This paper aims to examine how the legal status of animals as property affect them and their owners in the context of domestic abuse, and to answer the question of whether it would be appropriate to change this. Several methods are used, most notably the legal dogmatic, legal analytic, and socio-legal. A feminist perspective is also applied. Animals are classified as objects in the Swedish legal system. According to the courts, however, they are not an object like any other. Despite their legal status, they are entitled to certain rights. Through research on what is called the link, it has been proven that animals play a very important role in domestic abuse relationships. They are effectively weaponized against the woman, and they are also often themselves abused, something that is not always understood considering the animals’ status as property. Because of recent court judgements and other societal tendencies, it can however be discussed if this is still the case, or if the order is slowly shifting. The paper finds that it cannot be claimed that animals by the legal order are viewed as more than objects in cases of domestic abuse. It can however be claimed that court judgements, public projects and recent changes on the animal rights area show inclinations of the Swedish legal system increasingly acknowledging animals within the domestic abuse context, however principally to the extent the abused woman views the animal as meaningful to her. Further findings include that it is not expedient to broaden the right of appeal in animal rights cases for the sake of the domestically abused animal, until they are considered more than property. It is furthermore not expedient to consider all or certain types of animals as more than property in the context of domestic abuse, as it would not outweigh the opposing interests. The findings lead to the conclusion that animals in situations of domestic abuse are best protected within Swedish law by strengthening animal welfare, by recognizing abuse against animals as a form psychological violence against women, and by establishing national measures on how the link problematic is to be addressed and redressed.

<p>Canadian courts have struggled to develop a consistent and coherent approach for reviewing administrative decision-making. In particular, they have been unable to create a workable framework that will guide when the courts will show deference to administrative tribunal interpretations of law and when they will interfere with them, leading to a system of administrative law that is unpredictable and disorderly. This thesis develops a novel approach to administrative review centered on a conception of judicial due-deference that is correlated with a Razian account of legitimate authority. My argument is that administrative review is best understood as an exercise of inter-institutional decision-making in which diverse institutions within the meta-institution of government must work together to arrive at decisions that best secure government objectives. When reviewing courts recognize that administrative actors are better situated in particular circumstances to make decisions than the courts, they ought to show deference. On the other hand, when courts are better situated to handle these matters, deference is not to be shown. I begin in Part I by analyzing the history of Canadian administrative law jurisprudence through to the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in <em>Dunsmuir</em>, highlighting the competing principles of the rule of law and democracy that animate the ‘Diceyan Dialectic’. In Part II, I articulate a complex theory of inter-institutional reasoning that demonstrates the important role of deference and authority in good government decision-making. In Part III, I apply this model to the circumstances of Canadian administrative review. I show how there are certain institutional strengths, as well as key limitations, with respect to how our superior courts can play a role in upholding the Rule of Law and democracy. Ultimately, I argue that the superior courts must pay attention to the unique institutional placement of administrative actors relative to them in order to discern if these non-curial actors possess greater authority and hence ought to be shown deference.</p> / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

World-wide, the nature, purpose and existence of private education has evoked intense interest and controversial debate. For many, private education presents a legal-moral dilemma. On the one hand, it is recognised as a fundamental right in terms of freedom of association, religion and culture. On the other, it raises perplexing moral and philosophical issues about social exclusivity, selectivity and elitism. Notwithstanding the equally compelling legal, social, economic, educational and political arguments for and against private education, private schools in South Africa, which are increasing in number, continue to form an essential and permanent part of the education system. Private education is a complex subject which can be researched from a myriad of perspectives. This study is essentially a legal enquiry into the legal status of private schools in South Africa within the new democratic constitutional dispensation and how the law affects the organisation, governance and management of private schools. To this end, the study is confined to a discussion on legal aspects relating to private school governance, public funding of private schools, teachers' appointments and discipline, student admission and discipline and religious freedom. In discussing the legal context of such topics, a number of issues emerged concerning the complex nature and diversity of private schools, the relationship between the State and the private school sector, the right of private schools to exist and the implications of the bill of rights for private schools. Furthermore, the study raises challenging questions about the issues of choice, autonomy, religious freedom and diversity, which lie at the heart of the establishment and maintenance of private schools in a democratic society. Finally, one of the difficulties of conducting such a study is that South African law is complex and changing, and it is still in a state of evolution, given the recentness of the Constitution and the bill of rights. This means that while some legal issues pertaining to private schools are fairly well settled, for the most part it is not possible to provide a comprehensive or definitive statement about complex and often highly sensitive issues but merely to pose various legal-education questions and problems for consideration. In time, many of the issues raised will no doubt be settled by the courts / Educational Leadership and Management / D.Ed. (Educational Management

Thesis (LLD)--Stellenbosch University, 2012. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Ownership, and especially the ownership of land, consists of rights as well as duties. The social responsibilities of the owner depend on the prevailing needs of the public (as expressed in legislation) and are subject to change. Section 25(1) of the Constitution impliedly recognises the social obligations of the property owner insofar as it confirms that ownership can be regulated by the state in the public interest. Section 25(1) also sets requirements for the interference with property rights and, in so doing, recognises that the social obligations of the property owner are not without boundaries. In its landmark FNB decision the Constitutional Court gave content and structure to a section 25(1) challenge. The Constitutional Court held that deprivations will be arbitrary for purposes of section 25(1) if the law of general application does not provide sufficient reason for the deprivation or is procedurally unfair. The Constitutional Court elaborated that ‘sufficient reason’ had to be determined with reference to eight contextual factors which reflect the complexity of the relationships involved in the dispute. With reference to section 25(1) and FNB this dissertation considers the constitutional implications of two types of statutory interference with the owner’s right to use, enjoy and exploit his property. Firstly, the dissertation considers the owner’s statutory duty in terms of the National Building Regulations and Building Standards Act 103 of 1977 to demolish unlawful and illegal building works in certain instances. Secondly, the dissertation considers the limitations imposed by the National Heritage Resources Act of 25 of 1999 and the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (PIE) on the owner’s right to demolish historic or unlawfully occupied structures. This dissertation argues that building and development controls, historic preservation laws and anti-eviction legislation are legitimate exercises of the state’s police power. Generally, these statutory interferences with ownership will not amount to unconstitutional deprivation of property. Nevertheless, there are instances where regulatory laws cannot be applied inflexibly if doing so results in excessive interferences with property rights. The FNB substantive arbitrariness test indicates when the law imposes disproportionate burdens on land owners. Furthermore, the non-arbitrariness tests shows when it might be necessary to mitigate disproportionate burdens, imposed in terms of otherwise legitimate regulatory laws, by way of German-style equalisation measures, which are comparable to the constitutional damages granted by South African courts. This dissertation concludes that in the past century the South African legal system has progressed from the apartheid regime, which protected the rights and interests of the white minority, to a constitutional regime which safeguards the rights of all South Africans. There are two legal developments that may lead to positive change in the next century, namely active pursuance of the notion that ownership consists of rights and duties and the development of equalisation-style measures, incorporated into legislation, to alleviate excessive burdens imposed on property owners in the public interest. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Eiendomsreg, veral eiendomsreg op grond, bestaan uit regte sowel as pligte. Die sosiale verantwoordelikhede van die eienaar word bepaal deur die heersende behoeftes van die publiek (soos in wetgewing beliggaam) en is onderhewig aan verandering. Artikel 25(1) van die Grondwet erken implisiet die sosiale verpligtinge van die eienaar in soverre dit bevestig dat eiendomsreg nie ʼn absolute reg is nie en dat dit deur die staat in die openbare belang gereguleer kan word. Artikel 25(1) koppel vereistes aan statutêre beperkings wat op die eienaar se regte geplaas kan word en erken daardeur dat die sosiale pligte van die eienaar nie onbegrens is nie. In die invloedryke FNB-beslissing het die Grondwethof inhoud en struktuur aan grondwetlike analise ingevolge artikel 25(1) gegee. Die Grondwethof het bepaal dat ʼn ontneming arbitrêr sal wees vir die doeleindes van artikel 25(1) as die algemeen geldende reg nie genoegsame rede vir die ontneming verskaf nie of as die ontnemingsproses prosedureel onbillik was. Die Grondwethof het uitgebrei dat ‘genoegsame rede’ bepaal moet word met verwysing na agt kontekstuele faktore wat die kompleksiteit van die verhoudinge wat in die geskil betrokke is, weerspieël. Met verwysing na artikel 25(1) en FNB oorweeg hierdie proefskrif die grondwetlike implikasies van twee tipes statutêre beperkinge wat deur wetgewing op eienaars se regte geplaas word. Eerstens neem die proefskrif die eienaar se statutêre plig ingevolge die Wet op Nasionale Bouregulasies en Boustandaarde 103 van 1977 om onwettige en onregmatige geboue en bouwerke te sloop, in oënskou. Tweedens oorweeg die proefskrif die beperkinge ingevolge die Wet op Nasionale Erfenishulpbronne 25 van 1999 en die Wet op die Voorkoming van Onwettige Uitsettings en Onregmatige Besetting van Grond 19 van 1998 op die eienaar se reg om historiese en onregmatige bewoonde strukture te sloop. Die proefskrif betoog dat bou- en ontwikkelingsbeheermaatreëls, historiese bewaringswette en uitsettingsvoorkomingswetgewing legitieme uitoefening van die staat se polisiëringsmag is. In die algemeen sal hierdie statutêre inmenging nie uitloop op ongrondwetlike ontneming van eiendom nie. Nietemin is daar gevalle waar die regulerende wette nie onbuigsaam toegepas kan word nie indien dit tot uitermatige inmenging met die eienaar se regte lei. Die FNB-toets vir substantiewe arbitrêre ontneming dui aan wanneer ‘n wet ʼn disproporsionele las op grondeienaars plaas. Verder wys die FNB-toets wanneer dit nodig mag wees om oneweredige laste, wat deur andersins regmatige regulerende wette opgelê is, te versag. Dit kan gedoen word deur middel van ʼn statutêre maatreël, geskoei op Duitse voorbeeld, wat vergelykbaar is met grondwetlike skadevergoeding wat deur Suid-Afrikaanse howe toegeken is. Hierdie proefskrif kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat die Suid-Afrikaanse regstelsel oor die afgelope eeu ontwikkel het van die apartheidsbestel, wat die regte en belange van die wit minderheid beskerm het, tot die huidige grondwetlike bestel wat die regte van alle Suid-Afrikaners beskerm. Twee ontwikkelinge kan tot positiewe verandering in die volgende eeu lei, naamlik aktiewe bevordering van die gedagte dat eiendomsreg uit regte en verpligtinge bestaan en ontwikkeling van statutêre maatreëls wat die uitermatige las wat in die openbare belang op eienaars geplaas word, te verlig.

Thesis (LLD)--Stellenbosch University, 2012. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Section 25(2) of the 1996 Constitution states that property may only be expropriated for a public purpose or in the public interest and compensation must be paid. This dissertation analyses the public purpose and public interest requirement in light of recent court decisions, especially with regard to third party transfer of expropriated property for economic development purposes. The public purpose requirement is explained in terms of pre-constitutional case law to create a context in which to understand the public purpose and public interest in terms of the 1996 Constitution. This leads to a discussion of whether third party transfers for economic development purposes are generally for a public purpose or in the public interest. The legitimacy of the purpose of both the expropriation and the transfer of property to third parties in order to realise the purpose is considered. Conclusions from a discussion of foreign case law dealing with the same question are used to analyse the South African cases where third party transfers for economic development have been addressed. Based on the overview of foreign case law and the critical analysis of South African cases, the dissertation sets out guidelines that should be taken into account when this question comes up again in future. The dissertation also considers whether an expropriation can be set aside if alternative means, other than expropriating the property, are available that would also promote the purpose for which the property was expropriated. Recent decisions suggest that alternative and less invasive measures are irrelevant when the expropriation is clearly for a public purpose. However, the dissertation argues that less invasive means should be considered in cases where it is not immediately clear that the expropriation is for a valid public purpose or in the public interest, such as in the case of a third party transfer for economic development. The role of the public purpose post-expropriation is considered with reference to purposes that are not realised or are abandoned and subsequently changed. In this regard the dissertation considers whether the state is allowed to change the purpose for which the property was expropriated, and also under which circumstances the previous owner would be entitled to reclaim the expropriated property when the public purpose that justifies the expropriation falls away. It is contended that the purpose can be changed, but that the new purpose must also comply with the constitutional requirements. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Artikel 25(2) van die Grondwet van 1996 vereis dat `n onteining slegs vir `n openbare doel of in die openbare belang mag plaasvind, en dat vergoeding betaalbaar is. In die proefskrif word die openbare doel en openbare belang geanaliseer in die lig van onlangse regspraak wat veral verband hou met die onteining van grond wat oorgedra word aan derde partye vir doeleindes van ekonomiese ontwikkeling. Die openbare doel vereiste word geanaliseer in die lig van respraak voor die aanvang van die grondwetlike bedeling om beide die openbare doel en openbare belang in terme van die Grondwet van 1996 te verstaan. Op grond van hierdie bespreking word die vraag ondersoek of die onteiening van grond vir ekonomiese ontwikkeling en die oordrag daarvan aan derde partye vir `n openbare doel of in die openbare belang is. Gevolgtrekkings uit `n oorsig van buitelandse respraak waarin dieselfde vraag reeds behandel is dien as maatstaf vir die Suid-Afrikaanse regspraak oor die vraag te evalueer. Op grond van die kritiese analise van die buitelandse regspraak word sekere aanbevelings gemaak wat in ag geneem behoort te word indien so `n vraag weer na vore kom. Die vraag of `n onteiening ter syde gestel kan word omdat daar `n alternatiewe, minder ingrypende manier is om die openbare doel te bereik word ook in die proefskrif aangespreek. In onlangse regspraak word aangedui dat die beskikbaarheid van ander, minder ingrypende maniere irrelevant is as die onteiening vir `n openbare doel of in die openbare belang geskied. Daar word hier aangevoer dat die beskikbaarheid van alternatiewe metodes in ag geneem behoort te word in gevalle waar dit onduidelik is of die onteining vir `n openbare doel of in die openbare belang geskied, soos in die geval van oordrag van grond aan derde partye vir ekonomiese ontwikkelingsdoeleindes. Ter aansluiting by die vraag of die onteining van grond vir oordrag aan derdes vir ekonomiese ontwikkeling geldig is, word die funksie van die openbare doel na onteiening ook ondersoek. Die vraag is of die staat geregtig is om die doel waarvoor die eiendom onteien is na afloop van die onteiening te verander. Die vraag in watter gevalle die vorige eienaar van die grond teruggawe van die grond kan eis word ook aangespreek. Daar word aangevoer dat die staat die doel waarvoor die eiendom benut word kan verander, maar dat die nuwe doel ook moet voldoen aan die grondwetlike vereistes. / South African Research Chair in Property Law, sponsored by the Department of Science and Technology, administered by the National Research Foundation and hosted by Stellenbosch University / Cuicci bursary fund / Faculty of Law Stellenbosch University

Harming the dignity of the learner; refusing to hear his side of the story; neglecting to help him retrieve his stolen property : such are the unfortunate occurrences at many South African schools, and such are the experiences that have led to this research. Dedicated educators sometimes default, leaving their wronged learners out m the cold. The questions are therefore: • What causes this conduct of educators and why does it recur? • Is it ignorance of their legal position? • Is it insensitivity to common law principles and statutory provisions? • Is it sheer carelessness? Mindful of the introduction of the South African Constitution Act 108 of 1996, wh1ch contains the long-awaited Bill of Fundamental Rights, this study has been undertaken to give an educational-juridical perspective of the educator-learner relationship 1n South African public schools by means of a literature study and an elementary legal comparative study. Various legal terms which influence the educator-learner relationship significantly are defined. In conjunction with the private law status of the learner, the position of the learner within the school system, and the fundamental rights of the learner in the context of the administration of justice are identified and dealt with in so far as they have any bearing on the educator-learner relationship, Moreover, the legal determinants of the educator-learner relationship and the educator's duty of care are pinpointed to determine their significance in an accountable, responsive and open educator-learner relationship, A comparative school law perspective of the sources of school law, the duties and responsibilities of educators, the fundamental rights and legal obligations of the learner, the educator's duty of care, discipline and legal liability in England and Wales, Canada, Japan, and South Africa is presented in terms of similarities and differences, Attention is paid to the necessity of informing educators and learners concerning their respective rights and duties, in order to develop accountable, responsive and open educator-learner relationships in South African schools, / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education, 2000

Le droit administratif coréen se trouve caractérisé depuis peu par une tentative d'adoption du droit du service public. Cette tentative signifie un mouvement pour faire évoluer le droit administratif par le dépasse-ment de ses fondements classiques en provenance du droit allemand, notamment des doctrines fondamentales élaborées à la fin du 19ème siècle. La tentative se manifeste par l'introduction de règles générales pour les activités du service public. Cependant, la mise en œuvre de ces règles novatrices pour le droit coréen ne sera cohérente que lorsque certaines conditions seront satisfaites, notamment des conditions procédurales telle que l'élargissement de la recevabilité du contentieux administratif. Nous avons relevé des éléments dont on doit tenir compte pour le changement du droit administratif coréen par l'adoption du droit du service public français afin que l'adoption soit opérationnelle. Cette démarche est fondée sur l'analyse de l'état actuel du droit coréen concernant l'idée de service public et les juridictions publiques / Korean administrative law is characterized recently by an attempt to adopt the law of public service. This means a movement attempting to change the administrative law by exceeding its classical foundations from German law, including fundamental doctrines developed in the late 19th century. The attempt is mani-fested by the introduction of general rules for public service activities. However, the implementation of these innovative rules for Korean law will be consistent only when certain conditions are met, including procedu-ral requirements such as enlargement of the admissibility of administrative litigation. We identified elements that must be considered for change of Korean administrative law by adoption of the French law of public ser-vice se that it could be operational. This approach is based on the analysis of the current state of Korean law regarding the idea of public service and public jurisdictions

L'ordre juridique international appréhende une collectivité infra-étatique comme un organe de l'État souverain. Cette logique classique d'assimilation, guidée par une lecture étatiste des rapports internationaux, y conditionne les opérations d'identification d'un engagement en raison d'un acte juridique, d'imputation d'un fait illicite et d'établissement d'une capacité à ester en justice. Dans ce contexte, une collectivité infra-étatique ne dispose pas d'une personnalité juridique propre, réserve faite du cas particulier des collectivités fédérées. Originellement internationaux, les ordres juridiques de l'Union européenne (U.E.) et du Conseil de l'Europe conservent une part de cet héritage. Toutefois, l'incorporation des collectivités infra-étatiques à cet édifice juridique régional, certes encore dominé par les États, les hisse progressivement au rang d'actrices singulières. L'autonomisation des deux ordres juridiques européens à l'égard de ces mécanismes internationaux classiques et la réalisation du principe d'immédiateté amènent alors à reconsidérer la pertinence d'une assimilation systématique des collectivités infra-étatiques à la figure de l'État et à prendre plus régulièrement en compte leur personnalité juridique distincte, telle que consacrée en droit interne. Cette logique nouvelle de personnification, qui trouve à s'exprimer dans une dimension verticale (i.e. dans les rapports entre les ordres juridiques internes et européens) et horizontale (i.e. dans les rapports entre les ordres juridiques internes des États) reste encore imparfaite. / The international legal system perceives a sub-state collectivity as a sovereign State's organ. This classical logic of assimilation, led by a statist perception of international relations, conducts the operations of identification of a commitment due to a juridical act, attribution of a wrongful act and acceptance of standing. In this context, a sub-state collectivity is not considered as a juridical person, subject to the particular situation of federated collectivities. Originally international, European Union's (E.U.) and Council of Europe's legal systems retain a measure of this heritage. However, the incorporation of sub-state collectivities in this regional legal system, admittedly still dominated by States, raises them gradually to the rank of singular actresses. The empowerment of both European legal systems from these classical international mechanisms and the realization of the principle of immediacy bring to reconsider the relevance of a systematic assimilation of the sub-state collectivities as insignificant parts of State and take account of their own juridical personality, such as established by domestic law. This new logic of personification, which develops vertical (i.e. relations between European and domestic legal systems) and horizontal dimensions (i.e. relations between domestic legal systems) is still imperfect. When they're not considered as State's organs, sub-state collectivities are sometimes perceived as individuals, who try to satisfy their own interests without any reference to general interest.

Dès la genèse des universités, à la fin du XIIe siècle, leur autonomie implique un certain rapport au pouvoir puisqu’elles n’existent que si elles sont reconnues et garanties par des autorités extérieures. Les facultés de droit, composantes des universités, sont particulièrement liées au pouvoir politique en raison des rapports étroits unissant le politique et le droit. À partir du XVIIe siècle, en France, le pouvoir royal s’ingère véritablement dans le domaine des facultés de droit. Ce processus d’immixtion du pouvoir politique sur les facultés de droit s’étend jusqu’au point culminant de la réforme napoléonienne instaurant l’Université impériale. Il s’agit d’une phase de transformation des facultés de droit, alliée à la mutation de l’État lui même, située entre les facultés de droit médiévales, détentrices d’une certaine autonomie, jusqu’aux institutions étatisées dont les finalités sont définies par le pouvoir politique. Les facultés de droit d’Italie du nord, pour le moins en Piémont et en Lombardie autrichienne, connaissent la même évolution au travers des réformes du XVIIIe siècle menées respectivement par Victor-Amédée II et Marie-Thérèse d’Autriche. L’influence politique, soulignant les finalités assignées aux facultés de droit, se traduit par un contrôle de la structure mais également par une immixtion dans le contenu même des enseignements. Ainsi, le type de juriste voulu par le pouvoir politique se dessine au travers des différentes réformes adoptées. / From the genesis of the universities in the late twelfth century, autonomy implies a certain relationship to power as they only exist if they are recognized and guaranteed by external autorithies. The Faculties of Laws, universities components, are particularly related to political power because of the close relationship liking the political and law. In France, from the seventeenth century, the royal power truly interferes in the field of law schools. This process of political interference power over law schools extends to the height of the Napoleonic reform establishing the Imperial University. It is a phase transformation of law schools, combined with the transformation of the state itself, between the faculties of medieval law, holders of a degree of autonomy, to the state-owned institutions, whose purpose is defined by the political power. The faculties of law in northern Italy, at least in Piemont and Lombardy Austrian, experience the same evolution through reforms of the eighteenth century led respectively by Victor Amadeus II and Maria Theresa of Austria. The political influence, highlighting the objectives assigned to the faculties of law, resulting in a control structure but also by interference in the same educational content. Thus, the type of lawyer wanted by the political power emerges through various reforms.

Pour réglementer les activités de navigation civile internationale, aérienne et maritime, les États ont choisi d’agir au moyen de deux institutions spécialisées du système des Nations Unies. L’Organisation de l’aviation civile internationale (OACI) et l’Organisation maritime internationale (OMI) ont été investies du pouvoir de superviser l’élaboration de règles techniques applicables à ces matières. De façon générale, les règles adoptées par ces Organisations doivent, pour prendre effet, être acceptées par les États, sous diverses formes (tacites ou expresses, collectives, voire individuelles). Leur application est tributaire d’actes unilatéraux des États, qui agissent parfois collectivement, étant souvent amiablement contrôlés par l’OACI ou l’OMI. Derrière une apparente clarté, se dissimulent des zones d’ombre. Outre, la situation des tiers et des personnes privées, et les rapports entre l’ordre international et les ordres juridiques étatiques, la nature de ces institutions normatives interroge. Y voir des autorités normatives agissant sur le fondement de pouvoirs constitués serait, en effet, ignorer le jeu incessant de la volonté des États, qui, partout là où il étire les pouvoirs de l’institution, montre l’irréductible liberté contractuelle et constituante de ces mêmes États. Le degré de centralisation de ces systèmes s’effacerait sous le constat que leur effectivité repose sur la volonté même de leurs sujets, plus ou moins tenue par des nécessités techniques, ce qui n’est pas sans conséquences pratiques. / In order to regulate the international civil navigation (air and maritime), the States have chosen to act through two specialized United Nations agencies. Hence they confered the International Civil Aviaton Organization (ICAO) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) the power to oversee the elaboration of technical rules relevant to this field. In general, the rules adopted by these organizations require various forms of States acceptance to be effective (i.e. express or implied, collective or individual forms). Their implementation depends on unilateral acts of States, that can sometimes act sometimes collectively. And the States are often amicably controlled by the ICAO or the IMO. Behind the apparent clarity, lay some gray areas. Beyond the situation of third and private individuals, and the relationship between international order and national legal systems, one can wonder about the nature of these normative institutions. These could be perceived as normative authorities acting on the basis of an established power. However, this interpretation would ignore the incessant game of States’ will. Whenever the will of the States stretches the power of the institution, the irreducible constituent and contractual freedom of the States appears. The degree of centralization of these systems would be blurred by the observation that their effectiveness depends on the willingness itself of their subjects, which is more or less held by technical necessities, and that would not be without practical consequences.