Submitted by Viviane Lima da Cunha (viviane@biblioteca.ufpb.br) on 2016-07-26T15:35:01Z No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivototal.pdf: 1826886 bytes, checksum: 258afa1d986c7ceb99150d6dfab14db8 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-07-26T15:35:01Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivototal.pdf: 1826886 bytes, checksum: 258afa1d986c7ceb99150d6dfab14db8 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-05-28 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / The metaphysical discussion over causality and identity of events, in the aim of the physicalism, emerges in the context of the collapse of behaviorism. Whilst the paradigms of logical positivism dominated philosophy, the behaviorism dominated psychology. The rupture with the positivism was marked by the work of Willard V. O. Quine. The critics from the two dogmas of empiricism and the proposal of a radical translation allowed emergence of the theses of indetermination of meaning and inscrutability of reference. As alternative to empiricism, Quine recurs to ontological simplification and holism about theory, but considering the primacy of experience, he proposes a shift towards pragmatism. However, Quine’s pragmatism was founded in a behavioristic perspective on the acquisition of linguistic competences, and behaviorism didn’t stood as paradigm for the explanation of mentalist vocabulary. Quine had a great influence in the work and life of Donald Davidson. The ontological economy and the holism of theory marked Davidson’s work in his choice of events as basic entities and his approach to meaning in Truth and Meaning through a theory of truth. While in articles as Action, Reason and Causes Davidson develops an approach to the causal role of events in intention and action, stating that reasons are causes, in The Logical Form of Action Sentences and Causal Relations, he searches for the adequate logical forms of describing events and singular causal statements in order to establish an identity of events. The following metaphysical positions support, in Individuation of Events, a causal individuation criterion for events, and in Events as Particulars and Eternal vs Ephemeral Events, Davidson defends that events are spatiotemporal and unrepeatable particulars, finalizing a metaphysical discussion over of events that will enable him to approach the problem of the mind-body relation, in the anomalous monism argument. Donald Davidson’s anomalous monism presented in Mental Events proposes the thesis of monism – identity between physical events and mental events –, and anomalism of the mental – events do not fall under strict causal laws. To support these theses Davidson formulates three principles, whose conjunction gives us a non-reductionist version of token physicalism and, therefore, permits us to conciliate the mentalist vocabulary with the structure of physicalist language. In this sense, anomalous monism supports a supervenience theory of the mental. Despite the critics made to anomalous monism, as the epiphenomenalism accusation, the theory only crumbles in its initial presuppositions that is that of a priori causality and identity. Thus, the frailest aspects of the argument consist in the difficulty of tracking and identify in experience neural events with mental events, and in the formulation of strict laws. Those questions depend, respectively, on the advancement of neurosciences and physics. The present work, by the name of “Identity, Differentiation and Metaphysics of Events”, consists on an approach to metaphysics of events, in the context of the physicalism of tokens, more specifically to the Donald Davidson’s argument of the anomalous monism that argues for the identity of physical events and mental events and the causal role of mental events. It pretends, therefore, to coordinate the metaphysical discussion of events with Davidson’s anomalous monism. / A discussão metafísica sobre a causalidade e a identidade de eventos, no âmbito do fisicalismo, surge no contexto do colapso do behaviorismo. Porquanto os paradigmas do positivismo-lógico dominaram a filosofia, o behaviorismo dominou a psicologia. A ruptura com o positivismo é marcada pela obra de Willard V. O. Quine: a crítica aos dois dogmas do empirismo e a proposta de uma tradução radical, permitiu erguer as teses da indetermi-nação do significado e inescrutabilidade da referência. Como alternativa ao empirismo, Quine recorre à simplificação ontológica e ao holismo da teoria, mas com a primazia da experiência, propondo assim uma guinada rumo ao pragmatismo. Contudo, o pragmatismo de Quine era fundamentado numa perspectiva behaviorista para a aquisição de competên-cias linguísticas, e o behaviorismo não se firmou como paradigma para a explicação da vocabulário mentalista. Quine teve grande influência no trabalho e vida de Donald Davidson. A economia ontológica e o holismo da teoria marcam a obra de Davidson através da escolha de eventos como entidades básicas e da proposta de problematização do significado, em Verdade e Significado, através de uma teoria da verdade. Enquanto que em artigos como Action, Reasons and Causes Davidson desenvolve uma abordagem ao papel causal de eventos na intenção e na ação, afirmando que razões são causas, em The Logical Form of Action Sentences e Causal Relations, ele explora as formas lógicas adequadas para descrever eventos e para declarações causais singulares e para estabelecer uma identidade de eventos. As posições metafísicas daqui decorrentes sustentam, em Individuation of Events, um critério de individuação causal de eventos e em Events as Particulars e Eternal vs Ephemeral Events, Davidson sustenta que eventos são particulares espaciotemporais irrepetíveis, finalizando uma discussão metafísica de eventos que lhe permitirá abordar o problema da relação corpo-mente, no argumento do monismo anômalo. O monismo anômalo de Davidson, apresentado em Mental Events propõe as teses do monismo – identidade entre eventos físicos e eventos mentais –, e do anomalismo do mental – eventos mentais falham em cair sob leis causais estritas. Para suportar essas teses, Davidson formula três princípios cuja conjunção nos dá uma versão não reducionista do fisicalismo de ocorrências, que, portanto, permite conciliar o vocabulário mentalista com a estrutura linguística fisicalista. Assim, o monismo anômalo suporta uma teoria da superveniência do mental. Apesar do monismo anômalo sofrer algumas críticas, como a acusação de epifenomenalismo, a teoria só sucumbe nos seus pressupostos iniciais, ou seja, a causalidade e a identidade a priori. Os aspetos mais frágeis do argumento consistem na dificuldade de rastrear e identificar, na experiência, eventos neurais com eventos mentais, e na formulação de leis estritas. Questões estas que dependem, respetivamente, do avanço das neurociências e desenvolvimento da física. O presente trabalho, pelo nome de “Identidade, Diferenciação e Metafísica de Eventos”, consiste numa abordagem à metafísica de eventos, no contexto do fisicalismo de ocorrências, mais especificamente do argumento do monismo anômalo de Davidson, que afirma a identidade entre eventos físicos e eventos mentais, assim como o papel causal de eventos mentais. Pretende, portanto, coordenar a discussão metafísica de eventos com o monismo anômalo de Davidson.

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / Anomalous monism is a theory in the philosophy of mind put forth by Donald Davidson in the 1970s. Although influential at the time, it received numerous criticisms, and it is now widely rejected. The present Master s Dissertation argues for a revision of the reasons for which anomalous monism should be rejected. According to a well known objection in the literature, anomalous monism entails the thesis of property epiphenomenalism, and should be rejected because this consequence is unacceptable. It is proposed that this objection is inadequate in its two crucial steps. First, property epiphenomenalism does not seem to follow from anomalous monism, and, second, there seems to be no sufficient reason for a decisive rejection of property epiphenomenalism. Despite this, there are alternative reasons for rejecting anomalous monism, which concern the justification of the monist thesis. At least one of the premises Davidson takes to support it appears to be false, and, additionally, the very possibility of the monism at issue is threatened by problems in the ontology of events it assumes. / O monismo anômalo é uma teoria em filosofia da mente proposta por Donald Davidson na década de 1970. Embora influente na época, essa teoria recebeu inúmeras críticas e é atualmente amplamente rejeitada. A presente dissertação argumenta em favor de uma revisão das razões pelas quais o monismo anômalo deve ser rejeitado. De acordo com uma objeção bem conhecida na literatura, o monismo anômalo implica a tese do epifenomenismo de propriedades e deve ser rejeitado porque essa consequência é inaceitável. Propõe-se que essa objeção é inadequada em seus dois passos cruciais. Em primeiro lugar, o epifenomenismo de propriedades não parece se seguir do monismo anômalo, e, em segundo, não parece haver razões suficientes para uma rejeição decisiva do epifenomenismo de propriedades. Apesar disso, há razões alternativas para se rejeitar o monismo anômalo, que dizem respeito à justificação da tese monista. Pelo menos uma das premissas que Davidson empregou em sua defesa parece falsa, e, adicionalmente, a própria possibilidade do monismo em questão é ameaçada por dificuldades na ontologia de eventos que pressupõe.

Upplysningen var en period av radikala förändringar. Religion, vetenskap och politik influerades under denna period av de vetenskapliga framgångar som gjordes under 1600-talets vetenskapliga revolution tack vare bland annat Galileo och Kopernikus. Trots att upplysningens påverkan inte begränsades till enbart vetenskap och filosofi utan även religion finns det en etablerad definition av upplysningen som icke-religiös. Christopher Hitchens och John Gray är båda ateister men har markanta meningsskiljaktigheter när det kommer till upplysningen och deras tankar om periodens främsta representanter. Hitchens tillskriver upplysningen ideal som förnuft, framgång och en ärlig intellektuell strävan medan Gray menar att upplysningen var en era av blind hängivelse till förnuft och vetenskap som ersatte den monoteistiska guden. Han menar även att upplysningens tendens att intellektualisera och legitimera rasism genom att inkorporera den i vetenskap har lett till moderna rasistiska ideologier. Även om dessa perspektiv skiljer sig i hur de beskriver upplysningen och deras främsta tänkare är Grays analys mer historisk och även fri från en form av ytlig romantisering som Hitchens gör sig skyldig till. En granskning av utdrag ur verk från Voltaire, Baruch Spinoza och David Hume gör det svårt att känna samma vördnad för dem som Hitchens gör och legitimerar Grays beskrivning av eran som fylld av rasism, kolonialism och intellektuellt förtryck av allt som inte var europeiskt.

Le « problème difficile » de la conscience (Chalmers 1996) ou la question de pourquoi nos états mentaux sont dotés d’une certaine qualité subjective met en évidence l’existence d’un « écart explicatif » (Levine 1983) entre l'expérience vécue du sujet et les structures physiques et fonctionnelles du cerveau (ou de l’organisme dans son ensemble). Parmi les plusieurs solutions envisagées pour le trancher, le monisme neutre s’érige comme une option attirante entre les extrêmes du physicalisme et le dualisme. Dérivé initialement de la pensée de Bertrand Russell (1927), le monisme neutre part d’une simple constatation : dans notre conception scientifique de la matière, il y a un écart conceptuel important entre le rôle causal qu’on lui reconnait, et ses propriétés intrinsèques, fondamentales, qu’on ignore complètement. En d’autres mots, on sait que la matière se comporte de telle ou telle façon, mais on ne comprend pas pourquoi il en est ainsi. En ce sens, la nature fondamentale de la matière ne serait ni de l’ordre physique ni de l’ordre mental, mais quelque chose de neutre duquel émergeraient les propriétés physiques et mentales. L‘objectif de notre mémoire est d’expliquer en détail les antécédents, l’origine, le développement, l’évolution et les perspectives de cette solution en la comparant, notamment, avec d’autres postures monistes et neutralistes. Au passage, nous allons aussi évaluer certaines des objections qui ont été formulées à son égard. On s’attardera enfin sur quelques formulations contemporaines inspirées de la thèse russellienne dans le but de réfléchir sur leur plausibilité. / The “hard problem” of consciousness (Chalmers 1996) or the question on why our mental states are endowed with a certain subjective quality renders evident the existence of an “explanatory gap” (Levine 1983) between the experience lived by the subject and the brain’s physical and functional structures (or the organism’s altogether). Among the many solutions devised to solve it, Neutral Monism stands as an appealing alternative between the extremes of physicalism and dualism. Initially derived from Bertrand Russell’s thought (1927), Neutral Monism departs from this starting fact: within our scientific conception of matter, there is an important conceptual gap between the causal role thereof and its hitherto unknown intrinsic, fundamental properties. In other words, we know that matter behaves in such and such a way, but we do not know why it is so. In the light of these facts, the fundamental nature of matter is neither physical nor mental, but it identifies to a neutral stuff from which would emerge both the physical and mental properties. In that sense, this research focuses on spelling out the antecedents, origin, development, evolution and prospects of this solution, comparing it with other monist and neutralist positions. As research develops, we shall assess some of the objections raised against it. Finally, we shall consider some contemporary formulations inspired by the Russellian thesis in order to reflect upon their plausibility.

L’objectif principal du mémoire est de répondre à une lacune dans la littérature en philosophie politique concernant la laïcité. En effet, la totalité des interprétations de celle-ci entretient une forme ou une autre de monisme, la doctrine métaphysique selon laquelle les valeurs peuvent, en principe, être harmonisées en un tout unifié. Les défenseurs de la « laïcité ouverte », par exemple, empruntent à l’idée de consensus par recoupement élaborée par John Rawls selon laquelle les sociétés démocratiques et libérales reposeraient sur un accord fondamental sur une conception politique de la justice. En revanche, le pluralisme de valeurs ne reconnaît pas qu’un tel accord soit possible, ni même souhaitable. En nous appuyant sur les grands penseurs du pluralisme de valeurs, Stuart Hampshire, Isaiah Berlin et Bernard Williams, nous souhaitons réfléchir à la laïcité en prenant véritablement au sérieux la pluralité des valeurs et leur manière de concevoir les conflits qui traversent nos sociétés. Ce faisant, nous proposerons une conception pluraliste de la laïcité pour laquelle les accommodements raisonnables sont un aspect essentiel afin de garantir l’équité des institutions de résolution de conflit. / This dissertation aims to fill a gap in the political philosophy literature on secularism. So far, virtually all writings on the subject assume a form of monism, the moral metaphysical doctrine according to which values can be reconciled without compromise as parts of a unified whole. For example, Rawlsians adopt a notion of overlapping consensus for liberal democratic societies. However, value pluralists such as Isaiah Berlin, Stuart Hampshire and Bernard Williams argue that monism is both impossible to be realised, and damaging. This thesis takes their argument seriously. In so doing, it proposes a pluralist conception of secularism for which compromises, and so accomodations, play a central role in realising the justice of our institutions as regards the question of religion in the public sphere.

As an artist, my work reflects my own life experiences, allowing me to reinterpret and process difficult events in a new light. Creating art is a therapeutic process for me, enabling me to explore and understand my past and my own Self. In line with James Baldwin's views, I believe that the duty of an artist is to provide their audience with an opportunity to rediscover themselves; to help them explore their inner selves. In my experience, to achieve that goal, the first and most important hurdle the artist needs to cross is exploring themselves. In the process of answering questions about their own selves, they can touch many other souls. In Fragmented Self, I employ composited 3D animations of my own body parts juxtaposed over still and moving images. Each body part and piece in Fragmented Self is a metaphorical representation of a specific experience I have lived through. The resulting pieces are meditative, surreal, and abstracted spaces that speak to the complexities of life experiences. I believe each body holds messages from the past, and in Fragmented Self, I disembody and fragment my own body to study and explore my own Self. Drawing inspiration from Walt Whitman's Leaves of Grass in which he proclaims, "I contain multitudes", I see my Self as a composite of various selves shaped by different life experiences coming together to form one Self. I believe that I am a constantly evolving individual, influencing my everyday encounters and choices. As in the Japanese tradition of Kintsugi, in Fragmented Self, I trace the gold lined cracks that unite my multitudinous selves into one in hopes of answering the question "What makes me who I am today?" / Master of Fine Arts / Fragmented Self is a body of artwork created in an effort to learn about my own Self. The work explores how I see my Self as containing multiple selves. The project utilizes video and 3D rendering to create digital composites with semi-realistic aesthetics. The finished work includes 3 pieces focusing on ideas of time, perception, and fragmentation.

Christian Spirituality, Church History & Missiology

Ernst Haeckel (1834-1919), Professor für Zoologie an der Universität in Jena, war der bedeutendste Vertreter des deutschen Darwinismus und wurde zum Wegbereiter einer neuen naturwissenschaftlich-monistischen Weltanschauung. Vor allem beeinflusst durch Goethes pantheistische Ideen und Darwins Entwicklungslehre betonte Haeckel die Beseeltheit der Natur, die Einheit von Gott und Welt, Geist und Materie, und anorganischer und organischer Natur. Im ersten Teil dieser Arbeit werden das Leben und Werk Haeckels mit einem besonderen Bezug zu denjenigen monistischen Themenbereichen, die auch in Tschechien Resonanz gefunden haben, vorgestellt. Im zweiten Teil wird die Rezeption des Haeckelschen Monismus im tschechischen Kulturraum am Ende des 19. und am Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts präsentiert. Ausgehend von den tschechischen "Vordenkern" einer monistischen ganzheitlichen und einheitlichen Weltbezogenheit wird der Zeitgeist vor allem in Bezug auf die Tendenzen zur Entwicklung einer eigenständigen tschechischen nationalen Wissenschaftlichkeit und die durch diese Aspekte bestimmte Rezeption des Darwinismus charakterisiert. Der offensichtliche Mangel an tschechischen Übersetzungen von Schriften Darwins und Haeckels wird insbesondere durch die an Haeckel gerichtete Korrespondenz belegt. Vor allem Josef Bulova...

Quel type de choses sont les raisons que nous donnons pour expliquer nos comportements ? Sont-ce des entités dans nos cerveaux causalement responsables de nos actions ? Sinon, doit-on accepter le dualisme cartésien ? Faut-il croire avec Davidson que les raisons sont des entités physiques pourtant impossibles à identifier en termes physiques ? Nous proposons une réponse alternative : les raisons sont des choses dont nous ne faisons pas l’expérience. Elles peuvent être dites guider nos actions, en vertu d’une cohérence que nous acquérons à travers le temps, en même temps qu’une identité personnelle claire. On défend donc ici la thèse wittgensteinienne selon laquelle les raisons ne sont pas des causes, et l’on cherche ce qu’elles sont positivement. Car il y a bien une différence, dans la réalité physique, entre agir pour une raison ou l’autre. Mais c’est une réalité que l’on recherche et construit, et non que l’on observe et nomme. En parlant de nos raisons, on parle avant de savoir, pour faire advenir quelque chose –quelque chose de physique, comme toute chose.On soutient ainsi contre Kim qu’il est possible de croire à la pertinence propre des raisons, tout en restant moniste, sans dommage pour la rationalité humaine.Tout ceci a d’importantes conséquences éthiques : l’évaluation des raisons et intentions n’est sensée que si elle est une tentative pour bien agir ; elle sera toujours non pertinente pour définir les actions passées, et cela remet gravement en cause la notion de mérite. Ainsi proposons-nous de concevoir la morale de façon dynamique, comme étant ce que l’on cherche toujours à rendre possible. / What kind of things are the reasons we use to explain our behavior? Are they material entities in the brain, causing actions? Are they, as Davidson says, physical entities that we cannot identify in physical terms? Are we forced to accept Cartesian dualism? This thesis proposes another answer. Reasons are not experienced. They are sought through action and conceptualization. They may be said to guide our actions, but not as events which cause actions; rather, they serve, over time, to construct coherent behavior and stable personal identity.We defend here the Wittgensteinian thesis that reasons are not causes. We show that it is consistent with monism. The difference between acting for this or that reason does exist in reality, but it is a reality that we construct and pursue, not one that we experience and name. This is because when we give reasons, we speak before knowing, in order to make something exist.Thus we argue, against Kim, that it is possible to be a monist, to defend the importance of rational explanations, and to deny the possibility of reducing reasons to causes. Indeed, the knowledge necessary to do so would be far beyond the knowledge we require to speak the language of reasons.This conception of reasons as things that we seek rather than thing that we experience has important consequences in ethics. Namely, that the evaluation of reasons or intentions only makes sense when one attempts to act appropriately; it is irrelevant in defining past actions. This means that the very idea of merit is problematic, and that morality itself is something we must constantly work to make possible.

The Diploma Thesis deals with the relationship between International and European law in the context of actual events. The main aim is to analyse this relationship on the particular case of Yassin Abdullah Kadi by means of the wide scale of expert opinions and discussions. The main aim will be achieved through several partial aims (theoretical definition of essential conceptions relating to the theme, description of particular UN resolutions and their implementation into European law, analysis of the judgements of EU judicial authorities in the Kadi case).