La philosophie de Socrate selon Platon se structure autour de six termes : la Forme, l'âme, l'ignorance, la science, la vertu et la dialectique. En effet, l'âme, immortelle, est la source de tous les biens et de tous les maux, parce qu'elle est le principe du mouvement spontané et par conséquent la cause première de tous les mouvements aussi bien intellectifs que sensitifs et physiques. Cela étant, rendre justes la cité et les citoyens, c'est avant tout rendre juste leur âme. Or, comment rendre meilleure une âme, si l'on ne connaît pas la cause même des biens et celle des maux ? Dans les premiers dialogues, Socrate philosophe contre l'ignorance qui est la cause du vice, lequel prive l'âme de la vertu. Dans les dialogues tardifs, Socrate philosophe pour la science, c'est-à-dire la connaissance de ce qui est, qui est la source même de la vertu. Or comment connaître ce qui est, si la réalité ou l'être ne cesse de changer? De là vient la nécessité de l'existence des réalités intelligibles qui sont universelles et immuables auxquelles participent les réalités sensibles qui sont particulières et changeantes. Une question se pose : si la réfutation est le moyen, à travers le dialogue, de faire apparaître l'ignorance, quel est le moyen de connaître ce qui est ? Ce moyen, c'est la dialectique qui permet, à travers le dialogue, de se remémorer des réalités véritables que l'âme eut jadis contemplées. / According to Plata, the philosophy of Socrates is structured around six terms: Form, soul, ignorance, knowledge, virtue, and dialectics. The soul, which is immortal, is the source of all goods and all evils, since it is the principle of spontaneous movement, and consequently the first cause of all movements, whether intellective, sensitive, or physical. Therefore, to make the city and its citizens just means, above all, making their soul just. Yet how can a soul be made better if one does not know the very cause of what is good and what is bad? ln the first dialogues, Socrates philosophizes against ignorance as the cause of vice, which deprives the soul of virtue. ln the late dialogues, Socrates philosophizes in favor of knowledge, that is, the knowledge of that which is, which is the very source of virtue. Yet how can one know that which is, if reality or being never cease changing? Hence the need for the existence of intelligible realities that are universal and immutable, in which sensible realities, which are particular and changing, participate. A question arises: if refutation is the means of revealing ignorance through dialogue, what is the means for knowing that which is? The answer is dialectic, which, through dialogue, allows one to recall the genuine realities which the soul once contemplated.

Submitted by Silvana Teresinha Dornelles Studzinski (sstudzinski) on 2016-02-15T14:53:24Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Tarcila Nienow Stein_.pdf: 1556276 bytes, checksum: e291913ec339bc5d4190ffd4d576e5ea (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-02-15T14:53:24Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Tarcila Nienow Stein_.pdf: 1556276 bytes, checksum: e291913ec339bc5d4190ffd4d576e5ea (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-10-02 / CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / Esta dissertação analisa a obra escrita pelo médico brasileiro Francisco de Mello Franco, intitulada Medicina Teológica ou súplica humilde feita a todos os Senhores Confessores, e Diretores, sobre o modo de proceder com seus Penitentes na emenda dos pecados, principalmente da Lascivia, Colera e Bebedice, de 1794, detendo-se, especialmente, nos capítulos que tratam das doenças do ânimo e das terapêuticas e fármacos recomendados para a obtenção de sua cura. Iniciamos com a apresentação da trajetória de Mello Franco, inserindo-a, primeiramente, no contexto de transformações que Portugal vivenciou na segunda metade do século XVIII, em decorrência da Ilustração. E posteriormente em um cenário marcado pela revisão ou contestação às reformas introduzidas pelo Marquês de Pombal. Para a compreensão das influências acadêmicas sofridas por Mello Franco, analisamos os documentos da Universidade de Coimbra produzidos à época da Reforma de 1772 e, também, o catálogo do seu acervo particular de livros, que permite uma reflexão acerca das leituras e apropriações que, provavelmente, fez. Destacamos, ainda, sua condenação à prisão pelo Santo Ofício, no ano de 1781, vinculando-a à opção pelo anonimato na publicação da Medicina Teológica, já que a obra, além de ter sido dedicada aos confessores, propunha a substituição destes religiosos pelos médicos no tratamento das doenças da alma. Dedicamos dois capítulos da dissertação à análise das doenças do ânimo - cólera, melancolia, bebedice, erotomania, satyriazes e ninfomania - e, para tanto, inspirados em obras referenciais da História da Medicina e da História da Saúde e das Doenças, dialogamos tanto com a produção historiográfica sobre o tema, quanto com tratados de Medicina do ânimo, receituários e dicionários setecentistas, bem como com catálogos de plantas medicinais contemporâneos. A análise desta categoria de enfermidades - associadas à conduta moral dos penitentes que buscavam os confessores - e, sobretudo, dos receituários que encontramos na obra de Mello Franco constitui-se em abordagem original, ainda não contemplada pelos historiadores que se debruçaram sobre a Medicina Teológica. / This dissertation analyses the book written by the Brazilian physician Francisco de Mello Franco in 1794, titled Medicina Teológica ou súplica humilde feita a todos os Senhores Confessores, e Diretores, sobre o modo de proceder com seus Penitentes na emenda dos pecados, principalmente da Lascivia, Colera e Bebedice, focusing on the chapters that describe the soul disorders and on the recommended therapies and prescriptions for their healing. Mello Franco’s path is presented in the context of the changes that Portugal went through in the XVIII century, because of the Enlightenment and of the restructuring of the University of Coimbra. To better understand this period, documents such as 1772’s University of Coimbra Statute and Mello Franco’s private book collection catalogue were analysed, allowing for us to infer on the readings that the author might have done. It is worth mentioning that he had been arrested by the Portuguese Inquisition in 1781, which could be the reason for the anonymous publication of Medicina Teológica, since this book was dedicated to the clergy, intending their replacement by physicians on the treatment of the soul disorders. Two chapters are focused on the diseases described by Mello Franco, such as anger, melancholy, drunkenness, and lust related disorders. Other medical references, both modern and from the same period, were used in this dissertation. Before the XVIII century, soul disorders, such as those aforementioned, were associated with misbehaviour conducts and sins. In search for a cure, the sinners used to get help from the Church. With the Enlightenment, books as Mello Franco’s proposed an alternative, separating Faith and Science. The analytical approach chosen to this work is novel.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-28T20:40:02Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Aline Ribeiro Fiamenghi.pdf: 2341077 bytes, checksum: e356d81fd0febc68f6ed52f1af356fce (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-05-14 / This research intends to present the concept of "Soul-Making". Its basis resides in the activities of dance improvisation. According to Archetypal Psychology, "soul" is an imaginative possibility, a function of transforming events into experiences and the capacity of recognizing all realities as primarily symbolical or metaphorical. We don't intend to restrict dance experience to psychological ideas, nor explain it. We take dance as our starting-point for its power of "touching us". Dance functions as a means to create metaphors as we understand improvisation in dance like the act of imagining with the body. Dance is a search for encounters, it happens in relation to: image, music and the dancer s intellectual, artistic and corporeal repertoire as much as his connections (relations) among other dancing bodies. We believe that movement, organized as the thought of the body can produce different conscience modalities, beyond the egoic one. We show a working method, developed in two meetings, which we called Improvisation Laboratory. Our purpose was to observe the reverberations of free movements, without any previous technical preparation for the dancers. That is to say, what kind of images were produced and how they have transformed the event into an animic experience / Esta pesquisa trata-se de um trabalho sobre o fazer-alma que tem sua base na improvisação em dança. Na perspectiva da psicologia arquetípica, alma é uma possibilidade imaginativa, a função de transformar eventos em experiências, a capacidade de reconhecer todas as realidades como primariamente simbólicas ou metafóricas. Não tentamos psicologizar a experiência da dança, nem explicá-la, mas partimos da dança por ser algo que toca. Por ela, vemos a possibilidade de metaforizar, pois entendemos que improvisar em dança é imaginar com o corpo. A dança busca encontro, se faz na relação com a imagem, a música, o repertório artístico, intelectual e corporal do dançarino e com outros corpos dançantes. Acreditamos que o movimento, organizado como pensamento do corpo, é uma possibilidade investigativa e imaginativa que produz outras modalidades de consciência, para além da egoica. Apresentamos um método de trabalho, elaborado em dois encontros, nomeado por Laboratório de Improvisação, a fim de observar as repercussões dos movimentos livres, sem preparo prévio nas dançarinas. Ou seja, que imagens foram produzidas e como transformaram o evento numa experiência anímica

A presente dissertação investiga o argumento da distinção real entre corpo e alma presente nas Meditações Metafísicas. O objetivo central é explicar o motivo pelo qual, nesta obra, a separabilidade entre corpo e alma é posta como condição suficiente para esse tipo de distinção. Para isso, percorre, ao longo das Meditações, os conceitos de alma, de corpo e de percepção clara e distinta. Faz uma análise do argumento da distinção real entre corpo e alma exposto na Sexta Meditação e, em seguida, se utiliza das discussões de Descartes com Caterus e Arnauld presente nas Objeções e Respostas visando a esclarecer pontos do argumento que ainda permanecem obscuros. Mostra, com o estudo das Meditações associado às Objeções e Respostas, que a distinção real é aquela que se dá entre substâncias e que ser substância é ser separável. Assim, sendo o reconhecimento da separabilidade de duas coisas o reconhecimento de que essas coisas são substâncias – e, portanto, de que são realmente distintas – explica, com isso, o motivo pelo qual a separabilidade é condição suficiente para a distinção real entre corpo e alma e conclui que ela lhe é, também, uma condição necessária. / This dissertation investigates the argument of the real distinction between body and soul presented on the Meditations on First Philosophy. The main goal is to explain the reason why the separability between body and soul is considered sufficient condition for this sort of distinction. In order to reach its goal, along the Meditations, it takes the path through the concepts of soul, body and the clear and distinct perception. It analyses the argument of the real distinction between body and soul presented on the Sixth Meditation and afterwards it makes use of Descartes’ discussions with Caterus and Arnauld, presented on Objections and Replies, seeking to clarify points of the argument that yet remain obscure. Studying the Meditations associated with the Objections and Replies, this dissertation shows that the real distinction is the one that happens between substances and that being a substance is being separable. Thus, being the recognition of the separability of two things the recognition of that those things are substances – and, hence, that they are really distinct – it explains the reason why the separability is sufficient condition for the real distinction between body and soul. It concludes that the separability is also a necessary condition to that sort of distinction.

Tendo como objeto a perda progressiva da autoridade do professor, esta pesquisa foca-se sobre suas condições de possibilidade e emergência no discurso pedagógico brasileiro. Por meio da análise de artigos da Revista Brasileira de Estudos Pedagógicos, publicados entre as décadas de 1940 e 1960, investiga-se o tecido discursivo que deu suporte às teorias da Escola Nova no Brasil, e suas contribuições para que uma nova imagem docente se instaurasse. A peculiaridade do contexto brasileiro, carente de um sistema nacional de educação consolidado, fez com que se aliasse aqui o velho prestígio do ofício docente, com as novas exigências da escola renovada. Progressivamente, teorias e procedimentos de cunho psicológico foram incorporadas ao discurso, transferindo a centralidade do ensino para os alunos, e reclamando ao professor uma atitude investigativa capaz de perscrutar suas personalidades. O papel docente foi então reformulado, calcado em atributos mais íntimos e pessoais, a serem cultivados via formação contínua e por uma atitude reflexiva própria. A dimensão pessoal adentrou então o coração do ensino, fazendo da interioridade a força motriz do trabalho ali realizado. Tanto o professor, como seus alunos, deveriam submeter-se às novas regulações e controles de um governo da interioridade; capaz de transferir ao domínio de si e ao auto-governo a autoridade institucional que outrora reconhecíamos por sua externalidade e intermédio do professor. / This research studies the progressive loss of the teacher´s authority, focusing on its manifestations throughout the Brazilian educational discourse. Based on the analyses of the articles from the journal Revista Brasileira de Estudos Pedagógicos, published between 1940 and 1960, we investigate the discursive scenario that supported the theories of The New School in Brazil, as well as its contributions to the rise of a new image of the teachers. In this unique context, that lacked a consolidated national education system, the reputation of the old teachers was made compatible with the new demands of the reformed school. Progressively, theories and psychological procedures were incorporated to the discourse, transferring the aim of the studies to the students, proclaiming that teachers should investigate their personalities. The teacher´s role was then reformulated, based on intimate and personal attributes, cultivated by continuous educational training as well as a reflexive attitude towards life. This personal dimension became the heart of education, transforming interiority into the driving force of the work that is carried out. Both the teacher and the students are submitted to new regulations and restraints of a government of interiority, which is capable of transferring to self-control and self-government the institutional authority that was once recognized by its exterior form and had the teacher as its mediator.

The paper examines how human inner properties and the interpretation of the external worldare explained and presented in Dark City (Alex Proyas, 1998). Aspects as the relationship between the body and soul/consciousness, body snatching, memory transferences and dystopian cities are analyzed. The field of study is compared to a general science-fiction film perspective regarding the aspects. Dark City contains an alien race with a common mind, but who lacks soul and individuality. They represent what humanity can become if the scientific development goes too far. They conduct research about the human soul to save their own race. They fail to reach the soul trough scientific experiments, which include memory transferences. The only remaining explanation is that the soul has an immaterial origin. This is against the common materialistic view in the current science-fiction genre; the inner aspects are to a large extent explained from a cognitive/neural perspective. This means that Dark City implicit criticize movies and theories which states that we may be able to understand and create copies of the human consciousness.

Phenomenal consciousness presents a recalcitrant problem for the scientific conception of the world and the physicalist thesis that claims that everything that exists (including whatever is involved in any mental phenomena) is physical and physically explainable. Thus, on this view, every truth is a physical truth. By Putnam-Kripkean considerations and for several other reasons, I defend the claim that any version of such a physicalist thesis must be a necessary thesis, which ultimately means that contingent physicalism is not tenable. Against this thesis, philosophers have put forward several anti-physicalist arguments including the knowledge argument, the conceivability/modal argument, the explanatory gap argument, and the property dualism argument. All these arguments rest on the assumption of an epistemic/explanatory gap, which I call the &ldquo / phenomenal-physical gap,&rdquo / between the phenomenal and the physical. I claim that the phenomenal-physical gap (the PP-gap) is unbridgeable, from which it can be concluded that a priori physicalism is not tenable. The phenomenal concept strategy (PCS), which is a specific strategy within a posteriori necessary physicalism, aims at offering an explanation in physical terms of why we have such an unbridgeable gap by differentiating between phenomenal and physical concepts in a fundamental way. Nevertheless, proponents of PCS&mdash / the most promising version of a posteriori necessary physicalism&mdash / face a severe problem that I call &ldquo / the problem of phenomenal subjecthood&rdquo / in explaining in physical terms why we have the PP-gap. The phenomenon of &ldquo / experiencing&rdquo / consists of three substantially existing elements: the phenomenal subject (the experiencer), the experiential item (what is experienced by the subject), and the phenomenal s-v-o relation (the experiential relation) between the first two. I argue for the substantial existence of phenomenal subjects based on an argument I provide, the reality of some mental phenomena such as phenomenal unity and continuity, and the mental facts concerning phenomenal peculiarity, phenomenal agency, and the sense of phenomenal I-ness, the reality of all of which one cannot deny. Since PCS accounts are mostly qualia-centered accounts that ignore the reality of phenomenal subjects and the phenomenal s-v-o relation, they cannot account for the PP-gap in physical terms without first offering substantial theories of phenomenal subjecthood. But once they grant the substantiality of phenomenal subjects, they face severe difficulties in establishing their accounts of the nature of phenomenal concept, and thus the PP-gap in physical terms.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Minnesota, 1983. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [169]-179).

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal

This thesis examines a primary question raised by both Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas: What constitutes the beginning of a human being? Aristotle and Aquinas raise this question for very different reasons. Modern critical commentators revisit it for their own reasons, namely for the purposes of ethical debates surrounding conception and abortion. They frequently attribute the notions of delayed ensoulment and quickening to Aristotle. Through examination of the primary texts, I demonstrate that this attribution is erroneous. Aristotle contends that ensoulment is substantially complete at conception, though subject to gradual actualization throughout the lifespan of a human being; while Thomas suggests that conception is a process, requiring several substantial changes before a human soul is infused. I argue that Aquinas adapts Aristotle in accordance with his Christian theological commitments, and modern commentators follow him to develop their own notions of delayed ensoulment and quickening.