There is without doubt as much criticism of Liberation Theology as there is understanding regarding the need for a theology which seeks answers to the effectiveness of the Christian witness, against a background of mounting poverty, the oppression of woman and continued discrimination by one race against another, worldwide. Many scholars struggle with the revolutionary and often hostile nature and methodology of Liberation Theology. This paper attempts to enter into a conversation between the theology of John Wesley and Liberation Theology. The theology of John Wesley had a tremendous impact on social, political and economic areas of the Eighteenth century England. It was in many ways a revolutionary theology. This paper takes as a standpoint, the need for praxis with regard to Christian witness and therefore seeks to argue that there may be common ground between Wesleyan Theology and Liberation Theology. / Systematic Theology and Theological Ethics / M.Th. (Systematic Teology)

Submitted by Viviane Lima da Cunha (viviane@biblioteca.ufpb.br) on 2015-11-23T13:23:22Z No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivototal.pdf: 1484170 bytes, checksum: 4438c4dcffe6cded29457aa7c70d86b8 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-11-23T13:23:22Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivototal.pdf: 1484170 bytes, checksum: 4438c4dcffe6cded29457aa7c70d86b8 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-07-17 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / “Herbert Marcuse‟s „Reason and Revolution‟ towards a institutional changing‟s dialectic” expounds the philosophical reasons of a revolutionnary‟s praxis. The argument is developed by the reciprocity of two dialectic‟s criteria: the historic understanding of the libertarian aims and of its institutional actuality. The freedom as an ontological category, first criterion, and the political process of human liberation, the second, accomplish the elements of the reciprocity‟s dynamics as expounded in “Reason and Revolution” at 1941. The 1960‟s preface, “A note on dialectic” develops the reciprocity between the freedom‟s consciousness and the process of its actuality, as a alternative discourse instead of surrendering to the establishment. The text also recognizes in the Marcuse‟s work of 1966, the analogy between the essential criteria of the dialectic perspective and the understanding that the affluent capitalism‟s negation demands two types of strategies, one stood by the concept of negation one as a internal power and the other as an external one. The internal negation reveals the unaccepetable contradictions of the capitalist system and the external permits understanding the protest for justice and for the human good, universal values, beyond the capitalist system. / “„Raison et Révolution' pour une dialectique de changement institutionel" déploit une fondement philosophique pour la practique révolutionnaire. L'argumentation était déployée par la réciprocité entre deux critères de la dialectique: la compréhension historique des objetives libertaires et la compréhension de sa éféctivité institutionel. La liberté comme catégorie ontologique, prémier critère et le processus politique de libération humaine, le second, constituent les éléments de la dynamique de la réciprocité exposés dans l'oeuvre de 1941, "Raison et Révolution". La réciprocité entre le procesus de connaissance de la libération et le processus de sa éféctivité est confirmée au préface."A note on dialectic" tant comme une language alternative à la capitulation à l'établissement comme le déploiement de l'argumentation à l'année de 1960. Le texte de 1966 "Le concept de négation dans la dialectique" on fait reconnaître l'analogie entre les critères essentiels pour une perspective dialectique et la compréhension que la négation du capitalisme développé demande deux types de stratégies, une fondée sur la négation comme supération interne et l'autre fondée sur la négation extérieure, la première révélée par les contradictions internes d'une totalité-part, la seconde, supération extérieure, que permet de comprendre la clameur de la justice e du bien, éléments universels de la totalité-majeure que la totalité-part capitaliste. / “Razão e Revolução de Herbert Marcuse, por uma Dialética de Alteração Institucional”, expõe a fundamentação filosófica de uma práxis revolucionária. A argumentação é desenvolvida a partir da reciprocidade entre dois critérios da dialética: a compreensão histórica dos objetivos libertários e a compreensão de sua efetivação institucional. A liberdade como categoria ontológica, primeiro critério e o processo político de libertação humana, o segundo, constituem-se elementos da dinâmica de reciprocidade como expostos na obra de 1941, “Razão e Revolução”. No prefácio “A note on dialectic” de 1960, a reciprocidade entre o processo de conscientização da liberdade e o processo de sua efetivação, constitue-se num discurso alternativo à capitulação ao estabelecido. Em 1966, reconhecemos a analogia dos critérios essenciais de uma perspectiva dialética com a compreensão de que a negação do capitalismo tardio exige dois tipos de estratégias, uma fundada na negação enquanto superação interna, e a outra fundada na negação como superação externa, a primeira expressa a partir das contradições internas de um todo-parte e a segunda, a superação externa, permite compreender o clamor por justiça e pelo bem, elementos universais de uma totalidade maior do que o todo-parte capitalista.

This thesis studies the uses of the concept of revolution in Swedish socialist press from 1917 to 1924. Political revolution and civil wars shook several countries. The Russian February and October Revolutions were soon followed by uprisings in countries such as Germany and Finland. While the social and political history of this period, with its mass demonstrations for bread and voting rights, often called the Swedish revolution, has been covered extensively in existing research, we know much less about the theoretical understanding of revolution among Swedish socialists. This thesis examines the concept of revolution from a perspective inspired by the Begriffsgeschichte of German historian Reinhart Koselleck. This foundation in the history of concepts aims at understanding how Swedish socialists, in a wide sense, understood their own time, how they related to the past and what they expected from the future, during the years of the First World War and the immediately following years. By focusing on what might be the most central, but also the most contested and most difficult to define, concept I hope to complement earlier research focusing on the social and political history of the period and its socialist movements. The main purpose of the thesis is to analyse how the labour movement understood revolution with particular weight placed upon the theoretical and ideological tensions between revolution and reform, determinism and voluntarism and localized and universal revolution. The starting point is the political and social changes in Sweden and abroad at that time and the place of the political press as opinion leaders capable of negotiating the space of political action. A secondary aim is to discuss how focusing on temporality can inspire new perspectives on the use of conceptual history. My research shows that how the concept of revolution was used was shaped both by already established notions regarding the socialist revolution as well as by the political situation at hand. The October Revolution forced a sharpening of its meaning, wherein different factions elaborated their understanding of it in relation to each other, which in turn determined how the concept was used fom that point on.

Cette thèse analyse les échanges artistiques entre la France et l’URSS durant l’entre-deux-guerres, leurs rouages et les avantages mutuels qu’ils présentent. Cette période connaît quatre phases successives, ce qui permet de découper la recherche en autant de parties. La première étudie la période d’avant la reconnaissance de l’URSS par la France et la mise en place des relations diplomatiques (avant 1924) ; la deuxième se penche sur les premiers liens officiels qui suivent ladite reconnaissance (1925-1928) ; la troisième s’intéresse aux années 1928-1934, période du « Grand Tournant » dans l’économie soviétique, et enfin la quatrième englobe les années qui suivent l’instauration du réalisme socialiste en 1934 et se termine avec la guerre. Notre projet tente d’évaluer la pertinence de l’approche stéréotypée portant sur le lien entre art et idéologie, de voir si la peinture soviétique, telle que présentée lors des expositions en France, était similaire à celle exposée en URSS et constituait un outil de propagande à part entière. Sous quelle forme l’art soviétique est-il présenté en France et quel est le rôle des instances dans la mise en place de ces manifestations ? Il s’agit d’étudier le rôle des acteurs de ces échanges : instances étatiques, associations, galeries, spécialistes d’art, intellectuels, collectionneurs ou enfin les artistes eux-mêmes. Nous nous intéressons également aux expositions d’artistes français et à l’organisation de leurs voyages en URSS. Ce travail montre que les maillons de la chaîne « politique-idéologie-finances » sont intimement liés entre eux et que l’argent a souvent un rôle décisif pour les instances soviétiques. / This dissertation focuses on artistic exchange between France and the USSR in the interwar period, its mechanisms and the benefits it presented. This period can be divided into four successive phases, accounting for the four parts this research falls into. The first part studies the years leading up to the recognition of the USSR by France and the setting up of diplomatic relations (prior to 1924); the second part deals with the first official links following the recognition (1925-1928); the third part focuses on the years 1928-1934, a period of economic change also known as « the Great Turn » in Soviet economy and the fourth and final part spans the years after socialist realism was established from 1934 on up to the outbreak of the war. This research questions the stereotypical approach to the link between art and ideology and asks whether Soviet painting, as shown during exhibitions in France, was similar to that shown in the USSR and whether it was, or not, a sheer tool for propaganda. Under what form was Soviet art presented in France and what role did authorities play in organizing artistic events? The role played by the actors of this exchange is studied: state authorities, associations, art galleries, art specialists, intellectuals, collectors, intellectuals, and last but not least the artists themselves. Also studied are the exhibitions of French artists and how their trips to the USSR were organized. This research shows that politics, ideology and money are tightly linked together and that money played a decisive role for Soviet authorities.

No description available.

There is little solid research that explores counterinsurgency practices against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), not only from the standpoint of what is being done, but, rather, what should be done based on past COIN successes. Notable works on counterinsurgency in Colombia include the research of Tom Marks, who focused on operational strategy and tactics; Kevin Self, who professes the importance of controlling territory in defeating the FARC, by addressing the social and institutional ills within Colombia itself; and Dennis Rempe, who notes US involvement in shaping Colombia's COIN strategy. Using a comparative case study model, this thesis provides an analysis of Colombia?s counterinsurgency (COIN) strategies and tactics through the lens of successful and unsuccessful COIN operations in Iraq, Algeria, Malaya, South Vietnam, Thailand, Algeria and El Salvador over the course of the 20th and early 21st centuries. After all, no matter how successful a COIN force is militarily, their accomplishments will ultimately be fruitless if the conditions which fuel insurgency remains present. This paper begins by providing the historical context for the conditions which shaped the Colombian social order, which led to the revolutionary movement. It then follows the growth of the FARC, examining that organization?s strengths and weaknesses. The FARC is contrasted by outlining recent COIN transformation efforts within the Colombian government, to include little acknowledged failures and successes, strengths and weaknesses. An important focus is placed on Colombian President Alvaro Uribe Velez? Democratic Security Policy as the model for Colombia?s current COIN efforts. After next examining various ongoing factors contributing to the Colombian insurgency?to include institutional failures, illicit funding and the problem of paramilitary groups?this thesis examines past COIN efforts by other governments. Finally, after applying lessons learned from thee past COIN efforts?cross-referencing historically successful and unsuccessful tactics with tactics used and not used by Bogota in its fight against the FARC?I provide recommendations to the government of Colombia (GOC) on how to improve its COIN efforts. Although it is important to look at this problem set from an external standpoint, we must still factor in internal factors that have limited Colombia?s ability to emerge victorious, such as allowing porous borders, airspace and coastlines; placing a priority on killing or capturing the enemy and not on engaging the population; and the primacy of military direction of counterinsurgency; disregard of basic human rights; an insufficient judiciary structure; failure to halt financial support mechanisms; and the lack of an outlet for political inclusion . From this vantage point, we will be able to see that these elements?when properly implemented?have proven successful over time and may enhance GOC success and ultimately result in victory over the insurgency that has plagued their country for 40+ years

Cette thèse est une étude du mouvement Cobra à travers les œuvres collectives, une de ses composantes caractéristiques. Il s’agit tout d’abord de comprendre le mouvement, ses origines et influences, ainsi que sa visée d’un art libre, ouvert, expérimental, partie prenante de la vie. Dans un contexte social d’après-guerre, souvent politisé, Cobra défend l’action collective, définie notamment dans les notions d’antispécialisme et d’interspécialisme. Il convient de mettre en exergue les origines de cette pratique, et saisir les divers aspects qu’elle arbore, notamment au travers de revues, d’expositions ou de créations partagées. Le poète Christian Dotremont, animateur et âme de Cobra, favorise le travail de collaboration et contribue à son développement en stimulant les rencontres artistiques. Il se fait le passeur et le permanent "agitateur"» de cette notion. Les peintures-mots qu’il crée avec d’autres artistes participent à sa réflexion majeure sur l’écriture et la peinture. Ce lien interpelle quelques artistes belges comme Pierre Alechinsky, mais il passionne Christian Dotremont qui ne cesse de multiplier les expériences à ce propos, pour aboutir à ce qu’il nomme les logogrammes, remarquable fusion de la peinture et de la poésie, et aboutissement de toute une vie de recherche. <p>Ce travail est structuré en trois points. Le premier établit une étude du contexte artistique et social des années précédent Cobra puis la mise en place du groupe. Le second aborde les années d’intense activité "officielle" du groupe, au service du collectif. Enfin, le troisième propose de suivre l’évolution post-Cobra des œuvres collectives et des recherches sur l’écriture et la peinture. / This thesis is a study of the Cobra movement through one of its characteristic components: the collective works. First of all it's about understanding the movement, its origins (three countries), its influences and its purpose of a free art, open, experimental, involvement with life. In a social after-war context, often politicized, Cobra defends collective action, notably defined in concepts of anti-specialism and inter-specialism. We should therefore underline the origins of this practice and undestand different aspects that it shows, in particular through publications, exhibitions or shared creations. The poet Christian Dotremont, leader and soul of Cobra, promotes cooperative work by collaboration and contributes to its development by stimulating artistic meetings. He is the purveyor and permanent "agitator" of this concept. The words-paintings that he creates with other artists, take part of his major thinking about writing and painting. This link interpellates a few Belgian artists like Pierre Alechinsky, but it fascinates Christian Dotremont who keeps experimenting on it, in order to reach what he calls the logograms, a remarkable fusion of painting and poetry, and a culmination of a life-time of research.<p>This work is structured in three parts. The first one draws a study of the artistic and social context of the years preceding Cobra and the setting up of the group. The second one talks about years of intense "official" activity of the group serving collective way of work. Finally, the third one offers to follow the post-Cobra evolution of collective works and researches about writing and painting. / Doctorat en Histoire, art et archéologie / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

This dissertation is a focused analysis of the origins, organization, training, politics, and combat capability of the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN) from 1954 to 1963, the leading military instrument in the national counterinsurgency plan of the government of the Republic of Viet Nam (RVN). Other military and paramilitary forces that complemented the army in the ground war included the Viet Nam Marine Corps (VNMC), the Civil Guard (CG), the Self-Defense Corps (SDC) and the Civil Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) which was composed mainly of the indigenous populations in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam. At sea and in the air, the Viet Nam Air Force (VNAF) and the Viet Nam Navy (VNN) provided additional layers of tactical, strategic and logistical support to the military and paramilitary forces. Together, these forces formed the Republic of Viet Nam Armed Forces (RVNAF) designed to counter the communist insurgency plaguing the RVN. This thesis argues the following. First, the origin of the ARVN was rooted in the French Indochina War (1946-1954). Second, the ARVN was an amalgamation of political and military forces born from a revolution that encompassed three overlapping wars: a war of independence between the Vietnamese and the French; a civil war between the Vietnamese of diverse social and political backgrounds; and a proxy war as global superpowers and regional powers backed their own Vietnamese allies who, in turn, exploited their foreign supporters for their own purposes. Lastly, the ARVN failed not because it was organized, equipped, and trained for conventional instead of counterinsurgency warfare. Rather, it failed to assess, adjust, and adapt its strategy and tactics quickly enough to meet the war’s changing circumstances. The ARVN’s slowness to react resulted from its own institutional weaknesses, military and political problems that were beyond its control, and the powerful and dangerous enemies it faced. The People’s Army of Viet Nam (PAVN) and the People’s Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF) were formidable adversaries. Not duplicated in any other post-colonial Third World country and led by an experienced and politically tested leadership, the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam (DRVN) and the National Front for the Liberation of Southern Viet Nam (NFLSVN) exploited RVN failures effectively. Hypothetically, there was no guarantee that had the US dispatched land forces into Cambodia and Laos or invaded North Vietnam that the DRVN and NFLSVN would have quit attacking the RVN. The French Far East Expeditionary Corps (FFEEC)’ occupation of the Red River Delta did not bring peace to Cochinchina, only a military stalemate between it and the Vietnamese Liberation Army (VLA). Worse yet, a US invasion potentially would have unnerved the People’s Republic of China (PRC) which might have sent the PLAF to fight the US in Vietnam as it had in Korea. Inevitably, such unilateral military action would certainly provoke fierce criticism and opposition amongst the American public at home and allies abroad. At best, the war’s expansion might have bought a little more time for the RVN but it could never guarantee South Vietnam’s survival. Ultimately, RVN’s seemingly endless political, military, and social problems had to be resolved by South Vietnam’s political leaders, military commanders, and people but only in the absence of constant PAVN and PLAF attempts to destroy whatever minimal progress RVN made politically, militarily, and socially. The RVN was plagued by many problems and the DRVN and NFLSVN, unquestionably, were amongst those problems.

This dissertation is a focused analysis of the origins, organization, training, politics, and combat capability of the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN) from 1954 to 1963, the leading military instrument in the national counterinsurgency plan of the government of the Republic of Viet Nam (RVN). Other military and paramilitary forces that complemented the army in the ground war included the Viet Nam Marine Corps (VNMC), the Civil Guard (CG), the Self-Defense Corps (SDC) and the Civil Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) which was composed mainly of the indigenous populations in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam. At sea and in the air, the Viet Nam Air Force (VNAF) and the Viet Nam Navy (VNN) provided additional layers of tactical, strategic and logistical support to the military and paramilitary forces. Together, these forces formed the Republic of Viet Nam Armed Forces (RVNAF) designed to counter the communist insurgency plaguing the RVN. This thesis argues the following. First, the origin of the ARVN was rooted in the French Indochina War (1946-1954). Second, the ARVN was an amalgamation of political and military forces born from a revolution that encompassed three overlapping wars: a war of independence between the Vietnamese and the French; a civil war between the Vietnamese of diverse social and political backgrounds; and a proxy war as global superpowers and regional powers backed their own Vietnamese allies who, in turn, exploited their foreign supporters for their own purposes. Lastly, the ARVN failed not because it was organized, equipped, and trained for conventional instead of counterinsurgency warfare. Rather, it failed to assess, adjust, and adapt its strategy and tactics quickly enough to meet the war’s changing circumstances. The ARVN’s slowness to react resulted from its own institutional weaknesses, military and political problems that were beyond its control, and the powerful and dangerous enemies it faced. The People’s Army of Viet Nam (PAVN) and the People’s Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF) were formidable adversaries. Not duplicated in any other post-colonial Third World country and led by an experienced and politically tested leadership, the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam (DRVN) and the National Front for the Liberation of Southern Viet Nam (NFLSVN) exploited RVN failures effectively. Hypothetically, there was no guarantee that had the US dispatched land forces into Cambodia and Laos or invaded North Vietnam that the DRVN and NFLSVN would have quit attacking the RVN. The French Far East Expeditionary Corps (FFEEC)’ occupation of the Red River Delta did not bring peace to Cochinchina, only a military stalemate between it and the Vietnamese Liberation Army (VLA). Worse yet, a US invasion potentially would have unnerved the People’s Republic of China (PRC) which might have sent the PLAF to fight the US in Vietnam as it had in Korea. Inevitably, such unilateral military action would certainly provoke fierce criticism and opposition amongst the American public at home and allies abroad. At best, the war’s expansion might have bought a little more time for the RVN but it could never guarantee South Vietnam’s survival. Ultimately, RVN’s seemingly endless political, military, and social problems had to be resolved by South Vietnam’s political leaders, military commanders, and people but only in the absence of constant PAVN and PLAF attempts to destroy whatever minimal progress RVN made politically, militarily, and socially. The RVN was plagued by many problems and the DRVN and NFLSVN, unquestionably, were amongst those problems.

This dissertation is a focused analysis of the origins, organization, training, politics, and combat capability of the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN) from 1954 to 1963, the leading military instrument in the national counterinsurgency plan of the government of the Republic of Viet Nam (RVN). Other military and paramilitary forces that complemented the army in the ground war included the Viet Nam Marine Corps (VNMC), the Civil Guard (CG), the Self-Defense Corps (SDC) and the Civil Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) which was composed mainly of the indigenous populations in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam. At sea and in the air, the Viet Nam Air Force (VNAF) and the Viet Nam Navy (VNN) provided additional layers of tactical, strategic and logistical support to the military and paramilitary forces. Together, these forces formed the Republic of Viet Nam Armed Forces (RVNAF) designed to counter the communist insurgency plaguing the RVN. This thesis argues the following. First, the origin of the ARVN was rooted in the French Indochina War (1946-1954). Second, the ARVN was an amalgamation of political and military forces born from a revolution that encompassed three overlapping wars: a war of independence between the Vietnamese and the French; a civil war between the Vietnamese of diverse social and political backgrounds; and a proxy war as global superpowers and regional powers backed their own Vietnamese allies who, in turn, exploited their foreign supporters for their own purposes. Lastly, the ARVN failed not because it was organized, equipped, and trained for conventional instead of counterinsurgency warfare. Rather, it failed to assess, adjust, and adapt its strategy and tactics quickly enough to meet the war’s changing circumstances. The ARVN’s slowness to react resulted from its own institutional weaknesses, military and political problems that were beyond its control, and the powerful and dangerous enemies it faced. The People’s Army of Viet Nam (PAVN) and the People’s Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF) were formidable adversaries. Not duplicated in any other post-colonial Third World country and led by an experienced and politically tested leadership, the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam (DRVN) and the National Front for the Liberation of Southern Viet Nam (NFLSVN) exploited RVN failures effectively. Hypothetically, there was no guarantee that had the US dispatched land forces into Cambodia and Laos or invaded North Vietnam that the DRVN and NFLSVN would have quit attacking the RVN. The French Far East Expeditionary Corps (FFEEC)’ occupation of the Red River Delta did not bring peace to Cochinchina, only a military stalemate between it and the Vietnamese Liberation Army (VLA). Worse yet, a US invasion potentially would have unnerved the People’s Republic of China (PRC) which might have sent the PLAF to fight the US in Vietnam as it had in Korea. Inevitably, such unilateral military action would certainly provoke fierce criticism and opposition amongst the American public at home and allies abroad. At best, the war’s expansion might have bought a little more time for the RVN but it could never guarantee South Vietnam’s survival. Ultimately, RVN’s seemingly endless political, military, and social problems had to be resolved by South Vietnam’s political leaders, military commanders, and people but only in the absence of constant PAVN and PLAF attempts to destroy whatever minimal progress RVN made politically, militarily, and socially. The RVN was plagued by many problems and the DRVN and NFLSVN, unquestionably, were amongst those problems.