本研究主要探討的是三大法人是否對公司能夠發揮監督的效果，並加入股東會的因子觀察三大法人是否為了在股東會行使表決權、發揮監督公司效果以達到改善其經營績效的目的而增加其持股比率。研究樣本來自2006年到2014年所有上市上櫃(但不含F股)公司的市場資料及財務資料，並使用普通最小平方法則和固定效果模型對三大法人持股的影響進行分析。 實證結果顯示，三大法人持股比率越高的公司確實會有較好的經營績效，與許多國內外認為機構投資人可以有效監督公司營運的研究結果符合，但在加入股東會因素後，本研究發現只有外資可能藉由其持股在股東會時發揮影響力，以達監督公司之目的；為了更進一步檢驗外資是否真能藉由股東會加強標的公司之公司治理，本研究使用資訊透明度及財報重編次數作為代理變數，模型結果也顯示外資在股東會最後過戶日前有增加持股的公司會有較好的公司治理表現，因此認為外資可能透過股東會以發揮其影響力，但投信及自營商則沒有此行為。

Corporate bodies are essential for the development of companies activities, and their minutes provide a means of evidence and proof of the deliberations and resolutions adopted therein. In certain conlict situations, the presence of a notary public is required in the meetings in order to verify the legality and validity of the resolutions adopted. This is why the General Corporations Law provides for the possibility that the notary public witnesses the general shareholders meeting, but omits it in the case of the board of directors. In this context, the amendment of article 170 of the General Corporations Law expressly incorporates the possibility of counting with the presence of a notary public in the board of directors in order to certify the authenticity of the resolutions and implement immediately the decisions adopted by both corporate bodies. / Los órganos sociales son esenciales para el desarrollo de las actividades de las sociedades y sus actas constituyen un medio de constancia y prueba de las deliberaciones y acuerdos adoptados en ellos. En ciertas situaciones confictivas, se amerita la presencia de un notario en las reuniones para dejar constancia la legalidad y validez de los  acuerdos adoptados. Por ello, la Ley General de Sociedades preveía la posibilidad de que el notario presencie las juntas generales de accionistas, pero lo omitía en el caso del directorio. En este contexto, la modiicación del artículo 170 de la Ley General de Sociedades incorpora de manera expresa la posibilidad de contar con la presencia de un notario en el directorio para certiicar la autenticidad de los acuerdos y poder ejecutar de inmediato las decisiones de ambos órganos sociales.

O presente trabalho tem por objetivo traçar os principais contornos do instituto do benefício particular, positivado na legislação brasileira por meio do artigo 115, §1º, da Lei n. 6.404/76, diferenciando-o do instituto relativo ao interesse conflitante nas sociedades, insculpido no mesmo dispositivo supra citado. A partir da análise do Direito Comparado, constatou-se que o benefício particular, tal como o conhecemos hoje no Brasil, tem origem na legislação francesa, especificamente nas Leis de 17 de julho de 1956 e 24 de julho de 1867. Os contornos de sua conceituação, portanto, estão intimamente ligados às razões de ordem histórica e teleológica que levaram o legislador estrangeiro a criá-lo, o qual visava, à época, afastar os abusos e inconveniências decorrentes da aprovação, em assembleia, de vantagens especiais e exclusivas pelo próprio sócio beneficiário dessas vantagens. Complementarmente, por meio da análise e interpretação sistemática da legislação societária brasileira e de outras fontes de direito disponibilizadas, como a doutrina e a jurisprudência, pôde-se definir algumas das características mais marcantes do instituto, das quais se pode destacar a licitude, a gratuidade e o caráter social das vantagens a ele associadas, garantindo ao beneficiado acesso aos fundos sociais. Em paralelo, para fins de mera comparação com o instituto do benefício particular, foram abordados alguns aspectos relativos ao instituto do conflito de interesses, reafirmando conceitos doutrinários já sedimentados acerca do alcance do interesse social e procurando, a partir da análise da legislação brasileira e comparada, fixar alguns elementos intrínsecos a esse instituto, tal como a ilicitude e o caráter extrassocial da vantagem visada pelo acionista conflitado. Comparando as características do benefício particular e do conflito de interesses, pode-se concluir que, apesar da aparente semelhança que carregam, tratam-se de institutos distintos, que regulam situações diversas, não podendo ser confundidos ou tomados um pelo outro, sendo possível, de fato, se estabelecer um critério relativamente seguro para distingui-los entre si, conferindo uma maior segurança jurídica aos aplicadores do direito, evitando-se, assim, algumas interpretações equivocadas acerca dos institutos, tais como aqueles constantes nos posicionamentos da Comissão de Valores Mobiliários analisados ao final desse trabalho. / The current paper has the sole purpose of designing the main lines of the private benefits regulation, reaffirmed by means of Act 115, §1st, in the Brazilian law number 6.404/76, distinguishing it from institutions that relate to conflicting partnership interests, comprehended by the same aforementioned Act. From assessing the Paired Law regulation, it has been understood that the private benefits, such as it is currently recognized in Brazil, is based on the French legislation, more specifically on the July 17, 1956 and July 24, 1867 Acts. Therefore, the contours of its conceptualism are intimately connected to historic and teleological reasoning that took the foreign regulator to create it and which aimed, at that time, to keep away abuse and inconveniences resulting from the approval, in an shareholders meeting, of special and exclusive advantages by their own beneficiary parties. In addition, by means of systematically assessing and interpreting the Brazilian Corporate Law and other Law resources made available, such as the Law doctrine and jurisprudence, it was possible to determine some of the most outstanding characteristics of such an institute, among which the lawfulness, gratuity and social character of the advantages associated with it can be highlighted, thus assuring the access of the beneficiary party to social funds. In parallel, by means of solely comparing the private benefits regulation, some aspects regarding the conflict of interests were also assessed, reaffirming doctrine concepts about the reach of social interests that are already established and trying to determine, by means of analyzing the Brazilian Corporate Law and Paired Law, some of the elements that are inherent to that establishment, such as its wrongfulness and the extrasocial character of the advantage pledged by the conflicting party. By pairing the characteristics of private benefits and the conflict of interests, it is concluded that, despite their apparent similarities, those are distinct institutes that regulate diverse situations, which cannot be confused or taken by one another and, in fact, it is possible to establish a relatively safe criteria to differentiate both, thus providing greater judicial accuracy to Law enforcers, and this way avoiding misinterpretation of regulation, such as those that are common to the positioning of the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission that are analyzed in the end of this paper.

我國於94年6月22日公布修正後之公司法，正式賦予公司召開股東會時，得採行書面或電子方式供股東行使表決權之法律依據，期能使我國之公司治理與股東權益維護能與國際接軌；惟「股東會電子投票」制度，歷經元大京華證券股份有限公司、台灣總合股務處理股份有限公司及台灣集中保管結算所股份有限公司三個平台之建置，仍然未被各上市、櫃公司廣為採用，即使偶有採用者，其投票總權數占總股份之比例多數未及1%，顯示成效不彰。另2010年10月的亞洲公司治理協會(Asian Corporate Governance Association)年會，提出了最新一份的「CG Watch」報告，在這份報告中，ACGA指出我國推動股權權益的狀況上較前次調查類似，並未有太大改善，比如公司對國外投資人「通訊投票」、「分割投票」權益的行使，相關法規及配套仍不夠完備，而針對「通訊投票」得分，在歷次的評分中，我國都是敬陪末座，可以說，這幾年來此一核心問題並未被重視並獲得具體的改善。 基此本研究將以股東會通訊投票之法令、制度為經，佐以實務之見解為緯，參考外國經驗，藉由分析現行之問題並勾勒未來推動之建議供各界參考。本研究除分析我國股東會之基本概念、表決權行使方式、委託書之使用，並藉由對美、日兩國股東會制度及實務之探討，一窺國際之現況及未來發展之趨勢。另針對我國股東會通訊投票制度與現況進行背景說明，並介紹我國通訊投票下書面投票與電子投票之架構及現況，最後分析我國電子投票採用率偏低之原因。 此外，針對美、日、台三國股東會通訊投票制度分別由法規制度面、股東權益面、公司執行面及電子投票實務面進行比較，最後並提出對相關主事者之建議及對後續研究者未來研究方向之建議，以期經由各界之腦力激盪，共同為我國的資本市場國際化而努力。 / The amendment of Taiwan Company Act in June 22nd, 2005, upon its release, granted each shareholder the legitimate right to cast his/her vote by both written and electronic means in shareholders’ meetings. This amendment is menat to bring Taiwan’s corporate governance and shareholder rights in line with the international practice. However, with the limited use of no more than 1% voting rights of most listing and over-the-counter (OTC) companies on the three voting forums established by Yuanta Core Pacific Securities Co., Ltd., Taiwan Integrated Shareholder Service Company and Taiwan Depository & Clearing Corporation, the attempt has been proven unsuccessful. In addition, the latest “CG Watch” report, submitted during the 2010 Asian Governance Association annual conference held in October, has suggested that, similar to the previous reports, shareholder rights of Taiwan-based companies have not been improved outstandingly. For instance, the exercise of “postal voting” and “vote splitting” upon foreign investors of Taiwan-based companies has been restricted due to the flaws in the domestic voting system and regulations. Also, in the report, a constant low rating in “postal voting” for the Taiwan-based companies simply hints that the core issue has never been properly valued nor concretely improved. Based on the suggestions in the previous paragraph, this research paper provides an overview of the laws and the regulations of the postal voting system. The paper also includes opinions on practical needs and comparison from foreign experiences. By means of analyzing our current issues, the research draws an outline of the propositions for trends of the future development. Apart from analyzing the basic concepts of shareholders’ meetings held by some Taiwan-based companies, exercise of voting rights, and use of proxy forms, the research also peeks into the current situation around the globe and the future trends by consulting the system and the practical needs of shareholders’ meetings in the U.S. and Japan. As for the postal voting system and the current situation in Taiwan, the research provides a background illustration by introducing the structure and the current status of printed ballot voting and electronic voting under our postal voting framework. In conclusion, the paper points out the reasons for limited use of electronic voting in Taiwan. Finally, the research measures postal voting systems in the U.S., Japan and Taiwan from aspects of the laws and regulations, the shareholder rights, the corporate execution and the practical needs. In the end, in order for the effort of internationalization upon domestic capital market, the research eventually proposes the solutions for the related personnel in charge and the follow-up research direction for future researchers.

Le capital social, de par la pluralité de ses fonctions, est le théâtre de la rencontre de l'intérêt des créanciers, des actionnaires et de la société. Sa modification, réalisée à la hausse ou à la baisse, impacte corrélativement l'étendue des prérogatives dont bénéficient ces protagonistes. Si ces derniers peuvent être animés d'objectifs divergents -et doivent, en conséquence, être protégés séparément -ils s'accordent néanmoins sur la nécessité de certaines caractéristiques intrinsèques du capital social. Aussi, il n'est pas surprenant que le législateur se soit attaché à assurer la sauvegarde de leurs droits, soit chacun particulièrement, soit de manière collective. L'étude des différentes mesures de protections prévues par le droit positif révélera tantôt ses imperfections, tantôt ses lacunes et ses incohérences. Sera également mis en exergue le caractère modulable de certains dispositifs, offrant ainsi aux organes sociaux la faculté de les supprimer ou de les façonner en fonction de la vision « distributive» ou« financière» du capital social qu'ils auront arrêtée. Enfin, cette étude mettra en relief l'opportunité d'autoriser sa variabilité sans contrainte si celle-ci est limitée par deux bornes, lesquelles dessineraient le capital« autorisé ». / Due to the multiplicity of its functions, the share capital is the scene where the interests of creditors, shareholders and the company meet. Its modification, whether it be for amplification or reduction, has an impact which corresponds to the extent of the prerogatives which the protagonists enjoy. If the latter may have conflicting objectives -and must therefore be protected separately -they nevertheless agree on the necessity of some intrinsic features of the share capital. This is why it is not surprising that the legislator has made a point of safeguarding their rights, either on an individual basis or collectively. The study of the different protection measures provided for by the positive law sometimes reveals its imperfections, sometimes its shortcomings and its inconsistencies. The adjustable nature of some specific devices will also be highlighted, thereby providing the social organs with the right to remove or shape them according to the "distributive" or "financial" vision of the social capital they will have determined. Finally, this study will highlight whether or not to allow its variability without constraint if it is set within two bounds, which would represent the "authorized" capital.

O presente trabalho tem por objetivo traçar os principais contornos do instituto do benefício particular, positivado na legislação brasileira por meio do artigo 115, §1º, da Lei n. 6.404/76, diferenciando-o do instituto relativo ao interesse conflitante nas sociedades, insculpido no mesmo dispositivo supra citado. A partir da análise do Direito Comparado, constatou-se que o benefício particular, tal como o conhecemos hoje no Brasil, tem origem na legislação francesa, especificamente nas Leis de 17 de julho de 1956 e 24 de julho de 1867. Os contornos de sua conceituação, portanto, estão intimamente ligados às razões de ordem histórica e teleológica que levaram o legislador estrangeiro a criá-lo, o qual visava, à época, afastar os abusos e inconveniências decorrentes da aprovação, em assembleia, de vantagens especiais e exclusivas pelo próprio sócio beneficiário dessas vantagens. Complementarmente, por meio da análise e interpretação sistemática da legislação societária brasileira e de outras fontes de direito disponibilizadas, como a doutrina e a jurisprudência, pôde-se definir algumas das características mais marcantes do instituto, das quais se pode destacar a licitude, a gratuidade e o caráter social das vantagens a ele associadas, garantindo ao beneficiado acesso aos fundos sociais. Em paralelo, para fins de mera comparação com o instituto do benefício particular, foram abordados alguns aspectos relativos ao instituto do conflito de interesses, reafirmando conceitos doutrinários já sedimentados acerca do alcance do interesse social e procurando, a partir da análise da legislação brasileira e comparada, fixar alguns elementos intrínsecos a esse instituto, tal como a ilicitude e o caráter extrassocial da vantagem visada pelo acionista conflitado. Comparando as características do benefício particular e do conflito de interesses, pode-se concluir que, apesar da aparente semelhança que carregam, tratam-se de institutos distintos, que regulam situações diversas, não podendo ser confundidos ou tomados um pelo outro, sendo possível, de fato, se estabelecer um critério relativamente seguro para distingui-los entre si, conferindo uma maior segurança jurídica aos aplicadores do direito, evitando-se, assim, algumas interpretações equivocadas acerca dos institutos, tais como aqueles constantes nos posicionamentos da Comissão de Valores Mobiliários analisados ao final desse trabalho. / The current paper has the sole purpose of designing the main lines of the private benefits regulation, reaffirmed by means of Act 115, §1st, in the Brazilian law number 6.404/76, distinguishing it from institutions that relate to conflicting partnership interests, comprehended by the same aforementioned Act. From assessing the Paired Law regulation, it has been understood that the private benefits, such as it is currently recognized in Brazil, is based on the French legislation, more specifically on the July 17, 1956 and July 24, 1867 Acts. Therefore, the contours of its conceptualism are intimately connected to historic and teleological reasoning that took the foreign regulator to create it and which aimed, at that time, to keep away abuse and inconveniences resulting from the approval, in an shareholders meeting, of special and exclusive advantages by their own beneficiary parties. In addition, by means of systematically assessing and interpreting the Brazilian Corporate Law and other Law resources made available, such as the Law doctrine and jurisprudence, it was possible to determine some of the most outstanding characteristics of such an institute, among which the lawfulness, gratuity and social character of the advantages associated with it can be highlighted, thus assuring the access of the beneficiary party to social funds. In parallel, by means of solely comparing the private benefits regulation, some aspects regarding the conflict of interests were also assessed, reaffirming doctrine concepts about the reach of social interests that are already established and trying to determine, by means of analyzing the Brazilian Corporate Law and Paired Law, some of the elements that are inherent to that establishment, such as its wrongfulness and the extrasocial character of the advantage pledged by the conflicting party. By pairing the characteristics of private benefits and the conflict of interests, it is concluded that, despite their apparent similarities, those are distinct institutes that regulate diverse situations, which cannot be confused or taken by one another and, in fact, it is possible to establish a relatively safe criteria to differentiate both, thus providing greater judicial accuracy to Law enforcers, and this way avoiding misinterpretation of regulation, such as those that are common to the positioning of the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission that are analyzed in the end of this paper.

在資本主義盛行之今日，「公司治理」已成為舉世矚目之焦點。自從1997年亞洲爆發金融危機後，許多國際組織、非政府組織及亞洲經濟體投入大量的資源與時間研究此一議題，認為完善的公司治理是提昇企業策略能力及國際競爭力的最佳良方。在台灣，隨著資本主義盛行的浪潮，近二十年來產業轉型、高科技事業蓬勃發展的幕後功臣，除了政府主導科技研發計劃與租稅優惠及專案補助措施外，首推「創業投資業」；創業投資業之所以成為台灣高科技產業之推手，主要在於其「投資後管理」之積極性、策略性功能。根據經濟合作暨發展組織（OECD）於2002年所發表之研究報告顯示，創業投資業投資額佔GDP比率與該國公司治理績效之評比成正相關，由此可見創業投資業對提昇公司治理的貢獻。 本研究之目的在探討創業投資業於各投資階段，增進轉投資事業公司治理之最佳實務作法，期能提供我國創業投資業者參酌、運用，以發揮其對被投資公司積極、正面之監督控管功能，並符合公司治理的四個基本原則：公平性（Fairness）、透明性（Transparency）、課責性（Accountability）、責任性（Responsibility），建立二者間良性、穩定的溝通模式及信賴關係，讓創業投資業繼續為台灣產業競爭力加分。 「創業投資」（Venture Capital）又稱「風險投資」，而專為投資於高科技、高風險、具發展潛力且成長快速之事業所募集之資金，則為「創業投資基金」（Venture Capital Fund）。創業投資的投資模式是在高風險、高報酬的前提下，對具成長潛力的被投資公司提供中、長期資本及經營、資源、網絡的加值服務，協助投資標的快速成長，克服各項經營問題，申請上市櫃，以實現其高額之資本利得；因此，創業投資業與被投資公司間之投資關係，是建立在相互合作之互信基礎，互謀長期最大利益，而創業投資業最重視的則是，投資資金是否能順利回收及獲利，被投資公司的獲利是否有如預期、體制運作是否健全，進而進入資本市場，讓其所投入之資金有退出機制。 公司治理 (Corporate Governance) 這個議題是從美國發展出來的，當初國內學者對該名詞的翻譯不盡相同，有譯為「公司管理」、「公司治理」者；亦有譯為「公司監控」、「公司管控」者；在台灣統稱為「公司治理」，以兼顧管理、監控及自治、自律之功能。依據中華公司治理協會之定義：「公司治理是一種指導與管理的機制，以落實公司經營者責任為目的，在兼顧其他利害關係人利益下，藉由加強公司績效，保障股東權益」。 良好的公司治理必須符合四個原則，分別是公平性 (Fairness)、透明性 (Transparency)、課責性 (Accountability)以及責任性 (Responsibility)。公平性指的是對公司各投資人以及利益相關者予以公平合理的對待；透明性指公司財務以及其他相關資訊，必須適時適當地揭露；課責性指公司董事以及高階主管的角色與責任應該明確劃分；責任性則指公司應遵守法律以及社會期待的價值規範。 依據OECD公司治理原則之說明，良好的公司治理具有：提高經濟效率、降低資金成本、健全財務結構之基礎等功能。 在台灣，上市公司與大多數國家一樣，公司的所有權結構大都傾向於具有控制股東，而控制股東會透過金字塔結構、交叉持股與互為董事等方式而達到控制公司的目的，在此情況下，控制股東極可能透過利益輸送和掏空公司資產等方式，剝奪奪小股東的財富，並衍生道德危機與逆選擇的相關代理成本，而引發核心代理問題。 本研究發現創業投資業推動公司治理之誘因如下列： 一、期藉由灌輸經營團隊公司治理--「課責性」及「責任性」之基本原則，塑造正確之價值觀，建立企業長治久安之基礎。 二、強調公司治理--「公平性」之基本原則，保障少數股東之權益，維護創業投資業持有股權之股東權益及價值。 三、確信良好之公司治理會提昇轉投資事業之獲利能力及市場價值，同時增加創業投資業退出時所獲之資本利得。 本研究發現創業投資業評估轉投資事業公司治理之重點如下列： 一、轉投資事業之財會數據之正確性、可信賴度及資訊透明度、詳細度。 二、轉投資事業股東成員、股權結構及背景，及具實質影響力之股東特性。 三、轉投資事業董事會運作之情形，如：董事會成員、董事選任方式、董事會議題及會議進行模式。 四、轉投資事業經營團隊之商譽及誠信度，各項法令之遵循程度，公司章程之適法性及可執行程度。 五、董事會、董事長、總經理之權責劃分是否適當及課責性是否落實。 六、轉投資事業之會計制度是否建立且落實執行，以避免轉投資事業做假帳，並確保能按時提供財務報表。 本研究針對創業投資業推動創建期事業公司治理之方法建議如下： 一、建立企業主正規之「公司法制」觀念。 二、正視「公司章程」之法律地位及重要性。 三、導入「股份有限公司」之運作機制，建立「股東會」、「董事會」及「監察人」之基本功能及符合法令規定之決策模式。 四、建制符合「內部控制機制」之作業系統及程序。 本研究針對創業投資業推動擴充期事業公司治理之方法建議如下： 一、善用「公司章程」及「法令規章」解決「核心代理問題」。 二、強化「董事會」、「監察人」職能，推動「上市上櫃公司治理實務守則」。 本研究針對創業投資業推動成熟期事業公司治理之方法則建議由實踐股東行動主義著手；包括： 一、創投業於投資前，應確信公司治理之重要性，將投資標的推動公司治理之績效，納入投資組合考量。 二、執行投資後，創投業應經常與公司重要股東與經營階層充份溝通及於董事會、股東會中充份表達意見，以促使公司控制股東及經營階層重視少數股東之權益。 關鍵字：創業投資業、創建期、擴充期、成熟期、公司治理、核心代理問題、控制股東、公司章程、股東會、董事會、監察人 / According to the OECD research report released in 2002 that existed a positive relevant between the investment amount of venture capitalist to the GDP and the corporate governance performance in the most countries worldwide. The contribution of venture capitalist for the corporate governance is obviously numerous. The objectives of this thesis is intend to research venture capitalist how to enhance the investee corporate governance in the investees’ start-up, development, maturing stages practicably. Basing on this study, both of the venture capitalist and the investee can conduct a beneficial and stable communication manners and relationship. In Taiwan, most of the listing companies are same as the developed countries; the majority shareholders almost constitute the whole shareholders’ structure and possess the great majority voting rights. Under this circumstance, the majority shareholders instinctively intend to create the arms-in-length transactions to deprive the minority the shareholders’ benefits and wealth, and cause the core agent problems. The study was conducted by analysis, induction, and case study methodology covering three samples of venture capitalist. The results of this study are follows: 1.At the investees’ start-up stage, the measures of venture capitalist enhances corporate governance are listed as below: 1)Educating the business owner to establish the corporate legal concept. 2)Paying much attention about the article to follow the company law. 3)Introducing and following the company law’s operating structure, and establish the “shareholders”, “board of directors” and “supervisors” basic functions and decision model. 4)Establish the internal control system and procedures. 2. At the investees’ development stage, the measures of venture capitalist enhances corporate governance are listed as below: 1)Practicing the article and regulation to overcome the core agent problems. 2)Empowering the board of directors and supervisors function, and progressing the “Corporate Governance Best Practice Principles for TSEC/GTSM Listed Companies” in the investees business running. 3. At the investees’ maturing stage, the venture capitalist suggested to practice the shareholders activism; for example: taking the corporate governance performance into the investment evaluation. Key Words: venture capitalist, start-up stage, development stage, maturing stage, corporate governance, core agent problem, majority shareholders, article, shareholders’ meeting, the board of directors supervisor

由國內相關研究來看，探討委託書之相關議題，如委託書對於股東的財富影響、委託書所造成之案例等研究，其資料頗為豐富，是一個多實證研究及多社會興趣的主題，且近年來，有關委託書徵求所引發之經營權爭議亦是層出不窮。故本論文主要乃將偏向為國內委託書制度尚可以改善之方向進行探討，將以我國委託書制度與國外制度之比較之差異及可以參酌改進之地方做一論述。另發現針對近年來國內興起股東會電子化之規範及成效研究部份更是微乎其微，是故亦將股東會電子化之成效研究納入本論文主軸，期待以提供一個簡單、便利、安全及隱密的電子平台，使投資人的意見可充分反應，亦無遭篡改之虞，亦可使國內近年來委託書之爭議有所改善，再輔以近年來較具爭議之委託書競爭行為分析，以說明委託書之規範若不嚴謹時將對小股東造成之損害。 / During these few years, proxy has been a tool to manipulate the outcome of hostile takeover. In this thesis wet want to evaluate the possibility of implementing electronic voting for proxy and comparing different proxy regulation of other developed countries. The main reason for implementing electronic vote and advantages will be explained in the thesis and the after effect will also be discussed.

The dissertation deals with legal, accounting and taxation aspects of liquidation of trading corporations. Based on an analysis, it evaluates aspects in the liquidation process of trading corporations under the conditions of the Czech Republic´s legislation. It provides an outline of the liquidation process and the liquidator´s activities, it points out legislative changes and hazard moments of the liquidation process.