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This dissertation examines the relation between embodiment and language, knowledge and memory, as explored in the poetry of South African poet Gabeba Baderoon. In her three published collections of poetry, namely, The Museum of Ordinary Life, The Dream in the Next Body and A Hundred Silences, she depicts seemingly trivial and everyday events or experiences with acute attention to detail, all of which are connected by her unique portrayal of their embodied nature. In doing so, her work illustrates that intellectual activities typically associated with the mind, such as language, knowledge and memory, in fact require the incorporation of the body. Therefore, this dissertation studies the mind-body relation represented in her work with regard to these thematic concerns, since it is a crucial aspect of her poetry and aids not only in understanding and interpreting her work, but also the discourse on embodiment in general. These concerns do, moreover, not remain on a thematic level, but are evident in her poetry itself; that is, her poems too act as a form of embodiment. Furthermore, Baderoon’s poems are able to transcend the supposed mind-body dichotomy in a way that shows much in common with phenomenology, and especially the perspective held by authors such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty. This dissertation incorporates phenomenological ideas on the body and embodiment, as these assist in interpreting Baderoon’s work, as well as for the reason that her poetry sheds new light upon the understanding of such phenomenological ideas, too. Thus, this dissertation seeks to elucidate the manner in which Gabeba Baderoon’s poetry transcends the mind-body dichotomy by means of her exceptional employment of the notion of embodiment on a thematic as well as formal level. / Thesis (MA (English))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2012

AL'objectif de cette recherche est une réinterprétation de la pensée esthétique de Maurice Merleau-Ponty visant à la découverte de sa matrice morphologique, c’est-à-dire de sa pertinence et de ses dettes à l’égard la tradition goethéenne et de ses développements dans le domaine de la théorie de l'art et la philosophie de la nature. La thèse est divisée en trois chapitres, dont chacun cherche à mettre l'accent sur les différents aspects de cette filiation morphologique, suivant son développement dans la chronologie de la production merleau-pontienne. Le premier chapitre tente de relier la méthode morphologique et la méthode phénoménologique en évaluant la similarité de leurs contenus esthétologiques. Ce premier chapitre est organisé autour de trois concepts clés de la morphologie, à travers les quels il opère un premier examen de la philosophie merleau-pontienne, depuis ses débuts dans les années Quarante jusqu’à ses résultats ontologiques dans les années Cinquante et les années Soixante: l'ambiguïté de la notion goethéenne de forme nous permet de remonter à la genèse de la philosophie merleau-pontienne de la forme dans La structure du comportement et dans Phénoménologie de la perception; la notion corrélative de symbole permet d'aborder les notions merleau-pontiennes d’idée sensible et matrice symbolique, en les rapprochant à l’Urphänomen de Goethe; la catégorie transversale de style est configuré comme un outil d'enquête des questions morphologiques dans la pensée esthétique de la «nouvelle ontologie» (L’œil et l’esprit [1958] e le Notes de Cours au Collège de France 1958-1959 et 1960-1961). Dans ce chapitre, nous démontrons la confrontation essentielle et constante avec des expériences artistiques (Cézanne, Klee, Rodin, Bazaine et l’Ecole de Paris), convoquées par Merleau-Ponty à l'appui de ses théories esthétologiques. Le chapitre est clôt par un bref appendice sur la question de la fondation “scientifique” de l'esthétique, mis au point par une comparaison entre Merleau-Ponty et Konrad Fiedler. Cette annexe ouvre en même temps le champ de recherche du deuxième chapitre: en fait, compte tenu de la contribution à l'esthétique fournie par la psychologie et la physiologie de la perception, la thèse se plonge dans l'analyse de la voie gestaltiste de la dette merleau-pontienne de la morphologie. Le deuxième chapitre suit le passage qui porte – au sein de la production merleau-pontienne des années Cinquante – d’une philosophie de la forme à une philosophie de l’expression et il fournit la reconstruction de celle qui apparaît comme une véritable esthétique de l’expression et du mouvement. Cette recherche se fonde sur l’analyse attentive de l’inédit Le monde sensible et le monde de l’expression, actuellement conservé dans le Département de Manuscrits Occidentaux de la Bibliothèque Nationale de France et correspondant à la préparation du Cours du Jeudi tenu par Merleau-Ponty au Collège de France dans l’année académique 19952-1953. Le travail d’analyse de l’inédit nous a permis d’évaluer, en plus des inhérences déjà confirmées de l’esthétique merleau-pontienne à la Gestalttheorie (Köhler, Koffka, Wertheimer, Guillaume), une autre comparaison théorique capitale – et assez méconnue -, c’est-à-dire celle avec Viktor Von Weizsäcker par rapport les relations entre la perception et le mouvement. Le troisième chapitre se concentre sur la phase ontologique de la pensée merleau-pontienne, celle qui correspond à la production tardive de Merleau-Ponty et brusquement interrompue par sa mort prématurée en 1961. Central, dans ce troisième chapitre, est la reconstruction du destin de la notion de Gestalt dans Le visible et invisible, qui présente la novelle ontologie de la chair et un contexte philosophique complètement reformé par rapport aux écrits merleau-pontiens des années Quarante. Les paragraphes centraux de ce dernier chapitre se concentre - à travers une comparaison avec des auteurs étroitement liée à Merleau-Ponty - etc / The aim of this project is to provide an alternative reading of Merleau-Ponty’s aesthetics by discovering its morphological matrix and its debts towards the Goethean tradition and towards its developments in the field of art theory and the philosophy of nature. The dissertation is divided into three chapters, each of which seeks to focus on different aspects of the morphological roots of phenomenological aesthetics, in order to follow its developments in the Merleau-Ponty’s production. The first chapter is an attempt to relate morphological method and phenomenological method by evaluating the similarity of their aesthetological contents. This initial chapter is organized around three key concepts of morphology, through which it operates a first screening of merleaupontian philosophy, from its beginnings in the Forties up to its ontological outcomes during the Fifties and the Sixties: the ambiguity of Goethe's notion of form allows us to reconstruct the genesis of the philosophy of form in Merleau-Ponty’s Structure of Behavior and Phenomenology of Perception; the related concept of symbol helps us to realte Merleau-Ponty’s notions of idée sensible and symbolic matrix to Goethe’s Urphänomen; the transversal category of style is configured as a tool for investigation of the morphological issues in the aesthetic thought of the merleaupontian "new ontology". In this chapter we also demonstrate the crucial importance of constant confrontation of Merleau-Ponty with artistic experiences (such as Cézanne, Klee, Rodin, Bazaine and the Ecole de Paris), convened by the philosopher in support of his aesthetological theories. The chapter ends with a brief appendix on the question of the scientific foundation of aesthetics, developed through a comparison between Merleau-Ponty and Konrad Fiedler. This appendix opens simultaneously the search field of the second chapter: in fact, considering the contributions to the aesthetics provided by psychology and physiology of perception, the dissertation goes into the analysis of the role of the Gestalttheorie in Merleau-Ponty’s morphological debt. The second chapter follows the evolution of a theoretical passage in Merleau-Ponty’s production of the Fifties - from a philosophy of form to a philosophy of expression – ending up in the reconstruction of what seems to be a complete aesthetic of expression and of movement. This part of the research project is based on the deep analysis of an unpublished document (Le monde sensible et le monde de l'expression) - currently preserved at the Bibliothèque National de France - corresponding to the lectures given by Merleau-Ponty in the biennium 1952-1953 at the Collège de France. The work of analysis of the document was to assess, in addition to already confirmed inherences of Merleau-Ponty’s aesthetics to Gestalt psychology (Köhler, Koffka, Wertheimer, Guillaume), another crucial theoretical comparison of those years, the one with Viktor von Weizsäcker on the relations between perception and movement. The chapter closes with an appendix which tries to pick up the threads of the contributions to aesthetics theories that Merleau-Ponty develops within his philosophy of nature; this appendix embodies the attempt to read Merleau-Ponty’s aesthetics in terms of philosophy of morphogenesis and productivity The third chapter concentrates on the late ontological phase of Merleau-Ponty’s production - corresponding to the years between 1958 and 1961 - abruptly interrupted by his early death. Central, in this third chapter, is the reconstruction of the fate of the concept of Gestalt in the framework of the text The visible and the invisible, that is structured within the newly formed ontology of the flesh and on the background of a completely reformed philosophical landscape. The central paragraph of this chapter concentrate, through a comparison with two authors closely related to Merleau-Ponty - etc

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Made available in DSpace on 2015-04-14T13:55:24Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 459289.pdf: 904643 bytes, checksum: 494bba68668b2082672ac959477f8cff (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-06-26 / The text of the Phenomenology of inclusiveness characterizes itself as a new work in the area of phenomenology. Seeking phenomenological sources in Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and Waldenfels, the text attempts to develop inclusiveness in order to contemplate the inclusive/exclusive paradox and, moreover, to show its efficacy in measuring the inclusive scope of any ethical theory ever developed. From Husserl, we find the basis for a phenomenology of inclusiveness, which was put forth in his Krisis. In order to solve the constitutive paradoxes, Husserl nurtures the idea of an inclusive basis. Such inclusiveness is characterized by a latent reflective attitude, an attitude of inclusion in the lifeworld, an attitude of not closing our thesis, and, finally, an attitude that avoids the reductionism of the subjective and objective poles. With the radicality of thought from Merleau-Ponty, the text presents support for a complicity of meaning. Now, the subject sees his/herself as complicit in his/her relationship with the liveworld thus withdrawing the heavy burden that previously was placed solely on the subject as the ultimate endower of all meaning. The constitutive process entails a radical attitude that enables an incarnate inclusiveness, conveying the inclusive scope to the horizontality of life. However, as Waldenfels investigated the progress of ethical theory, he added an ethical-practical character to the constitutive dimension. Waldenfels emphasized an inevitable response before any thesis, due to our being in the world, as an event that just happens, regardless of our will or objectivications. Such responsiveness promotes the threshold of the senses as a responsive ethical possibility. In response itself, we find a responsive content that is not objectified, guiding us to the thresholds, considering them as possibilities and not as threats. For Waldenfels, what was previously excluded from the established order appears at the threshold, providing inclusive opportunities. After these considerations, the text reveals an inclusiveness which is open, latent, included in the lifeworld, non-reductionist, complicit in the constitutive process, and has an ethically responsive character. Although the studied authors do not work directly with the theme of inclusiveness, we examine sufficient sources to propose a method of phenomenology that demonstrates inclusivity, i.e., that is phenomenologically inclusive. Although the method is neither a measure nor a foundation, nevertheless it provides a base that serves as the measure and foundation of all morality ever built. Thus, we can measure the inclusive scope of all ethics and see how far the inclusivity extends, but yet not present inclusivity as the determinative basis. The foundation of the base is phenomenological, i.e., predicted within the latency and horizontality of the lifeworld / O texto Fenomenologia da inclusividade se caracteriza por ser um novo trabalho na ?rea da fenomenologia. Buscando fontes fenomenol?gicas em Husserl, Merleau-Ponty e Waldenfels, o texto procura desenvolver uma inclusividade capaz de contemplar o paradoxo inclusivo/exclusivo e, indo al?m, mostrando-se eficaz para medir o escopo inclusivo de qualquer tese ?tica j? elaborada. A partir de Husserl, encontramos as bases para uma fenomenologia da inclusividade, que fora trabalhada em sua obra Krisis. Buscando resolver os paradoxos constitutivos, Husserl nutre a ideia de um fundamento inclusivo. Tal inclusividade se caracteriza por uma atitude reflexiva latente, uma atitude de inclus?o no mundo-da-vida, uma atitude de n?o fechamento de nossas teses e, por fim, uma atitude que evite o reducionismo dos polos subjetivo e objetivo. Com a radicalidade do pensamento de Merleau-Ponty, o texto encontra subs?dios para uma cumplicidade de sentido. Agora, o sujeito se v? c?mplice de toda significa??o em sua rela??o com o mundo-da-vida. Retira-se o pesado fardo que antes era concedido t?o somente ao sujeito como doador ?ltimo de todo o significado. O processo constitutivo enseja uma atitude radical que habilita uma inclusividade encarnada, avultando o escopo inclusivo ? horizontalidade da vida. Todavia, investigando os avan?os da teoria ?tica de Waldenfels, acresce-se, ? dimens?o constitutiva, um car?ter ?tico-pr?tico. Waldenfels enfatiza uma inevit?vel resposta dada antes de qualquer tese decorrente de nosso estar no mundo como um evento que simplesmente acontece, independente de nossa vontade ou objetifica??es. Tal responsividade promove a fronteiriza??o dos sentidos como possibilidade ?tico-responsiva. Na pr?pria resposta encontramos um teor responsivo n?o objetivado, guiando-nos ?s fronteiras, considerando-as como possibilidade e n?o como amea?as. Para Waldenfels, o que antes era exclu?do da ordem estabelecida aparece junto ao limiar, facultando possibilidades inclusivas. Feitas estas considera??es, o texto revela uma inclusividade aberta, latente, inclu?da no mundo-da-vida, n?o reducionista, c?mplice nos processos constitutivos e possuindo um car?ter ?tico-responsivo. Embora os autores estudados n?o trabalhem diretamente com o tema da inclusividade, obt?m-se fontes suficientes para elaborarmos uma fenomenologia com uma proposta inclusiva. O m?todo proposto ? fenomenol?gico inclusivo. Entretanto, apresenta-se como uma medida, como um fundamento que n?o ? nem uma medida nem um fundamento. Mas, mesmo assim, serve como medida e fundamento de toda a eticidade j? constru?da. Dessa forma, podemos medir o escopo inclusivo de toda eticidade, ver at? onde se estende sua inclusividade, mas sem se apresentar como um fundamento determinativo. O fundamento ao qual nos pautamos ? fenomenol?gico, ou seja, previsto dentro da lat?ncia e horizontalidade do mundo-da-vida

¿Por qué plantear como problema el principio del proceso creativo en el arte en vez de lo bello en sí? Este último no es un problema que prime en el trabajo creativo del artista de hoy, como tampoco lo fue en los artistas de ayer, a pesar de haber sido y de ser un tema relevante para los filósofos. Desde la plataforma de los que somos artistas plásticos o visuales, el proceso creativo sí es parte de nuestra rutina. En ese sentido, urge seguir encontrando un mejor orden que ayude a organizar ese proceso. / Tesis

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-28T20:56:57Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Flavio Kenji Murahara.pdf: 2267328 bytes, checksum: e636ca3a25dffd917ee961f9ff0e6b82 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-12-04 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / This study consisted on a phenomenological study about the representativeness process of scholars with intellectual disability in a public school of São Paulo. The aim of the study was to investigate how the inclusion actors comprehended this process. The first theoretical chapter contained a discussion about the intellectual disability while the second chapter discussed the concepts of inclusive education, social movements and inclusive practices in the school. Regarding the method, the epistemological aspects were initially introduced, followed by the descriptions of preparatory meetings and all activities related to representativeness in among the scholars. The chosen approach was the reflective interview, and the participants were: the SAAI educator, the representative scholars, the pedagogical coordinators and the mother of a representative scholar. The analysis of the data has shown that the process of representativeness was comprehended, in its educative dimension, by a wide variety of aspects. On the other hand, the theoretical studies and the analysis indicated a dichotomy among the social participation and inclusive education. Becoming a representative was a very meaningful experience for the scholars with intellectual disabilities. Furthermore, having their opinion expressed and the sensibility of being comprehended are the basis of an effective school participation. We realized that it is important for the school to make adaptations as a guarantee for the scholars with intellectual disability to get involved in a representative environment. Finally, the present research may contribute to future discussions about public policies, that should aim on the appropriation of the representative spaces in school and on the encouragement of the active participation of scholars with intellectual disability / O presente trabalho consistiu em um estudo fenomenológico sobre o processo de representatividade de educandos com deficiência intelectual em uma escola municipal de educação fundamental de São Paulo, com o objetivo de investigar como o processo de representatividade escolar é compreendido pelos diferentes atores envolvidos na inclusão desses educandos. O primeiro capítulo fundamentou teoricamente a deficiência intelectual, enquanto o segundo capítulo referiuse às noções de educação inclusiva, movimentos sociais e práticas inclusivas escolares. Com relação ao método, apresentouse uma discussão sobre os aspectos epistemológicos da pesquisa, seguido da apresentação do contexto da pesquisa, que contemplou a descrição das reuniões preparatórias e das atividades relativas aos educandos representantes ocorridas na escola. O instrumento de coleta escolhido foi a entrevista reflexiva, sendo os participantes: a educadora da SAAI, os educandos representantes, as duas coordenadoras pedagógicas e a mãe de uma educanda representante. As análises apontaram para o fenômeno da representatividade como um processo que pode ser compreendido em sua dimensão educativa, que revelou muitos aspectos sobre a inclusão escolar do educando com deficiência. No entanto, tanto os estudos teóricos quanto as análises indicaram uma dicotomia entre as questões da participação social e da educação inclusiva. Verificouse que a experiência de se tornar representantes foi muito significativa para os educandos com deficiência intelectual. Além disso, compreendeuse a importância na relação entre a expressão dos educandos e a disposição sensível na escuta pelos educadores, condição para que haja uma efetiva participação na escola. Percebeuse ser necessário realizar adaptações como garantia para o envolvimento do educando com deficiência em um ambiente de representatividade. O presente estudo pode contribuir para futuras discussões sobre políticas públicas que foquem na apropriação dos espaços de representatividade escolar e sobre a participação do educando com deficiência na escola

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:27:10Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Ana Cristina Martins Westphal.pdf: 900341 bytes, checksum: f08d38baede0b09a98d340036e9bd050 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-03-09 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / This paper aims to clarify the relationship that Merleau-Ponty establishes between painting and philosophy while planning on a reflexive practice "according to" painting procedures. Notably Merleau-Ponty articulates this relationship based on a system of equivalences and relations of analogy whose backgrounds are perception and expression. Although Merleau-Ponty has created a series of metaphorical relations in which painting presents to philosophy as a possible reference -it cannot be affirmed at any given point in time that he seeks to create an aesthetic theory -rather, it is clear that he does not wish to talk "about" painting but "according to" painting. In Eye and Mind Merleau-Ponty works with the idea that a pictorial image is not to be seen from an objectifying relation because the observer does not look at a painting as if looking at an object, the eyes pop out of the head, wander around the painting while it resonates back to these eyes as if it had stemmed from the eyes themselves. This magical vision theory which introduces the idea that vision echoes from the observer‟s interior and makes him believe that the thing is embedded in his flesh appears to Merleau-Ponty through Cézanne‟s painting. The subject is linked to the essence of appearance, to the vision which restores presence, the body and the world. In analogy, Merleau-Ponty confronts the resulting meaning of perception and of spontaneous body gestures to the uniqueness of a work of art. But why does Merleau-Ponty see in painting a model that can serve the purpose of a reflexive practice? In order to answer this question this paper works through the "major subjects" that support Merleau-Ponty‟s reflections such as the Being, the world, the other, the body, returning to conclude with the question above. The starting point is when Merleau-Ponty manifests his desire, that is, to understand the language that begins "in" mankind and not "by" mankind. His assumption is that painting to his eyes becomes the flesh model of such language, that is, he takes painting as the "materialization" of vision inspecting the world 10 instead of a vision that has already a determined meaning system. As an elusive "logic" a "logic" without an exterior model the point in which the eye expresses the first trace of mankind in the world. Merleau-Ponty wishes to demonstrate that there is a first language which precedes a systemic language. A language that does not have its meaning manifested through the relation between word and concept-a sign for a preexisting meaning-but, on the contrary, a language that is created spontaneously amid the intertwining of meaning made transparent through body action. Therefore, it can be stated that meaning is manifested by an invasive relationship [empiétement] and involvement [Ineinander experience] among them. This "language without thought" has its symbolization strength closely related to motion and vision. Vision is the background that supports all of Merleau-Ponty‟s reflection about the origin of meaning: its innateness to [perception], its concerns [things, others, the world], and its results [expression]. The experience of vision makes him question the ways in which to access the visible: the visible, says Merleau-Ponty, rejects its premises when it becomes the outer synthesis. The redesign of the movement of vision appears in his reflection on the clairvoyant-like vision and it retains Cézanne‟s vision at a margin. According to Cézanne, vision is not accepted as a vision from the outside that is presented to him, but as secret genesis of things in the body itself, as an enclosure of the world in the body. The painter, says Cézanne, should not obey the logics of the mind because in it he would be lost and it is with the eyes, assures Cézanne, that the painter must be lost. The eye restores to Cézanne and Merleau-Ponty a feeling of expression of the thing in itself an eye which provides them in the "now" the thing "in the flesh". Like a tidal wave the work of Merleau-Ponty in an act of displacement, it swallows concepts and returns another concept / O trabalho tem como objetivo explicitar a relação que Merleau-Ponty estabelece entre pintura e filosofia, ao se propor pensar a prática reflexiva segundo os procedimentos da pintura. Ver-se-á que Merleau-Ponty as articula a partir de sistemas de equivalências e relações de analogia, que têm como fundo a percepção e a expressão. Conquanto, muito embora Merleau-Ponty tenha criado uma série de relações metafóricas em que a pintura aparece à filosofia como um possível referencial, em nenhum momento poder-se-á dizer que ele procura criar uma teoria estética, ou melhor, ver-se-á que ele não deseja falar sobre pintura, e sim segundo a pintura. Em O olho e o espírito Merleau-Ponty trabalha com a ideia de que a imagem pictórica não é vista a partir de uma relação objetal, pois o observador não olha a pintura como quem olha uma coisa, seus olhos saem da cabeça, passeiam pela pintura, enquanto esta ressoa a esses olhos como que provinda deles próprios. Essa teoria mágica da visão, que permite dizer que o visto ecoa do interior daquele que vê, e fá-lo crer que a coisa incrusta-lhe na carne, aparece à Merleau-Ponty pela pintura de Cézanne. A questão vincula-se à essência do aparecer, ao olhar que restitui à presença, o corpo e o mundo. Como um análogo, Merleau-Ponty confronta o sentido resultante da percepção e dos gestos espontâneos do corpo à singularidade da obra de arte. Mas porque Merleau-Ponty vê na pintura um modelo que pode ser destinado à prática reflexiva? Para responder a esta questão o trabalho passa pelos grandes temas que sustentam a reflexão de Merleau-Ponty, como o ser, o mundo, o outro, o corpo, para então concluir com a questão colocada. Partir-se-á do ponto que Merleau-Ponty diz ser seu desejo, ou seja, compreender a linguagem que se faz no homem e não, pelo homem, por supor que a pintura, a seus olhos, torna-se o modelo carnal dessa linguagem, ou seja, que ele toma a pintura como materialização dos olhares na inspeção do mundo, não quando estes olhares já se tornaram um sistema de significantes, mas enquanto 8 lógica alusiva, lógica sem modelo exterior, ponto em que o olho exprimir o primeiro traço do homem no mundo. O que Merleau-Ponty deseja mostrar é que há uma linguagem primeira, que é anterior à linguagem sistematizada, linguagem que não tem seu sentido manifesto na correspondência de uma palavra a um conceito um signo para uma significação já definida -, mas, ao contrário, é linguagem que se cria espontaneamente no entrelaçamento dos sentidos, transparentes por sua vez, na ação do corpo próprio. Assim sendo, poder-se-á dizer que o sentido se manifesta a partir de uma relação de invasão [empiétement] e envolvimento [experiência de Ineinander] entre eles próprios. Essa linguagem sem pensamento tem sua potência de simbolização intimamente relacionada à motricidade e ao olhar. O olhar é o fundo que sustenta toda a reflexão merleau-pontyana sobre a origem do sentido: sua inerência à [percepção], o que ele toca [coisa, outro, mundo], e o que dele resulta [expressão]. A experiência do olhar fá-lo questionar o modo de acesso ao visível: o visível, diz Merleau-Ponty, esquece suas premissas ao tornar-se a sìntese do fora . O redesenho do movimento do olhar aparece em sua reflexão sobre o vidente-visível, reflexão que conserva, na margem, o olhar de Cézanne. Em Cézanne a visão não é acolhida como olhar sobre o fora que se lhe apresenta, mas como gênese secreta das coisas no corpo próprio, como anexação do mundo no corpo. O pintor, diz Cézanne, não deve obedecer a uma lógica cerebral, pois nela ele se perderia, e é com os olhos, afirma Cézanne, que o pintor deve perder-se. O olho restitui à Cézanne e a Merleau-Ponty o pressentimento da expressão na própria coisa, olho que lhes dá no agora a coisa em carne e osso . Como uma grande onda, a obra de Merleau-Ponty, num movimento de arrastamento, engole os conceitos, e os devolve outros

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2017-03-27T10:20:50Z No. of bitstreams: 1 João Carlos Neves de Souza e Nunes Dias.pdf: 2528509 bytes, checksum: 42e6065a97ba0750ae6553c04b8e1096 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-03-27T10:20:50Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 João Carlos Neves de Souza e Nunes Dias.pdf: 2528509 bytes, checksum: 42e6065a97ba0750ae6553c04b8e1096 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-03-17 / Our research has as central theme of corporeality in Merleau-Ponty, considering the expression and flesh notions articulated to the body and brought in some of his works. Our argument is based on the assertion that the body gains distinction and philosophical thickness along the Merleau-Ponty thought experiment. In order to emphasize the strength of its proposal and the contrast with certain philosophical tradition, initially present understanding the body in Descartes, without losing sight the philosophical and medical context of the XVI e XVII centuries. In a second move, we follow the phenomenological description of the body proposed by Merleau-Ponty in Phénoménologie de la perception, in order to reveal the textures of the body itself and its modes of expression in the world, and his incisive criticism of the Cartesian philosophy and its impact an empirical science. In the third and final movement of this research, we expose certain plots of esthesiological body articulated to the Merleau- Ponty’s ontological project, with reference to his last writings, L’oeil et l’esprit and Le visible et l’invisible / Nossa investigação tem como centralidade o tema da corporeidade na filosofia de Merleau-Ponty, considerando as noções de expressão e carne articuladas ao corpo e apresentadas em algumas de suas obras. Nosso argumento assenta-se na afirmação de que o corpo ganha distinção e espessura filosófica ao longo da experiência do pensamento de Merleau-Ponty. No sentido de ressaltarmos o vigor de sua proposta e o contraste com certa tradição filosófica, inicialmente apresentamos a compreensão do corpo em Descartes, sem perder de vista o contexto filosófico e médico dos séculos XVI e XVII. Em um segundo movimento, acompanhamos a descrição fenomenológica do corpo proposta por Merleau-Ponty em Phénoménologie de la perception, no sentido de evidenciar as texturas do corpo próprio e seus modos de expressão no mundo, bem como sua crítica contundente à filosofia cartesiana e seu desdobramento empírico na ciência. No terceiro e último movimento dessa investigação, expomos certas tramas do corpo estesiológico articuladas ao projeto ontológico de Merleau-Ponty, tendo como referência seus últimos escritos, L’oeil et l’esprit e Le visible et l’invisible