Made available in DSpace on 2017-07-10T18:26:04Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Vanessa Brun Bicalho.pdf: 823140 bytes, checksum: 841a6cd082d29ce940ff0f686c8893b7 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-08-08 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / This research has as main purpose to analyze the validity from argument from Faktum of reason how possible founder of the moral law and freedom in Kant's practical philosophy. In order to explain the moral-practical domain in which conceptualized the argument from Faktum of reason, our text will demonstrate initially from the reading of the Critique of Pure Reason, the limits of theoretical reason by which, by the distinction of objects in general phenomenon and noumena, Kant founds both the speculative domain of reason as well, then the practical reason. The determination of the limits from the understanding´s faculty is crucial to establish the thematization of the freedom´s concept as a concept not only speculative (transcendental freedom), but also practical reason (practical freedom). Only so are presented the conditions to be thought of as not contradictory Nature and Freedom. Through the understanding of how theoretical reason (Verstand) knows, and the proper way to understand what pure reason (Vernunft) admits in favor from thinking of ideas that relate to the knowledge (ex., soul, God, and freedom), Kant developed the project of transcendental reason, the systematic point of view. The presence from the argument from Faktum of reason, a single fact admitted this as the reason (Vernunft) contrasted with the Kantian moral theory, developed and explained to the Groundwork from the Metaphysics of Morals. The argument of a Faktum at this reason, brought by the Critique of Practical Reason, caused a disturbance in the reception of Kant´s moral theory, giving breath to a debate on the possession, by reason, of the freedom´s concept. This new foundation argument was explained by Kant as an consciousness of immediately practical, awareness by itself and in itself guarantees the cogency of justification of possession from freedom, in our view, as the only critical argument can be provided by the faculty of pure practical reason. Unfavorable interpretations and receptions from Kant´s strategy of reasoning from freedom in Faktum of reason are discussed in this dissertation. Many current proposals to counteract the appearance of coherent Kant´s strategy brought by Critique of Practical Reason is shown attached to the previous movements of proof to demonstrate the freedom´s concept. In opposition to these proposals, which are a deconstruct component in the Kant´s argument of the perspective from critical-transcendental reason or systematic conformation, our text establishes a dialogue to elucidate the possible incongruities argumentative these interpretations, the themes of freedom (transcendental) and defense of Faktum as compatible arguments with the main transcendental perspective of reason, so kept in accordance with the project of reason from founding a Metaphysics of Morals. / Esta pesquisa tem como proposta principal analisar a validade do argumento do Faktum da razão como possível fundador da lei moral e da liberdade na filosofia prática kantiana. A fim de explicitar o domínio prático-moral no qual tematizamos o argumento do Faktum da razão, nosso texto demonstrará inicialmente a partir da leitura da Crítica da Razão Pura, os limites da razão teórica mediante os quais, pela distinção dos objetos em geral em fenômeno e númeno, Kant funda tanto o domínio especulativo da razão como também, em seguida, o da razão prática. A determinação dos limites da faculdade do entendimento é decisiva para instituir a tematização do conceito de liberdade como conceito não apenas especulativo (liberdade transcendental), mas também prático da razão (liberdade prática). Unicamente por isso são apresentadas as condições para serem pensados como não contraditórios Natureza e Liberdade. Por meio da compreensão do modo como a razão teórica (Verstand) conhece, e do modo adequado de compreender aquilo que a razão pura (Vernunft) admite em favor do pensamento de ideias que têm relação com o conhecimento (p.e., alma, Deus e liberdade), Kant desenvolveu o projeto da razão transcendental, do ponto de vista sistemático. A presença do argumento do Faktum da razão, de um único fato admitido como presente à razão (Vernunft), contrastou com a teoria moral kantiana, desenvolvida e explicitada até a Fundamentação da Metafísica dos Costumes. O argumento de um Faktum presente à razão, trazido pela Crítica da Razão Prática, provocou uma inquietação na recepção da teoria moral kantiana, dando fôlego a um debate em torno da posse, pela razão, do conceito de liberdade. Esse novo argumento fundamentador foi explicitado por Kant como uma consciência do imediatamente prático, consciência que por si mesma e em si mesma garante a irrefutabilidade da justificação da posse da liberdade, a nosso ver, como o único argumento crítico possível de ser fornecido pela faculdade da razão pura prática. Interpretações e recepções desfavoráveis à estratégia kantiana de fundamentação da liberdade no Faktum da razão são debatidas na presente dissertação. Muitas propostas atuais de neutralizar o aspecto coerente da estratégia kantiana trazida pela Crítica da Razão Prática se mostram apegadas aos movimentos anteriores de prova para demonstrar o conceito de liberdade. Em oposição a essas propostas, que encontram na argumentação kantiana um componente descontrutivo da perspectiva da razão crítico-transcendental ou da sua conformação sistemática, nosso texto estabelece um diálogo visando elucidar as possíveis incongruências argumentativas dessas interpretações, pela tematização da liberdade (transcendental) e da defesa do Faktum, como argumentos compatíveis com a própria perspectiva transcendental da razão, mantidos por isso em conformidade com o projeto da razão de fundar uma Metafísica dos Costumes.

Made available in DSpace on 2017-07-10T18:26:28Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Luciano Vorpagel da Silva.pdf: 537928 bytes, checksum: 8bfe3caa7d62137106546647617b2f64 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-12-09 / Fundação Araucária / This dissertation deals with the concept of legal duty in Kant, developing a study from three aspects, namely the origin, the distinction and the application. Initially, the focus of work is the foundation of moral duties in general, so the goal is to highlight and clarify the concept of the categorical imperative as the supreme principle of moral(ity) for men, rational beings who are sensitive. Secondly, the focus is the distinction between legal obligations and duties of virtue, which are products of the determination of the will over free will. When the determination is of pure will of the subject themselves on the maxims of the will, so the law is ethical and the duty is due, but only the form of agency is determined and such determination is performed by the unified will of the people, then the legislation is legal and duty is legal. In the third and final time, the focus is the applicability, that is, the legal duty in the judicial from theory to praxis. At this point the aim is to understand the legal concepts of practical reason, law and coercion capacity, from that, understand the applicability of legal duty under two distinct optical, namely through the moral metaphysics way and through historical-anthropological of unsocial sociability. By analyzing these three points, it can be infered that the legal duty, the thought of Immanuel Kant, is the need for legality and morality as initial assumption, so that men first approach of legality, when they leave state of nature and enter into the marital status, toward morality, through a process of ethical standards within the Republican state of right. In this way, the legal duty expresses in the name of morality, the need for men to join marital status and at the same time, the need for such state be Republican, and at the same time in which the unified will of the people, which is irresistible, be to enact laws and source of all public law. / A presente dissertação trata do conceito de dever jurídico em Kant, desenvolvendo um estudo a partir de três aspectos, a saber, a origem, a distinção e a aplicação. Num primeiro momento, o foco do trabalho é a fundamentação moral dos deveres em geral, de modo que o objetivo é evidenciar e esclarecer o conceito de imperativo categórico como princípio supremo da moral(idade) para os homens, que são seres racionais sensíveis. Num segundo momento, o foco é a distinção entre os deveres jurídicos e os deveres de virtude, os quais são produtos da determinação da vontade sobre o livre-arbítrio. Quando a determinação é da vontade pura do próprio sujeito sobre as máximas do arbítrio, então a legislação é ética e o dever é de virtude; mas se apenas a forma do arbítrio é determinada e tal determinação é realizada pela vontade unificada do povo, então a legislação é jurídica e o dever é jurídico. Num terceiro e último momento, o foco é a aplicabilidade, isto é, o dever jurídico na passagem da teoria à práxis. Neste ponto o objetivo é compreender os conceitos de razão prática jurídica, Direito e faculdade de coerção para, a partir disso, compreender a aplicabilidade do dever jurídico sob duas óticas distintas, a saber, pela via da metafísica dos costumes e pela via histórico-antropológica da insociável sociabilidade. Por meio da análise destes três pontos, evidenciar-se-á que o dever jurídico, no pensamento de Immanuel Kant, é a necessidade da legalidade como pressuposto inicial para a moralidade, de modo que os homens primeiro se aproximam da legalidade, ao saírem do estado de natureza e entrarem no estado civil, para só depois se aproximarem da moralidade, por meio de um processo de moralização dentro do estado republicano de direito. Neste sentido, o dever jurídico exprime, em nome da moralidade, a necessidade dos homens entrarem no estado civil e, ao mesmo tempo, a necessidade de que tal estado seja republicano, no qual e somente no qual a vontade unificada do povo, que é irresistível, é a promulgadora das leis e fonte de todo o direito público.

Submitted by Nara Lays Domingues Viana Oliveira (naradv) on 2015-08-29T14:56:24Z No. of bitstreams: 1 clorio.pdf: 1569404 bytes, checksum: 1d447767db6e54e17d83dc952781b7af (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-08-29T14:56:24Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 clorio.pdf: 1569404 bytes, checksum: 1d447767db6e54e17d83dc952781b7af (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011 / Nenhuma / A História proporciona, em certa medida, um relato da sociedade na qual se está envolvido no presente. É naquela que está a possibilidade de respostas a certas inquietações, sem que tais respostas transbordem da sua condição de respostas para a de soluções. Mas olhar a História é, com efeito, olhar a tessitura e os vários “textos” que a formam. Os vários “eventos” devem ser considerados nesse contexto. No correr da História, no tempo e no espaço do Ocidente, ela sempre foi vista como uma sucessão de etapas, etapas vistas como mudanças que, por sua vez, decorriam de escolhas e supressões. O posterior, se não moralmente, ideologicamente superior ao anterior. Para essa narrativa ser possível, mister uma estrutura conceitual filosófica que representasse e justificasse os valores envolvidos nas escolhas: a Filosofia. A partir da filosofia grega, constitui-se um esteio justificador que permeou todas as demais instituições, especialmente o Estado e o Direito. Efetivamente as escolha são feitas; o que predomina, porém, jamais se demite da sua experiência anterior, pois não há rigorosamente nada de originário. O evento, seja o Estado, seja o Direito, sempre está vinculado ao contexto. Um contexto de ações, atitudes, de cultura, em um sentido amplo, envolvendo todos os comportamentos, modos de pensar e agir do homem; envolvendo o ethos; isso é o originário. Na dinamização da cultura é que se pode observar o valor das ações. O valor atribuído a elas é o critério usado para se proceder às escolhas e configura, portanto, o núcleo ético-mítico no espaço e no tempo da civilização ocidental. Se desde sempre se está em um mundo de escolhas, desde sempre se está num mundo prático. A Filosofia no entanto, transformada em metafísica, esconde essa questão originária da escolha, ao cindir a razão e subordinando a razão prática à razão teórica, na medida em que esta fornece os elementos estruturais necessários (transcendentes) para a formulação dos juízos. Cindir a razão é uma escolha, vinculada a um modo de agir, a uma atitude, a um ethos. Isso está repercutido na forma como a História é considerada (etapas sucessivas e superiores) e na fundamentação filosófica do Estado e do Direito. O exemplo da Modernidade é eloquente, pois, a pretexto de superar o Medievo, recupera materiais da Antiguidade clássica, sem dar-se conta, no entanto, que o Medievo sequer rompera com a Antiguidade. Assim, é possível olhar a História não na linearidade da sucessão de fases e períodos, mas como um desdobramento cultural em espaço definido. Esse ponto de vista permite identificar nas manifestações políticas (Estado) e jurídicas (Direito) a natureza das escolhas a partir da fundamentação filosófica. Estado e Direito, em que pese serem conquistas (no sentido positivo) da civilização ocidental, conservam a originariedade do ethos civilizatório. O desvelamento é possível a partir da filosofia hermenêutica ou da hermenêutica filosófica. Retirar o véu encobridor das relações, não apenas revela os tantos problemas sociais, deixa implícita uma contradição: mantém-se um discurso que substitui a realidade (o uno) pela aparência (a igualdade entre o uno e outro) e a verdade, com efeito, é entregue à retórica, ao argumento. A hermenêutica filosófica não é normativa, mas apenas por meio dela é que se pode dizer que desde sempre se está na razão prática, desde sempre se faz escolhas, na História e na Linguagem. / History provides, to a certain extent, a report of the society in which it is involved at the present. It is in that which is the possibility of responses to certain concerns, without which such answers exceeds its condition of answers to solutions. But looking at History is, in fact, look at the structure and the various "texts" that forms it. The various "events" should be considered in this context. In the course of History, time and space in the West, it has always been seen as a succession of steps, steps seen as changes which, in its turn, resulted from choices and omissions.The latter, if not morally, ideologically superior to the former. To be possible this narrative, it is necessary a philosophical conceptual framework that could represent and justify the values involved in the choices: Philosophy. From the Greek philosophy, is a mainstay justifier that permeated all the other institutions, especially the State and the Law. Effectively the choices are made; what predominates, however, never resigns from his previous experience, because there is absolutely nothing of originating. The event, being it the State, being it the Law, is always linked to the context. A context of actions, attitudes, culture, in a wide sense involving all behaviors, ways of thinking and acting of the human being, involving the ethos, that is original. In fostering the culture that it is possible to observe the value of the actions. The value assigned to them is the criteria used to make the choices and configures, therefore the ethical and mythical nucleus in both space and time of Western civilization. If since always one is in a world of choices, since always is in a practical world. Philosophy, however, turned into metaphysics, hides this original question of choice, splitting the reason and subordinating practical reason to theoretical reason, in so far as that it provides the necessary structural elements (transcendent) for the formulation of judgments. Split the reason is a choice, linked to a way of acting, to an attitude, to an ethos. This is reflected in the way history is considered (successive and superior stages) and the philosophical foundation of the State and Law. The example of Modernity is eloquent, thus the pretext of overcoming the Medieval period, recovers materials of classical antiquity, without realizing, however, that the Medieval period even broken with the antiquity. Thus, it is possible to look at History not in the linearity of the succession of phases and periods, but as a cultural unfolding in definite space. This point of view allows the identification of the political demonstrations (state) and legal (law) the nature of the choices from the philosophical foundation. State and Law, although being conquests (in the positive sense) of Western civilization, retain the originating of ethos civilization. The unveiling is possible from the hermeneutic philosophy or of philosophical hermeneutics. Remove the veil that covers the relationship, not only reveals the many social problems, but it is implicit a contradiction: it remains a discourse that replaces the reality (the sole one) by the appearance (equality between the one and another) and the truth, indeed, is given to rhetoric, to the argument.The philosophical hermeneutics is not normative, but only through it is possible to say that since one is always in practical reason, one always makes choices, in the History and Language.

No description available.

Le présent travail consiste en une étude de l’œuvre d'Immanuel Kant, avec pour objet la question du passage entre théorique et pratique. En étudiant méticuleusement chacune des étapes du développement de la pensée kantienne, ce travail abouti sur la mise au jour d'un principe fondamental, dit du double mouvement du dualisme et de la réflexion, d'après lequel se structure l'ensemble de la pensée kantienne, mais aussi plus généralement, la possibilité de toute philosophie transcendantale. / Doctorat en Philosophie / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

This thesis examines the viability of the concept of political liberalism. Since its emergence, the idea of a purely political liberalism has been the subject of a voluminous amount of discourse and debate. The concept of political liberalism has been presented as both a solution to the problems of justice and political stability troubling liberal democracies and an exemplar of all that is wrong with contemporary political philosophy; it has, quite literally, altered the landscape and the vernacular of contemporary political theory. Herein it is argued that, despite the significant amount of literature that has been devoted to the analysis of the idea of a purely political liberalism, the idea itself has yet to be subjected to the type of critique that is required if one is to assess its viability effectively. Though there have been a number of contemporary political theorists who have developed conceptions of political liberalism which they believe differ in important ways from those of their doctrinal colleagues, detailed analyses of the concept of political liberalism have and remain focussed almost exclusively on a single formulation: namely, Rawlsian political liberalism. This singular focus has precluded the completion of a comprehensive assessment of the viability of the concept (as opposed to a single conception) of political liberalism as represented both by Rawlsian and non-Rawlsian models. This thesis confronts this problem by expanding the scope of investigation to include a fulsome examination of other prominent paradigmatic conceptions of political liberalism namely, those developed by Charles Larmore and Judith Shklar and in so doing provides a more inclusive and, subsequently, thorough critique than has previously been offered. Adopting such an approach reveals that, despite protestations to the contrary, the prominent paradigmatic conceptions of political liberalism are sufficiently similar in all important respects to enable their conflation for the purpose of analysis; and when subjected to a thorough analysis, the idea of a purely political liberalism proves itself to be untenable. / Political Science / D. Litt. et Phil. (Politics)

L'argomento di questa tesi è una particolare forma di ripresa tedesca dell'etica delle virtù, ad opera di Anselm W. Müller, sorta in quel movimento di rifondazione della filosofia morale che prende il nome di Rehabilitierung der praktischen Philosophie. Una prima parte del lavoro ricostruisce tale contesto, la cui causa è l'esigenza di restituire all'etica la sua capacità di guidare l'azione. Esaminando la filosofia politica e la scuola ermeneutica, è possibile risalire alla loro matrice comune: l'interpretazione heideggeriana di Aristotele. Nel neoaristotelismo pratico si radica, infatti, l'etica delle virtù tedesca (Tugendethik), che si propone come risposta all'impasse della filosofia morale denunciata dalla Rehabilitierung. Vengono evidenziate innanzitutto le differenze rispetto alla più ampia Virtue ethics angloamericana e poi i concetti intorno a cui questo modello di etica si costruisce: la virtù, la saggezza, la vita buona come attuazione di tutte le potenzialità umane realizzata grazie alle virtù; il carattere come struttura costantemente in fieri, modellata da una pratica continua di atti virtuosi o viziosi. L'influsso di ciascuna azione non è rivolto, dunque, verso l'esterno, ma verso l'interno della personalità del soggetto. L'etica delle virtù è, pertanto, un'etica “di prima persona”, concentrata sull'agente, piuttosto che sulle sue singole azioni. / The topic of this Ph. D. thesis is the latest discovery of virtue ethics in Germany, developed in the frame of that moral philosophy Renaissance called Rehabilitierung der praktischen Philosophie. I use as a model the latest Anselm Müller's work. The first part of my work describes this context, whose cause is the requirement of giving back to ethics its ability to lead action. Observing political philosophy and hermeneutic school, we can discover their common origin: Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle's ethics. German virtue ethics (Tugendethik), which is the main topic of the second part, is based on practical Neoaristotelism. Tugendethik can be a possible answer to the difficulty of moral philosophy that Rehabilitierung has shown. At first, I have highlighted the differences from the largest Anglo-American virtue ethics; then I have exposed the main concepts of this ethics model: virtue, wisdom, good life – as total human fulfilment and flourishing, allowed by virtues - and character – as a permanent changing fabric, woven by a continuous practice of virtuous or vicious acts. The main influence of every action is, in fact, not external, but internal: its target is the agent's personality. Therefore virtue ethics is a “first person-ethic”, because it cares more about the person who acts than about his singular actions.

Isaiah Berlin maintains that there are two distinct forms of freedom or liberty: negative and positive. Berlin’s principal claim is that negative liberty does not require that the self be somehow separate from the empirical world (causally aloof, or an originator of causal chains). My principal claim is that to be an agent is to be committed to a separation of self in this sense, thus that the self for its very being requires to possess a species of positive liberty. This conception proceeds in part from Immanuel Kant’s claim that there is a separation between spontaneity and receptivity. Commitment to this assertion allows there to be an understood distinction between the self as a spontaneous self-active agent that makes choices, and the self as a mere reactionary brute that does what it does by biological imperatives. In this thesis, I defend the view that negative liberty is subsumed under positive liberty: you cannot have the former without the latter. I am therefore taking a rationalist stance towards Berlin’s thinking. My methodology is to bring into consideration two perspectives upon the underlying normative principles within the space of reason. The first is of Kant’s understanding of the principle of responsibility and the activity of spontaneity; the second is John McDowell’s understanding of that principle and activity. The key claim of this thesis is that Berlin misunderstands what it is to be a chooser. To be a chooser is to be raised under the idea that one is an efficient cause; human children are brought up being held responsible for their reasons for acting. This principle allows mere animal being to be raised into the space of reason, where we live out a second nature in terms of reason. Using their conclusions I further investigate Berlin’s understanding of conceptual frameworks, taking particular interest in historic ‘universal’ conceptions that shape human lives. He too finds that that we are choosers is necessary for what it is to be human. I take his conclusion, and suggest that if he had had a clear understanding of the space of reason, the historic claim that we have choice would find a more solid footing in the principle of that space, in that we are responsible for our actions. I conclude that the upshot of understanding the ‘I’ as an originating efficient cause is that we treat ourselves as free from a universal determinism that Berlin himself disparages; and that the cost to Berlin is that all choice is necessarily the activity of a higher choosing self. It is part of a Liberal society’s valuing, by their societal commitment to, the ideology of raising our children to understand themselves as choosers, that we have choice at all. This is irrespective of whether that which fetters choice is internal or external to the agent, or of whether having self-conscious itself requires such a cultural emergence of second nature.

Στην εργασία παρουσιάζεται η Θεωρία Δικαίου του Καντ, σε συνδυασμό με την Ηθική και Πολιτική Φιλοσοφία του φιλοσόφου προκειμένου να αναδειχθεί η κοινή θεμελίωσή τους στον ηθικό νόμο που ενυπάρχει στον ανθρώπινο Λόγο και ελευθερία.. Η σύνδεση πολιτικής, δικαίου και ηθικής διατυπώνεται ρητά από τον Καντ, και επίσης υπό την ανάλυση του σύγχρονου φιλοσοφικού στοχασμού (Τίμμονς, Βίλλασεκ, ΜακΝτάουελ) τεκμηριώνεται η ανεξάλειπτη ηθική διάσταση εντός του δικαίου και της πολιτικής μέσα από την πραγμάτευση των σύγχρονων αντιλήψεων, όπως η περιγραφικότητας, η εξωτερικότητα και η επιτακτικότητα, και μέσα από την απόρριψη των επιμέρους θέσεων της ανεξαρτησίας και της εξωτερικότητας του δικαίου. / In this paper, the Kant’s Doctrine of Right is presented in combination with his Moral and Political Philosophy, in order to display; their common foundation on the moral law that prevails on the human Reason and freedom. Kant has explicitly expressed the connection between politics, law and morality, and additionally in the modern philosophical thought (Timmons, Willaschek, McDowell) the ineffaceable moral dimension of right and politics is validated through the modern concepts of descriptivity, externality and prescreptivity, by the refutation of Independence and Externality Theses.

This thesis examines the viability of the concept of political liberalism. Since its emergence, the idea of a purely political liberalism has been the subject of a voluminous amount of discourse and debate. The concept of political liberalism has been presented as both a solution to the problems of justice and political stability troubling liberal democracies and an exemplar of all that is wrong with contemporary political philosophy; it has, quite literally, altered the landscape and the vernacular of contemporary political theory. Herein it is argued that, despite the significant amount of literature that has been devoted to the analysis of the idea of a purely political liberalism, the idea itself has yet to be subjected to the type of critique that is required if one is to assess its viability effectively. Though there have been a number of contemporary political theorists who have developed conceptions of political liberalism which they believe differ in important ways from those of their doctrinal colleagues, detailed analyses of the concept of political liberalism have and remain focussed almost exclusively on a single formulation: namely, Rawlsian political liberalism. This singular focus has precluded the completion of a comprehensive assessment of the viability of the concept (as opposed to a single conception) of political liberalism as represented both by Rawlsian and non-Rawlsian models. This thesis confronts this problem by expanding the scope of investigation to include a fulsome examination of other prominent paradigmatic conceptions of political liberalism namely, those developed by Charles Larmore and Judith Shklar and in so doing provides a more inclusive and, subsequently, thorough critique than has previously been offered. Adopting such an approach reveals that, despite protestations to the contrary, the prominent paradigmatic conceptions of political liberalism are sufficiently similar in all important respects to enable their conflation for the purpose of analysis; and when subjected to a thorough analysis, the idea of a purely political liberalism proves itself to be untenable. / Political Science / D. Litt. et Phil. (Politics)