Cardinal Richelieu is traditionally accredited with defeating the power of the grands, the upper echelon of the French nobility, as part of his supposedly successful project for monarchical absolutism. Modern historians have recast Richelieu as a nobleman of his time, who advanced himself within the social and political hierarchies through marriage alliances and patronage. He therefore worked hard to forge alliances with the grands rather than trying to destroy them. Yet his ministry was riven by persistent noble conspiracies and rebellions, which have gone largely without systematic investigation. This study examines the nature and causes of that unrest during Richelieu’s final six years, offering a radical re-assessment of the opposition and the politics of the period. Noble conspiracy was not just a by-product of government by a first minister, but reflected the factional nature of Richelieu’s approach. Factional rivalry was exacerbated by the emergence, after 1638, of a struggle for the anticipated regency. After this, Richelieu took a more hostile approach to his adversaries, forcing them to adopt strong countermeasures in order to preserve their positions. Richelieu’s opponents were surprisingly successful in asserting their independence. As well as enjoying widespread domestic support, they allied with the Habsburg powers to engineer military rebellion, posing a major threat to the Cardinal and undermining the war effort against Spain. The Spanish set their stall out for a long-term war, expecting that Richelieu’s opponents would eventually gain power and negotiate peace on more flexible terms. The ability of the grands to re-assert themselves was still a dominant characteristic of French politics. Richelieu’s legacy, on his death in 1642, was a highly volatile political situation in which success was still a long way off for France. These findings suggest the catalytic impact of Habsburg power on France’s internal divisions, which should consequently be seen as integral to the forging of the ancien régime.

Thesis (MA (Political Science. International Studies))--University of Stellenbosch, 2010. / Bibliography / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This research has used a critical discourse analysis approach encompassing postcolonial theory and theory of media effects in order to investigate the influence of political discourse in the media upon youth’s violence in Cameroon. As a result it has been found that the use of private violence by young people in urban cities has become ordinary. Such an attitude reflects among other some aspects of youth’s lifestyle designed to cope with the hardship of their social status and to resist the elite’s dominance. While no counter-narrative has been found in the independent publications about the portrayal of youth’s violence as criminal by the state-owned press, the young people nevertheless have produced through a street culture a narrative deconstructing the political discourse in the media and highlighting their grievances in a more or less violent tone. Thus the use of private violence during the riot in February 2008, is far from an isolated (re)action of angry young people , it obeys the very practicality of their existence and the political turmoil it might cause is incidental to the way of life in which it is embedded. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die navorsing het ‘n kritiese diskoers analise-benadering gebruik wat ‘n postkoloniale teorie en ‘n teorie van media-effekte insluit om sodoende die invloed van politieke diskoers in die media op jeuggeweld in Kameroen, te ondersoek. Daar is gevolglik gevind dat die gebruik van private geweld deur jongmense in stedelike gebiede normaal geword het. So ‘n houding reflekteer onder andere sommige aspekte van die jeug se leefstyl wat ontwerp is om die ontbering van hul sosiale status te hanteer en ook die elite se dominasie te weerstaan. Ofskoon geen teen-narratief sover gevind is in die onafhanklike publikasies oor die uitbeelding van jeuggeweld as krimineel en die publikasies van die staatsbeheerde pers wat die jeug uitbeeld met min agentskap nie, het jongmense wel ‘n teen-narratief geskep deur ‘n straat-kultuur. Hierdie teen-narratief dekonstruktueer die politieke diskoers in die media en onderstreep hul griewe in ‘n geweldadige toon. Dus die gebruik van private geweld gedurende die onluste in Februarie 2008, wat nie as ‘n geïsoleerde (re)aksie van woedende jongmense gesien kan word nie, is getrou aan die wese van hulle bestaan en die politieke onrus wat dit moontlik mag veroorsaak, is bykomstig tot die leefstyl waarin dit vasgelê is.”

Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited / This thesis compares the Western response to two radical challenges in eras considerably removed in time: the 1900-1901 Boxer rebellion in China and today's Islamic terror. It brings a much-needed historical perspective to bear in assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the contemporary Western conceptualization of the al-Qaeda and Taliban threat as a "clash of civilizations." It demonstrates that the current struggle against Islamic fundamentalism is not an altogether new challenge to Western interest and values. Al-Qaeda and the Taliban are in the end an expression of the same forces of resistance that also led to the origination of the Boxers in 19th century China. The cultural pressure that the West unavoidably developed by its imperialistic policy in the 19th and early 20th centuries was replaced by the penetration of the world with values, standards and symbols of the Western way of life and civilization in the course of globalization. The West ought to understand that the current terrorist threat is not "the next stage of history," as some scholars erroneously puts it, but a known historical phenomenon in a new form, for which neither the West nor other cultures bear the blame. / Major (GS), German Army

Emotional hardcore är subkulturen som gick från undergroundrörelse med nära kopplingar till punken till att bli en extremt kommersialiserad subkultur. Emos efter millennieskiftet har beskrivits som deprimerade och destruktiva, och deras kultur som potentiellt farlig för unga människor. I den här uppsatsen kommer emo-kulturens uttryck och intention att undersökas, framförallt kommer fokus att ligga på hur samtalet om motstånd, psykisk ohälsa och känslor såg ut. Genom kvalitativa intervjuer med fem personer som rört sig i emo-kulturen, analyser av text från Bilddagboken och privata bloggar framträder en mer komplex bild av emos. Kulturen rymmer både normskritiska och livsbejakande inslag, även om scenen inte värjer sig för tunga ämnen som självdestruktivitet och depression. Emos synliggjorde sina känslor och personliga uttryck men krävde också respekt och acceptans från sin omgivning. Deras närvaro öppnar upp för en debatt om utseendenormer och psykisk ohälsa som fortfarande är aktuell. / Emotional hardcore is the subculture which went from underground movement with close ties to punk rock to become an extremely commercialized subculture. The emos of the post-millennial emo culture have been described as depressed and destructive, and their culture as potentially dangerous to young people. This essay is exploring the expressions and intentions of the emo culture, with a focus on the discourse on rebellion, mental health and feelings. Qualitative interviews with five former members of the Swedish emo-community, textual analyses from the social media Bilddagboken (Dayviews) and private blogs form a more complex picture of emos. The emo culture contains both norm critical and life affirmative elements, even if the scene doesn’t shield itself from difficult subjects like self-harm and depression. Emo kids made both their feelings and personal expressions visible and demanded respect and acceptance from their surroundings. Their presence open up for a debate about standards of appearance and metal health that is still relevant.

Les guerres civiles en Afrique sont multiples, désastreuses et multicausales. Cependant les analyses privilégient fréquemment les causes identitaires liées à l‟ethnique ou à des faits historiques. Il est proposé ici, une analyse différente par une approche économique. Si au sens de l‟économie classique ou néoclassique, les ressources naturelles sont une dotation constituant un avantage absolu ou comparatif, en Afrique, elles contribuent à alimenter les guerres intra-étatiques pénalisant ainsi tout effort de développement. L‟exploitation d‟uranium au Niger, loin de permettre une performance économique grâce aux revenus qu‟elle génère, représente a contrario une double source de « malédiction » : Conforme au « syndrome hollandais » accompagné de la médiocrité économique qui le caractérise mais constitue également un enjeu autour duquel se fonde la rébellion armée. / The civil wars in Africa are multiple, disastrous and multicausal. However analyses privilege frequently the identical causes connected to the ethnic or to the historic facts. It is proposed here, a different analysis by an economic approach. If in the sense of the classic or neo-classic economy, natural resources are an endowment constituting an absolute or comparative advantage, in Africa, they contribute to feed the intra-state wars punishing any effort of development. The exploitation of uranium in Niger, far from allowing an economic performance thanks to the income which it generates, represents a double source of "curse": in compliance with the "dutch disease" accompanied with the economic mediocrity which characterizes it but also constitutes a stake in which bases the armed rebellion.

Au Tchad, le Nord contraste avec le Sud. Alors que le Nord, aride consacré à l’élevage, est majoritairement de culture arabo-islamique, le Sud, savane boisée propice à l’agriculture, a épousé la culture occidentale. Avec la colonisation, puis avec les présidents sudistes Tombalbaye et Malloum, cette dichotomie s’est accrue ethniquement, religieusement... Le Frolinat, taxant les régimes sudistes de dominants, a pris le pouvoir après la guerre civile de 1979 et depuis lors, le Nord l’a confisqué, même si, une opposition politico-militaire sudiste, l’a contesté en permanence : face à Goukouni, les FAT, reliquat de l’ancienne armée nationale, coiffées par un organe politique, le Comité Permanent créé en 1979 lors du repli des sudistes au Sud, puis face à Habré une opposition armée dénommée Codos, créés pour résister à l’invasion très meurtrière du Sud par les forces de Habré. Les Codos purent s’imposer lors d’engagements considérables mais jamais déterminants. En effet, l’appui extérieur obtenu par Habré pour le conflit d’Aouzou, l’existence de multiples groupes de Codos, l’absence de base arrière... les rendirent vulnérables. Mais leur action a amené Habré à la négociation permettant un rééquilibrage politico-militaire. Les Codos (ré)intégreront les organes administratifs militaires et civils. Beaucoup de lycéens reprendront leurs études. Certains leaders seront nommés à de hautes fonctions et d’autres militaires prendront leur retraite. Ainsi émerge un Codo, Tokinon P. K. qui est devenu un homme d’affaires sans désavouer le Codoriste leader sudiste, Kamougué qui occupa plusieurs hautes fonctions politiques et créa son parti politique en 1992. Est-ce la fin de la guerre Nord-Sud ? / In Chad, the North contrasts with the South. While the arid and mostly arabic-islamic North is devoted to the breeding of animals, the South with its wooded bush appropriate to agriculture has adopted the Western culture. With colonization then with the Southern presidents, Tombalbaye and Malloum, the dichotomy has increased considering ethnic and religious matters. Criticizing the southern regimes to be dominant, Frolinat has overthrown the southern power after the 1979 civil war and since then, the North confiscated it, even if an opposition politico-soldier Southerner, disputed it permanently : against Goukouni, the FAT, the remnants of the former national army lead by a political organ, the Permanent Committee created in 1979 during the southerners’ withdrawal in the South, and against Habré and an armed opposition called the Codos. The Codo movement was created to resist against the extremely bloody invasion of the South by Habré’s forces. The Codos managed to resist with considerable commitments but not conclusive. Indeed, the fact that Habré obtained an outside support for the Aouzou conflict, and the existence of multiple groups of Codos, and the absence of a rear base, the Codos got vulnerable. But their action lead Habré to the negociations which permitted a new military and political balance. The Codos would then incorporate administrative, military and civil organisms. Many students would go back to school. Some leaders will be named with high positions and other soldiers will take their retirement. Then, one Codo emerged, Tokinon P. K, who became a businessman without downgrading the influence of Kamougué, the Codorist Southern leader who dealt with several high political functions and created his political party in 1992. Is this the end of the North-South war?

Da palavra no livro à palavra no palco. Desvendar os caminhos dessa transposição é o principal objetivo desse estudo. Nosso trabalho investigou a transposição e a transformação da obra euclidiana em peça teatral, a passagem de uma estrutura discursiva para um dispositivo de enunciação diferente. A peça: \"A Luta, primeira parte\" compreende o início da Campanha de Canudos e suas três primeiras expedições. Demonstramos caráter autônomo e universal desta obra, pois, mesmo sendo uma das cinco partes de \"Os Sertões\", carrega consigo diversos elementos representativos de todo o trabalho executado e, principalmente, dos elementos que caracterizam e identificam a encenação do grupo Teat(r)o Oficina Uzyna Uzona liderado pelo encenador, dramaturgo e ator José Celso Martinez Corrêa. Estruturamos o nosso trabalho na análise do espetáculo através de cenas previamente escolhidas como amostras, nas quais observamos: a teatralização do texto e sua interpretação cênica. Toda essa análise baseou-se no acompanhamento dos ensaios (abertos e fechados), em muitas das apresentações, das discussões entre os membros do grupo, dos comentários do diretor Zé Celso e em entrevistas com os integrantes do grupo. Procuramos descrever um processo de criação que, ao se defrontar com inúmeras referências (históricas, atuais, universais, teatrais e até mesmo pessoais) não fizesse apenas uma \"livre associação de ideias\" ou uma mera categorização. Nossa intenção foi dar visibilidade ao trabalho de criação. / From the word in the book to the word in the stage. To uncover the paths that implementation is the main objective of this study. Our study investigated the implementation and transformation of the Euclidian work on the play, the passage of a discourse structure for a different device enunciation. The piece: \"The Fight, first part\" (A Luta, primeira parte) comprises the beginning of the Canudo\'s War (Campanha de Canudos) and the first three expeditions. Demonstrating a stand-alone character and universal this piece, even though it\'s one of the five parts of \"Rebellion in the Backlands\" (Os Sertões), it carries diverse representative elements of all work done and especially those elements that characterize and identify the staging of the group Teat(r)o Oficina Uzyna Uzona run by the stage director, playwright and actor José Celso Martinez Corrêa. We tailor our work in the analysis of the spectacle through the scenes previously chosen as samples, in which we observed: a dramatization of the text and its scenic interpretation. All of this analysis was based on monitoring the rehearsals (open and closed), in a lot of the presentations, the discussions between members of the group, the commentaries of the director Zé Celso and in interviews with members of the group. We look to describe a process of creation that when presented with numerous references (historical, actual, universal, theatrical and even personal) it\'s not just a simple association of ideas or a mere categorization. Our intention was to give visibility to the work of creation.

The Spanish colonisation of the Philippines in 1565 opened up trade between China, Latin America and Europe via the Pacific crossing, changing the history of global trade forever. The traditional understanding of the early colonial period in the Philippines suggests that colonial control spread rapidly and peacefully across the islands, ushering in dramatic changes to the social, political and economic environment of the archipelago. This dissertation argues by contrast that the extent of Spanish control has been overstated - partially as a by-product of an over-reliance on religious and secular chronicles that sought to magnify the role and interests of the colonial state. Through extensive archival work examining different sites of colonial authority and power, I demonstrate that Philippine communities contested and limited the nature of colonisation in their archipelago. In making this argument, I challenge prevalent assumptions of indigenous passivity in the face of imperial expansion. By demonstrating the agency of Southeast Asians, particular actors come to the fore in each of the chapters: Chinese labourers, indigenous elites, fugitives and apostates, unpacified mountain communities, native priestesses and Moro slave raiders. The culture and social organisation of these Southeast Asian communities impacted on the nature of Spanish imperialism and the capacity for the Spanish to retain and extend their control. Throughout the seventeenth century, the Spanish presence within the archipelago was always tenuous. A number of communities remained outside of Spanish control for the duration of the century, while still others oscillated between integration and rebellion, by turns participating in and resisting the consolidation of empire. These communities continued to maintain their local and regional economies and customs. Thus, by the end of the seventeenth century, imperial control remained fragmented, partial and incomplete. The dissertation contributes not only to the historiography of the Philippines - which remains under-explored - but also to the historiographies of Colonial Latin America, Southeast Asia and early modern empires. Conceptualising the Philippines as a frontier space helps to overturn the foundations of the myth of a completed conquest. This dissertation thus raises questions about the inevitability of empire by arguing that indigenous communities were active respondents to Spanish colonisation attempts and that indigenous traditions and culture in this region were both resilient and enduring in the face of colonial oppression.

Thesis (M.A.)--Indiana University, 2010. / Title from screen (viewed on February 26, 2010). Department of History, Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI). Advisor(s): Jason M. Kelly, Annie Gilbert Coleman, Monroe H. Little. Includes vitae. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 120-125).

從歷史淵源而言，「東突厥斯坦」乙詞緣於19世紀沙俄試圖從地理名稱、宗教信仰與民族識別等深層的滲透方式，藉由「泛突厥主義」與「泛伊斯蘭主義」拉攏新疆信仰伊斯蘭教的少數民族，以東突的概念，將之納入已遭其併吞的中亞突厥斯坦地區，復以此話語的界定權，取得全世界對於俄國版地理分隔線的認同。復由於國共內戰時期，蘇聯鼓動成立「東突厥斯坦共和國」，毛澤東亦以「三區革命」稱許之，以期掀起遍地革命火種，給予現代新疆少數民族留下以語言及信仰為基礎的革命建國歷史記憶。 從中國的內政視野，政治穩定與否是東突問題載浮載沉的關鍵，清末與民國時期的內憂外患時期自不待言。中共建政之初，對少數民族採取相對溫和的社會主義改造政策，漸次形成了認同的政治文化，然而卻隨著左右傾路線發展遭到破壞；雖然1989年中共實施經濟改革後，新疆少數民族亦從中獲利，但幅度始終跟不上漢族的移入者，以致無論是民族關係、經濟關係乃至政治關係上均惡化為破碎的政治文化，即漢族始終自認是政策利多的給予者，而少數民族則自視為被剝奪者與受害者。1991年蘇聯解體之後，中亞五國獨立對新疆少數民族造成磁吸效應，成為東突議題再起的火種。然自江澤民上台之後，對於東突治理的基調仍採取軍事過硬的鎮壓手段，並未從根本解決少數民族的問題，以致民族融合更加困難，暴力衝突的數量與規模屢創新高。 從區域安全角度，新疆與其隔鄰的中亞自古以來就是伊斯蘭、儒家、斯拉夫與佛教等四大文明邊緣的交會破碎區，少數遊牧民族逐水草而居的生活型態更打破國家之間的界線，伊斯蘭宗教信仰與突厥方言的識別取代了國家認同。以致本地區所謂的認同兼具有脆弱性與包容性。因此，自古以來外在強權對於本地區並不刻意建立有形的實質統治，而是透過優勢文化或軟實力滲透，讓區域內的少數民族對強勢帝權國家產生有形與無形依賴，前者是物質與經濟力量，後者是文化與心理作用。兩相交替，造成被影響國家邊境少數民族出現認同危機。過去是沙俄與前蘇聯藉此覬覦中國的領土，現今則有美國、歐洲乃至日本加入競逐天然資源蘊藏豐富的中亞地區，以各種優厚的條件，取得天然資源開發特許權。 從治理成果評估，新疆少數民族、東突議題與中共政權之間不僅在中國大陸境內出現認同分離現象，並隨著全球資訊化的發展，使得國內問題惡化為國際議題。衝突雙方藉由印象管理、符號黏合等方式，在各自的舞台上展示政治訴求。雖然在以主權國家為主體的國際體系中，東突組織屈居下風；然而受到網際網穿透性、民族宗教關懷，或者，如中共政權所認定之「國際陰謀」作用，使得部分東突組織與成員雖然不足以影響大局，但仍透過相關議題在特定國際社會場域形成動靜觀瞻之國際影響。 / From the historical aspect, Russia mixed the concepts of geography, religion and nation to establish the title of “East-Turkistan” in 19th century, and then attracted the minorities of Xinjiang into her Center Asia provinces by the ideas of Pan-Islam and Pan-Turkism. By the power of discourse, Russia’s new map about the East-Turkistan got the recognitions in the world. In 1944, the eve of Chinese Civil War, Soviet Union supported the Xinjiang minorities to establish the “Republic of East-Turkistan”. Mao Zedong praised it “Three Regions Revolution” to combine the spirit of revolution in the China Mainland. All these give the modern Xinjiang minorities fresh founding memory till now. Tracing the development of Chinese internal affairs, there are significant relations between the issues of East-Turkistan and domestic political stable. It goes without saying the worse situation during the late Qing dynasty and the early Republic of China (ROC). In the beginning of People’s Republic of China (PRC) regime, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) taking the warm socialism reform policies, got the Xinjiang minorities’ identity and formed the unify political culture, which been broken by following political conflicts in a short time. In 1978, the CCP promoted the economic reform policies, the Xinjiang minorities got some profit from it, but the earnings could not compare with the Han immigrations. All of those led the ethnic, economic and political relations becoming a cracked political culture. In other words, the Han thought themselves as givers of the profit, but the Xinjiang minorities felt been exploited. The independent tide of the five former Central Asia Republics after dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 produced the magnetic effect to Xinjiang minorities and stimulated the revival of East-Turkistan issues. Since Jiang Zemin, the Secretary General of CCP still compressed the problem by military means in 1992; the ethnic integration in Xinjiang becomes more difficult. The number of violence accidents hits higher and higher level. According to the regional security, Xinjiang and Central Asia locate at the crossroad of four civilizations, including Islam, Confucius, Slavs and Buddhism. In addition to the living style of nomads breaking the boundaries in this area, the Islamic belief and Turkic dialect take place the national identity, which are full of the vulnerability and tolerance. The outside superpowers penetrate this area by excellent culture and soft power instead of creating functional institutions, causing the crisis of identity or loyalty. For example, the Russia and Soviet Union invaded the vast land of Xinjiang in the 19th; the US, Europe and Japan rapidly join the great competition of natural resources in Central Asia nowadays. Evaluation the policy of CCP toward East-Turkistan is not easy. This is not only the identity crisis in China, but also transfers into the international field. Both sides take the strategies of impression management and exegetical bonding to show their political appeals. Although the realistic international system is composed by the sovereignty states obstructed the East Turkistan organizations, which still take advantages of internet, ethnic and religious methods to attract some specific concerns. This study found that: First, the proper noun “East Turkistan” does not created by the Uyghur themselves, but by the Russia in the 19th. In addition, The Republic of East Turkistan (1944-1949) organized by many minorities of Xinjiang, not by Uyghur only. Therefore, the Uyghur can’t be referred to the East Turkistan totally. Second, the definition of East Turkistan problem is rebellion or terrorist attack is decided by the Chinese central government. The Republic of China thought it as the Soviet Union agitated the local minorities’ armed rebellion. The CCP took the same viewpoints before 1990s. While, the CCP highlights the terrorism about the East Turkistan’s issues that got few recognition from the US and UN after September 11 attack. Although the change let the CCP wins tiny interest in a short period, the foreign countries use the excuse of human rights and against radical anti-terrorism strategy to intervene the CCP domestic issues. Third, the exile Uyghur does not get the general agreement about resistance movement and the core attitude toward the CCP. Those are the obstacles for the exile Uyghur to form the unify action and power. Forth, the CCP always declares to the world that the Xinjiang Uyghur relates closely with the East Turkistan terrorism organizations. That enrages some Uyghur to take fierce actions against the CCP. Now the most important duty for the CCP is to find a balance between the removals of terrorism label from the Uyghur and increasing the budget for the anti-terrorism mission. Fifth, the appeals of Rebiya Kadeer and the overseas Uyghur groups which she leads do not want to establish an independent state. Instead, she struggles to ask a higher autonomy. The idea is familiar to the Soviet republics, but refused by the CCP.