Thomas Hobbes est sans doute mieux connu comme philosophe politique que comme homme de science et ses longues querelles avec John Wallis en mathématiques et Robert Boyle en physique n’ont guère encouragé les historiens des sciences à prêter attention à son œuvre scientifique. Pourtant, Hobbes conçut la philosophie comme une science et se considérait comme le fondateur non seulement d’une science nouvelle : la philosophie civile, mais aussi de la science de l’optique - récemment renouvelée à la faveur de la découverte du télescope - et même des mathématiques. Mais à quoi Hobbes pense-t-il quand il parle de science ? Aux mathématiques qu’il admire tant ? A la philosophie naturelle de Galilée ? Ou à la médecine de Harvey ? En quel sens la philosophie civile est-elle une science et quel est le statut des mathématiques ? Telles sont les questions que nous abordons à partir d’une analyse du De Corpore et des dix premiers chapitres du De Homine traduits du latin. L’interprétation proposée ici consiste à réaffirmer l’unité du système des Éléments de la philosophie et à souligner la dimension matérialiste et réaliste de la science hobbesienne. Bien que Noel Malcolm ait définitivement établi que Hobbes n’est pas l’auteur du Short Tract on first principles, nous montrons que le tournant scientifique de Hobbes est profondément marqué par son intérêt pour l’optique qu’il renouvela sur la base d’une ontologie matérialiste et des principes du mécanisme hérités de Galilée. / Thomas Hobbes is perhaps best known as a political philosopher than as a scientist and his too long quarrels with John Wallis in mathematics and Robert Boyle in physics did little to encourage historians of science to pay attention to his scientific work. Yet Hobbes conceived of philosophy as a science and considered himself the founder not only of a new science: civil philosophy, but also the science of optics - recently renewed thanks to the discovery of the telescope - even mathematics. But what Hobbes has in mind when he talks about science? Mathematics he so admires? Galileo’s natural philosophy? Or Harvey’s medicine? In what sense civil philosophy is a science and what is the status of mathematics? These are the issues we discuss from an analysis of De Corpore and the first ten chapters of De Homine translated from Latin. The interpretation proposed here is to underline the unity of the system of the Elements of philosophy and emphasize the materialistic and realistic nature of Hobbesian science. Although Noel Malcolm has definitively established that Hobbes is not the author of Short Tract on First Principles, we show that Hobbes’s shift to science was deeply marked by his interest in the science of optics he renewed on the basis of a materialist ontology and principles inherited from Galilee mechanism.

A Sceptical Aesthetics of Existence: The Case of Michel Foucault Emmanouil Simos (Hughes Hall) Michel Foucault's genealogical investigations constitute a specific historical discourse that challenges the metaphysical hypostatisation of concepts and methodological approaches as unique devices for tracking metaphysically objective truths. Foucault's notion of aesthetics of existence, his elaboration of the ancient conceptualisation of ethics as an 'art of living' (a technē tou biou), along with a series of interconnected notions (such as the care of the self) that he developed in his later work, have a triple aspect. First, these notions are constitutive parts of his later genealogies of subjectivity. Second, they show that Foucault contemplates the possibility of understanding ethics differently, opposed to, for example, the traditional Kantian conceptualisation of morality: he envisages ethics in terms of self-fashioning, of aesthetic transformation, of turning one's life into a work of art. Third, Foucault employs these notions in self-referential way: they are considered to describe his own genealogical work. This thesis attempts to show two things. First, I defend the idea that the notion of aesthetics of existence was already present in a constitutive way from the beginning of his work, and, specifically, I argue that it can be traced in earlier moments of his work. Second, I defend the idea that this notion of aesthetics of existence is best understood in terms of the sceptical stance of Sextus Empiricus. It describes an ethics of critique of metaphysics that can be understood as a nominalist, contextualist, and particularist stance. The first chapter discusses Foucault's late genealogy of the subject. It formulates the interpretative framework within which Foucault's own conceptualisation of the aesthetics of existence can be understood as a sceptical stance, itself conceived as nominalist, contextualist and particularist. As the practice of an aesthetics of existence is not abstract and ahistorical but the engagement with the specific historical circumstances within which this practice is undertaken, the second chapter reconstructs the intellectual context from which Foucault's thought has emerged (Heidegger, Blanchot, and Nietzsche). The third chapter discusses representative examples of different periods of Foucault's thought -such as the "Introduction" to Binswanger's "Traum und Existenz" (1954), Histoire de la folie (1961), and Histoire de la sexualité I. La volonté de savoir (1976)- and shows in which way they constitute concrete instantiations of his sceptical aesthetics of existence. The thesis concludes with responses to a number of objections to the sceptical stance here defended.

À la suite d’Agrippa, maint sceptique a argué de la pluralité des systèmes pour ruiner toute ambition de vérité philosophique : des systèmes contradictoires ne pouvant être vrais simultanément, leurs prétentions respectives s’annulent. L’argument n’a pourtant de valeur que si la pluralité des systèmes est elle-même irrationnelle. Or plusieurs philosophes ont rationalisé la diversité des systèmes philosophiques, suggérant par là que la raison puisse s’approprier sa propre limite ; notamment Kant, dans l’« Histoire de la raison pure » qui conclut la Critique de la raison pure (1781) ; Hegel, dans les Leçons sur l’histoire de la philosophie (1805–1830) ; Victor Cousin, dans Du Vrai, du beau et du bien (1828) et l’Histoire générale de la philosophie (1863) ; Charles Renouvier, dans l’Esquisse d’une classification systématique des doctrines philosophiques (1885–1886) ; et Jules Vuillemin, dans Nécessité ou contingence (1984).Étudier de manière interne chacune de ces entreprises permet de déterminer quels en sont les critères fondamentaux, la forme mathématique générale, et le but philosophique. L’histoire kantienne de la raison pure, injustement dédaignée, repose sur les concepts fondamentaux du criticisme, structure maint chapitre des trois Critiques, et annonce la paix philosophique perpétuelle dont est porteur le criticisme. Les Leçons de Hegel ne sont ni un résumé empirique ni une histoire biaisée de la philosophie : fondées sur la Logique et la Phénoménologie, elles mettent au jour la dialectique interne des systèmes. La classification de Renouvier n’est pas, comme on le dit parfois, a posteriori, mais repose au contraire sur le jeu a priori d’une table des catégories et d’une théorie de la contradiction. Enfin, la classification vuilleminienne des systèmes, qui s’appuie sur une classification des formes de prédication, généralise la classification kantienne. Seule la classification de Victor Cousin s’avère finalement a posteriori.Ancrées dans les concepts fondamentaux de chacune de ces doctrines, ces classifications montrent qu’un système peut construire l’image des autres et de leurs relations aussi rigoureusement qu’il décrit le monde : les relations entre systèmes ne sont pas moins structurales que les systèmes eux-mêmes. / Following the example of Agrippa, a lot a sceptics argued that, because of the plurality of philosophical systems, there could be no unique philosophical truth: contradictory systems could not be true at the same time. But this argument presupposes that this plurality is itself irrational. And yet some philosophers took the diversity of philosophical systems as rational, suggesting that reason was able to take possession of its own boundary: Kant, in the “History of pure reason” of the Critique of Pure Reason (1781); Hegel, in the Lessons on the History of Philosophy (1805–1830); Victor Cousin, in his books Du Vrai, du beau et du bien (1828) and the Histoire générale de la philosophie (1863); Charles Renouvier, in the Esquisse d’une classification systématique des doctrines philosophiques (1885–1886); and Jules Vuillemin, in Necessity or Contingency (1984).By examining the internal structure of each of these attempts, we can show their main criteria, their general mathematical form, and their philosophical aim. Kant’s “History of Pure Reason” uses the fundamental concepts of criticism, plays a structuring role in the Critique of Pure Reason, and forecasts the perpetual peace of criticism. Hegel’s Lessons are neither an empirical summary nor a biased history of philosophy: they are grounded on Hegel’s Logic and Phenomenology, and reveal the internal dialectic of systems. Renouvier’s classification is not a posteriori, but combines an a priori table of categories with a theory of contradiction. Finally, Vuillemin’s classification of systems, which is grounded on a classification of elementary sentences, is a generalization of Kant’s classification. Only Victor Cousin’s classification is a posteriori.These classifications find their roots in the fundamental concepts of each of these systems. A philosophical system is thus able to account not only for the world, but also for other systems and for their relationship. The relationship between systems is not less structural than systems themselves are.

(in English): The aim of the work is to reconstruct and interpret the method of historicized analysis and its employment to examine the phenomenon of "making up people". The concept is Hacking's description for the impact scientific classifications can have on classified people. The point of departure for the examination in the work is the thesis that historicized analysis employs the elements of philosophical conceptual analysis together with historical tools philosophy of science corroborates and whose strategies are often in opposition to the analytical tradition. As a follow-up of the main thesis the work also examines whether the historicized analysis can be understood as a history of the present. Moreover, it asks questions that come up in connection with the project of "making up people" such as: "What are the conditions for a scientific category to emerge? When categories emerge do new kinds of people emerge as well? What is the specific structure that enables the mutual interaction and effect scientific categories and classified people make? One of the aims will therefore be to elucidate to what extend the historicized analysis is able to answer those questions. Last but not least the work looks into the critical implications and usefulness of the method of historicized analysis.