What do we owe to our loved ones? What is the status of these requirements? How do we reconcile them with other requirements? Are we allowed to buy our child an expensive car when that money could save countless strangers overseas? What exactly does morality demand of us? / My thesis defends an account of partiality justified in terms of relationships. I develop the view that relationships are inextricably linked to wellbeing, and I defend the idea that morality must be concerned with our wellbeing. I try to make sense of this account of partiality with the idea that morality carries a requirement of impartiality. If wellbeing is an important part of morally right actions, and if acting in accordance with reasons of partiality (qua relationships) sometimes promotes wellbeing better than impartiality, then some reasons of partiality lead to morally right actions. Minimally, I argue that for why a strictly impartial (or, on the other extreme, a strictly partial) theory does not work. Both reasons (of partiality and impartiality) must be taken into account and carefully calibrated. More ambitiously, I argue for why partiality deserves its own place at the table in normative ethical theorizing. This is not to say that partiality always leads to right action, rather the suggestion is that there are some forms of partiality (found within relationships) which morality requires. / Thesis / Candidate in Philosophy / Some forms of partiality seem clearly wrong, like racial bias or nepotism; in such cases, it is better to consider our reasons to be impartial, which seem to lead to more fairness or equality. Still, there seem to be other forms of partiality which are clearly right, like the love and care a parent has for their child; in these cases, considering our reasons to be impartial seem like (to quote Bernard Williams), “one thought too many.” This thesis tries fit reasons of partiality and reasons of impartiality together, and argues for a view of (moral) partiality grounded in relationships.

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This master’s thesis investigates normative lifelines, time and space in relation to a nonbinary gender identity. My research questions focused on nonbinary aging, orientation in regards to identity and spaces, and views on maturity. I wanted to know how temporality and spatiality can be used as a theoretic framework to better understand nonbinary people’s experiences. This was achieved by interviewing seven Swedish nonbinary subjects aged 30-41 about norms regarding time and place. The results show that the nonbinary informants use gender norms to orient themselves in relation to gender identity. Aging is shown to be a gendered practice and therefore nonbinary aging and what the future will hold is made unclear for the participants. Nonbinary people seek not to be a hindrance or annoyance to the outside world and are aware that their identity often is viewed as childish, made up and illegitimate. Despite fears that they take up too much space I have shown that there is not enough space for nonbinary subjects to comfortably find a place in most rooms.

Published Article / Modern philosophy left us with an unbridgeable divide between factual reality and the domain of values (normativity). This article first of all analyze modal norms, such as the principle of avoiding what is legally excessive. There are distinct but mutually cohering kinds of laws. The distinction between modal laws / norms and type laws / norms required an example from the domain of human society - John Locke and Adam Smith, whose ideas in practice gave birth to trade unionism and labour parties. The idea of an "invisible hand" (manifest in the "free market") operates with exact (natural) laws, such as supply and demand. When modal norms are distinguished from type norms it becomes clear that states and a business enterprises can act uneconomically by wasting their money although they ought to function in a way that is guided by economic considerations of frugality. As an example the well-known natural law of energy-conservation is explained as the embodiment of an analogical link between the physical aspect and the kinematic aspect which should rather be designated as the law of energy-constancy. Finally the problem of normativity is related to the coherence between the logical-analytical aspect and its coherence with the aspects of number and space - focused on the principle of the excluded middle and its implications for diverging schools of thought within twentieth century mathematics. The last subsection concludes with reference to the norms guiding technological developments and with an assessment of the meaning of technology.

This thesis is a detailed examination of the logico-semantic system propounded by the English philosopher and theologian William of Ockham (c.1287 – c.1347). It provides a reinterpretation of Ockham's account of mental content and mental-language semantics, as well as of his theory of consequential goodness. It does so from the standpoint of an inferentialist theory of meaning, in rejection of previous attempts made from the standpoint of internalist and externalist theories of mental content. Chapter 1 ('The Scientic Status of Logic') provides an account of Ockham's understanding of logic as a rational, practical, ostensive science. Chapter 2 ('The Received Interpretation') presents and casts doubt upon the arguments put forward by the defenders of both externalist and internalist construals of Ockham's semantic theory. Chapter 3 ('An Inferentialist Construal') presents the central tenets of a inferentialist theory of meaning. In order to show how Ockham's system can be understood within such a semantic paradigm, we will have to set out at least three things. First, Chapter 4 ('Ockham's Propositionalism') argues that the mature Ockham actually embraced a propositionalist theory of meaning. Second, Chapter 5 ('Obligationes and the Normativity of Asserting') seeks to prove that such a theory of meaning can only be properly understood against the normative background provided by his theory of obligationes. Finally, Chapter 6 ('Consequences') argues that Ockham's theory of consequential goodness is materialist, not formalist. That is to say, that the goodness of a certain kind of consequence ultimately depends upon the meaning of its propositional parts, rather than upon its structure. It is then shown that all remaining kinds of consequences (syllogisms included) are to understood with respect to these material inferences. The main sources of this research are Ockham's Ordinatio, his Summa logicae, and his Quodlibeta septem. As regards the inferentialist theory of meaning, Robert Brandom's Making it Explicit (1994) and Wilfrid Sellars 'Inference and Meaning' (1953) were essential to this research.

This thesis is a critique of the prominent strand of contemporary liberal political theory which maintains that liberal political authority must, in some sense, rest on the free consent of those subjected to it, and that such a consensus is achieved if a polity’s basic structure can be publicly justified to its citizenry, or to a relevant subset of it. Call that the liberal legitimacy view. I argue that the liberal legitimacy view cannot provide viable normative foundations for political authority, for the hypothetical consensus it envisages cannot be achieved and sustained without either arbitrarily excluding conspicuous sectors of the citizenry or commanding a consent that is less than free. That is because the liberal legitimacy view’s structure is one that requires a form of consent that carries free-standing normative force (i.e. normative force generated by voluntariness), yet the particular form of hypothetical consent through public justification envisaged by the view does not possess such force, because of its built-in bias in favour of liberalism. I also argue that the liberal legitimacy view is the most recent instantiation of one of two main strands of liberal theory, namely the nowadays dominant contract-based liberalism, which seeks to ground liberal political authority in a hypothetical agreement between the citizens. My case against the liberal legitimacy view, then, contributes to the revitalisation of the other main approach to the normative foundations of liberalism, namely the substantivist one, which legitimates liberal political authority through an appeal to the substantive values and virtues safeguarded and promoted by liberal polities.

Absente en tant que telle dans le discours des juristes civilistes français, la normativité précontractuelle constitue un phénomène juridique à part entière, dont l'appréhension suppose de suspendre provisoirement le raisonnement habituel par lequel le juriste appréhende la période précontractuelle.Signalée par les fautes précontractuelles, la normativité précontractuelle est distincte de la normativité générale et abstraite, inhérente à la période précontractuelle, que des différents dispositifs du Code civil (p. ex. art. 1109 et s.) et des principes jurisprudentiels (p. ex. la bonne foi) indiquent. Concrète, la normativité précontractuelle apparaît dans un premier temps tel un rapport normatif, établi entre les précontractants en situation de négociation. Décelable en rétrospective d'un contrat critiqué à l'occasion d'une faute simple ou qualifiée, ce rapport se constate également dans la perspective d'un contrat en négociation et constitue la réalité matérielle de cette normativité particulière. Dans un second temps, la normativité précontractuelle renvoie, dans l'ordre des concepts, à une norme. Endogène, celle-ci se manifeste dans l'environnement évolutif, au sein duquel les précontractants se placent volontairement pour déterminer le contenu de leur contrat futur.Point de jonction d'une norme spécifique précontractuelle et d'un rapport noué entre les précontractants, la normativité précontractuelle tient en échec la théorie des sources d'obligations, dans la mesure où celle-ci, considérée comme répertoriant les sources de normativité, ne parvient pas à expliquer celle-là par une seule source. Éclectique et complexe, la normativité précontractuelle échappe, quant à sa représentation, à une construction juridique. Fabriquée dans une discussion normative qui suppose d'envisager les précontractants dans le rapport qui les unit l'un à l'autre, la norme précontractuelle concrète se réalise, au cas par cas, sous l'action originale du juge, lorsque celui-ci reconnaît, rétrospectivement, sa présence ou non, à l'issue d'une bataille argumentative à laquelle les précontractants, parties au procès, participaient, pour mettre en avant l'intérêt qui les animaient lors des négociations et qu'ils entendent désormais faire privilégier par le juge, dans la pesée des intérêts.Hypothèse de quasi-droit, la mise en évidence de la normativité précontractuelle et sa mise à l'épreuve invitent le juriste à repenser les chemins de la normativité pour faire entièrement place à l'irréductible sociabilité qui caractérise le droit. / Absent as such in the discourse of French civil lawyers, the pre-contractual normativity is a legal phenomenon. Its comprehension supposes temporarily suspending the usual reasoning by which a jurist apprehends the pre-contractual period.Revealed through mistakes committed during pre-contractual negotiations, pre-contractual normativity is distinct from general and abstract normativity of the pre-contractual period and indicated in various provisions of the Civil Code (art. 1109 et seq.) and jurisprudential principles (e.g. good faith). As it is concrete, pre-contractual normativity firstly appears as a normative relationship, established between negotiators in the process of negotiating, whether the contract is finally signed or not. This relationship is the material reality of this particular normativity. Secondly, pre-contractual normativity sends back to a norm. As it is endogenous, it is revealed in the evolving environment, in which the negotiators voluntarily place themselves to settle the content of their future contract.Pre-contractual normativity is where a specific pre-contractual norm and a relationship forged between negotiators meet. It renders ineffective the theory of sources of obligations, since the latter, which is known for listing the sources of normativity, fails to explain the former with a single source. Pre-contractual normativity is eclectic and complex and thus, defies a single theorization in the way it is presented. Created in the process of a normative discussion which supposes considering negotiators in the relationship that unites them to one another, the concrete pre-contractual norm is achieved, case-by-case, under the supervision of a judge, who afterwards recognizes a presence or absence of such a norm at the end of a debate in which the negotiators – who have become party to the case - actively take part. The aim is to put forward the interests that stir them during the negotiations and that they now intend to have the judge's favor in his balancing of interests.The demonstration of pre-contractual normativity and its modus operandi are hypothesis of quasi-law and invite jurists to rethink the paths to normativity to give way to the completely inherent sociability that characterizes the law.

Dans le cadre de l’exercice de ses activités professionnelles, le médecin développe avec ses interlocuteurs des liens d’intérêts susceptibles d’influencer ses décisions et la manière dont il pratique la médecine. Ces influences peuvent s’avérer bénéfiques lorsqu’elles lui permettent de perfectionner ses connaissances et ses compétences. Toutefois, lorsqu’elles sont contraires à l’intérêt supérieur des patients, ces influences sont constitutives d’un conflit d’intérêts que le droit médical se fait un devoir d’encadrer avec plus ou moins de succès. Par ailleurs, les autorités institutionnelles sanitaires et les acteurs de la relation médicale sont également à l’origine de la production des normes de droit souple, a priori sans valeur coercitive, que le droit va faire sienne et intégrer à la norme juridique. Ainsi, les autorités éthiques, sanitaires et scientifiques, mais également les acteurs de la relation de soin et leurs représentants influencent la norme juridique médicale. L’étude du droit médical démontre, en résumé, une ambivalence de la matière à l’égard des influences exercées par les acteurs du système de santé sur la pratique de la médecine et sur les sources des normes qui l’encadre. / During the exercise of his professional activities, physician develops with his interlocutors links of interests likely to influence his decisions and the way he practices medicine. These influences can be beneficial when they allow him to perfect his knowledge and skills. However, when they are contrary to the best interests of patients, these influences constitute a conflict of interest that medical law try to manage with more or less success. In addition, the health institutional authorities and the actors of the medical relationship are also produce soft laws, without coercive value, that the law will adopt and integrate them into the legal norm. Thus, the ethical, health and scientific authorities, but also the actors of care relationships and their representatives influence medical law. In short, the study of medical law shows an ambivalence of the subject with regard to the influences exerted by the actors of the health system on the practice of medicine and on the sources of the norms that frame it.

Trata-se, nesta dissertação, da análise do conceito de gramática, tal como Wittgenstein o usa no período de escrita das Investigações Filosóficas. Nesse sentido, mostra-se que ele não julga que a gramática seja essencial para a instituição de uma linguagem. Um corolário disso é que aquilo que Wittgenstein chamou, de modo bastante geral, de regras gramaticais tampouco o são. Veremos que esta posição é o resultado de uma virada importante no pensamento de Wittgenstein, a partir da qual os conceitos de forma de vida e prática, bem como o papel da experiência, em geral, assumem posição fundamental em sua apresentação do que seja a linguagem. Com efeito, é partir destes conceitos que poderemos apresentar com alguma perspicuidade as fontes da normatividade da linguagem, em geral, e da gramática, em especial. / The central topic of this dissertation is the analysis of the concept of grammar, as Wittgenstein uses it in the period of composition of the Philosophical Investigations. In this sense, we will show that he does not think that a grammar is an essential condition for the establishment of a language. A corollary of this latter point is that what Wittgenstein called, quite generally, rules of grammar does not constitute such a condition either. We will see that this position is the result of a major turning point in Wittgensteins thought, from which the concepts of form of life and practice, as well as the role of experience, in general, assume a key position in his presentation of what language is. Taking this concepts as point of departure, we intend to present with some perspicuity some sources of the normativity of language, in general, and of grammar, in particular.

Thomas Hobbes está preocupado com as consequências do desacordo moral que, segundo ele, impedem as sociedades de viverem em paz, a qual é condição necessária para a garantia uma vida confortável a todos. Para apresentar uma solução a esse problema, o autor começa estudando a condição natural dos humanos, que, sem um poder soberano, vivem em condição de guerra. Depois de alcançar essa conclusão, Hobbes nos mostra como é possível constituir corretamente uma república. Apesar de apresentar o argumento do estado de natureza como sendo o ponto de partida para a instituição da soberania, ele está focado principalmente no seu significado para a estabilidade da república. Hobbes afirma, assim, estar consciente de que as pessoas sempre desejam viver juntas e de que elas têm vivido assim desde sempre. Seu principal interesse está, na verdade, em demonstrar como as pessoas podem viver juntas em paz ao longo do tempo. Hobbes mostra aos seus leitores que a paz só é possível quando os cidadãos conhecem as leis de natureza e estão corretamente motivados a segui-las. Essa tese tem dois objetivos principais: (i) discutir como Hobbes desenvolve sua teoria moral, e como ele conecta essa teoria à lei civil, e (ii) debater sua teoria sobre a natureza humana e a possibilidade de ensinar os cidadãos sobre a necessidade de obedecer ao soberano. Os principais tópicos discutidos e as contribuições que essa tese pode proporcionar estão relacionados à questão da normatividade das leis de natureza e ao impacto que ela pode ter no restante da teoria política de Hobbes, com particular destaque à relação, em uma república, entre moralidade e educação, pois a segunda motiva os cidadãos a seguirem a primeira. / Thomas Hobbes is concerned with the consequences of moral disagreement as, according to him, they prevent societies from living in peace, which is a necessary condition to guarantee a comfortable life to everyone. In order to present a solution to this problem, Hobbes starts studying the natural condition of humans, who, in the absence of a sovereign power, live in a state of war. After reaching this conclusion, Hobbes shows us how it is possible to correctly institute a commonwealth. Despite presenting the argument concerning the state of nature as a starting point to the institution of the sovereignty, he is focused mainly on the state of nature’s meaning to the stability of the commonwealth. Hobbes hence asserts that he is aware that people always desire to live together and have always lived like that. His main interest is actually to demonstrate how people can live together in peace over time. Hobbes shows his readers that peace is only possible when citizens know the laws of nature and are correctly motivated to follow them. This paper has two main aims (i) to discuss how Hobbes advances his moral theory and how he connects it to the civil law, and (ii) to reflect his theory about human nature and the possibility of teaching citizens about the need of obeying the sovereign. The main topics discussed and the contributions this paper may make concern the normativity of the laws of nature and the impact it may have on the rest of Hobbes’s political theory, with particular emphasis on the relation, in a commonwealth, between morality and education, as the latter motivates citizens to follow the former.