A ipseidade na ética argumentativa de Paul Ricoeur é a referência básica da hermenêutica do si ao qual sempre retorna. Ela estabelece a constante mediação reflexiva em oposição à pretensa posição imediata do sujeito. A mesmidade do si tem como contrapartida o outro. Na comparação, a mesmidade é sinônimo de identidade-idem em oposição à ipseidade-ipse que inclui a alteridade. Esta inclusão questiona a capacidade do si construtivo da ética e, portanto, responsável jurídica e moralmente nas várias injunções do outro. O projeto ético de Ricoeur é compreensível a partir e dentro de sua peculiar metodologia que ele denomina de dialética entre a ética teleológica e a moral deontológica. Esta dialética se fundamenta na tríade do desejo, do dever e da sabedoria prática em recíproca atividade, privilegiando a dimensão teleológica do desejo da vida boa com o outro e para o outro em instituições justas. A ética argumentativa tem a função de dar conteúdo as duas dialéticas pela inclusão do outro no si mesmo sem o qual a reflexão sobre a ipseidade perderia o sentido. A sabedoria prática da ética e do julgamento moral em situação inclui a discussão porque o conflito é insuperável e determina o argumento para o consenso eventual. Nossa tese é a afirmação da capacidade do si mesmo atuar ações construtivas. Além da critica à ideologia e à utopia, Ricoeur fundamenta a dialética entre o princípio-esperança e o princípio de responsabilidade mediante a via utópica do futuro e a via realista da preocupação com o presente diante dos casos inéditos em que a vida e o ecossistema se associam. A imputação pessoal e coletiva desde o passado, no presente para o futuro é devida à responsabilidade. A ipseidade constrói o futuro no presente através de decisões éticas. / The ipseity in ethics argumentative of Paul Ricoeur is the basic reference of the hermeneutic of the selfhood that he always returns. She settles the constant reflexive mediation in the opposition supposed immediate position of the subject. The sameness of the selfhood has like counterpoint the other. In the comparison, it is a synonym of identity-ditto an opposition ipseity-ipse that it includes the others. This inclusion questions the capacity of the self to be ethical and, ergo responsible juridical and morals in the various junction of the other. The ethical project of Ricoeur is comprehensible from and inside his peculiar methodology that he nominates dialectics between the teleological ethics and the deontological moral. This dialectics settles the triad of desire, obligation and practical wisdom in reciprocal activity, privileging the teleological dimension of the desire goods life with the other and for other in fair institutions. The ethics argumentative has the function to give contents the two triads, through the inclusion of the other in selfhood without the reflection about ipseity would lose sense. The practical wisdom of the ethical and moral judgement in situation includes discussion because the conflict is insuperable and it determines the best argument for the eventual consensus. Our thesis is the affirmation capacitys of selfhood to actuate constructive actions. By critique on ideology and utopia Ricoeur bases the dialectics between the principlehope and the principle of responsibility through utopian way of future and realistic way of preoccupation with the present in front of the hard cases that life and the ecosystem are associated. The personal and collective ascription on the past, in the present towards the future is due to the moral responsibility. The selfhood constructs the future in the present by your ethics decisions. It deals about ethical capacity of selfhood.

This thesis is a critical discussion of political thinker Hannah Arendt’s moral thought, as developed in her works from EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM onwards. Arendt, I argue, sought to respond to the moral challenge she saw posed by the phenomenon of banal evildoing, as revealed in Nazi Germany. Banal evildoers are agents who, under circumstances in which their ordinary moral triggers and guides (conscience, moral habits and norms, the behavior of their peers, etc.) are subverted, commit evil despite having no evil intent. Such subversion of ordinary moral voices would appear to absolve these agents from moral responsibility for their acts, which led most commentators to reject claims to such subversion by Nazi collaborators. Arendt, who sees the phenomenon of banal evildoing as factually substantiated, set out to show that such agents possessed other mental capacities (namely, critical and speculative thinking, reflective judging, and free willing), more appropriate for moral decision-making, on which they could have relied even under Nazi conditions. It is for their disregard of such capacities that banal evildoers can be held morally responsible. In this thesis I critically engage with this Arendtian argument. I show how the Nazi subversion of German agents’ ordinary moral voices was achieved. I then exegetically explicate Arendt’s (unfinished) analysis of the above mental capacities and of their moral role. I then argue for the addition of the capacities of empathetic perception and practical wisdom to this understanding of moral performance. In the course of this analysis I show that in responding to this challenge, Arendt develops a powerful argument regarding the moral dangers of overreliance on mental shortcuts in decision-making, a strong argument regarding the interconnectedness between morality and humanness, and implicitly, a novel conception of selfhood that sees otherness as interrelated and interconnected with selfhood, such that concern for others is part of what constitutes, and therefore is inscribed into, care for the self. I end by critically assessing the applicability of Arendt’s moral analysis to more ordinary decisional circumstances than those of Nazi Germany, and the insight this analysis points to regarding the relationship between moral and political decision-making.

This thesis is a critical discussion of political thinker Hannah Arendt’s moral thought, as developed in her works from EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM onwards. Arendt, I argue, sought to respond to the moral challenge she saw posed by the phenomenon of banal evildoing, as revealed in Nazi Germany. Banal evildoers are agents who, under circumstances in which their ordinary moral triggers and guides (conscience, moral habits and norms, the behavior of their peers, etc.) are subverted, commit evil despite having no evil intent. Such subversion of ordinary moral voices would appear to absolve these agents from moral responsibility for their acts, which led most commentators to reject claims to such subversion by Nazi collaborators. Arendt, who sees the phenomenon of banal evildoing as factually substantiated, set out to show that such agents possessed other mental capacities (namely, critical and speculative thinking, reflective judging, and free willing), more appropriate for moral decision-making, on which they could have relied even under Nazi conditions. It is for their disregard of such capacities that banal evildoers can be held morally responsible. In this thesis I critically engage with this Arendtian argument. I show how the Nazi subversion of German agents’ ordinary moral voices was achieved. I then exegetically explicate Arendt’s (unfinished) analysis of the above mental capacities and of their moral role. I then argue for the addition of the capacities of empathetic perception and practical wisdom to this understanding of moral performance. In the course of this analysis I show that in responding to this challenge, Arendt develops a powerful argument regarding the moral dangers of overreliance on mental shortcuts in decision-making, a strong argument regarding the interconnectedness between morality and humanness, and implicitly, a novel conception of selfhood that sees otherness as interrelated and interconnected with selfhood, such that concern for others is part of what constitutes, and therefore is inscribed into, care for the self. I end by critically assessing the applicability of Arendt’s moral analysis to more ordinary decisional circumstances than those of Nazi Germany, and the insight this analysis points to regarding the relationship between moral and political decision-making.

A ipseidade na ética argumentativa de Paul Ricoeur é a referência básica da hermenêutica do si ao qual sempre retorna. Ela estabelece a constante mediação reflexiva em oposição à pretensa posição imediata do sujeito. A mesmidade do si tem como contrapartida o outro. Na comparação, a mesmidade é sinônimo de identidade-idem em oposição à ipseidade-ipse que inclui a alteridade. Esta inclusão questiona a capacidade do si construtivo da ética e, portanto, responsável jurídica e moralmente nas várias injunções do outro. O projeto ético de Ricoeur é compreensível a partir e dentro de sua peculiar metodologia que ele denomina de dialética entre a ética teleológica e a moral deontológica. Esta dialética se fundamenta na tríade do desejo, do dever e da sabedoria prática em recíproca atividade, privilegiando a dimensão teleológica do desejo da vida boa com o outro e para o outro em instituições justas. A ética argumentativa tem a função de dar conteúdo as duas dialéticas pela inclusão do outro no si mesmo sem o qual a reflexão sobre a ipseidade perderia o sentido. A sabedoria prática da ética e do julgamento moral em situação inclui a discussão porque o conflito é insuperável e determina o argumento para o consenso eventual. Nossa tese é a afirmação da capacidade do si mesmo atuar ações construtivas. Além da critica à ideologia e à utopia, Ricoeur fundamenta a dialética entre o princípio-esperança e o princípio de responsabilidade mediante a via utópica do futuro e a via realista da preocupação com o presente diante dos casos inéditos em que a vida e o ecossistema se associam. A imputação pessoal e coletiva desde o passado, no presente para o futuro é devida à responsabilidade. A ipseidade constrói o futuro no presente através de decisões éticas. / The ipseity in ethics argumentative of Paul Ricoeur is the basic reference of the hermeneutic of the selfhood that he always returns. She settles the constant reflexive mediation in the opposition supposed immediate position of the subject. The sameness of the selfhood has like counterpoint the other. In the comparison, it is a synonym of identity-ditto an opposition ipseity-ipse that it includes the others. This inclusion questions the capacity of the self to be ethical and, ergo responsible juridical and morals in the various junction of the other. The ethical project of Ricoeur is comprehensible from and inside his peculiar methodology that he nominates dialectics between the teleological ethics and the deontological moral. This dialectics settles the triad of desire, obligation and practical wisdom in reciprocal activity, privileging the teleological dimension of the desire goods life with the other and for other in fair institutions. The ethics argumentative has the function to give contents the two triads, through the inclusion of the other in selfhood without the reflection about ipseity would lose sense. The practical wisdom of the ethical and moral judgement in situation includes discussion because the conflict is insuperable and it determines the best argument for the eventual consensus. Our thesis is the affirmation capacitys of selfhood to actuate constructive actions. By critique on ideology and utopia Ricoeur bases the dialectics between the principlehope and the principle of responsibility through utopian way of future and realistic way of preoccupation with the present in front of the hard cases that life and the ecosystem are associated. The personal and collective ascription on the past, in the present towards the future is due to the moral responsibility. The selfhood constructs the future in the present by your ethics decisions. It deals about ethical capacity of selfhood.

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No / This book takes a novel approach to the study of male eating disorders – an area that is often dominated by clinical discourses. The study of eating disorders in men has purportedly suffered from a lack of dedicated attention to personal and socio-cultural aspects. Delderfield tackles this deficiency by spotlighting a set of personal accounts written by a group of men who have experiences of disordered eating. The text presents critical interpretations that aim to situate these experiences in the social and cultural context in which these disorders occur. This discursive work is underpinned by an eclectic scholarly engagement with social psychology and sociology literature around masculinities, embodiment and fatness, belonging, punishment, stigma, and control; leading to understandings about relationships with food, body and self. This is undertaken with a reflexive element, as the personal intersects with the professional. This text will appeal to students, scholars and clinicians in social sciences, humanities, and healthcare studies, including public health.

The purpose of this project is to argue that we possess a minimal self. It will demonstrate that minimal selfhood arrives early in our development and continues to remain and influence us throughout our entire life. There are two areas of research which shape my understanding of the minimal self: phenomenology and enactivism. Phenomenology emphasizes the sense of givenness, ownership, or mineness that accompanies all of our experiences. Enactivism says there is a sensorimotor coupling that occurs between us and the environment in a way which modulates the dynamic patterns of our self development; the laying down of these basic patterns helps make us who we are and gives rise to the phenomenological, experiential mineness. Drawing on these two core ideas, I will be arguing for a Phenomenological-Enactive Minimal Self (abbreviated PEMS). I will be emphasizing the role of the body and the role of affects (moods, feelings, and emotions) as the most important components relevant to understanding minimal selfhood. Put more concretely, the set of conditions which constitute the PEMS view are: (i) The minimal self is the experiential subject; the minimal sense of self is present whenever there is awareness. It is the subjectivity of experience, the sense of mineness, or givenness which our experiences contain. (ii) The phenomenological part of the PEMS view turns on the idea of a bodily and dynamic integration of sensorimotor coupling and affective experience. It is, ontologically speaking, the lived body in enactive engagement with the environment. It is this embodied subject which anchors and forms the foundation for the later ‘narrative' self, which emerges from it and which is continually influenced by it. It is the subject enactively engaged with others, dependent on sensorimotor processes and affects. We have an identity, but it emerges from relational and dynamic processes.

This thesis explores high-end and bespoke menswear, tailoring and fashion, asking the question - why do some men choose to spend large sums of money to have clothes made for them? Using tailors and high-end menswear as a lens, this thesis unpacks how men construct their notion of self in the digital and terrestrial worlds through the clothes that they wear and the identities they perform. Based on twelve months' terrestrial fieldwork in London and twenty-four months' concurrent digital fieldwork with Instagram, this thesis examines notions of dress, performance and the individual across a multi-dimensional fieldsite set within a blended digital and terrestrial landscape. The fieldwork comprised visiting and interviewing tailors, and observing inside their workshops and at their fashion shows. In addition, the analyst-as-client built relationships with tailors, and constructed a digital self within Instagram through the publication of self-portraits and images of clothing. This thesis is presented in four chapters, flanked by an Introduction and Conclusion. These chapters move from an exploration of terrestrial research in the first two, to an analysis of digital research in the latter two. Five major motifs emerge in this thesis: the importance of the anthropology of clothing and adornment within western society; the nature of the individual in a digitised world; the difficulty in conducting western-centric fieldwork without an element of digital analysis; a methodological restructuring of digital anthropology; and the idea that a digital self can acquire agency. This thesis employs a pioneering blended methodology which brings together the fields of digital anthropology, visual anthropology and material culture to question how selves are constructed in a rapidly changing and increasingly digitised modernity. In conclusion, the thesis argues that individuals construct multiple digital selves and a sense of identity (around the notion of 'authentic individualism') that is illusory.