Pretendemos demonstrar como Agostinho reconduz a questão gnóstico-maniqueia das duas almas para o campo da interioridade humana, associando vida e alma como bens compreendidos pelo intelecto e, consequentemente, irredutivelmente verdadeiros. Na primeira parte da dissertação, buscamos os traços da questão no livro III das Confissões, parágrafos 1,1 à 6,12, em duplo interesse quanto a noção de pecado: primeiro, como ser ou ausência de ser, defectus da vontade individual; em seguida, como miséria - herança de uma impotência dejá lá e sintoma de uma situação de dessemelhança (regio dissimilitunis). Essa dupla visada tem o intuito de verificar possibilidades de assimilação e afastamento da gnose-maniqueia, a fim de que possamos seguir os argumentos filósofo de Hipona no enfrentamento do problema da existência da alma má em um tratado de 392, Sobre as Duas Almas (De duabus animabus) segunda parte de nosso trabalho. Nessa obra, o bispo procura derruir o dogma maniqueu a partir da alma como primeira consideração (cogito cf. tríade ser-vida-intelecto); atribui-lhe natureza intermediária entre sensíveis e inteligíveis e livre determinação de si pela atividade de valorar os bens que a cerca. Consequentemente, a alma tem a missão de julgar os valores das naturezas apreendidas e organizá-las internamente segundo a via de percepção própria: sensível ou inteligível. Ora, esse procedimento é volitivo, então Agostinho descobre a absoluta indeterminação interior da vontade como único elemento do móbile humano e convoca a teoria das partes da alma, segundo a tradição neoplatônica, para redefinir o 7 alcance da parte intelectiva da alma a partir de sua experiência de falibilidade pessoal. Ao final, o esforço de reconhecer ontologicamente a alma como incorporeamente una momento em que pecado é definido como estado negativo de ser -, deve considerar a cisão original e supra individual: um involuntário instalado no seio do voluntário. Reintroduzse a questão das duas almas no plano geral da filosofia do bispo, em registro notoriamente distinto: interioridade e confissão / The aim of this thesis is to demonstrate how Augustine reappoints the Manichaean issue of \"two souls\" to the field of human interiority, as associate life and soul as goods perceived by the intellect and therefore irreducibly real (cogito). Thus, the soul can judge the value of natures and organize them internally according to each way of perception of soul: sensible or intelligible. In the first part, we seek to understand the question through the analysis of third book of the Confessions, paragraphs 1.1 to 6.12. We proceed in double interest, interrelating two notions of sin: 1) The nature of being or not beingdefectus of individual will- and 2) as misery -heritage impotence deja lá in order to aim possibilities of assimilation and refusal of the Manichaean gnosis. In addition, we explore how Augustine faces the problem of the existence of evil soul in analysis of the treatise of 392, About the Two Souls (De duabus animabus) - second part of our work. In this work, the Hipponate seeks to demolish all gnose through doctrine of two souls. Thus, the soul is the first consideration -cogito: being, life and intellection comprenhended only by the intellect- by which intuitive definitions of will and sin are allowed. After discovering the absolute indeterminacy of the will as the only element of human mobile, Augustine proceed to adapt the theory of \"parts of the soul\", according to the Neoplatonic tradition, and sharply modify the role of intellectual part of the soul- in context of his own experience of fallibility. At the end, the effort to recognize the soul as ontologically non-corporeal and undivided moment in which sin is 10 defined as denial of being (defectus) - should also consider the original and supra-individual cleavage: \"an involuntary installed within the volunteer\". It was reintroduced the question of two souls\" in the philosophy of the bishop in distinguished register: interiority and confession

Esta pesquisa representa um esforço teórico no sentido de evidenciar ao Direito do Trabalho a possibilidade de se compreender o fenômeno do assédio moral no trabalho por mais um referencial: a cultura do narcisismo. A consideração da cultura do narcisismo em estudos sobre assédio moral sinaliza ao Direito do Trabalho a tendência de banalização do assédio moral no trabalho e a necessidade primordial de se combater e prevenir tal fenômeno em uma perspectiva coletiva e social, promovendo debates que não estejam restritos ao ambiente de trabalho, mas que também considerem a discussão do agir do trabalhador como ser humano em outras esferas sociais que não apenas a produtiva. Encarar o assédio moral considerando a cultura do narcisismo implica forçosamente reconhecer que respostas individuais na justiça do trabalho são meramente paliativas e circunscrevem-se à categoria de reparação e não de efetiva transformação social. O Direito deve implementar mecanismos que contribuam para a conscientização sobre o assédio moral no atual contexto da cultura do narcisismo e para seu efetivo combate. / This research is a theoretical effort to demonstrate how the phenomenon of moral harassment at work can be understood in Labor Law using the culture of narcissism. When considering the culture of narcissism while studying moral harassment, it is possible to bring to Labor Laws attention the trend toward the trivialization of moral harassment at work and the primordial need for fighting against and preventing such phenomenon in a collective and social manner. Such fight and prevention should be carried out by promoting debates which are not restricted to the work environment and which also consider the discussion of the workers acting as human beings in areas other than the productive one. Viewing moral harassment with the narcissism culture in consideration necessarily entails recognizing that individual responses in labor justice are merely palliative and are confined to repairing an issue rather than socially transforming it. Law should implement mechanisms that contribute to raising the awareness of and fighting against moral harassment in the current context of the culture of narcissism.

Thesis advisor: Liane Young / Thesis advisor: James Dungan / Moral psychologists disagree over whether descriptively different moral violations represent distinct cognitive domains or are in fact unified by common cognitive mechanisms. The Moral Foundations Theory (MFT; Haidt, 2007) offers five different domains of moral transgressions: Harm/Care, Fairness/Reciprocity, Ingroup/Loyalty, Authority/Respect, and Purity/Sanctity. Both intentionality and omission bias (e.g. omissions such as letting someone die being judged less harshly than actions such as killing someone) have been shown to impact moral judgments; however, it remains unclear how these rules modulate judgments across moral transgressions of various types. Here, we investigate the role of intentionality and omission bias across different moral violations to determine if the divide between moral domains represent true cognitive, (as opposed to descriptive), differences. We utilized a 2 x 2 x 5 design to create stories across the 5 domains posited by MFT that were intentional/accidental cases of actions/omissions. Importantly, this study also looks at four distinct moral judgments of wrongness, responsibility, blameworthiness, and punishment to assess the role of these rules across judgments. We found that intent and action play different roles across judgments, particularly when comparing wrongness and punishment. Intent seems to matter more for wrongness, whereas action matters more for punishment. Further, these rules also differ across domains. We found that intent matters more for the individualizing foundations of harm and fairness (versus the binding foundations of ingroup, authority, and purity) in judgments of wrongness and punishment. The difference between action and omission is also more important for the individualizing foundations for punishment. These data suggest intentionality and omission bias manifest themselves uniquely across moral judgments and domains and provide evidence that there are meaningful differences between domains. / Thesis (BS) — Boston College, 2014. / Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: College Honors Program. / Discipline: Psychology Honors Program. / Discipline: Psychology .

Thesis advisor: Jeffrey Bloechl / The idea of moral action seems to contain a paradox. On the one hand, it seems that in performing such an act one is obligated, bound to the act by something external. On the other hand, it seems that such an act must be freely chosen in the sense that the act must be done for its own sake. The source of the moral act therefore seems to be located both within and without the self. I refer to this as the problem of moral motivation. This dissertation proposes to clarify the nature of moral motivation in the context of a phenomenological investigation of the feeling of guilt, one informed by various thinkers, but particularly by the work of Paul Ricoeur. The rationale behind this proposal can be grasped by observing the confrontation between Immanuel Kant and Friedrich Nietzsche. Kant’s moral philosophy answers the problem of moral motivation by identifying freedom with the determination of the will by the moral law. A crucial aspect of his argument for this identification is his appeal to the experience of respect for the moral law. This feeling, which Kant describes as the incentive of morality, is a feeling of humiliation before reason, but is at the same time the ennobling sense of one’s autonomy. Nietzsche places this liaison between morality and freedom under stern scrutiny, arguing that the two notions are antithetical to one another. In effect, Nietzsche’s attack implies that moral motivation is a chimera. Guilt does not signify the power of the good to motivate one to do right for its own sake. Moral action is better interpreted as the exertion of power: justice is the advantage of the stronger. Provoked by this confrontation, the dissertation argues that the phenomenology of guilt does not permit us to reduce it entirely to internalized aggression and self-deception. Rather, the self-deceptive and manipulative emotional phenomenon that Nietzsche calls bad conscience can be distinguished from guilt per se. The central task of the work is to explicate the distinctive structure of the latter for the sake of two purposes: 1) by distinguishing guilt from bad conscience, to defend the possibility of moral motivation, and 2) to clarify that possibility in terms of its apparently paradoxical relation to the structure of the self. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2016. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

Procuramos neste trabalho investigar um modelo de uma sociedade em que agentes aprendem de seu vizinhos sociais. Buscando inspiração no paradigma de redes neurais, construímos uma analogia entre o modelo e o julgamento moral. Usando dados de questionários on-line obtidos alhures, apresentamos uma análise estatística de dados de sujeitos humanos. A partir destes dados estudamos o modelo, encontrando uma transição de fase entre um estado ordenado e um desordenado, dependente de um parâmetro análogo ao inverso da temperatura beta que denominamos peer pressure e de um parâmetro de controle delta associado ao comportamento dos agentes. Ao compararmos histogramas obtidos do modelo com histogramas dos dados de questionários observamos uma semelhança surpreendente entre os dois. Para determinar o diagrama de fases do modelo, usamos métodos de Monte Carlo e uma aproximação de campo médio usando métodos de máxima entropia. Estudamos também a suscetibilidade do sistema a perturbações no ambiente de discussão e encontramos um decaimento exponencial da distância entre o estado perturbado e o de equilíbrio, com um mínimo no tempo característico de adaptação para um certo valor de delta. / In this work we seek to investigate a model of a society in which agents learn from their social neighbours. Seeking inspiration in the neural network paradigm, we build an analogy between the model and moral judgement. Using data from online questionaries obtained elsewhere, we present a statistical analysis of human data. Starting from these we study the model, finding a phase transition between an ordered and a disordered state, dependent on a parameter akin to the inverse temperature beta that we denominate peer pressure and a control parameter delta associated to the agents\' behavior. Comparing the histograms obtained with the model and histograms obtained from the data we observed a surprising simlarity between the two. To determine the phase diagram of the model we use Monte Carlo methods and a mean-field approximation using maximum entropy methods. We also study the susceptibility of the system to perturbations in the environment and find an exponential decay in the distance between the perturbated and equilibrium states, with a minimum of the characteristic time of adaptation for a given value of delta.

Este trabalho pretende demonstrar a existência de um pensamento consistente e coerente na obra de Voltaire. Para tal, num primeiro momento, recorre à finalidade atribuída por esse autor à filosofia, a saber: o combate pelo aperfeiçoamento moral dos homens. Esse caráter bélico de seus textos é o laço a unir sua multifacetária obra, dando-lhe coerência. Num segundo momento, identifica que esse combate pressupõe uma fundamentação das ideias, ou seja, a finalidade da filosofia voltairiana exige um pensamento consistente que lhe serve de alicerce; por fim, expõe quais os pressupostos da realização do combate filosófico, em uma palavra, objetiva compreender como esse combate se efetiva. / This work intends to show the existence of a consistent and coherent thinking in Voltaires work. In order to reach that goal, at first, it is analysed the final usage given to Philosophy by him, in other words: the struggle to mankind moral improvement. This fighting aspect of his texts is the lace that binds his multifacated work together, giving coherence to it. Then, this research identifies that struggle takes for granted based ideas, in other words, the objective of Voltaires Philosophy demands a consistent thinking that serves as its foundation; finally, it exposes the assumptions in which this philosophical struggle happens, in one word , how this struggle takes place.

The present thesis provides insight into the social context in which the perceptions that first-generation Canadians have towards access to healthcare for newcomers may emerge. The study was completed in Ottawa-Gatineau in March and April of 2016 and covered the perspectives of nine people, across eight semi-structured interviews. Following the review of the literature and theoretical framework, the present work highlights the role that first-generation Canadians’ moral worlds play into how they perceive access to healthcare for Canadian newcomers. On the subject of perceptions of first-generation Canadians, this research goes beyond the practical concerns faced by newcomers and delves into people’s moralities as these relate to the interpretation of rights and deservingness of access to subsidized healthcare. In grasping the different ways that health and healthcare are understood, as well as individual perceptions of the granting healthcare to newcomers to Canada, my thesis makes visible moral elements that can help to understand how rights to healthcare can be configured and reconfigured across various contexts.

My dissertation explores the role of narrative in the cultivation of empathy for ethical attitudes and behaviors. I begin by exploring an uncommon view of human nature, concluding that we are not autonomously individualistic rational deciders but ultrasocial moral intuitionists. Our intuitions are developed through our social engagements and the moral imagination. Intersubjective relations run deep in our psychology and provide the basis by which we shape the meaning of our lives as individuals in communities. It is because of this that we need to reconsider and redesign our moral cultivation programs both for the child-rearing years and throughout adult life. I look at empathy, the means of our mutual understanding, care, and help, as a key site for moral cultivation. I explicate the neurophysiological bases of empathy, both conscious and unconscious. Empathy is on the continuum with very primitive, automatic mirroring systems, which through varying levels of mimicry facilitate social cognition and moral insight and action. It is thus the ideal means of cultivating a skillful morality. Empathy enables us to enter the worlds and feelings of others in rich and full-bodied ways and so can reveal others in their full subjectivity. Such experiences can incite empathic regard and compassionate action, but empathy, like all of our psycho-social capacities, requires cultivation to develop its skillfulness in practice. Narrative is an obvious means of cultivating empathy because it is humanity’s primary meaning-making structure, utilizing the empathic imagination to seduce us into the inner worlds of others. Through narrative dramatizations of experience, we learn to see and feel from another’s point of view, sensitizing us to their inner states and outward behavior. Such sensitivity can facilitate improving our moral attitudes and action by dislodging preoccupation with self-concern and instigating higher regard for others. In narratives we can imaginatively practice various moral actions, witnessing possible results. Reflective engagement can then bring the moral insights of these imaginative experiences to life in our practical worlds by attuning us to what is morally salient. Narrative engagement is thus a natural and vital part of shaping empathic moral perception for compassionate action. By reading and feeling with others reflectively, we can expand empathy for the pluralistic communities in which we live, make meaning, and grow.

O que leva uma criança a agir bem? A psicologia do desenvolvimento tradicionalmente buscou responder a essa questão através do estudo dos juízos morais das crianças. O recorte adotado neste trabalho é o de que, junto ao saber agir moralmente, é necessário querer agir. Portanto, a ação moral, concreta e coerente com os juízos de valor do sujeito depende de dimensões cognitivas e afetivas, da formação da chamada Personalidade Ética (La Taille, 2006). Formulamos a hipótese de que as ações investigadas têm relação com valores que, ao longo do desenvolvimento, vão sendo associados às representações de si, valores admirados e almejados pelos sujeitos. Para a investigação empírica foram realizados dois estudos: os valores dos sujeitos e a coerência entre esses valores e suas ações na escola. Foram estudadas três faixas etárias - 9, 12 e 16 anos. Levantamos os valores de 340 sujeitos, estudantes de uma escola particular de classe média-alta da cidade de São Paulo, através de um questionário respondido por escrito, sobre o que admiravam nas outras pessoas. Esses valores foram classificados em categorias relativas à moral: Princípios Morais, Respeito de Si, Reciprocidade Nascente e Outros. As orientadoras educacionais desses alunos informaram, através de uma pontuação, como eles agiam na escola, com relação a dois aspectos: postura de estudante e relações sociais. Encontrou-se uma sofisticação progressiva nos valores levantados como dignos de admiração: aos 9 anos de idade não há referências a princípios morais ou respeito de si - valores que aparecem nos sujeitos de 16 anos. Quanto à correlação entre os valores e as ações, ainda que não tenha sido possível a validação estatística, encontramos uma tendência apontando que alunos considerados como exemplares pelas orientadoras responderam admirar valores mais vinculados a moral, enquanto alunos que falham em suas ações na escola elegem valores menos vinculados a ela. Tais resultados demonstram como as questões afetivas são importantes para o desenvolvimento moral e como é necessário desenvolvermos instrumentos para investigar as ações morais concretas / What leads a child to behave well? Developmental psychology traditionally sought to answer this question by studying the moral judgments of children. The cut-off used in this work is that along with knowing how to act morally it is necessary wanting to act morally. Thus, the moral action, concrete and consistent with the judgments of the subject depends on cognitive and affective dimensions, the development of the so-called personality Ethics (La Taille, 2006). We hypothesized that the actions investigated are related to values that, throughout development, are being associated with the representations of the self, values admired and desired by the subjects. For the empirical investigation two studies were carried out: The values of the subjects and the consistency between these values and the subjects actions at school. We studied three age groups: 9, 12 and 16 year-olds. We investigated the values of 340 subjects (students at a private school for upper-middle class in the city of Sao Paulo) through a questionnaire about what these students admired in other people answered in written format. These values were classified into categories related to moral: Moral Principles, Self respect, Reciprocity, and Others. The school counselors graded how these same students acted in the school with respect to two aspects: students attitude and social interactions. There was a progressive sofistication in the values assessed as worthy of admiration: at 9 years of age there was no reference to moral principles or respect for self-values that appear in the subjects of 16 years. Although it was not possible to determine statistically significance, in regards to the consistency between values and actions we found a trend indicating that students considered as models by the school councelors resported to admire values more linked to morality, whereas students who fail in their actions at school admire values less tied to morality. These results demonstrate how the emotional issues are important for moral development and how it is necessary to develop tools to investigate concrete moral actions

Trata-se de dissertação de mestrado onde se procura dialogar com os autores que elaboraram diversas teorias do desenvolvimento econômico bem como de desenvolvimento da ciência. Para tanto, toma-se o tema do desenvolvimento ferroviário tal como visto por um estudioso que lhe foi contemporâneo, Adolpho Augusto Pinto, como estudo de caso para aquele diálogo. / Most authors have written about economic and scientific development. In this essay, we dialogue with some of them to compress it better. For that, we take the railway development in estate of São Paulo, as it was seen by another author, Adolpho Augusto Pinto, as a theme for that discussion.