Au Tchad, le triptyque « armées, sécurité et rébellions » est indissociable, tant il mêle des acteurs armés qui ont dominé la scène nationale depuis l’indépendance du pays en 1960. L’entrelacs des intérêts et des combats a aussi provoqué l’implication d’intervenants extérieurs nombreux, la France et la Libye en premier lieu. Tous ont participé à cette séquence historique, de 1969 à 1990, dominée par l'émergence d'une rébellion, le Front de libération nationale du Tchad (FROLINAT), qui finira par s'emparer du pouvoir et engendrer une guerre civile suivie d'une guerre de libération des provinces du Nord. La France s’engage au Tchad en 1969 dans sa première véritable guerre depuis l’indépendance de l’Algérie, et dès lors restera actrice du destin de ce pays, sous tous les régimes successifs, de Tombalbaye au régime d’Hissène Habré. Elle cherche à conserver son appréciation autonome de situation, et renseigner sur les groupes rebelles du Tchad, la Jamariyya libyenne, voire ses propres alliés, afin de donner à ses décideurs politiques et militaires des clés de compréhension et d’action. Dans cette guerre d’un genre nouveau et méconnu des citoyens français, le renseignement et les actions spéciales constituent des armes fondamentales au cœur des engagements opérationnels, de l’évolution des différents types de capteurs, et des tensions interservices entre le SDECE/DGSE et les autres services chargés de renseignement. Parce qu'elle veut conserver son rang en Afrique notamment dans la bande sahélo-saharienne, concurrencée par les Etats-Unis, défiante vis-à-vis de la Libye et de l'Union soviétique; parce qu'elle est très impliquée dans les affaires intérieures du Tchad, parfois avec excès; et enfin parce que ses adversaires la contraignent à une adaptation permanente de posture et de capacités militaires, la France va faire du Tchad son point focal en Afrique, le laboratoire de ses futurs engagements, à la frontière entre légalité et légitimité, entre actions conventionnelles et spéciales, entre raison d'Etat et diplomatie. / In Chad, the triptych « armed forces, security and rebellion » is inextricably linked, so much it mixes armed players that dominated the scene since the independence in 1960. The interlacing of interests and fights also led to the involvement of external players, making Chad an enduring challenge for France, Libya, United-States and many others. Those countries, along with local players, participated to this historical sequence, 1969-1990, dominated by the apparition of the FROLINAT’ rebellion, that will finally seize power and generate a civil war followed by a liberation war of the Northern provinces. Thus France will commit itself in Chad in 1969, in its first real African war since the independence of Algeria, and by then will remain actress of Chad’s destiny whatever the political system is, from Tombalbaye to Hissène Habré’s reign. France will try to keep its autonomous situation awareness and collect intelligence on the Chadian rebel groups, the Jamariyya, or even its own allies, in order to provide to the political and military decision-makers some keys for understanding and acting. In this new type of warfare, unknown by the French population, intelligence and special actions manage to be fundamental weapons at the core of operational commitment, sensors evolutions, and interagency tensions between the SDECE/DGSE and the other intelligence services. Because France wants to keep its rank in Africa, especially in the Sahelian strip, challenged by the United-States, defying Libya and hampered by the Soviet Union; because it is deeply committed in the internal affairs of Chad, sometimes too deeply; and finally because its adversaries do compel it to an everlasting adaptation of its posture and military capabilities, France will make Chad its focal point in Africa, the laboratory of its future deployments, at the edge between legacy and legitimacy, between conventional and special actions, between raison d’Etat and diplomacy.

In dieser Arbeit wird das Thema Adoleszenz in dem Roman Jenseits der blauen Grenze von DoritLinke, in Bezug auf Persönlichkeitsentfaltung, untersucht und welchen Einflüssen des Staates sowieder Erwachsenen im Umfeld die Jugendlichen ausgesetzt sind. Thematisiert werden unter anderemdie Phasen der Adoleszenz und Freundschaft, aus psychoanalytischer Sicht, im Rahmen derJugendzeit

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In 1979, a handful of Nevada state officials sparked a movement to transfer the large unappropriated domain to the western states. For two years what became known as the Sagebrush Rebellion swept across the American West like brushfire, engaging westerners of all stripes in a heated dispute over the question of the public lands. In Utah, as elsewhere in the West, public officials, rural ranchers, miners, developers, academics, environmentalists, and concerned citizens joined the debate and staked sides. This episode underscored western relationships between people and nature and featured contests over competing ideologies in the West. But it probably did more harm than good in solving the problems of the West and even further polarized westerners against themselves. After just two years in the limelight, the Sagebrush Rebellion unspectacularly faded into public memory, partly as a result of environmental opposition but mostly because Ronald Reagan's administration steered public land policy in a new direction. Interior Secretary James Watt took steps to appease disgruntled westerners by loosening federal regulations on the public lands, but he opposed any efforts for a large-scale transfer. Thus the Sagebrush Rebellion ultimately failed; but still today the sentiment and conflicts that propelled it persist, continuing to color the panorama that is the American West.

This essay explores the dynamic landscape of Anthropocene fiction, using novels such as John Lanchester’s The Wall and Sam J. Miller’s Blackfish City as lenses through which to explore the aftermath of climate change. Both narratives tackle the question: what unfolds in the wake of environmental disaster? Focused on the consequences of flooding, these novels depict worlds grappling with diminishing resources and an acute scarcity of habitable land, intensifying the challenges of overpopulation. In response, the remaining governments resort to authoritarian measures, fostering oppression and control. This exploration unfolds through the lens of four primary Anthropocene themes: climate change, overpopulation, authoritarianism, and rebellion. By examining how these novels navigate these themes, the essay contributes to the emerging field of Anthropocene fiction. Moreover, it highlights the urgent need for addressing climate change while underscoring the social justice implications embedded in these narratives. John Lanchester’s The Wall and Sam J. Miller’s Blackfish City serve as vital contributors to this literary landscape, shedding light on the intricate interplay between humanity and the environment in the face of Anthropocene challenges.

This study investigated how the age of an environmental movement organisation and its degree of institutionalisation impacted the usage of threat-related framing and blame attribution in regards to environmental issues. Environmental discourse has lately developed a rhetoric that embraces urgency and severity, but how different types of environmental movement organisations have approached this, historically and today, has not been widely studied. A mixed-methods approach was therefore employed that thematically examined texts from the Swedish branch of Extinction Rebellion and The Swedish Society for Nature Conservation at several points in time. The analysis indicated that the degree of institutionalisation had an influence on the organisation’s blame attribution, whilst age did not. Furthermore, no conclusive implications followed the analysis of the organisation’s framings. The study concluded that the degree of institutionalisation is an important factor behind how environmental movement organisations choose their blame attribution. The study provided insights into how institutionalisation affects strategic choices of movement organisations, possibly providing a foundation for future research in the field.

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Denna kvalitativa studie ämnar undersöka vilka diskurser, perspektiv och aktörer som speglas i media kring ämnet klimataktivism. Detta har undersökts genom en kritisk diskursanalys i vilken tematisk analys har använts för att analysera 193 stycken medieartiklar från de fyra mest lästa svenska tidningarna. Studien har utförts i en svensk kontext och begränsats till ett tidsspann mellan 2018-2023. Ytterligare presenteras tidigare forskning inom ämnet för ny klimataktivism samt klimataktivism och media. För analysen av resultatet har Foucaults (2003, 2009) teorier kring disciplin, makt och kunskap, ideologi, diskurser, den reglerande apparaten samt olydnad använts som ett övergripande ramverk, vilka kompletteras med begrepp från Mathiesen (1982). Utöver detta har Becks (2009, 2012) teorier om risksamhälle och hot använts, vilka kompletteras med begrepp från Altheide (2013), för att kunna analysera resultatet på omfattande och djupgående sätt, anpassat till det moderna samhället. Medelst detta visar undersökningen en djupgående och omfattande bild genom att rama in mediers speglande av ämnet klimataktivismen i samtiden. Det visades olika, delvis motstridiga, diskurser: ”kampen för klimatet”, ”klimataktivismen som hot” samt ”politiken som hot”, vilka också innefattar olika mindre diskurser om exempelvis ”domedagen” och ”civil olydnad”. Vidare framkom att alla diskurser innefattar positiva och negativa diskursiva aspekter, där dock alla diskurser och aspekter ramas in av en allomfattande ”riskdiskurs” som uttrycks genom de olika perspektiven inom ämnet klimataktivism. Sist förs en avslutande diskussion om konsekvenserna och utkomsterna av denna diskursiva framställning av klimataktivism; en reflektion kring vad som sker och kan ske genom mediers porträttering och vilken vikt media har för produktionen av upplevelser i samhället. / This qualitative study aims to analyse discourses, perspectives and actors which are represented in media within the topic: climate activism. The study was implemented through critical discourse analysis (CDA) in which thematic analysis was used to analyse the material of 193 news articles from the four most read Swedish newspapers. Furthermore, the study was delimited to Sweden and in a timeframe from 2018-2023. Also, previous research about today’s climate activism and climate activism and media is represented. For the analysis of the results, Foucault’s (2009, 2003) theories about discipline, power and knowledge, ideology, discourse, the ruling apparatus, and disobedience have been used. These theories have been completed by concepts from Mathiesen (1982). Moreover Beck’s (2009, 2012) theories of risk society and threat have been used and completed by concepts from Altheide (2013), to be able to analyse the results in an extensive and profound way which fits today’s modern society. Through that, the study shows a deep and including picture that frames how media portraits the topic: climate activism. The study has shown discourses, that in some ways are contradictory: “fight for the climate”, “climate activists as threat” and “politics as threat”. These discourses include several smaller discourses, for instance “doomsday” and “civil disobedience”. Also, it has been shown that all discourses include positive and negative aspects, yet all discourses and aspects of them set in an all-encompassing “risk-discourse”, which takes form through the different perspectives that are included in the subject of climate activism. Lastly, a final discussion is held about the consequences and outcomes of the discursive representation of climate activism; a reflection about what is and what can be happening because of the representation through media and what significance media has in the production of experience in society. / <p>2024-05-30</p>

Le mal est par sa nature un scandale car il se définit par ce qui ne devrait pas être à l’opposé du bien qui se présente comme ce qui doit être. Cette affirmation, qui relève de la tautologie, marque la réalité éprouvée face au mal. Il a d’abord été une évidence criante : comment réagir face aux maux de l’existence humaine ? Ainsi le mal est inscrit dans l’histoire de la pensée et commence pour notre travail avec le platonisme. Avant la conceptualisation platonicienne, le mal est une donnée factuelle de la vie avec laquelle il faut composer. Les figures divines sont ambivalentes à l’image des hommes et alternent vices et vertus. Platon postule une entité divine unique, omnisciente, omnipotente et bienveillante. Ce dieu devient intelligence, calcul et raison : le monde devient une création parfaite, belle et ordonnée et non plus le théâtre d’un affrontement entre les diverses passions des dieux. Le mal se transforme alors en un enjeu métaphysique : comment concilier cette perfection avec l’émergence du mal ? Il faut désormais expliquer et tenter de justifier la violence et les crimes. S’il est possible de proposer une théodicée qui rende le mal physique et métaphysique nécessaire, légitimer la méchanceté se révèle plus ardu. Les penseurs du platonisme, du néoplatonisme et du stoïcisme vont tenter d’apporter une première réponse au mal moral. Dans leur sillage, une rupture conceptuelle advient et révolutionne le concept : le christianisme invente le péché. En devenant péché, le mal se retrouve désormais sous la responsabilité de l’homme coupable. Le mal entre dans le giron de la liberté : il est voulu, consenti. A la suite des penseurs chrétiens, certains philosophes continueront ce travail d’élucidation de la volonté du mal. L’objectif est de retracer l’histoire de ces systèmes conceptuels qui s’entremêlent et se répondent les uns aux autres. Le mal moral se construit dans cette progression qui a des conséquences anthropologiques importantes : l’homme se pense à travers le mal. La méchanceté n’est donc pas seulement un problème à résoudre, elle devient le paradigme à travers lequel définir l’homme. Notre problématique est de montrer comment la question de la méchanceté est à la base du problème de la morale et comment elle conditionne notre représentation de la nature de la volonté humaine. Cette évolution s’est nouée lors d’étapes clés de la pensée philosophique. En effet, si dans toute philosophie morale, le concept du mal est évoqué, il n’est pas en général le centre de l’argumentaire. Le premier moment est celui de la pensée antique. Platon fait naître Dieu et le monde dans l’histoire des concepts puis se retrouve face l’énigme de nos crimes. La théodicée mise en place et qui sera reprise par Plotin et les Stoïciens ne cessera de nier l’existence d’un instinct pervers. Le mal voulu est une absurdité. L’irruption de la faute chrétienne bouleverse la donne. Saint Augustin en sera le théoricien le plus investi affectivement. Ayant expérimenté une double conversion dans sa vie spirituelle, il théorise une méchanceté issue de notre faiblesse, de notre faute première. Le mal est voulu car il n’est plus possible de vouloir autre chose. Saint Anselme reprend également le dogme de la chute mais lui apporte une dimension logique et sémantique en proposant une méchanceté égoïste. Le mal est certes voulu mais par dédain du bien. Notre dernière étape est kantienne. Le mal radical est le concept qui permet enfin de penser une volonté normale qui voudrait le mal simplement parce qu’elle a en elle cette possibilité et la liberté fondamentale de le choisir. Nous pourrons donc constater le chemin parcouru entre notre point de départ et notre point d’arrivée et comment cette problématisation du mal fait apparaître une généalogie de la volonté. Au fil de la pensée, elle passe de l’ombre à la lumière, n’étant jamais aussi présente que quand elle se retrouve confrontée aux obstacles. Penser le mal moral c’est faire l’archéologie de la volonté. / Evil provokes scandal by nature because it is what it should not be unlike good which is what it has to be. This tautological assertion expresses our feelings toward evil. It was first perfectly obvious : how must we face human pain ? Evil is a part of thinking’s history : our study starts with Platonism. Before his work, evil is just a fact of life you have to live with. The gods of Antiquity are like men : good or bad. The God of Plato is the one, omniscient, all-powerful and kindly. God is just intelligence, calculation and reason : the world he created is beautiful, ordered and perfect and it is no longer the place for the vices of ancient gods. Evils turns into a metaphysical issue : how can be the world perfect despite evil ? We have now to explain, to justify violence and crimes. Theodicy can justify pain and illness. It does not work with wickedness. Platonism, Neo-Platonism and Stoicism tried to answer this question. Following them, a conceptual break happens : Christendom invented sin. When evil became sin, man became liable and guilty. It is now a matter of liberty : man wants evil. After them, some philosophers will keep to work on the subject of the bad will. Our purpose is to find the story of these concepts and to connect thoughts between themselves. Evil has been made by this story and brings many anthropological consequences : man understands himself through evil. Wickedness is not just a matter to solve, wickedness becomes a way to define mankind. We want to show that wickedness issue is the foundations of morality and how it makes us see and think human will. Several stages occurred in this philosophical evolution. Every ethic deals with evil, not all put it at the heart of their system. Our first stage is Antiquity. Plato brings the ideas of God and perfect world in philosophy but faces the riddle of our crimes. His theodicy adopted by Plotinus and Stoics will always refuse pervert instinct in man. A man who want evil is nonsense. Christian sin appearance changes everything. Augustine will be his strongest defender. By living a double spiritual conversion, he understands wickedness as weakness due to original sin. Man want evil because he is no longer able to will something else. Anselmus follows the dogma of the fall but puts logical and semantic dimension in it and presents a self-interested wickedness. Man wants evil not for itself, man does not want enough good. Our last stage is Kant. Radical will is the first concept which allows to conceive a normal bad will which would evil just because it is one of his options and it has the liberty to do so. We can see the difference between our starting point and our arrival. We see now how the concept of will has grew up and changed. Little by little, will comes from darkness to light. The more will faces obstacles, the more it is obvious. Thinking on evil is the archaeology of the will.

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