A presente dissertação tem por objetivo o estudo da aplicação do princípio da congruência no Processo Individual do Trabalho. Tal princípio caracteriza-se pelo caráter restritivo da atuação judicial, vinculando a prolação de sentença aos limites da lide. A problemática centra-se no entendimento do conceito de lide, ora entendido simplesmente como pedido, ora como a matéria fática e jurídica levada aos autos, permitindo-se ao magistrado conhecer de pedidos não formulados expressamente, desde que os fatos a eles pertinentes tenham sido discutidos nos autos. A partir da Teoria Instrumentalista do Processo, que admite este modo de resolução de conflitos como um meio para a efetividade do Direito Material, buscou-se identificar a possibilidade de flexibilização do princípio da congruência no Processo Individual do Trabalho, tendo em vista que o estudo deste princípio revelou que a doutrina e a jurisprudência civil e trabalhista já permitem sua relativização ou mitigação em determinados casos, em especial quando se trata da aplicação de norma de ordem pública, uma das características do Direito Material do Trabalho. Ademais, considerando as questões linguísticas implicadas na formulação da pretensão da parte e da sentença, foi feita pesquisa jurisprudencial no sítio eletrônico do Tribunal Superior do Trabalho, de modo a identificar as relações hermenêuticas estabelecidas entre o pedido e a decisão final neste tribunal. Para tanto, foram selecionadas 149 decisões em que se discute a existência ou não de julgamento além dos limites da lide, destacando-se os casos em que o tribunal considerou desnecessária a formulação de pedido expresso para a concessão de direito trabalhista / The purpose of this dissertation is to study the use of the Principle of Ne Ultra et Extra Petita in individual labor process. This principle is defined by the restrictive aspect of the acts of the judge, binding the sentence to the matters under dispute. The core discussion lies on the identification of such matters, which can be seen as simply the pleadings expressed by the parties or as all the matters in connection with the facts merely mentioned by them. The latter position would allow the judicial authority to pronounce a sentence addressing additional matters that were not expressly pleaded by the parties. Based on the idea that the due process of law is an instrument to achieve effectiveness of legal commands, on the already accepted exception of this principle when it comes to public order rules, and also on the assumption that labor law is of public order, this dissertation analyzed the possibility of disregarding the Principle of Ne Ultra et Extra Petita in individual labor process in order to enhance the legal award. In addition to the theoretical analysis, a wide research on the website of the superior labor court (Tribunal Superior do Trabalho) was carried out in order to verify the hermeneutical relations between the pleadings and the dispositions of the judicial decision. Bearing such an objective in mind, 149 decisions on the alleged violation of the Principle of Ne Ultra et Extra Petita were selected and analyzed, focusing on those awards in which the court considered irrelevant the existence of an express pleading in order to grant or deny a specific labor right.

Das Verfahren der internationalen ad hoc Strafgerichtshöfe für das ehemalige Jugoslawien und für Ruanda kann als die erste völkerstrafverfahrensrechtliche Ordnung betrachtet werden. Von den Richtern selbst ausgearbeitet und entwickelt, orientierte sich dieses Verfahren ursprünglich sehr an dem angloamerikanischen Strafprozessmodell. Mangels geeigneter Präzedenzfälle und angesichts der vielen Analogiefaktoren zwischen dem innerstaatlichen Strafverfahrensrecht und dem Völkerstrafverfahrensrecht haben sich die Richter -insbesondere während der ersten Tätigkeitsjahre ihrer Gerichtshöfe- öfter auf innerstaatliche Rechtspraxen bei der Anwendung ihrer Verfahrens- und Beweisordnungen bezogen. Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht diese Bezugnahme auf innerstaatliches Recht anhand der Rechtsprechung beider ad hoc Strafgerichtshöfe im Bereich des Beweisrechts. Die Gründe und Formen der Bezugnahme auf innerstaatliches Recht werden zuerst dargestellt und anschließend analysiert. Aus der Untersuchung der Rechtsprechung ergibt sich eine insgesamt unsystematische und pragmatische Nutzung des innerstaatlichen Rechts, welches meistens dazu dient, die für den Einzelfall geeignetste Lösung zu liefern und/ oder die von den Richtern getroffene Entscheidung zu legitimieren. Solch eine Vorgehensweise birgt zweierlei Probleme: Ein Legitimitätsproblem angesichts der Internationalität des Verfahrens der ad hoc Strafgerichtshöfe und ein Problem hinsichtlich der Vorhersehbarkeit der Anwendung ihrer Verfahrens- und Beweisordnungen. Abschließend widmet sich diese Arbeit dementsprechend der Frage nach einer methodischen Herangehensweise, welche zu mehr Legitimität und Vorhersehbarkeit bei der Anwendung der Verfahrensregeln internationaler Strafgerichtshöfe beitragen könnte, und dies abgesehen davon, ob sich die Richter dabei auf externe normative Räume, wie diejenigen innerstaatlicher Rechtsordnungen, beziehen oder nicht. / The procedure of the ad hoc international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda can be regarded as the first set of rules of international criminal procedure. This procedural law, constructed and developed by the judges themselves was primary inspired by the common law approach to criminal proceedings. In the absence of precedents, and given the numerous potential analogies between domestic criminal procedure and international criminal procedure, the judges often referred to domestic legal practices - particularly during the ad hoc tribunals’ first years of activity - when applying rules of procedure and evidence. The present work investigates this reference to domestic law by examining the ad hoc tribunals’ jurisprudence regarding the law of evidence. The reasons for and forms of the reference to domestic law are first presented and then analysed. This study concludes that, on the whole, domestic law is referred to in an unsystematic and pragmatic manner: It is mostly used by the judges in order to provide the most suitable solution for the particular case before them and/ or to legitimate a decision they have already made on the basis of their own procedural rules. Such an approach raises two problems: a legitimacy deficit in regard to the internationality of the ad hoc tribunals’ procedure and a lack of predictability in the application of the rules of procedure and evidence. This study deals therefore finally with the possibility of a methodical approach, which could contribute to more predictability and legitimacy in the application of the procedural rules of international criminal tribunals, regardless of whether or not the judges refer to external normative systems, such as domestic legal orders.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:24:06Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Francis Ted Fernandes.pdf: 853394 bytes, checksum: df350b7125c4dde59f0cbfea3caf57d4 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-12-14 / Determining what legal principals are is an arduous task. The uncertainty peculiar to signs, the ambiguity of the language and the decoding of this legal term, not always performed under scientific criteria, are the first obstacles to be overcome in this endeavor. One way to determine what legal principles are is to analyze their meaning and function according to the understanding of the main schools of legal thought: the school of natural law, positivism and post-positivism. For the school of natural law, principles are values arising from the human reason. Positivism basically presents two conceptions on principles: the first one does not address the issue, since the legal system would be complete, self-sufficient and non-evaluative. The second conception of the positivist school recognizes the principles as bridging standards, which could never be opposed to the law, intended to fill the gaps in the legal system. The vision of positivism on the principles shows that this school of thought sees the legal system as a closed one, whose validity foundation lies in its own standards, which, in turn, are founded on a fundamental standard, which is assumed and not expressed. For this line of thought, any content can be right, being unimportant to question the material morality or immorality of a legal text. The neutrality of positivism in face of the legal content of law has ended up involuntarily legitimizing some arbitrary and totalitarian regimes. The failure of positivism in responding to certain situations has demanded an evolution in legal thinking and codifications, which propitiated an opening of the legal system to values and the consideration of content of what is right. In this new chapter of history, arises the post-positivist thought, which admits the principles as positivized values in the system, true standards that can solve concrete cases, as long as applied with an appropriate methodology. In addition to the standards, applicable to the greatest extent possible, the principles are considered as nuclear commandments of the legal system, which structures this system, granting unity to it, and, also, acting as vectors of interpretation of legal rules. Currently, in Brazil, the principles are also designed as bridging standards by virtue of the application of article 4 of the Law of Introduction to the Standards in Brazilian Law, since they were designed for the positivist school. There are several deviations on the application of legal principles, such as practices consisting in moving away the application of rules to certain concrete cases, under the guise of providing a solution based on principles, an effective expedient without a cohesive method and without justification supported by a solid argumentative process. This practice represents a risk to the typical activity of the Legislative Branch. It is assumed that the interpretation of the law and the resolution of concrete cases based on principles broadens the sphere of indeterminacy to which the interpreter is subjected, but this indeterminacy must be admitted, with a view to achieving the implicit justice claim in the legal system / Determinar o que são os princípios jurídicos é uma tarefa árdua. A imprecisão peculiar dos signos, a ambiguidade da linguagem e a decodificação deste termo jurídico, nem sempre realizada com critérios científicos, são os primeiros obstáculos que devem ser superados nesta empreitada. Uma forma de determinar o que são princípios jurídicos é analisar o seu significado e função de acordo com o entendimento das principais escolas do pensamento jurídico: o jusnaturalismo, o positivismo e o pós-positivismo. Para escola jusnaturalista os princípios são valores decorrentes da razão humana. O positivismo apresenta basicamente duas concepções sobre os princípios: a primeira não aborda o tema, já que o ordenamento jurídico seria completo, autossuficiente e avalorativo. A segunda concepção da escola positivista reconhece os princípios como normas de colmatação, que nunca poderiam se opor à lei, destinadas a preencher lacunas do ordenamento jurídico. A visão do positivismo sobre os princípios demonstra que esta escola do pensamento concebe o sistema jurídico como um sistema fechado, cujo fundamento de validade são suas próprias normas, que, por sua vez, encontram fundamento numa norma fundamental, que é pressuposta e não expressa. Para esta linha do pensamento, qualquer conteúdo pode ser direito, sendo despiciendo o questionamento sobre a moralidade ou imoralidade material de um texto legal. A neutralidade do positivismo para com o conteúdo legal do direito terminou por legitimar, involuntariamente, alguns regimes arbitrários e totalitaristas. A insuficiência do positivismo para dar resposta a determinadas situações exigiu uma evolução no pensamento jurídico e nas codificações, o que propiciou uma abertura do sistema jurídico a valores e à consideração do conteúdo do que é direito. Nessa nova quadra da história surge o pensamento pós-positivista, que admite os princípios como valores positivados no sistema, verdadeiras normas que podem solucionar os casos concretos, desde que aplicadas com uma metodologia adequada. Além de normas, aplicáveis na maior medida do possível, os princípios são considerados como mandamentos nucleares do sistema jurídico, que estruturam este sistema, conferindo unidade a ele e, ainda, atuando como vetores de interpretação das regras jurídicas. Atualmente, no Brasil, os princípios também são concebidos como normas de colmatação, por força da aplicação do artigo 4º da Lei de Introdução às Normas do Direito Brasileiro, como eram concebidos para escola positivista. Existem vários desvios na aplicação dos princípios jurídicos, como as práticas consistentes em afastar a aplicação das regras a determinados casos concretos, sob o pretexto de se dar uma solução com base em princípios, expediente efetivado sem um método coeso e sem justificativa lastreada num processo argumentativo sólido. Esta prática representa um risco à atividade típica do Poder Legislativo. Admite-se que a interpretação do direito e a solução de casos concretos, com base em princípios, amplia a esfera de indeterminação a que se sujeita ao intérprete, mas esta indeterminação deve ser admitida, com vistas a alcançar a pretensão de justiça implícita no ordenamento jurídico

The purpose of this paper is to glimpse as the Tax Law is inserted in the unit of general law, being important for understanding the knowledge of public and private law in general.In the second part of the paper, the author analyzes how private law applies to the financial subsidiary way through forwarding making the tax law itself or by express provision of the civil. He emphasizes in this introduction as dogmatic construction of the tax liability, originated and rationale in civil liability.Finally the author explains how general principles of law necessarily apply to financial law. Thus, the principles of good faith, breach of law, and the doctrine of estoppel, are universal principles applicable to every right and inexcusably financial and tax law. / El presente artículo busca vislumbrar cómo el Derecho Financiero y Tributario está inserto en la unidad del Derecho en general, resultando importante para su comprensión el conocimiento del Derecho Público y Privado. Por ello, el autor analiza cómo se aplica en forma subsidiaria el Derecho Privado al Derecho Financiero a través del reenvío que realiza la propia legislación fiscal o por disposición expresa de la civil. Destacamos en esta introducción cómo la construcción dogmática de la obligación tributaria tuvo su origen y razón de ser en la de la obligación civil.Finalmente el autor explica cómo los Principios Generales del Derecho necesariamente se aplican al Derecho Financiero. Así, los principios de buena fe, abuso del derecho, y la doctrina de los actos propios, son principios universales aplicables a todo el Derecho e inexcusablemente al Derecho Financiero y Tributario.

A presente dissertação tem por objetivo o estudo da aplicação do princípio da congruência no Processo Individual do Trabalho. Tal princípio caracteriza-se pelo caráter restritivo da atuação judicial, vinculando a prolação de sentença aos limites da lide. A problemática centra-se no entendimento do conceito de lide, ora entendido simplesmente como pedido, ora como a matéria fática e jurídica levada aos autos, permitindo-se ao magistrado conhecer de pedidos não formulados expressamente, desde que os fatos a eles pertinentes tenham sido discutidos nos autos. A partir da Teoria Instrumentalista do Processo, que admite este modo de resolução de conflitos como um meio para a efetividade do Direito Material, buscou-se identificar a possibilidade de flexibilização do princípio da congruência no Processo Individual do Trabalho, tendo em vista que o estudo deste princípio revelou que a doutrina e a jurisprudência civil e trabalhista já permitem sua relativização ou mitigação em determinados casos, em especial quando se trata da aplicação de norma de ordem pública, uma das características do Direito Material do Trabalho. Ademais, considerando as questões linguísticas implicadas na formulação da pretensão da parte e da sentença, foi feita pesquisa jurisprudencial no sítio eletrônico do Tribunal Superior do Trabalho, de modo a identificar as relações hermenêuticas estabelecidas entre o pedido e a decisão final neste tribunal. Para tanto, foram selecionadas 149 decisões em que se discute a existência ou não de julgamento além dos limites da lide, destacando-se os casos em que o tribunal considerou desnecessária a formulação de pedido expresso para a concessão de direito trabalhista / The purpose of this dissertation is to study the use of the Principle of Ne Ultra et Extra Petita in individual labor process. This principle is defined by the restrictive aspect of the acts of the judge, binding the sentence to the matters under dispute. The core discussion lies on the identification of such matters, which can be seen as simply the pleadings expressed by the parties or as all the matters in connection with the facts merely mentioned by them. The latter position would allow the judicial authority to pronounce a sentence addressing additional matters that were not expressly pleaded by the parties. Based on the idea that the due process of law is an instrument to achieve effectiveness of legal commands, on the already accepted exception of this principle when it comes to public order rules, and also on the assumption that labor law is of public order, this dissertation analyzed the possibility of disregarding the Principle of Ne Ultra et Extra Petita in individual labor process in order to enhance the legal award. In addition to the theoretical analysis, a wide research on the website of the superior labor court (Tribunal Superior do Trabalho) was carried out in order to verify the hermeneutical relations between the pleadings and the dispositions of the judicial decision. Bearing such an objective in mind, 149 decisions on the alleged violation of the Principle of Ne Ultra et Extra Petita were selected and analyzed, focusing on those awards in which the court considered irrelevant the existence of an express pleading in order to grant or deny a specific labor right.

La common law et le droit civil sont les principaux systèmes de droit dans le monde et la vente de marchandises est le contrat le plus important. La vente de marchandises a été soumise à la loi anglaise et au droit civil, indistinctement, ce qui a parfois posé des problèmes, suite à des approximations différentes en fonction de certains principes et institutions. La Convention de Vienne du 11 avril 1980 sur la vente internationale de marchandises a essayé d'harmoniser ces différences avec une technique codificatrice, typique du droit civil, en privilégiant des règles de droit civil le plus souvent, mais a aussi introduit des institutions de la common law, qui ne sont pas incompatibles avec le droit civil, comme nous le verrons. Les principes généraux du système de droit civil et les principes d'Unidroit aident à ce but d'harmonisation en intégrant les dispositions de la Convention de Vienne de 1980, et même, lors de la phase interprétative. La force de la codification s'impose par rapport à la common law, en donnant ainsi certitude et sophistication législative à ce sujet, dont l'importance est capitale pour le commerce mondial. / Common Law and Civil Law are the main legal systems in the world and the sale of goods is the most important contract. Sales of goods have been ruled either by English Law or Civil Law, which has posed problems sometimes due to different approaches regarding certain principles and institutions. The 11th April 1980 Vienna Convention on international sale of goods tried to harmonise these differences with a codification technique, typical of Civil Law, giving privilege to rules of Civil Law most of the time but also introducing institutions from Common Law, that are not incompatible with Civil Law, as we will see. The general principles of Civil Law and Unidroit principles help with this harmonisation goal, integrating the rules of the CISG and also with the interpretation phase. The power of codification prevails over Common Law, giving certitude and sophistication to this matter, which is vital for global commerce.

"Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de Maîtrise en droit - option recherche(LL.M)" / Ce mémoire traite de la contribution du Tribunal pénal international pour l'ex-Yougoslavie (« TPIY ») au développement des sources formelles du droit international public. Il considère, plus précisément, le dilemme normatif entre le droit international classique, polarisé sur l'État et « résorbé» dans une juridicité formelle, et le «droit de l'unité substantiel », codifiant le mythe kantien de la paix par le droit et associant juridicité et légitimité par une intégration de l'éthique dans le droit. L'analyse postule la rétroaction du droit sur ses sources et étudie les courants idéologiques du droit international contemporain à partir de la jurisprudence du TPIY. Le mémoire conclut à une rupture entre le discours rhétorique du TPIY sur les sources, se réclamant du droit international classique, davantage compatible avec le principe de légalité, et les pratiques normatives effectives du Tribunal, ressemblant à un jusnaturalisme moderne, fondé sur des valeurs morales et éthiques. / This thesis studies the contribution by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former- Yugoslavia ("ICTY") to the development of Public International Law. Specifically, it analyses the normative dilemma between sources ofClassic International Law - correlated to the will ofStates, as wel/ as legal formalism - and the "International law ofsubstantial unity" - which codifies the Kantian myth of ''peace by law" and moves the classic idea of legality from formalism to legitimacy by using ethical references. The analysis assumes Law's retroactive effect on its sources and considers ideological movements of Contemporary International Law in the jurisprudence of the ICTY. The thesis concludes to a clash between ICTYabstractfindings related to sources ofInternationallaw and the actual "day-by-day" normative practices ofthe Tribunal. While the first brings into play Classic International Law and the rule of law, the second looks more like a neo-naturalism, fashioned by moral and ethical values.

C’est par un regard systémique que sont abordés dans cette étude les rapports entre les ordres juridiques européens, Union européenne et Conseil de l’Europe, et les ordres juridiques nationaux sur le terrain spécifique de la protection des droits fondamentaux. L’ensemble des interactions a atteint un degré de sophistication tel qu’il est devenu difficile d’organiser leur analyse. L’approche par l’identification d’un système européen de protection des droits fondamentaux permet de dégager des règles, qui se présentent comme des effets de ce systèmes pour les ordres juridiques précités. Ainsi, la présomption de protection équivalente entre les droits fondamentaux est envisagée comme un élément déclencheur, formalisant les interactions entre les ordres juridiques dans un système. Celui-ci fonctionne grâce aux principes de subsidiarité, de proportionnalité et de sécurité juridique. Ces trois principes sont les règles du système, révélées par le regard englobant du système. Dans l’ensemble, il apparaît que l’adhésion de l’Union européenne à la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme serait pertinente mais ne représente pas une étape indispensable. En revanche, il serait souhaitable d’avancer vers une harmonisation matérielle plus poussée, qui pourrait être réalisée par les juges européens. Il suffirait d’élaborer des notions européennes communes et des obligations positives identiques à la charge des États, afin d’assurer une protection effective des droits fondamentaux. / The relationship between the two european legal order, the European Union and the Council of Europe, and national legal orders is analysed through a systemic vision, on the specific field of protection of Fundamental rights. Their relation has become so intense that it is hard to organise a study about them. That is why the systemic approach helps consider those relations as a whole. The first step, that shifts the interaction between the legal orders mentioned into a system is the presumption of equivalent protection. Follows the discovery of the rules of the system, that are also an effect of this system. More precisly, the rules are the principle of subsidiarity, proportionality and legal certainty. It appears that there is no need for the European Union to acceed to the European Convention of Human Rights, even if it would make the legal relation easier. However, it could be useful for the effectiveness of Fundamental Rights to deepen the substantial harmonisation between the european legal orders through the identification by the judges of european autonomous concept and common positive human rights obligations.

Le Tribunal arbitral du sport (TAS), organe de résolution des litiges sportifs par la voie de l’arbitrage, rend des sentences qui, grâce à la pratique du précédent, acquièrent la cohérence nécessaire à la formation d’une jurisprudence. À travers cette jurisprudence, le TAS contribue à l’édification d’un ordre juridique sportif global et autonome. Cette contribution est le résultat d’un double apport, normatif et structurant. D’abord, les règles prétoriennes produites par le TAS et formées essentiellement des principes généraux constamment appliqués par les arbitres, constituent une source de droit à l’intérieur de l’ordre juridique sportif. Certains de ces principes, principalement ceux permettant de protéger la sincérité des compétitions et les droits fondamentaux des athlètes, se démarquent par leur caractère intangible pour former l’ordre public sportif. La mise à l’écart du droit étatique au profit de l’application de ces principes, mais aussi des règlements sportifs, permet d’assurer l’autonomie de l’ordre juridique sportif. Ensuite, ces principes sont un facteur de structuration de l’ordre juridique sportif, dans la mesure où leur intervention favorise la cohérence du système. Cette structuration est le résultat de l’application de ces principes pour contrôler l’exercice par les organisations sportives de leurs compétences réglementaires et disciplinaires et pour délimiter les pouvoirs de chacune des composantes du mouvement sportif. Dans les deux cas, ces principes deviennent des standards communs qui s’imposent à l’ensemble de la communauté sportive / The Court of arbitration for sport (CAS), an arbitration body in sport disputes, passes sentences which, thanks to the practice of the precedent, get enough coherence to constitute a jurisprudence. Through this jurisprudence, CAS contributes in the erection of a global and autonomous sports legal order. This support is the result of a double contribution, normative as well as structuring. First, the pretorian rules generated by CAS and formed mainly by the general principles commonly applied by the judges, constitute a source of law within the sports legal order. Some of these principles, namely those aimed at protecting the fairness of the competitions and the fundamental rights of athletes, stand out with regards to their intangibility to form the sport public order. Discarding state law in favor of the application of these principles as well as of sport regulations, guarantees the autonomy of the sports legal order. Thereafter, these principles are considered as a structuring factor of the sports legal order, in that their intervention favors the coherence of the system. This structuring results from the application of these principles in order to monitor the practices by the sport organizations of their regulatory and disciplinary competences and also to confine the power of each of the components of the sport movement. In both cases, these principles become common standards for the whole sport community to abide by

Ce mémoire traite de la contribution du Tribunal pénal international pour l'ex-Yougoslavie (« TPIY ») au développement des sources formelles du droit international public. Il considère, plus précisément, le dilemme normatif entre le droit international classique, polarisé sur l'État et « résorbé» dans une juridicité formelle, et le «droit de l'unité substantiel », codifiant le mythe kantien de la paix par le droit et associant juridicité et légitimité par une intégration de l'éthique dans le droit. L'analyse postule la rétroaction du droit sur ses sources et étudie les courants idéologiques du droit international contemporain à partir de la jurisprudence du TPIY. Le mémoire conclut à une rupture entre le discours rhétorique du TPIY sur les sources, se réclamant du droit international classique, davantage compatible avec le principe de légalité, et les pratiques normatives effectives du Tribunal, ressemblant à un jusnaturalisme moderne, fondé sur des valeurs morales et éthiques. / This thesis studies the contribution by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former- Yugoslavia ("ICTY") to the development of Public International Law. Specifically, it analyses the normative dilemma between sources ofClassic International Law - correlated to the will ofStates, as wel/ as legal formalism - and the "International law ofsubstantial unity" - which codifies the Kantian myth of ''peace by law" and moves the classic idea of legality from formalism to legitimacy by using ethical references. The analysis assumes Law's retroactive effect on its sources and considers ideological movements of Contemporary International Law in the jurisprudence of the ICTY. The thesis concludes to a clash between ICTYabstractfindings related to sources ofInternationallaw and the actual "day-by-day" normative practices ofthe Tribunal. While the first brings into play Classic International Law and the rule of law, the second looks more like a neo-naturalism, fashioned by moral and ethical values. / "Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de Maîtrise en droit - option recherche(LL.M)"