本文以意識形態途徑，研究中共建國後毛澤東探索後革命時期理論與實踐 統一的過程。第一章導論，說明研究方法；第二章論一九四九至一九五三 年中共內政外交情勢與毛澤東之態度；第三章論一九五三年至一九五五年 底一五計畫及社會主義過渡時期總路線之初期實踐經驗，置重點於工業化 產生的問題，農業合作化的超速完成，以及毛澤東在這些實踐經驗中的地 位及其反省；第四章論一九五六年以後蘇共二十大及波蘭、匈牙利事件如 何促使中共公開反省蘇聯模式，即毛澤東提出「論十大關係」的過程及其 意義，並由此導出中共為另尋發展模式，必須借重本國 識精英，因此才 有由毛澤東提倡的百花齊放、百家爭鳴的寬鬆政策；但由於知識精英出發 點與毛澤東不同，終使雙百失控，導致反右鬥爭，使毛澤東帶領中共走向 極「左」思潮。綜觀建國後至一九五七年，中共及毛澤東所面對的客觀情 境，實為後革命時期的必然發展，包括城鄉分離、工農剪刀差危機、知識 精英與群眾對立等；毛澤東通過個人認知結構（本文以民族主義、民粹主 義、實踐性格及矛盾世界觀概括），企圖找出能指導後革命時期的理論， 但由於後革命時期客觀情境之本質，及毛本人認知框架之限制，終使毛走 上以革命手段企圖達成後革命任務的極「左」思潮。

<p>The subjects were 130 male prisoners in Swedish jails were examined by SCID and the diagnoses given in terms of DSM-IV. The most common mental disorder was drug abuse. On Axis II several personality disorders were diagnosed. Personality assessments were made by KSP. High scores were mainly found for e.g. impulsiveness, sensation seeking, aggression and low scores in socialisation.</p><p>MAO assays were performed in 99 male criminal offenders and in 60 non-criminal volunteers. Offenders had lower MAO activity than controls also with the confounding factor smoking under control. It is proposed that platelet MAO is linked to personality traits, which can predispose for criminality. </p><p>For testing the existence of combinations of vulnerability factors, a configuration frequency analysis (CFA) was used. The criteria which formed the basis for the subgrouping were; MAO activity below or above –0.5 SD of the mean (L and H), the presence or absence of an Axis I disorder (= drug abuse) (Y/N), the presence or absence of an Axis II disorder (Y/N), or the presence or absence of an Axis I and II disorder (Y/N). In this way eight subgroups were formed. Two significant "types" were found among the criminals: One was characterised by low platelet MAO activity, Cluster B personality diagnosis as well as Drug Abuse Disorder diagnosis (LYY); and the other by a pattern of normal platelet MAO activity, no Cluster B personality disorder, and no Drug Disorder diagnosis (HNN). Also two "antitypes", occurring less frequent than expected, were identified; LYN and LNY. Thus, the aggregation of certain risk factors in the same individual has been shown to contribute to the development of criminal behaviour.</p><p>The subgroups HNN, LYN, LNY and LYY were then analysed for a variety of criminological factors. There was a difference in mean age between the subgroups, the HNN being lowest. Economical crimes were more common at an early criminal debut and crimes involving violence at an adult debut. The HNN subgroup had a lower number of crimes and times spent in jail than the other subgroups. More than 50% of the clients in all groups had previously been sentenced to Reformatory.</p>

<p>Idag är det för en stark stat i västvärlden inte svårt att vinna ett konventionellt krig. Dock har man svårt med konflikter där en stat möter en icke-stat, till exempel USA i Afghanistan idag, trots att gerillan nästan uteslutande är sämre rustad och tränad jämfört med sin motståndare. Sverige är ett förhållandevis litet land och frågan finns om vi skulle klara en eventuell invasion. Det har tidigare existerat en debatt om gerillakrig är något för de svenska stridskrafterna och det torde vara aktuellt än idag. Principer för hur striden ska föras benämns i Sverige taktiska grundprinciper. Man kan fråga sig vart dessa taktiska grundprinciper, som fastställs i och med doktrinupprättandet, är hämtade från. Dessa ska förmedla beprövad erfarenhet, men Sverige har inte varit i krig på 200 år.</p><p>I konflikter där gerillan visat upp brukande av principer har man också varit framgångsrik. Ernesto Che Guevara och Mao Tse-tung teoretiserade båda om kriget i skrift och båda var mycket framgångsrika. Därför torde det vara intressant att undersöka hur dessa principer i teorin stämmer överens med våra svenska taktiska grundprinciper, då dessa taktiska grundprinciper ska vara tillämpbara i alla situationer.</p><p>Syftet är att undersöka om de svenska taktiska grundprinciperna stämmer överens, eller liknar de principer framgångsrika gerillakrigare förordar i sina litterära verk och om vissa principer är mer allmängiltiga än andra inom gerillakrigföringens taktik. Om Sverige som liten nation ska förhindra en invasion, kommer principerna för krigföring från gerillakrigare som också fått agera underlägsen styrka?</p><p>Frågan som ska besvaras i denna uppsats lyder: finns det likheter mellan Ernesto Che Guevaras och Mao Tse-tungs grundprinciper för gerillakrigföring på taktiskt nivå och svenska taktikens grundprinciper på markarenan? Om likheter finns, vilka är dessa?</p>

The subjects were 130 male prisoners in Swedish jails were examined by SCID and the diagnoses given in terms of DSM-IV. The most common mental disorder was drug abuse. On Axis II several personality disorders were diagnosed. Personality assessments were made by KSP. High scores were mainly found for e.g. impulsiveness, sensation seeking, aggression and low scores in socialisation. MAO assays were performed in 99 male criminal offenders and in 60 non-criminal volunteers. Offenders had lower MAO activity than controls also with the confounding factor smoking under control. It is proposed that platelet MAO is linked to personality traits, which can predispose for criminality. For testing the existence of combinations of vulnerability factors, a configuration frequency analysis (CFA) was used. The criteria which formed the basis for the subgrouping were; MAO activity below or above –0.5 SD of the mean (L and H), the presence or absence of an Axis I disorder (= drug abuse) (Y/N), the presence or absence of an Axis II disorder (Y/N), or the presence or absence of an Axis I and II disorder (Y/N). In this way eight subgroups were formed. Two significant "types" were found among the criminals: One was characterised by low platelet MAO activity, Cluster B personality diagnosis as well as Drug Abuse Disorder diagnosis (LYY); and the other by a pattern of normal platelet MAO activity, no Cluster B personality disorder, and no Drug Disorder diagnosis (HNN). Also two "antitypes", occurring less frequent than expected, were identified; LYN and LNY. Thus, the aggregation of certain risk factors in the same individual has been shown to contribute to the development of criminal behaviour. The subgroups HNN, LYN, LNY and LYY were then analysed for a variety of criminological factors. There was a difference in mean age between the subgroups, the HNN being lowest. Economical crimes were more common at an early criminal debut and crimes involving violence at an adult debut. The HNN subgroup had a lower number of crimes and times spent in jail than the other subgroups. More than 50% of the clients in all groups had previously been sentenced to Reformatory.

The foundation of the Chinese Communist Party was originated from the Bolshevik revolution in 1917 and the May Forth movement in 1919. Of the two events, the former inherited the ideological characteristics of ¡§globalization¡¨ on Marxism, while the latter embodied the ideological features of ¡§localization¡¨ on nationalism. Up to now, the ideology of the Chinese Communist Party has still been involving the dialectics of ¡§globalization¡¨ and ¡§localization¡¨. This doctoral dissertation first elaborates on the research motivation, purpose, method, documents, framework and so forth. It then continues to expound on the definitions of ideology, dialectics, globalization and localization. The third chapter discusses Marxism and Leninism which are the origins of the Chinese Communist Party¡¦s ideology. Chapter four analyzes how Mao Zedong conducted the dialectics of ideology and helped the Chinese Communist Party to seize power. Chapter five explores why Mao Zedong led the dialectics of the Chinese Communist Party¡¦s ideology to advance the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. The sixth chapter studies how Deng Xiaoping guided the dialectics of ideology and promoted the Chinese Communist Party to transform a political movement into an economic reform. Chapter seven investigates why and how Jiang Zemin, and later, Hu Jintao carry on the dialectics of the Chinese Communist Party¡¦s ideology and construct the important thought of Three Represents, harmonious society of socialism, etc. Chapter eight concludes the achievements and discoveries of this research. Be it Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, or, as a matter of fact, regardless of whoever was or is in charge, the leader of the Chinese Communist Party invariably conducts the dialectics of ideology on the ¡§globalization¡¨ of Marxism-Leninism and the ¡§localization¡¨ of the Chinese Communist Party in power. Based on the successful experience of ¡§localization¡¨ of socialism with Chinese characteristics, the Chinese Communist Party expects to achieve the goal of ¡§globalization¡¨ of the Marxism-Leninism.

Idag är det för en stark stat i västvärlden inte svårt att vinna ett konventionellt krig. Dock har man svårt med konflikter där en stat möter en icke-stat, till exempel USA i Afghanistan idag, trots att gerillan nästan uteslutande är sämre rustad och tränad jämfört med sin motståndare. Sverige är ett förhållandevis litet land och frågan finns om vi skulle klara en eventuell invasion. Det har tidigare existerat en debatt om gerillakrig är något för de svenska stridskrafterna och det torde vara aktuellt än idag. Principer för hur striden ska föras benämns i Sverige taktiska grundprinciper. Man kan fråga sig vart dessa taktiska grundprinciper, som fastställs i och med doktrinupprättandet, är hämtade från. Dessa ska förmedla beprövad erfarenhet, men Sverige har inte varit i krig på 200 år. I konflikter där gerillan visat upp brukande av principer har man också varit framgångsrik. Ernesto Che Guevara och Mao Tse-tung teoretiserade båda om kriget i skrift och båda var mycket framgångsrika. Därför torde det vara intressant att undersöka hur dessa principer i teorin stämmer överens med våra svenska taktiska grundprinciper, då dessa taktiska grundprinciper ska vara tillämpbara i alla situationer. Syftet är att undersöka om de svenska taktiska grundprinciperna stämmer överens, eller liknar de principer framgångsrika gerillakrigare förordar i sina litterära verk och om vissa principer är mer allmängiltiga än andra inom gerillakrigföringens taktik. Om Sverige som liten nation ska förhindra en invasion, kommer principerna för krigföring från gerillakrigare som också fått agera underlägsen styrka? Frågan som ska besvaras i denna uppsats lyder: finns det likheter mellan Ernesto Che Guevaras och Mao Tse-tungs grundprinciper för gerillakrigföring på taktiskt nivå och svenska taktikens grundprinciper på markarenan? Om likheter finns, vilka är dessa?

This research aims to examine the role of Chinese intellectuals in policymaking through the case of Labor Contract Law. Chinese intellectuals have played an important role in shaping of the post-Mao China. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership have always benefited from their expertise in formulation and development of the reform policies. Also, the fact that the CCP still need intellectuals&rsquo / support for ideological justification for its policies contributes to importance of intellectuals. In addition, intellectuals have affected the policy agenda-setting of the CCP leadership through their effects on the Chinese public opinion which has increasingly become influential since the 1990s. Furthermore, intellectual debates could function as a substitute for party politics in China&rsquo / s one-party system. These all jointly enhance the role of intellectuals in Chinese politics and make it a crucial subject to study. The case of this research, namely the Labor Contract Law, is selected not only for it received a high level of public attention, but also for it is closely related with one of the central matters of contemporary Chinese politics, i.e. economic development path and social justice. This inquiry into the making of the Labor Contract Law lead the author to emphasize that tension and animosity between liberal intellectuals and the authoritarian state, on which the existing literature largely focuses, is just one aspect of the intellectual politics in China. In the context of re-configuration of power and wealth due to the marketization, intellectuals&rsquo / position in the society has dramatically changed and patterns of the Party-intellectual relation have diversified. Thus, it is argued in this research that by taking into account the emergent market with its ideological effects and as an institutional force that is linked to intellectuals through ties with the new economic elite inside or outside the Party, parameters of intellectuals politics in China can be more accurately understood.

Richard Nixon’s trip to China in February 1972 marked a diplomatic breakthrough for Sino-American relations after two decades of mutual animosity since the Korean War. Nevertheless, the bilateral relations underwent a long stalemate in the mid-1970s, before the United States and China finally reached normalization of relations in December 1978. The scholarship on Sino-American relations in the 1970s tends to focus on Nixon’s visit or normalization of relations, without paying adequate attention to how Washington and Beijing dealt with the mid-decade deadlock. My report addresses this gap in the literature by analyzing the changing dynamism of Sino-American relations, determined first by Henry Kissinger and Mao Zedong, and later by Zbigniew Brzezinski and Deng Xiaoping. Kissinger sought to establish a triangular relationship with the Soviet Union and China, where the United States could manipulate the Sino-Soviet antagonism to improve its relations with both communist giants. With the failure of his initial idea of creating an anti-Soviet united front with Washington, Mao, through his Three World theory, championed the Third World struggle against both superpowers in competition for global hegemony in the disguise of détente. With Kissinger clinging to superpower détente and Mao determined to maintain a revolutionary China, their strategies were doomed to a stalemate. Unlike Kissinger, Brzezinski tried to create a bilateral structure, where the United States cooperated with China to confront the Soviet Union, which expanded its influence globally despite ongoing détente. Unlike Mao, Deng sought to replace revolution with development as China’s national agenda, by emphasizing modernization, instead of the Three World theory, in Chinese foreign policy. Their global strategies necessitated mutual cooperation, creating momentum for normalization negotiations, especially after Brzezinski’s trip to China in May 1978. The shifting dynamism in Sino-American relations from the Kissinger-Mao years to Brzezinski-Deng years, therefore, precipitated normalization of relations in the late 1970s. / text

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Thesis (M.A.)--University of Hong Kong, 1996. / Includes bibliographical references (leaf 83-92).