This research aims to contribute to the knowledge gap about opposition and support parties’ competitive behaviour in minority situations where no party have a majority in the parliament. Two Swedish parties - the Centre Party and the Left Party - will be examined to answer the two overarching research questions. Namely, 1) how does the competitive behaviour of parties vary in relation to a party’s role as a support party or opposition party? And 2) does the result support the cartel party thesis or the model of classic opposition? The competitive behaviour was measured in regards to counter proposals, standpoints and reservations on the governmental propositions. This was done through a quantitative content analysis of committee reports during four terms of office. The results indicate that both parties were more competitive during their time in opposition compared to in support status. This supports the model of classic opposition and rejects the cartel party thesis.

Our study aimed at contributing to the understanding of party policy preferences in Belgium, i.e. how far can we explain the attention that political parties allocate to different policy issues in their electoral manifestos. One of the added values of our study was located in our research design. We reversed the perspective that is used in most of previous works and we used party policy preferences – via the analysis of party manifestos – as a dependent rather than an independent variable. We were not interested in what could be explained by party preferences but in what could actually explain them. In addition, we observed that, in the few works that considered party policy preferences as a dependent variable, party competition was rarely mobilised as an explanatory variable. Our study aimed at contributing to the understanding of the content of party manifestos by confronting the hypothesis of party competition with other possible explanations.<p><p>With the help of new data about party preferences in Belgian party manifestos collected in the framework of the CAP project, we quantitatively analysed the content of all party manifestos between 1977 and 2007 and coded them according policy domains and issues (up to about 250 policy issues and coding categories). Based on the selection of four specific policy issues (environment, decentralisation, migration and morality issues) and on regression analyses (panel data), we hypothesised that party preferences on theses policy issues is best explained by party competition variables.<p><p>Our findings confirmed that party policy preferences are not static but rather that they evolve over time. Party preferences are different over time and space and we aimed at providing clues about what could explain these differences. Based on the literature, a large set of potential explanatory variables has been mobilised in order to explain these differences. But most of these independent variables have no or few impact on party preferences, such as the fractionalisation of the party system or ‘real-world’ indicators. Contrary to previous findings, changes in party manifestos are not explained by the fact that the party grows in size and gets older or by the fact that it wins or loses the elections. Similarly, we observed that party strategies – including party name change and the creation of electoral alliances – had no impact of the content of part manifestos. Even if our bivariate analyses indicated the importance of phenomena related to the government formation and participation, we found out that this effect disappears in multi-variate analyses.<p><p>Still, the introduction of our party competition variables – based on the niche party’s size, electoral fortunes and government participation – provided ambiguous results, depending on the policy issue at stake. Party competition contributes to the understanding of party policy preferences on environment and migration. Nonetheless, our models do not demonstrate an impact of party competition on preferences concerning decentralisation and morality. When controlling for party families, we observe that party competition has a significant impact on party preferences, meaning that political parties react to the electoral strength of a niche party by paying more attention to the niche party’s issue in their manifesto. Finally, the observed impact of party competition on policy preferences concerns certain parties only and the other parties display preferences that appear independent from the existing patterns of party competition. / Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

臺灣縣市議員與縣市長選舉的政黨競爭程度不及中央層級選舉，然而相對於地方首長選舉多數呈現兩黨競爭，地方議員選舉的政黨組成則相對多元，可能是近似縣市長的藍綠對決，也可以是無黨籍遙遙領先其他政黨，或是由單一政黨與無黨籍囊括多數選票，這代表政黨在各地區的議員與縣市長得票存在程度不等的落差。本文即在於尋找能夠解釋議員與縣市長選舉政黨得票連動關係不一的因素，並以「得票差距」及「得票相關程度」測量政黨得票的連動性。結果發現，議員選舉選區規模與議員選舉有效票數（縣市人口規模）等「先天結構因素」與政黨兩項選舉的得票差距具有關聯；除了「先天結構因素」，地方派系與現任議員參選比例等「政黨本身可掌握的因素」同樣與政黨兩項選舉的得票相關程度具有關係。地方派系在地方選舉具有舉足輕重的地位，足以解釋政黨議員與縣市長得票相關程度的變化，不過其與政黨得票差距的關係則未獲得證實，本文推測可能受到派系測量的限制。政黨標籤對地方議員選舉的重要性確實不如縣市長或中央層級選舉，但隨著縣市長選舉的兩黨競爭逐漸滲透至議員選舉，其意義已較以往提升。議員選舉兩黨競爭的出現反映議員選舉政黨化的跡象。 / The party competition is weaker in county/city councilor and county magistrate/city mayoral elections than in central elections in Taiwan. However, Electoral landscape of councilor elections is not the same in districts, rather than competition between two major parties in most county magistrate/city mayoral elections. Some are approximate two-party competition, some are parties lag far behind the independent candidates, others are single party and the independent candidates secure most votes. It indicates that the differences of party votes between county/city councilor and county magistrate/city mayoral elections vary in districts. The study explores the relationship of party votes between county/city councilor and county magistrate/city mayoral elections and uses “difference of party votes” and “correlation of the party votes” to measure the dependent variable. The results show that factors which parties can’t determine have something to do with the difference of party votes between local councilor and magistrate/mayoral elections, such as district magnitude in county/city councilor elections, scale of population in districts. In addition to factors which parties can’t determine, factors which parties can determine also have something to do with correlation of party votes between local councilor and magistrate/mayoral elections, such as local factions, the proportion of incumbent councilors run for another term. Local factions are the pivot of Taiwanese local elections, and can explain the correlation of party votes between local councilor and magistrate/mayoral elections, but the relationship with difference of party votes can’t be verified according to the result of analysis. It could attribute to the measurement of factions. The party label is less important in councilor elections than in county magistrate/city mayoral or central elections, but becomes more meaningful when two-party competition penetrates into councilor elections. The competition between two major parties of councilor elections reflects councilor election towards party competition.

Welche Kommunikationsstrategien benutzen Koalitionsparteien während ihrer Zeit im Amt? Koalitionsparteien stehen vor einem Dilemma, dass sie zwar nach aussen Einheit demonstrieren sollen, sich aber gleichzeitig von ihren Partnern differenzieren müssen. Ich argumentiere, dass politische Kommunikation eine wichtige Rolle dabei spielt, wie Parteien versuchen, ihr individuelles Profil zu erhalten. Dazu habe ich drei Hauptstrategien definiert, die Parteien benutzen können. Basierend auf einem Datensatz von über 35'000 deutschen und niederländischen Pressemitteilungen von Koalitionsparteien analysiere ich, was Parteien in ihrer Strategiewahl beeinflusst. Meine Resultate zeigen, dass Personalisierung, definiert als ein verstärkter Fokus auf Individuen, davon beeinflusst wird, wie stark sich Koalitionsparteien ideologisch unterscheiden. Ich benutze einen supervised classification algorithm, um die deutschen Pressemitteilungen in verschiedene thematische Kategorien zu klassifizieren. Ich nutze diese Klassifizierung um zu analysieren, ob Parteien während dem Wahlkampf einen besonderen Fokus auf die Themen legen, die ihnen wichtig sind. Dies ist nicht der Fall, und meine Analysen zeigen, dass Parteien kurz vor einer Wahl sogar einen geringeren Schwerpunkt auf diese Themen legen, ungeachtet ideologischer Differenzen zwischen ihnen und ihren Koalitionspartnern. Schließlich analysiere ich die Präsenz von negativem Campaigning in deutschen Pressemitteilungen und in einer Auswahl von Episoden einer politischen Talkshow. Im Falle der Pressemitteilungen stelle ich fest, dass die Parteien mit zunehmender Wahrscheinlichkeit "feindlich gesinnte" Politiker erwähnen, je näher die Wahl rückt, und dass diese Erwähnungen mit einem generell negativerem sentiment der betreffenden Pressemitteilungen korrelieren. / What communication strategies do coalition parties use during their time in office? Coalition parties face a dilemma between unity and differentiation, because while they need to keep relations with their partners stable, they also have to keep up constant efforts to differentiate themselves sufficiently from them. I argue that political communication plays a key role in how parties try to maintain a strong individual profile. I have defined three main strategies that parties can use to achieve this. Based on a dataset that contains over 35'000 press releases by German and Dutch coalition parties, I analyze what influences the usage of the three strategies in question. I find that the usage personalization, which is defined as focusing on individual politicians, is affected by the ideological distance between coalition partners. I use a supervised classiffication algorithm to classify the press releases issued by German coalition parties into issue areas to analyze whether parties use election campaigns to emphasize issues that are already important to them. I find that this is not the case, and that parties actually de-emphasize these issues as an election approaches, regardless of ideological distance between them and their partners. Lastly, I analyze the presence of negative campaigning in German press releases and in a selection of episodes from a political talk show. In the case of press releases, I find that parties are more likely to specifically mention hostile politicians as an election approaches, and that these mentions correlate with a more negative sentiment of the press releases in question.

本研究以台灣地區（包括台北市、高雄市與台灣省）為範圍，鄉鎮市區為基本單元，1989年到1995年的立法委員選舉為標的，使用人文區位研究途徑，來分析區域發展與政黨競爭之間的關係。在代表政黨競爭的自變項上，分別以各政黨在立法委員選舉中的得票率競爭程度，以及各政黨的得票率為變數。至於描述區域發展的自變項上，主要可分成兩個部分。橫斷面上由自然區位因素（包括都市化程度、工商業場所單位經營狀況、藍領階級比例、年輕人口比例、外省人口比例），以及政治區位因素（包括決算補助比例、縣市票源凝聚程度、鄉鎮市區票源凝聚程度、縣市地方派系強度虛擬變項、鄉鎮市區派系強度虛擬變項）作為自變項。在縱剖面上，則以時間的虛擬變項作為自變項，以反映長期的影響因素。在以各政黨當屆立委得票率為依變項時，則再加入當屆省市議員與上屆立法委員各政黨的得票率，來測量選舉慣性的影響力。 此外，並分別由區分為三個集群的集群面，以及整體面來進行迴歸分析。 研究結果發現，在各模型中較為重要而顯著的變數都與假設方向一致。其中都市化程度、工商業場所單位經營狀況、年輕人口比例，以及縣市票源凝聚程度會升高政黨競爭程度；而決算補助比、鄉鎮市區票源凝聚程度，以及縣市級地方派系則會減弱政黨競爭程度。都市化程度、工商業場所單位經營狀況，以及縣市票源凝聚程度對國民黨得票率不利，而外省人口比例則由1992年之前的有利，轉向為1995年的不利；但決算補助比例、縣市級地方派系強，以及鄉鎮市區票源凝聚程度都對國民黨得票率有利。都市化程度、工商業場所單位經營狀況以及縣市票源凝聚程度對民進黨得票率有利；而外省人口比例、決算補助比，以及鄉鎮市區票源凝聚程度則對民進黨得票率不利。都市化程度、工商業場所單位經營狀況、外省人口比例，以及年輕人口比例，均對新黨得票率有利；決算補助比、鄉鎮市區票源凝聚程度，以及各級地方派系不論強弱，均對新黨得票率不利。 在合併時間序列的分析上，隨著時間的推演，政黨得票率競爭程度也隨之升高，同時對國民黨得票率愈來愈不利，而對民進黨得票率愈來愈有利。此外不論是對哪一個政黨的得票率來說，選舉慣性因素的影響力都相當顯著。不過不同選舉還是有所不同，以同類型的選舉影響較大。 另一方面，經由對R 值的觀察，我們也發現政治區位因素在多數的情況下，其解釋力會大於自然區位因素。同時區位因素最適合用以解釋新黨的得票率，不過整體而言多數模型都有解釋力愈來愈高的趨勢，顯示近年來區域發展因素對於政黨競爭的解釋力較過去提升不少。 最後，透過區分集群的方式，有助於突顯出特定區域類型，以表現出其中更為強烈或更為微弱的，區域發展與政黨競爭之間的關係。可避免僅就整體面進行分析，使這些集群的特性消失，反倒不易瞭解區域發展與政黨競爭之間的真正關係的缺失。 第一章　緒論 壹、政黨競爭與選舉 貳、台灣的選舉競爭：國民黨的控制與反對黨的興起 參、選舉研究：個體或總體 肆、區域與區域發展 伍、台灣的區域發展：進步但不均衡 陸、區域發展與政黨競爭 第二章 文獻檢閱 壹、區域發展與人文區位指標 貳、選舉競爭與總體資料研究 參、整合性研究的需要 第三章 理論架構與研究方法 壹、研究範圍與內容 貳、研究架構與假設 參、變數建構與資料來源 肆、統計方法 第四章 變數的典型相關與鄉鎮市區的集群分析 壹、典型相關分析 貳、集群分析 參、依變項在整體面與集群面上之觀察 肆、討論與小結 第五章 區域發展因素對政黨競爭的影響－集群面的觀察 壹、第一集群的分析結果 貳、第二集群的分析結果 參、第三集群的分析結果 肆、討論與小結 第六章 區域發展因素對政黨競爭的影響－整體面的觀察 壹、影響政黨得票率競爭程度的區域發展因素研究 貳、影響政黨得票率的區域發展因素研究 參、整體面與集群面的比較 參、討論與小結 第七章 結論 壹、研究回顧與成果 貳、檢討與建議 參考書目 附錄一 國內以人文區位指標進行區域發展研究的相關論文列表 附錄二 國內以人文區位途徑進行選舉研究的相關論文列表 附錄三 各變數之相關係數、平均數與標準差 附錄四 各迴歸分析詳細列表 附錄五 各變數資料 / The thesis is an ecological analysis of competition between major parties (the KMT, DPP, and NP) in the 1989, 1992, and 1995 elections for Taiwan's Legislative Yuan. The unit of analysis is the "Hsiang" (rural township), "Chen" (urban township), "Shih" (county city), or "Ch'u" (precict), and we separate all of the local area units into three clusters to obtain the ecological determinants of the degree of competition between major parties. We explore the relative influence of ecological conditions of local units on the election returns over the six year period. The results of regression analysis indicate that major significant variables are in accordance with theoretical assumptions. Urbanization, development of industry and commerce, high percentage of youth in the population, and high degree of voting consistency in a county can raise the degree of competition between major parties, but a high percentage of the budget from subsidies, law degree of voting consistency in a township, and strong county factions can reduce it. Urbanization, development of industry and commerce, and degree of voting consistency in a county have influence on the percentage of the vote lost by the KMT's candidates, and percentage of the budget from subsidies and strong local county factions influence the percentage of the vote won by the KMT's candidates. A high percentage of mainlanders contributes to the KMT's vote share before 1992, but becomes disadvantageous in 1995. Urbanization, development of industry and commerce, and degree of voting consistency in a county are beneficial to the DPP, but a high percentage of mainlanders, a high percentage of the budget from subsidies, and a high degree of voting consistency in a township are harmful to it. Urbanization, development of industry and commerce, a high percentage of mainlanders, and a high percentage of youth in the population have a positive influence on the NP's vote, but a high percentage of the budget from subsidies, a high degree of voting consistency in a township, and strong local factions have a negative influence towards it. Longitudinal analyses find that the time factor intensifies the degree of competition between major parties in favor of the DPP. Electoral inertia, or the retrospective effects of the last election, has a powerful influence on the vote share of the KMT, DPP, and NP. Also the same type of elections has more influence than different types. Finally, through clusters analyses we can identify various types of groups which reveal various relationships between development of regions and competition between major parties.