The aim of this thesis is to examine how the central pillars of Salafi-Jihadism are discussed in ISIS’s own magazines and how the pillars are related to Juergensmeyer’s concepts of cosmic war, satanization, and theater of terror. The material in this thesis has been sourced from the magazines Dabiq and Rumiyah, which were published by ISIS in the period 2014-2017. The magazines are initially aimed at an English-speaking audience, and it is intended for ISIS’ followers, but also for their enemies. A thematic analysis approach with a deductive orientation was employed and preconceived themes from what Shiraz Maher describes as the five pillars of Salafi-Jihadism, tawḥīd, jihad, takfīr, al-walā’ wa-l-barā’, and ḥākimiyya were used. The analysis shows that the magazines place a strong emphasize on the Salafi-jihadist pillars, and ISIS can therefore be placed within the Salafi-Jihadi tradition.

The Swedish Police Authority currently categorise 61 urban areas in Sweden as vulnerable areas, where there is an increased risk of becoming a victim of crime or violence to both females and males living in those areas. In these places the feeling of insecurity and the lack of trust and confidence in the judiciary system is more common than in other urban parts of Sweden. Due to this negative trend and development local power factors have evolved, and the risk of parallel social structures enforced by criminal activity and violent extremism is higher than in other places in Sweden. This thesis investigates the connection between Swedish criminal networks and violent Islamic extremism to create a better understand of why individuals from the vulnerable areas in Sweden join criminal networks and, or violent Islamic extremist groups

Tal och texter kan innehålla så mycket; både uppenbara budskap och det som finns mellan raderna. Jag tror att vi kan lära oss mycket genom att ta del av andra människors ord och begrepp. Genom de begrepp vi använder uttrycker vi våra värderingar – det vi ser som bra och dåligt, viktigt och oviktigt. Människor i Västvärlden har genom historien generellt representerat ett idéarv som kan sägas vara specifikt för just Västvärlden. Ett sätt att tänka, se och tolka världen, som skiljer sig från människor i Öst. Annorlunda i Östs ögon. Och i Västs ögon är det Öst som är annorlunda. Där har man i generationer istället formulerat och omfamnat andra sätt att tänka, se och tolka världen. Ingen av dessa diskurser har förstås något självklart tolkningsföreträde och ingen kan ensam göra anspråk på sanningen. Men en tydlig konflikt existerar mellan de olika världsbilderna. Och den blir synlig bland annat i valen av ord och begrepp. Ord som frihet, framsteg, lydnad och rättvisa kan skapa olika associationer hos människor i Öst och Väst. Bakom orden och begreppen döljer sig de värderingar som är förhärskande i respektive diskurs. Jag har tittat närmare på några sådana värderingar för att se om de kan ge svar på frågor om orsakerna till konflikterna mellan Öst och Väst. Jag har härlett dessa värderingar bakåt i tiden för att komma åt de idéarv som två av diskurserna bygger på. Det är två diskurser med djupa rötter i historien – till synes oförenliga. Båda säger sig ha det rätta perspektivet och ofta även lösningar på världens problem. Men de tycks tala förbi varandra och se på varandra genom ett slags filter av fördomar, förutfattade meningar och oförsonlighet. När jag zoomat in några av dessa diskursers företrädare har jag sett att de båda diskurserna går att förstå och förklara genom att tillämpa teorier från idéhistorien. Jag har med hjälp av teorier om orientalism och occidentalism velat sätta fokus på politiska hållningar som kan uppfattas som ”extrema” och till synes liberala uppfattningar. Men vad är egentligen vad? Kan Usama Bin Laden hylla kärleken? Kan Tony Blair kräva lydnad? Det är angeläget att söka förståelse för de historiska sammanhang som ofta förblir outtalade eller ensidiga men som har betydelse för vår samtid. Jag är intresserad av hur Väst och Öst talar till och förhåller sig till varandra, med varandra och mot varandra. Med denna uppsats hoppas jag kunna bidra till lite större klarhet och insikt i den språkförbistring som orsakar konflikter i världen.

A close study of neorealist theory, indicates that revolutionary movements can produce some effects, that can have severe power political repercussions. Yet there is very little written in the neorealist corpus, about revolutions and revolutionary movements. The aim of this research was to investigate if these effects could contribute to our explanation, of the power political strategies employed by revolutionary movements. In order to fulfill the aim, a theory consuming case study was conducted. The method employed was a qualitative textual analysis, of a strategic text from Al-Qaeda. The result of the study showed that anticipated power political effects of a social revolution, were discounted for in the strategy. And the expected effects of a conflict between a revolutionary movement and a stable State, did appear in strategy. However the strategists calculations about revolutionary contagnation and the vulnerabilities of fragile States, did not match the theoretical expectations. Perceived foreign domination and perceived fragile State structures, effected the calculations in an unexpected way. Thus the results indicate that the employed analytic framework need further refinement.

La tesi ha un duplice obiettivo. Innanzitutto, aspira ad illustrare i cambiamenti avvenuti nella concezione di jihad tra due forme di jihadismo distinte, quella che puó essere definito “nazionale” - esemplificato dalla Ğamā’a al-Islāmiya (Gruppo Islamico) e dal Jihad al-Islāmy (Jihad Islamico) - e quello globale, esemplificato da al-Qa’ida e dalla seconda fase del pensiero e dell’azione di Ayman al-Zawahiri. Il secondo obiettivo è verificare l’ipotesi secondo la quale, a seguito dell’emersione di al-Qa’ida come attore regionale ed internazionale, un processo di de-radicalizzazione come quello attuato dai due gruppi jihadisti egiziani in esame non può più avere luogo. Fino ai tardi anni novanta del ventesimo secolo il jihad nazionale, caratterizzato da constituency uniforme per provenienza, rivendicazioni e fattori scatenanti eminentemente nazionali, nonchè da un nemico identificato nell’establishment al potere in un determinato stato, è stato la norma e non l’eccezione. “La strada per Gerusalemme doveva passare dal Cairo” e il movimento jihadista, con pochissime eccezioni, dava priorità al Nemico Vicino (i governanti arabi percepiti come corrotti ed occidentalizzati e le minoranze religiose) sul Nemico Lontano (Israele, gli Stati Uniti, i loro alleati e in generale il cosiddetto Occidente). Il lavoro si propone di dimostrare che i processi di de-radicalizzazione dei gruppi egiziani analizzati sono stati possibili proprio grazie alla dimensione nazionale della loro lotta e che, una volta che il jihad diventa globale, tali processi non sono più possibili. Con la transnazionalizzazione del jihad infatti, vengono a mancare i requisiti fondamentali di un autentico processo di de-radicalizzazione collettiva e politica, quali in particolare interessi e motivi di frustrazione unitari e comuni, un nemico comune e interno al proprio orizzonte nazionale e una leadership del gruppo nazionale, in grado di creare un terreno comune – tanto di scontro quanto di dialogo – con le istituzioni del proprio paese. / The objective of this project is twofold. First, it aims at illustrating the changes that have occurred in the conception of jihad between two distinct forms of jihadism in the MENA region, i.e. national and global jihadism. Second, it aspires to verify the research hypothesis according to which, once jihad goes global, it is no longer possible for an organic process of collective and political de-radicalization to happen, because global jihad does not possess a set of prerequisites that allow the process to occur. From a geographical perspective, Egypt will be chosen as the reference country. The national conception of jihadism will be exemplified by al-Ğamā ͑a al-Islāmiya (Islamic Group, IG) and al-Ğihād al-Islāmy (Islamic Jihad), the two major Egyptian jihadi groups of the twentieth century. Symmetrically, the so-called global jihad and the parabola of Ayman al-Zawahiri (Ayman al-Ẓawāhiri) and his thought will represent the second approach to violent jihadism. The two abovementioned groups, which were active during the last three decades of the twentieth century, constitute ideal case studies because they all performed a process of collective disengagement and de-radicalization that led them to abandon violence. Moreover, the Egyptian cases represent the most telling instances of de-radicalization because they involved comprehensive de-radicalization, i.e. successful de-radicalization processes completed on three levels: organizational, behavioral, and ideological. This is the main reason why Egypt will be preferred to disengagement processes that taken places in other countries, such as Algeria, which seems to partly lack the ideological component. At the same time, the beginning of global jihad in general and the figure of al-Zawahiri in particular will be chosen as the second basis for comparison because they represent the fundamental turning point from national to global jihadism. Indeed, until the late 1990s, when he joined Bin Laden’s World Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders, Zawahiri faithfully adhered to the strategic principle of making jihad against the Near Enemy and kept his focus on overthrowing the Egyptian government. He used to say that “the road to Jerusalem went first through Cairo” confirming the hypothesis that from the 1970s until the mid-1990s the jihadi movement, with few exceptions, did not pay much attention to the Far Enemy – the West and its allies - and focused on the national horizon. In this respect, the second objective of the present research is to demonstrate that, after the emergence of al-Qa‘ida as a regional and international player, a similar process of de-radicalization could no longer occur. The global project of al-Qa‘ida excludes every chance of undertaking a de-radicalization process in which a group effectively negotiates with a nation-state.

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This study aims to contribute to the scholarly literature on terrorism and negotiations by contributing to the debate on the relationship between ideology and organizational factors in explaining armed groups behavior. It is argued organizational factors influence the lethality of terrorist groups, more than ideology does. This study extends this debate to the realm of negotiations and the specific Salafi-Jihadism ideology. Over the past 20 years, a handful of Salafi-Jihadist groups have expressed readiness to negotiate. Yet, this puzzling outcome has been under investigated so far. However, the role of ideology has been appointed as influencing groups behavior in general, as well as organizational factors. This argument is tested in a structured focused comparison of four Salafi-Jihadist groups, with two positive cases. The analysis shows evidence for the influence of ideology and its implementation, between less radical and more radical groups, on the expression of readiness to negotiate across Salafi-Jihadist groups. It also highlights the need to consider ideology and organizational factors together.

Durant ces dernières années, le terme terrorisme djihadiste est devenu un vocable des plus récurrents au niveau international. Il est fortement présent dans le discours académique, ce particulièrement depuis l'apparition de ce qu'on appelle l'organisation de l'État islamique (Daesh) et également des attaques terroristes qui se sont succédé. Notre étude aborde, en première partie, les approches qui traitent du terrorisme ainsi que les facteurs qui ont été à l’origine de la propagation de ce phénomène et de l'extrémisme. La seconde partie est consacrée à l’analyse des discours académiques ayant traité des attentats terroristes en France en 2015/2016. Notre thèse tend à mettre en avant une approche analytique opérationnelle à travers l'utilisation de méthodes quantitatives. Nous nous proposons ainsi de prolonger la recherche actuelle en abordant plusieurs innovations méthodologiques relatives à l’analyse du discours universitaire sur le djihad afin d’en déterminer les similitudes et les différences, selon une approche multidisciplinaire et par une enquête analytique dans l’objectif d’en caractériser les relations et d’en expliquer la conjoncture. Il sera alors question de se demander s’il s’agit d’éléments spécifiques ou de la combinaison d’un ensemble d’éléments, présents dans une structure particulière, qui marginalisent ou criminalisent certains types de discours classés dans la catégorie du discours universitaire sur le djihad / In recent years, the term jihadist terrorism has become a term of recurrent at the international level. He is present in the academic discourse, this particularly since the appearance of what is called the Organization of the Islamic state (Daech) and the successive terrorist attacks. Our study first addresses the approaches that deal with terrorism as well as the factors that have led to the spread of this phenomenon and extremism. The second part is dedicated to the analysis of academic discourses dealing with terrorist attacks in France in 2015/2016. Our thesis tends to put forward an operational analytical approach through the use of quantitative methods. We propose to extend the current research by addressing several methodological innovations related to the analysis of the academic jihad discourse in order to determine the similarities and differences, using a multidisciplinary approach and an analytical survey with the aim of characterize the relationships and explain the situation. It will therefore be a question of whether they are specific elements or the combination of a set of elements in a particular structure that marginalizes or criminalizes certain types of discourse classed as academic discourse about jihad