Il s’agit dans cette thèse d’un parcours à travers la pensée de Merleau-Ponty afin de mettre en avant la nécessité de l’intervention du lien de l’intérieur topologique des corps de Chair, la nécessité d'une pensée s'adressant à la psychanalyse, à la topologie, à la psychologie, afin de donner une autre ouverture sémantique à l’inconscient, à travers la passivité-activité et la fondation en phénoménologie. Le chiasme, la réversibilité, l’empiètement, l’intercorporéité, l’interschématisme, l’enchevêtrement du désir et du sentir est l’élan pour désigner le narcissisme esthésiologique du corps à l’espace, le mouvement de son institution, sa corrélation et sa formation continue dans l’espace vécu.De l'espace des puzzles chez Husserl à l'espace vide et combinatoire de la Gestalt théorie, on passera à la courbure de l'espace par l'intervention de l'inachevé du regard afin d'arriver à l'espace enveloppé-enveloppant, à l’intervention de la topologie pour désigner les relations de l’intérieur des corps de Chair chez Merleau-Ponty. Par la suite, l’analyse de l’espace intermédiaire de la conscience-inconscient nous amène à l’espace onirique qui transparaît à l’espace de l’objectivité, et démontre l’intervention de l’imaginaire, du symbolique, du désir et de l’inconscient lors de l’apparaître. / This thesis is about a transversal approach of Merleau-Ponty’s analysis, and aims at determining the need for intervention of topological interrelation within bodies of Flesh, the need to insert a psychoanalytical, topological, psychological approach, in order to give another dimension to the unconscious in combination with the role of passivity-activity and foundation in phenomenology. Chiasm, reversibility, encroachment, intercorporality, interschematism, chiasm of desire and sense are significant to define the esthesiological narcissism of the body in space, the movement of its institution, its correlation and continuing formation in the lived space.From Husserl's space of puzzles to the empty and combinatorial space of the Gestalt theory, we proceed to the curvature of space by intervention of the uncompleted gaze in order to reach the space of enveloped-enveloping, the topology where the internal relations within Merleau-Ponty's body of Flesh are described. Thereafter, the analysis of the intermediary space of consciousness-unconscious leads us to the oniric space which shows through the space of objectivity, and reveals the intervention of the imaginary, the symbolic, the desire and the unconscious in appearance.

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Master of Philosophy (Dept. of Philosophy) / This thesis explores the evolution of the way the Phenomenology of Perception is read for the purpose of determining its relevance to cognitive science. It looks at the ways in which the descriptions of phenomena are taken to converge with connectionist and enactivist accounts (the "psychological" aspect of this reading) and the way Merleau-Ponty's criticisms of intellectualism end empiricism are treated as effective responses to the philosophical foundations of cognitivism. The analysis reveals a general assumption that Merleau-Ponty's thought is compatible with a broadly naturalistic approach to cognition. This assumption has its roots in the belief that Merleau-Ponty's proximity to the existential tradition is incompatible with a commitment to a genuine transcendental philosophical standpoint. I argue that this suspicion is unfounded, and that it neglects the internal structure of the Phenomenology. Merleau-Ponty's criticism of classical forms of transcendental philosophy is not a rejection of that tradition, but instead prompts his unorthodox use of pathological case-studies. For Merleau-Ponty, this engagement with pathology constitutes a kind of transcendental strategy, a strategy that is much closer to Husserl's later work than is commonly acknowledged. The thesis also demonstrates a different mode of engagement with cognitive science, through a critical encounter with John Haugeland's transcendental account of the perception of objects. Confronting his account with the phenomenon of anorexia, I challenge him to differentiate his notion of an existential commitment from the anorexic's pathological over-commitment to a particular body image. Merleau-Ponty's account does not suffer from the same problems as Haugeland's because transcendence is not construed in terms of independence, but in terms of the fecundity and inexhaustibility of the sensible. I attempt to articulate Merleau-Ponty's own notion of a pre-personal commitment through the metaphor of invitation and show how this commitment and the Husserlian notion of open intersubjectivity can shed light on the anorexic's predicament.

<p>The overall aim of this study is to analyze how the body is understood in the compulsory school subject physical education during the period 1976-2002. With pragmatism as the point of departure the texts of curricula, syllabi and articles from the physical education teacher's specialist press are analyzed. The analytical tools used are two perspectives of the body and human movement, one based on dualistic ideas and the other on Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of the lived body. The analysis shows that there are differences in how the embodied person is understood in three different types of text. In the curricula the dualistic ideas where the individual is seperated into body and soul prevail. The picture is more complex in the syllabi whilst in the articles from the specialist press the lived body is found more often. In the articles from the specialist press there is a pattern that shows change over time where phenomenological ideas are more prominent towards the end of the period studied. The dissertation consists of three parts. In the first part there is an introduction to the study and theoretical perspectives are introduced, the second part consists of the analysis of the texts and in the third part these are discussed and possible didactic consequences presented.</p>

Dans cette thèse, je propose à la fois un examen minutieux des activités maritimes butonaises et un dialogue entre ce cas ethnographique et son contexte austronésien. Pour cela, je mobilise notamment l'approche phénoménologique (et principalement les travaux de Merleau-Ponty sur la perception) ainsi que l'approche historico-culturelle de la cognition développée par Vygotsky. Outre les données ethnographiques inédites concernant le monde butonais (zone linguistique cia-cia), l'analyse développée ici conduit à plusieurs contributions importantes concernant la reconstruction du monde austronésien, le débat universalisme-relativisme dans le cadre de l'anthropologie cognitive ainsi que l'usage de la méthode ethnographique - en mettant l'accent sur la transformation de l'ethnographe au cours du terrain comme objet de connaissance. / This thesis proposes a detailed analysis of Butonese maritime activities as well as a dialogue between this ethnographic case study and its Austronesian context. The analysis relies in particular on Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological analysis of perception and on Vygotsky's historico-cultural conception of cognition. Besides presenting a wealth of new data about the Butonese world (and more specifically the cia-cia linguistic area), the analysis developed here leads to major contributions about the reconstruction of the Austronesian world, the universalism-relativism debate within cognitive anthropology and the use of ethnographic methodology - emphasizing on the ethnographer's own transformation.

Meaning or sense [sens] is traditionally thought to be bestowed by a subject, or found ready-made within the world. Against these views Merleau-Ponty develops an account of the genesis of sense in which it arises from the mutually formative relation between an intentionally directed body and the perceptual levels of the world. In this thesis I explore the implications of Merleau-Ponty's theory of sense for the work of art, arguing ultimately that artistic sense arises from a reversible relation between artist and world, intention and process, historical works and artistic goals, viewer and work. This account deepens through an analysis of the ontology of the Flesh through which we find that sense, as the intentional being of the body and the world, is what constitutes subject and object in the first place. Through a folding back on itself, being senses itself and gives rise to a generative difference through which new sense can emerge in perception, expression and aesthetic experience. / Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) - Joseph-Armand Bombardier CGS Master’s, Ontario Graduate Fellowship (OGF)

Yorgancioglu, Derya M. Arch, Department of Architecture Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Dr. C&acirc / n&acirc / Bilsel September 2004, 133 pages In this thesis it is aimed to develop a particular reading of Steven Holl&rsquo / s approach to architecture. It is claimed that in Holl&rsquo / s architecture there is a philosophical depth that embraces both his thinking on and making of architecture. This thesis suggests that, the phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, the French philosopher (1908-1961) is Steven Holl&rsquo / s main reference in achieving a philosophical depth in architecture. The thesis research focuses on understanding Holl&rsquo / s approach to architecture and its relation to Merleau-Ponty&rsquo / s phenomenological philosophy. In the second part of the thesis, in aiming to unfold how the design process develops the study focused on the intellectual framework in Holl&rsquo / s architecture. Specific concepts that Holl dwells upon are examined in relation to their philosophical references. This section also comprises a focus on the architect as the subject of architectural practice. In the third part, the phenomenological framework in the way Holl makes architecture is studied by examining how he relates building with site and situation / body to architectural space / body and architecture to time. This examination concludes with an inquiry in the haptic sensibility of the architect into articulating spaces and forms. Lastly, the forth part involves a study on Holl&rsquo / s particular projects, through which it is aimed to examine the architectural embodiment of his phenomenological approach. The thesis research in Steven Holl&rsquo / s architectural approach, which is held through his thinking on and making of architecture, opens up a field of study about the practice of an architect and the philosophical engagement of architecture.

Con el otro hay una doble implicación, la de cómplice y de rival, que abre en la conciencia el poder de elegir. El desencaje que sufre la conciencia ante la irrupción de otra conciencia, la faculta para poder elegir libremente, donde, mi satisfacción depende de la suya y la suya de la mía. Por consiguiente, libertad y responsabilidad son concomitantes. En ocasión del trabajo realizado por Merleau-Ponty sobre "El Ser y la Nada" de J.P Sartre, este tema será tratado en profundidad. Nos debatiremos entre una actividad y una pasividad que precisan del otro para armonizarse entre ellas en relación con él. Sartre, visto por Merleau-Ponty, define un ek-stasis entre yo y el "ser" que los hace inseparables, indisolubles, lo cual no obstante, imposibilita tener acceso a la conciencia del otro. Cada conciencia, por su situación, se ek-stasía en el "ser" común que las alberga. Son conciencias estancadas. Merleau-Ponty trata de superar esta teoría abogando por un cofuncionamiento entre conciencias basado en un horizonte prerreflexivo de "ser" que sostiene subrepticiamente cualquier teoría elaborada, incluida la antedicha. Nosotros replanteamos la tesis sartriana, tomando como extremos de este abrazo inextricable, el de la actividad solipsista del "Moi", y tal vez sea esta la novedad, el de un sentir del "ser" del que se origina pasivamente en la comunidad anónima. Si el saber empírico, que se sigue de las impresiones directamente recibidas sobre hechos que concurren, basa su objetividad en la coincidencia con otros, el saber intelectual, originado en el innatismo de su modo de instituir, basa su convicción en la descalificación de los otros. Sin embargo, mientras el saber empírico necesita de un "alguien mío" que lo abandere, el saber intelectual necesita de un "sentir anónimo" en el que "ser en el mundo". Los polos del binomio se necesitan procesualmente para poder acotar un campo de conocimiento. El otro y por extensión todos los otros, están religados a mí, como yo y cada uno de ellos a una red intersubjetiva que nos desborda. Estas interrelaciones de signo contrario dejan en la conciencia un poder para enjuiciar, directamente vinculado con nuestra convivencia o nuestro co-funcionamiento con los otros. No puede obviarse en ningún caso la presencia del otro en la interrogación sobre la pregunta del conocer. El estudio proseguirá analizando el lenguaje como la estructura de signos que satisface esta interrelación entre el pensar solipsista y el sentir "real" de la masa ciega. O como el saber que se erige desde la constitución significativa de unas relaciones causales, que satisfacen tal dialéctica entre el individuo y la sociedad. Nosotros pensamos que si bien un recorrido se dirige desde un sentir anónimo sedimentado por la coincidencia común en un pasado hacia la soledad de un yo que se aposta en un instante futuro último, hay otro recorrido contrapuesto que emerge del yo en la intimidad de su futuro para unirse al sentir anónimo que deja un pasado compartido. Son el anverso y el reverso de una sola relación. Para nosotros la intersubjetividad se teje en la mediación de estos dos aspectos temporales: el yo que precisa salir fuera de sus redes y el sentir anónimo que precisa de un actor en el que recalar, y tienen su resolución en una teoría sobre el tiempo que culmina en el reconocimiento del otro como verdaderamente otro. Para nosotros el cofuncionamiento es una compenetración entre cuerpos que solamente cuenta con el momento presente en el que se recogen estos dos frentes extemporáneos de sentido contrario.PALABRAS CLAVE: Fenomenología, Dialéctica, Otredad, Ecuanimidad, Significación, Tiempo / The examination of conscience concludes in a co-functioning between consciousness impossible to think without a intercorporealty, which in turn will require to be effective communication between bodies mediated by a language, and this is essentially the view we advocate, in short , co-functioning, communication and intercorporealty are inextricably linked. Where the culmination of this relationship ends in a recognition of others as genuinely others.

Master of Philosophy (Dept. of Philosophy) / This thesis explores the evolution of the way the Phenomenology of Perception is read for the purpose of determining its relevance to cognitive science. It looks at the ways in which the descriptions of phenomena are taken to converge with connectionist and enactivist accounts (the "psychological" aspect of this reading) and the way Merleau-Ponty's criticisms of intellectualism end empiricism are treated as effective responses to the philosophical foundations of cognitivism. The analysis reveals a general assumption that Merleau-Ponty's thought is compatible with a broadly naturalistic approach to cognition. This assumption has its roots in the belief that Merleau-Ponty's proximity to the existential tradition is incompatible with a commitment to a genuine transcendental philosophical standpoint. I argue that this suspicion is unfounded, and that it neglects the internal structure of the Phenomenology. Merleau-Ponty's criticism of classical forms of transcendental philosophy is not a rejection of that tradition, but instead prompts his unorthodox use of pathological case-studies. For Merleau-Ponty, this engagement with pathology constitutes a kind of transcendental strategy, a strategy that is much closer to Husserl's later work than is commonly acknowledged. The thesis also demonstrates a different mode of engagement with cognitive science, through a critical encounter with John Haugeland's transcendental account of the perception of objects. Confronting his account with the phenomenon of anorexia, I challenge him to differentiate his notion of an existential commitment from the anorexic's pathological over-commitment to a particular body image. Merleau-Ponty's account does not suffer from the same problems as Haugeland's because transcendence is not construed in terms of independence, but in terms of the fecundity and inexhaustibility of the sensible. I attempt to articulate Merleau-Ponty's own notion of a pre-personal commitment through the metaphor of invitation and show how this commitment and the Husserlian notion of open intersubjectivity can shed light on the anorexic's predicament.

xii, 278 p. / My dissertation is an existential-phenomenological account of human relations and ethics in dialogue with feminist care ethics. Using the work of Emmanuel Levinas, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Simone de Beauvoir, I describe how the ambiguity of human relationships results in an ambivalent ethical orientation, contingent as it is on negotiating the interrelated yet separable interests of the self and the other. Central to my work is a phenomenological description of maternal ambivalence (mothers' simultaneous desires to nurture and reject their children), an empirical case study that demonstrates how the conflicted nature of human relationships operates. Ultimately, I argue that ethical ambivalence is morally productive insofar as it helps one to avoid moral absolutism, recognize the alterity of others, attend to the particularities of situation, and negotiate one's own needs and desires with those of other people. This dissertation includes previously published material. / Committee in charge: Dr. Beata Stawarska, Co-Chair; Dr. Bonnie Mann, Co-Chair; Dr. Mark Johnson, Member; Dr. Sara Hodges, Outside Member