The importance of protecting artistic works and promoting the creation of new works has been well established since the inception of United States Constitution. Copyright protections were created by Congress to grant authors exclusive rights over how their works are used and any violation of these rights is copyright infringement. This paper outlines why the use of copyrighted material to train generative artificial intelligence (A.I.) systems is an infringement upon the rights of the author and not an exception under fair use. While no court decisions have been rendered on this legal issue, this paper utilizes previous court decisions in Authors Guild v. Google, Inc. (2015), Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. National Enterprises (1985), and Hachette v. Internet Archive (2015) to illustrate how the use of copyrighted material to train generative A.I. systems are an infringement and not an exception under fair use. This is a key point to establish as generative A.I. systems continue to be developed, and artists’ works are being used unfairly and without compensation. Creativity and innovation should be encouraged - but not at the expense of the rights of artists. Therefore, this paper suggests that laws be implemented that protect artists’ work while still allowing space for the development of generative A.I. programs.

Thesis (LLD)--Stellenbosch University, 2000. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This dissertation is an attempt at reconciling the existing (and until recently predominant) private law concept of ownership and the property rights espoused by the new constitutional order. The attempts at land reform in South Africa and Germany are used as specifie examples of the manner in which the whole property law order in both these legal systems is developed through legislative and judicial initiative, on the basis of the constitutional provisions concerning property protection and regulation. The purpose of the investigation is to determine to what extent constitutional development of the private law of property will result in a property law order serving the socio-economic and political goals of economic growth and self-fulfilment and empowerment of the individual. Focus is placed on the influence of the constitutional protection and regulation of property as a mechanism for developing the private law of ownership in Germany and South Africa. In the first part of the exposition, the choice of legal comparison as course of inquiry is substantiated, and the terminological difficulties connected with an investigation into the development of the private law of property by the constitutional protection and regulation of property are discussed. Attention is given to the use of the terms "ownership" and "property" in the private law and in the constitutional context. The term "tenure" is also discussed in the context of land reform in South Africa. Further, the usc of terms such as "public interest", "common weal" and "public purposes" is discussed. The use of these terms are particularly complicated by the fact that each of them are often used in more than one sense, and that the use of these di fferent terms overlap to varying extents. The second part of the exposition contains information on the background of the constitutional property orders as they arc found in Germany and South Africa. The drafting histories of the South African and German constitutional property clauses indicate that in both these legal systems, the constitutional property clauses have hybrid ideological foundations. Both contain a compromise between, on the one hand, classical liberalism (which affords the holders of rights a high degree of individual freedom and autonomy) and, on the other hand, social democracy (which allow stronger regulatory measures, also upon private properly). Further, some of the structural aspects connected to constitutional protection and regulation of property in Germany and South Africa are discussed. The positively phrased property guarantee in art 14 GG is compared with the negatively phrased "guarantee" of s 25 Fe, whereby the transitional property guarantee in s 28 JC is also considered. Further, the basic structure and stages of an inquiry into the constitutional property clause are discussed, with reference to differences between the German and South African methods. These differences are not of such a nature that it excludes further comparison. Ilowever, it is necessary to keep the differences in the judicial system in mind when conducting a comparison of the present nature. Therefore, a brief overview of the judicial systems of Germany and South Africa is provided, with specific reference to the manner in which the courts resolved certain property questions. The principles underlying the constitutional orders of Germany and South Africa are also discussed with specific reference to their significance for the treatment of property issues. In particular, the meaning of the constitutional state (Rechtsstaat) and the social wei fare state (Sozialstaat) for the solution of problems connected to property is discussed. It is indicated that the legitimacy of the legal order in general and property law in particular, depends on the degree of success in the implementation of these values. Further, it is indicated that the implementation of these values also determines the importance of private property and/or regulation thereof in a specific legal system. In the third part of the exposition, the relevance of the constitutional protection and regulation for the private law of ownership is discussed. The expansion of the concept of property by the application of a "purely" constitutional definition thereof raises the question as to the continued relevance of the private law concept of ownership. This issue is discussed with reference to the protection of property in terms of the constitution in comparison with the scope of property in private law. It is indicated that the "exclusively constitutional" concept of property is by no means based only on Constitutional law. The role of the private law concept of ownership in a constitutional order is then elucidated. The discussion then turns to an analysis of the limitations on property endorsed by the constitutional order. Two main kinds of limitation are possible: (i) limitation of property through vertical operation of the constitution (ie a broad category of legislative and administrative deprivation (regulation), and a more specialised category, namely expropriations), and (ii) limitation through horizontal operation of the constitution (ie through the inroads allowed on property rights by the protection of other rights in the Bill of Rights). It is indicated that the application of the public interest / public purposes requirements are sometimes intended to protect individual interest above those of society in general. In other cases, the public interest / public purposes requirement is aimed at securing the interests of the society at large. Further, it is indicated that the purpose of constitutional "interference" in the area of private property law is to correct imbalances in the relations among private persons which are regarded by the law as "equals," even if they are not equal for all practical purposes. The fourth part of the exposition concentrates on the land reform programmes in Germany (after the reunification of 1990) and South Africa (since 1991) in order to analyse the attempts by the legislature and judiciary to give effect to the improved property order as anticipated by constitutional development of property. In both Germany and South Africa political changes made land reform programmes essential: In South Africa the land reform programme was introduced to reverse the injustices created by colonialism and apartheid. A tripartite programme is employed for this purpose. The new kinds of land rights created through this system of land reform are indicated. The manner in which this body of law is treated by the courts is also analysed with reference to its relevance for the development of Property Law in general. In Germany a property and land reform programme became necessary with the reunification. On the one hand, the socialist property order in the former GDR had to be replaced by the property order already existing in the FGR, and on the other hand the individual claims for restitution of the land and enterprises taken by the GDR state or its Soviet predecessor had to be balanced against the claims that present occupiers of such land have to it. The influence of legislation and litigation connected to these issues on the development of Property Law is discussed. The final part of the exposition is a summary of the conclusions drawn during the course of the analysis. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: In 'n poging om in hierdie uiteensetting die bestaande (en tot onlangs nog oorheersende) privaatregtelike begrip "eiendom" te versoen met die breër eiendomsbegrip wat deur die nuwe grondwetlike bestel gepropageer word, word die grondhervormingsprogramme in Suid Afrika en Duitsland gebruik as voorbeelde van die wyse waarop die bestaande Eiendomsreg in beide regsisteme deur die wetgewer en die howe ontwikkel word. Die doel van die ondersoek is om vas te stel tot watter mate die grondwetlike ontwikkeling van privaatregtelike Eiendomsreg sal bydra tot die totstandkoming van 'n eiendomsregtelike regsorde waarin die sosio-ekonomiese en politieke doelwitte van ekonomiese groei en die vrye ontwikkeling en bemagtiging van die individu gedien word. Die klem word geplaas op die grondwetlike beskerming en regulering van eiendom as 'n meganisme waardeur die privaatregtelike Eiendomsreg in Duitsland en Suid- Afrika ontwikkel kan word. Die eerste deel van die uiteensetting begrond die keuse van regsvergelying as metode van analise en bespreek die terminologiese probleme wat in 'n ondersoek na die grondwetlike ontwikkeling van die privaatregtelike eiendomsreg kan opduik. Aandag word gegee aan die gebruik van begrippe wat verband hou met eiendom en publieke belang in sowel die privaatreg as in die grondwetlike konteks. Die gebruik van verskillende terme, veral in Engels, kan problematies wees, en daarom word dit breedvoeriger bespreek. In die tweede deel van die uiteensetting word die agtergrond waarteen die grondwetlike bestelle van Duitsland en Suid-Afrika funksioneer, bespreek: Eers word die formulering van die eiendomsklousules in Suid-Afrika en Duitsland vanuit 'n historiese perspektief ondersoek. In beide regsisteme is die grondwetlike eiendomsklousules op 'n kompromis tussen verskillende ideologieë gebaseer. Enersyds op klassieke liberalisme, in terme waarvan eienaars en ander reghebbendes 'n hoë mate van individuele vryheid en outonomie toegeken word; andersyds op sosiaal-demokratiese denke, in terme waarvan strenger regulerende maatreëls (ook op privaat eiendom) geduld moet word. Dan word sommige van die strukturele aspekte verbonde aan die grondwetlike beskerming en regulering van eiendom in Duitsland en Suid-Afrika bespreek. Die positief geformuleerde eiendomswaarborg in art 14 GG word vergelyk met die negatiewe formulering in art 25 FG en die positiewe waarborg in art 28 lG. Verder word die basiese struktuur en fases van 'n grondwetlike ondersoek in die beskerming en regulering van eiendom bespreek, met spesifieke verwysing na die verskille in die Duitse en Suid-Afrikaanse benaderings. Hierdie verskille is nie van so 'n aard dat dit regsvergelyking kortwiek nie. Nogtans is dit noodsaaklik dat die benaderingsverskille in ag geneem word vir 'n meer diepgaande vergelyking. Daarom word 'n vlugtige oorsig oor die rol van die howe in die hantering van eiendomsvraagstukke in grondwetlike konteks verskaf. Verder word die beginsels onderliggend aan die grondwetlike bestelle in Duitsland en Suid-Afrika bespreek met spesifieke verwysing na die betekenis daarvan vir die beskerming en regulering van eiendom. Daar word veral klem gelê op die regstaat- en sosiaalstaatbeginsels. Die legitimi teit van die regsorde in die algemeen, en meer spesifiek die Eiendomsreg, hang af van die mate van sukses waarmee hierdie beginsels in die gemeenskap geïmplementeer word. Daar word verder aangedui dat die toepassing van hierdie beginsels die mate van individuele vryheid in die uitoefening van eiendomsreg en/of die graad van regulering van eiendomsreg in 'n bepaalde regstelsel bepaal. Die derde deel van die uiteensetting konsentreer op die betekenis van die grondwetlike beskerming en regulering van eiendom vir die privaatregtelike Eiendomsreg. Die uitgebreide eiendomsbegrip wat in die grondwetlike konteks aangewend word, gee aanleiding tot die vraag na die sin van 'n voortgesette enger eiendomsbegrip in die privaatreg. Hierdie kwessie word bespreek met verwysing na die beskerming van eiendom in terme van die grondwet, en word vergelyk met die omvang van die eiendomsbegrip in die privaatreg. Daar word aangedui dat die sogenaamde uitsluitlik grondwetlike eiendomsbegrip geensins eksklusief aan die Grondwetlike Reg is nie. Die rol van die privaatregtelike eiendomsbegrip in 'n grondwetlike bestel word vervolgens uiteengesit. Verder word die beperkings op eiendom in die grondwetlike konteks geanaliseer. In beginsel is twee soorte beperkings regverdigbaar: (i) Beperking van eiendomsreg deur die vertikale aanwending van die grondwet, dit wil sê deur die breër kategorie wetgewende en administratiewe ontnemings (regulerings) van eiendomsreg en deur 'n enger en meer spesifieke kategorie, naamlik onteiening; en (ii) beperking van eiendomsreg deur horisontale aanwending van die grondwet, dit wil sê deur die inbreuk op eiendomsregte wat toegelaat word as gevolg van die uitwerking van die beskerming van ander regte in die Handves vir Menseregte. Daar word aangedui dat die vereiste van publieke belang in twee teenoorstaande opsigte gebruik word: Enersyds om die individuele belang bo dié van die gemeenskap te stel, en andersyds om die gemeenskap se belange as sulks te beskerm. Daar word ook aangedui dat grondwetlike "inmenging" met privaatregtelike eiendomsreg daarop gemik is om ongebalanseerdhede in die regsverhoudings tussen persone wat deur die reg as "gelykes" bejeën word en in effek nie gelyk is nie, uit te skakel. In die vierde deel van die uiteensetting word die grondhervormingsprogramrne in Duitsland (sedert hervereniging in 1990) en Suid-Afrika (sedert 1991) bespreek. Die klem val op die pogings van die wetgewer en howe om die verbeterde eiendomsbestel, soos wat dit in die grondwet in die vooruitsig gestel word, te konkretiseer. In beide regstelsels het politieke veranderinge 'n grondhervormingsprogram onontbeerlik gemaak: Die grondhervormingsprogram in Suid-Afrika het ten doelom die ongeregtighede in die grondbesitstelsel wat ontstaan het as gevolg van kolonialisme en apartheid uit te skakel. Vir dié doel berus die grondhervormingsprogram op drie verwante, maar uiteenlopende, beginsels. Die nuwe vorme van grondregte wat uit hierdie sisteem ontstaan, word aangedui, en die wyse waarop hierdie deel van die reg deur die howe hanteer word, word bespreek met verwysing na die betekenis daarvan vir die ontwikkeling van die Eiendomsreg. In Duitsland is die noodwendigheid van 'n grondhervormingsprogram aan die hervereniging van die DDR en die BRD gekoppel. Die sosialisties-georienteerde eiendomsbestel wat in die "oostelike" deel van Duitsland aanwending gevind het, moes vervang word deur die bestel wat reeds in die "westelike" deel van die "nuwe" staat in werking was. Verder moet die grondeise van persone wat grond of besigheidseiendom verloor het gedurende die sosialistiese regeringstyd en die voorafgaande Sowjetiese besetting, opgeweeg word teen die aansprake wat huidige besitters op sulke grond het. Die invloed van wetgewing en regspraak hieroor op die Eiendomsreg word geanaliseer. Die laaste deel van die uiteensetting bevat 'n samevatting van die gevolgtrekkings wat deur die loop van die analise gemaak is.

Thesis (LLM (Public Law))--University of Stellenbosch, 2009. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The 1996 Constitution provides in s 25(7) that individuals and communities who had been dispossessed of rights in land after 19 June 1913, as a result of past discriminatory laws, may claim restitution or equitable redress. The Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994 reiterates the 1913 cut-off date for restitution claims. The cut-off date appears to preclude pre-1913 land dispossessions. Various reasons are cited for this date, the most obvious being that it reflects the date on which the Black Land Act came into effect. The Richtersveld and Popela decisions of the lower courts appear to confirm the view that historically based land claims for dispossessions that occurred prior to 1913 are excluded from the restitution process. In Australia and Canada restitution orders have been made possible by the judicially crafted doctrine of aboriginal land rights. However, historical restitution claims based on this doctrine are constrained by the assumption that the Crown, in establishing title during colonisation, extinguished all existing titles to land. This would have meant that the indigenous proprietary systems would have been lost irrevocably through colonisation. In seeking to overcome the sovereignty issue, Australian and Canadian courts have distinguished between the loss of sovereignty and the loss of title to land. In this way, the sovereignty of the Crown is left intact while restitution orders are rendered possible. South African courts do not have to grapple with the sovereignty issue since post-apartheid legislation authorises the land restitution process. The appeal decisions in Richtersveld and Popela recognised that some use rights survived the colonial dispossession of ownership. This surviving right was later the subject of a second dispossession under apartheid. By using this construction, which is not unlike the logic of the doctrine of aboriginal title in fragmenting proprietary interests, the second dispossession could then be said to meet the 1913 cut-off date, so that all historically based land claims are not necessarily excluded by the 1913 cut-off date. However, it is still possible that some pre-1913 dispossessions could not be brought under the umbrella of the Richtersveld and Popela construction, and the question whether historically based restitution claims are possible despite the 1913 cut-off date will resurface, especially if the claimants are not accommodated in the government’s land redistribution programme / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die 1996 Grondwet bepaal in a 25(7) dat individue en gemeenskappe wat na 19 Junie 1913 van ‘n reg in grond ontneem is, as gevolg van rasgebaseerde wetgewing en praktyke, geregtig is om herstel van sodanige regte of gelykwaardige vergoeding te eis. Die Wet op Herstel van Grondregte 22 van 1994herhaal die 1913-afsnydatum vir grondeise. Dit lyk dus asof die afsnydatum die ontneming van grond voor 1913 uitsluit. Verskeie redes word vir hierdie datum aangevoer, waarvan die bekendste is dat dit die datum is waarop die Swart Grond Wet in werking getree het. Dit beslissing van die laer howe in beide die Richtersveld- en die Popela-beslissings bevestig blykbaar dat ontneming van grond of regte in grond voor 1913 van die restitusie-proses uitgesluit word. In Australië en Kanada is restitusiebevele moontlik gemaak deur die leerstuk van inheemse grondregte. Historiese restitusie-eise in hierdie jurisdiksies word egter aan bande gelê deur die veronderstelling dat die Kroon, deur die vestiging van titel gedurende kolonialisering, alle vorige titels op die grond uitgewis het. Dit sou beteken dat die inheemsregtelike grondregsisteme onherroeplik verlore geraak het deur kolonialisering. Ten einde die soewereiniteitsprobleem te oorkom het die Australiese en Kanadese howe onderskei tussen die verlies van soewereiniteit en die verlies van titel tot die grond. Op hierdie wyse word die soewereiniteit van die Kroon onaangeraak gelaat terwyl restitusiebevele steeds ‘n moontlikheid is. Suid-Afrikaanse howe het nie nodig gehad om die soewereiniteitskwessie aan te spreek nie omdat post-apartheid wetgewing die herstel van grondregte magtig. Die appélbeslissings in Richtersveld en Popela erken dat sekere gebruiksregte die koloniale ontneming van eiendom oorleef het. Die oorblywende gebruiksregte is later ‘n tweede keer ontneem as gevolg van apartheid. Deur gebruikmaking van hierdie konstruksie, wat dieselfde logika volg as die leerstuk van inheemsregtelike regte en berus op fragmentasie van eiendomsaansprake, kan gesê word dat die tweede ontneming van grond wel binne die 1913-afsnydatum val. Gevolglik sal alle historiese restitusie-eise nie noodwendig deur die 1913- afsnydatum uitgesluit word nie. Dit is steeds moontlik dat sommige pre-1913 ontnemings nooit onder die vaandel van die Richtersveld- en Popela-beslissings gebring sal kan word nie, en die vraag of histories gebaseerde eise moontlik is ongeag die 1913-afsnydatum sal daarom weer opduik, veral indien die grondeisers nie geakkommodeer word in die grondherverdelingsprogram van die staat nie.

This study analyses the treatment of Islamic law (Fiqh) under the English legal system by looking into the developments in waqf law in British India. It has the dual objective of analysing the impact of the English legal system upon Islamic law, and determining the role of various actors in this process. It argues that waqf law was transformed in order to fit into the state structure. The colonial state used the techniques of translation, adjudication, legislation and teaching in order to transform Islamic law. Adjudication was preferred over legislative codification as a mode of governance and rule making because of its flexibility. The translation of classical Islamic legal texts, the Hidāya and certain parts of the Fatāwā al-‘Ālamgīriyya, relieved English judges of the need for a reliance on local legal advisors. However, Muslim lawyers, judges, legal commentators, and some religious scholars (‘ulamā’) simultaneously collaborated and negotiated with, and resisted colonial administrators in the process of legal transformation. As adjudication was a preferred mode of transformation, legal commentaries played a crucial role in legal developments. A majority of legal commentators were Muslims, such as Ameer Ali, Abdur Rahim and Faiz Tyabji. They used their legal treatises to resist any colonial intervention in Islamic law. Although English educated Muslims replaced ‘ulamā’ as cultural intermediaries between the state and society, this did not eliminate the role of ‘ulamā’ as the custodians of Islamic law. They established closer links with society and issued fatāwā (legal opinions) on legal issues. Fatāwā were sought regarding every important aspect of waqf law, from the validity of family awqāf to the management of awqāf and the permissibility of awqāf of movables such as shares of companies. ‘Ulamā’ also lobbied for the enforcement of Islamic law in order to promote women’s rights of inheritance and to get a divorce. This study finds that Anglo-Muhammadan law was a product of interaction between various sections of Muslim society and colonial administrators. It reflected the socio-political context of colonial India and the process of negotiations between divergent interest holders. Despite replacing the traditional institutional structure, the overall legal system became more inclusive. It could interact with various stakeholders and represent them in the process of law making in order to respond to social change.

Thesis (LLD)--Stellenbosch University, 2015 / ENGLISH ABSTRACT : Section 25 of the South African Constitution authorises and sets the limits for two forms of legitimate regulatory interference with property, namely deprivation and expropriation. The focus of this dissertation is on the requirement in section 25(1) that no law may authorise arbitrary deprivation of property. According to the Constitutional Court, deprivation is arbitrary when there is insufficient reason for it. The Court listed a number of factors to consider in determining whether there is a sufficient relationship between the purpose to be achieved by deprivation and the regulatory method chosen to achieve it. The outcome of the arbitrariness question depends on the level of scrutiny applied in a particular case. The level of scrutiny ranges from rationality review to proportionality review. Deprivation that results in an excessively harsh regulatory burden for one or a small group of property owners will probably be substantively arbitrary and in conflict with section 25(1). Courts generally declare unconstitutional regulatory interferences with property rights invalid. However, invalidating legitimate regulatory measures that are otherwise lawful purely because they impose a harsh and excessive burden on some property owners may not always be justified if the regulatory measure fulfils an important regulatory purpose. Invalidating excessive regulatory measures may in some instances also be meaningless and may not constitute appropriate relief in vindicating the affected rights. The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the appropriateness of alternative solutions to invalidating otherwise lawful and legitimate but excessive regulatory deprivations of property. The goal is to identify remedies that allow courts to uphold the regulatory measure and simultaneously balance out the excessive regulatory burden it imposes on property owners. One alternative solution is to transform the excessive regulatory measure into expropriation and require the state to pay compensation to the affected owner. This approach is referred to as constructive expropriation. However, in view of the Constitutional Court’s approach to and the wording of section 25 it seems unlikely that it will adopt constructive expropriation as a solution. Another alternative solution is for the legislature to include a statutory provision for compensation in the authorising statute. Examples from German, French, Dutch and Belgian law show that this approach balances out the excessive regulatory burden and allows courts to uphold the otherwise lawful and legitimate but excessive regulatory statute without judicially transforming the deprivation into expropriation. An overview of South African law indicates that there is legislation that includes non-expropriatory compensation provisions. In cases where the regulatory statute does not contain a compensation provision, the courts might consider reading such a duty to pay compensation into the legislation or awarding constitutional damages. In conclusion, it is possible for the state to deprive owners of property in a manner that may result in an excessive regulatory burden being suffered by one or a small group of property owners if the regulatory purpose is necessary in the public interest, provided that the legislature explicitly or implicitly provides for non-expropriatory compensation in the regulatory statute. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING : Artikel 25 van die Suid Afrikaanse Grondwet magtig en stel grense daar vir twee regmatige vorme van regulerende staatsinmenging met eiendom, naamlik ontneming en onteiening. Die fokus van hierdie proefskrif is op die vereiste in artikel 25(1) dat geen wet arbitrêre ontneming van eiendom mag toelaat nie. Volgens die Grondwetlike Hof is ʼn ontneming arbitrêr as daar nie ʼn voldoende rede daarvoor is nie. Die Hof het faktore gelys wat oorweeg moet word om te bepaal of daar ʼn voldoende verhouding bestaan tussen die doel wat die staat met ontneming van eiendom nastreef en die regulerende maatreël wat vir die doel gebruik word. Die uitkoms van die toets vir arbitrêre ontneming hang af van die hersieningsstandaard wat die howe in ʼn spesifieke geval gebruik. Die standaard wissel van ʼn redelikheidstoets tot ʼn proporsionaliteitstoets. ʼn Ontneming wat ʼn oormatige swaar las op een of ʼn beperkte groep eienaars plaas sal waarskynlik arbitrêr en teenstrydig met artikel 25(1) wees. Die howe se benadering is om ongrondwetlike ontnemings van eiendom ongeldig te verklaar, maar dit is nie altyd geregverdig om toelaatbare en andersins regmatige ontnemings wat ʼn oormatige las op sommige eienaars plaas ongeldig te verklaar nie. Die ongeldigverklaring van wetgewing wat ʼn oormatige ontneming magtig mag soms ook nutteloos wees en nie ʼn gepaste remedie wees om die eienaar se regte te herstel nie. Die doel van hierdie proefskrif is om die geskiktheid van alternatiewe oplossings tot die ongeldigverklaring van andersins regmatige maar oormatige ontnemings van eiendom te ondersoek Die doel is om remedies te identifiseer wat die howe toelaat om regulerende ontnemings in stand te hou en terselfdertyd die oormatige las op enkele eienaars uit te balanseer. Een alternatiewe oplossing is om die oormatige ontneming te omskep in onteiening en die staat sodoende te verplig om aan die eienaar vergoeding te betaal. Hierdie benadering staan bekend as konstruktiewe onteiening. Gegewe die Grondwetlike Hof se benadering tot en die bewoording van artikel 25 is dit onwaarskynlik dat die howe konstruktiewe ontneming as ʼn oplossing sal aanvaar. ʼn Ander alternatiewe oplossing is vir die wetgewer om ʼn statutêre bepaling vir vergoeding in die magtigende wetgewing in te voeg. Voorbeelde uit die Duitse, Franse, Nederlandse en Belgiese reg toon aan dat hierdie benadering ʼn oormatige las kan uitbalanseer en die howe toelaat om die andersins geldige en regmatige ontneming in stand te hou sonder om dit in onteiening te omskep. ʼn Oorsig van Suid Afrikaanse reg dui aan dat daar wetgewing bestaan wat wel voorsiening maak vir sodanige vergoeding. In gevalle waar die magtigende wetgewing nie vergoeding voorsien nie kan die howe oorweeg om ʼn vergoedingsplig in die wet in te lees of om grondwetlike vergoeding toe te ken. Hierdie proefskrif kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat dit grondwetlik moontlik is vir die staat om eienaars van eiendom te ontneem op ʼn wyse wat soms daartoe kan lei dat enkele eienaars ʼn oormatige swaar las moet dra, mits die ontneming ʼn belangrike openbare doel dien en die wetgewer uitdruklik of implisiet voorsiening maak vir vergoeding.

Thesis (LLM)--Stellenbosch University, 2014. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Inaedificatio entails that movables that have been permanently attached to land through building cease to exist as independent things and become part of the land. Courts have adopted different approaches over time to investigate whether or not inaedificatio had occurred. It is sometimes said that courts have moved away from the so-called traditional approach, which focused on the objective factors, to the so-called new approach, which places more emphasis on the subjective intention of the owner of the movables. This thesis analyses the applicable case law and concludes that there is inadequate proof of such a shift since both older cases associated with the traditional approach and later cases associated with the new approach emphasise the intention of the owner of the movables to establish whether accession had taken place. However, the case law does allow for a cautious different conclusion, namely that a certain line of both older and new cases emphasise the owner of the movable’s intention for commercial policy reasons, specifically to protect ownership of the movables in cases where ownership had been reserved in a credit sale contract. Constitutional analysis of these conclusions in view of the FNB methodology indicates that the courts’ decision to hold that accession had in fact occurred in cases that do involve permanent attachment of movables to land will generally establish deprivation of property for purposes of section 25(1) of the Constitution, but such deprivation would generally not be arbitrary since there would be sufficient reason for it. However, in cases where the courts decide that there was no accession because ownership of the movables had been reserved subject to a credit sale agreement, there is no deprivation of property because the landowner, who is the only one who might complain about the decision, could not prove a property interest for purposes of section 25(1). Moreover, the courts’ decision that accession had either occurred or not does not amount to expropriation under section 25(2) of the Constitution because there is no common law authority for expropriation. Therefore, the principal conclusion of the thesis is that the courts’ decision that accession had either occurred or not would generally be in line with the property clause of the Constitution. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Inaedificatio behels dat roerende sake wat permanent deur bebouing aan grond vasgeheg is ophou bestaan as selfstandige sake en deel word van die grond. Die howe het in die verlede verskillende benaderings gevolg in hulle pogings om vas te stel of inaedificatio plaasgevind het. Daar word soms beweer dat die howe wegbeweeg het van die sogenaamde tradisionele benadering, wat op die objektiewe faktore gefokus het, na die sogenaamde nuwe benadering waarin die klem op die eienaar van die roerende goed se bedoeling val. Hierdie verhandeling analiseer die toepaslike regspraak en kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat daar onvoldoende bewys van so ‘n verskuiwing bestaan, aangesien sowel ouer sake wat met die tradisionele benadering geassosieer word en later regspraak wat die nuwe benadering sou volg klem op die eienaar van die roerende sake se bedoeling plaas. Die regspraak bied wel bewyse vir ‘n versigtige gevolgtrekking op ‘n ander punt, naamlik dat bepaalde ouer en later sake die eienaar van die roerende goed se bedoeling vir kommersiële beleidsredes beklemtoon, spesifiek in gevalle waar eiendomsreg in ‘n kredietkoop voorbehou is. Grondwetlike analise van hierdie gevolgtrekkings in die lig van die FNB-metodologie suggereer dat die howe se beslissing dat aanhegting wel plaasgevind het in gevalle waar permanente aanhegting van roerende goed aan grond ter sprake was oor die algemeen ‘n ontneming van eiendom vir doeleindes van artikel 25(1) van die Grondwet sal daarstel, maar aangesien daar oor die algemeen voldoende rede vir die ontneming is sal dit nie arbitrêr wees nie. Aan die ander kant, waar die howe beslis dat daar geen aanhegting was nie omdat eiendomsreg van die roerende goed vir sekerheid onderhewig aan ‘n kredietkoop voorbehou is, is daar geen ontneming van eiendom nie omdat die grondeienaar, die enigste party wat beswaar teen die beslissing mag maak, nie ‘n eiendomsbelang vir doeleindes van artikel 25(1) kan bewys nie. Verder stel die howe se beslissing dat aanhegting óf plaasgevind het al dan nie in elk geval geen onteiening daar nie aangesien daar geen magtiging vir onteiening in die gemenereg bestaan nie. Die gevolgtrekking van die verhandeling is dat die howe se beslissing dat aanhegting óf plaasgevind het al dan nie oor die algemeen nie in stryd met die eiendomsbepaling in die Grondwet sal wees nie.

Jersey law, and within it Jersey property law, has received little academic attention. This thesis seeks to examine, and provide a systematic account of, the Jersey law of property. Specific aspects of substantive law are explored. From these, general observations about the nature and structure of property law are made. Unsurprisingly, given the small size of the island, Jersey has a relatively limited amount of indigenous legal material to offer, much of it in French. Inevitably, there are gaps in the sources and some way of addressing these has to be determined before a systematic account of the law is possible. Juristic writing and modern caselaw demonstrate consistent recourse to the laws of other jurisdictions when gaps are encountered. Norman law, modern French law, and English law (to a much lesser extent and mainly where it conforms to Roman law) are used in the cases on property law, and thus also in this thesis. Reference is also made to the law of Guernsey (Jersey’s sister jurisdiction) but the difficulties encountered in researching Jersey law are no less evident there. In areas such as the law of servitudes, Roman law is often referred to explicitly by the Jersey jurists and by the commentators on Norman law. The influence of Roman law is also evident in the division between real rights and personal rights, sometimes barely visible in Jersey law, and is also a general backdrop to the rules on classification of things. Norman feudal law remains vestigially in place but the structure of the law and its individual rules bear many civilian characteristics. For this reason, in addition to Jersey sources, Norman law, modern French law, and any other materials used by the courts, other jurisdictions with civilian systems of property law are also referred to, specifically mixed jurisdictions, of which Jersey is one.

The aim of the thesis is to clarify the landlord’s rights and obligations towards the tenant when a case of emergency occurs in the tenant’s apartment. What can a landlord do to get access to the tenant’s apartment when a case of emergency occurs? Will the landlord be liable if he damages any property of the tenant during the time in the apartment? These are some of the questions that we will answer. The problem is guided by two main principles: the landlord’s right of possession of the apartment and also the tenant’s right of use of the same property. The conflict between these two principles and between the interests of the landlord and the tenant is the foundation of this problem. Case of emergencies in an apartment are not regulated in Swedish law. Therefore, we have chosen to do comparisons to other forms of similar situations, which already are regulated in the law. These comparisons are made to see if similar rules can be applicated to cases of emergencies in the tenant’s apartment. In addition to this, we have also used case law, which treats similar situations, to see if the principles from these cases also can be applicated in case of emergencies in the tenant’s apartment. / Uppsatsens syfte är att klargöra hur hyresvärdens rättigheter och skyldigheter gentemot hyresgästen regleras vid en nödsituation i hyresgästens lägenhet. Frågor som vi kommer att försöka svara på är bl a: hur långt får hyresvärden gå när han bereder sig tillträde till hyresgästens lägenhet? Blir han ersättningsskyldig om han skulle skada hyresgästens egendom då en nödsituation föreligger? Problemet är utöver ett obligationsrättsligt, även ett sakrättsligt problem. De sakrättsliga principer som ligger till grund för problemet är äganderätten och nyttjanderätten. I vårt fall kommer dessa till uttryck genom att hyresvärden, som har äganderätten till sin egendom, upplåter nyttjanderätten av sin egendom till hyresgästens förmån. Det här förhållandet mellan hyresvärden och hyresgästen är en av orsakerna till att det uppstår ett problem vid hyresvärdens tillträde till lägenheten vid en nödsituation. Eftersom nödsituationer inte är reglerade i 12 kap. 26 § Jordabalken har vi valt att göra jämförelser med andra typer av situationer som finns reglerade i lagen. Dessa är: mindre brådskande förbättringsarbete och annat arbete, brådskande förbättringsarbete och bekämpning av ohyra i hyresgästens lägenhet. Dessa jämförelser görs för att utreda vilka regler som kan tänkas tillämpas då en nödsituation föreligger. För att uppfylla syftet har vi även tagit hjälp av ett par äldre rättsfall som behandlar områden som har nära anknytning till vårt problem.

The aim of my thesis is to introduce the legislation related to real estate tax in the Czech Republic, to offer its critical evaluation and suggestions for its modification in the future. The work is divided into two parts, a theoretical part, which includes four chapters and a practical part, consisting of six chapters. The general part is devoted to the process of recodification of private law in the Czech Republic. It describes recodification in a broader context, it identifies legal institutes connected to real property tax and summarizes selected changes in terminology. In the next chapter is summarizes general theoretical introduction of taxes, with an emphasis on property taxes and briefly described elements of the tax structure. Fifth chapter and the next ones deals specifically with the real estate tax. First, the tax is described in general terms, then the amended changes are summarized and the scheme of the Act is introduced. The sixth chapter provides a complete analysis of the land tax, seventh chapter the tax of buildings and units. In both chapters the thesis consistently addresses all elements of aforesaid taxes. The eighth chapter presents provisions of the Act that are common to both taxes and in the following chapter the issue of tax administration is addressed. The final chapter...

On a souvent retenu la socialisation comme un concept au service du combat contre l’individualisme juridique. Il faut néanmoins admettre que cette conception est réductrice. La force de la notion de socialisation tient, en effet, à ce qu’elle intervient dans des registres différents. La socialisation du droit doit également s’entendre d’une « mise aux mœurs » du droit. Elle résulte, dans ce sens, d’une certaine conformation des règles juridiques à l’état du donné, au social. Telle qu’elle est mobilisée dans le discours des acteurs du 19e siècle, la thématique de la socialisation oscille d’ailleurs entre ces deux pôles. On doit donc considérer ces deux aspects de la socialisation. La notion se construit par opposition aux principes d’un droit individuel et, dans le même temps, elle traduit la nécessité d’élaborer un droit actuel. De ces deux points de vue, la participation du droit des biens au mouvement de socialisation du droit est manifeste. Il ressort d’abord que la discipline a accueilli une conception sociale du droit, bien avant que l’idée de socialisation ne soit explicitement exposée à la fin du 19e siècle. Plus tard, lorsque la nécessité de socialiser le droit a investi le discours juridique, la permanence du thème de la propriété et les références à sa destination sociale, ont assuré au droit des biens une participation déterminante à l’élaboration du concept juridique de socialisation. La participation du droit des biens à la mise en œuvre de la socialisation paraît revêtir une autre dimension. Généralement, les transformations qui ont affecté la discipline se sont accomplies dans le sens d’une mise en correspondance de ses principes avec des réalités nouvelles. L’entrée de valeurs nouvelles, incorporelles dans le champ des choses susceptibles d’appropriation a notamment révélé que le droit des biens avait évolué de manière à faire face aux bouleversements qu’a engendré la Révolution de l’immatériel. Une telle actualisation de la matière révèle son aptitude à assurer la construction d’un certain état de la société / One has often construed socialization as a construct to be used in the fight against legal individualism. And yet, it has to be owned that such an interpretation is too simplistic. The strength of the notion of socialization actually lies in the fact that the latter straddles several fields of social science. The socialization of law must also be understood as law adapting to the social mores of the times. From such an acceptation there has resulted a certain conformation of legal rules to a given state of affairs, to the social sphere. Such as it has been called upon in the 19th-century movers’ and shakers’ discourse, the thematic of socialization oscillates between these two poles. One must therefore contemplate both these aspects of socialization. The notion evolved as a reaction against the tenets of an individualistic law; at the same time, it reveals the need for developing a present-day law. From both these standpoints the inclusion of property law in the socialization movement is obvious. It emerges that the discipline nurtured a social conception of the law long before the idea of socialization was unequivocally expounded towards the end of the 19th century. Later on when the need to socialize law took hold of the legal discourse, the persistence of the theme of ownership and references to its social purpose made it possible for property law to have a decisive input in the development of the juridical construct of socialization. Being part of the implementation process of socialization seems to have involved another dimension. As a rule the makeovers that have impacted the discipline were effectued in the direction of a tallying of its own principles with new realities. The coming to the fore of new values, of immovables into the field of assets likely to be appropriated revealed in particular that property law had evolved so as to cope with the changes brought about by the revolution of intangible assets. Such an bringing up to date of this discipline reveals its aptitude to ensure the construction of a specific state of society