Global ETD Search

21	Cash-to-cash-styrning : ett spelteoretiskt angreppssätt Mangs, Christian, Fernholm, Nicholas January 2015 (has links) Objective: The objective is to examine if long terms of payment are created because of a perceived zero-sum game in the cash-to-cash cycles between companies. The study will also examine if dependence effects the dependent companies Cash-to-Cash-cycle because of long terms of payment. Scientific method: The study uses a qualitative and a quantitative method, where primary data is collected from semi-structured interviews. Additional primary data is collected from an unstructured interview with an expert in the field of which is examined. Additional data has been collected from the studied companies’ annual reports. Theoretical references: The primary theory has been Game theory, where the researchers have used this theory to analyze the behaviors of the companies. This theory has been reinforced by the theory Pareto efficiency to help analyze the strategy which gives the highest net-outcome. The theory Cash-to- Cash has also been a focal point in the study, which has been used in concert with Supply chain finance and Supply chain management. This has been done to be able to further analyze the behaviors of the companies and the cooperation in the “supply chain”. Result: The result shows that there seems to exist a perceived zero-sum game in the cash-to-cash cycles between companies. The consequence of this is that the companies in a dominant position use a strategy that prolongs payables outstanding and shortens accounts receivables. This in turn prolongs the cash-to- cash cycles for the dominant companies suppliers. Focus to improve the Cash-to-Cash-cycles for both companies is very small or non-existent. The authors want to emphasize that additional research is needed within this area, where other contributing factors can be effecting the company’s decisions. / Syfte: Studien syftar till att undersöka om ofördelaktiga betalningsvillkor skapas på grund av ett uppfattat nollsummespel inom Cash-to-Cash-cykler mellan företag. Studien syftar även till att undersöka om beroendeförhållanden påverkar beroende aktörers Cash-to-Cash-cykel på grund av ofördelaktiga betalningsvillkor. Metod: Studien använde en metodtriangulering, där primärdata samlades in via semistrukturerade intervjuer. Ytterligare primärdata samlades in via en ostrukturerad intervju med en expert inom området. Slutligen har data samlats in angående intervjuobjektens årsredovisning. Teoretisk referensram: Den primära teorin har varit Game theory, där forskarna använt teorin för att kunna analysera aktörernas beteenden. Denna teori har förstärkts av ytterligare teorier såsom Paretooptimalitet som hjälper att analysera utfall som ger högst möjlig nytta. Teorier angående Cash-to-Cash har även de varit centrala i arbetet som har kopplats till Supply chain management samt Supply chain finance för att ytterligare kunna analysera beteenden och data angående samarbeten i kedjor av aktörer. Resultat: Resultatet visar att det verkar finnas ett uppfattat nollsummespel inom cash-to-cash-cykeln mellan företagen. Detta leder till att aktörer med maktpositioner utgår från en strategi som innebär att förlänga betaltiderna för leverantörer, som då förlänger leverantörernas Cash-to-Cash-cykel. Fokus på att förbättra Cash-to-Cash-cyklerna mellan företagen är väldigt liten eller obefintlig. Författarna vill dock tydliggöra att ytterligare forskning kring ämnet behövs för att kunna säkerställa resultatet, då andra faktorer kan ha påverkat aktörernas beslut och beteenden. game theory cash-to-cash c2c supply chain finance supply chain management perceived Zero-sum game pareto effeciency dominant company power imbalance game theory cash-to-cash c2c supply chain finance supply chain management uppfattat nollsummespel pareto-optimalitet beroendeförhållande maktobalans
22	A game theoretic analysis of adaptive radar jamming Bachmann, Darren John Unknown Date (has links) (PDF) Advances in digital signal processing (DSP) and computing technology have resulted in the emergence of increasingly adaptive radar systems. It is clear that the Electronic Attack (EA), or jamming, of such radar systems is expected to become a more difficult task. The reason for this research was to address the issue of jamming adaptive radar systems. This required consideration of adaptive jamming systems and the development of a methodology for outlining the features of such a system is proposed as the key contribution of this thesis. For the first time, game-based optimization methods have been applied to a maritime counter-surveillance/counter-targeting scenario involving conventional, as well as so-called ‘smart’ noise jamming.Conventional noise jamming methods feature prominently in the origins of radar electronic warfare, and are still widely implemented. They have been well studied, and are important for comparisons with coherent jamming techniques.Moreover, noise jamming is more readily applied with limited information support and is therefore germane to the problem of jamming adaptive radars; during theearly stages when the jammer tries to learn about the radar’s parameters and its own optimal actions.A radar and a jammer were considered as informed opponents ‘playing’ in a non-cooperative two-player, zero-sum game. The effects of jamming on the target detection performance of a radar using Constant False Alarm Rate (CFAR)processing were analyzed using a game theoretic approach for three cases: (1) Ungated Range Noise (URN), (2) Range-Gated Noise (RGN) and (3) False-Target (FT) jamming.Assuming a Swerling type II target in the presence of Rayleigh-distributed clutter, utility functions were described for Cell-Averaging (CA) and Order Statistic (OS) CFAR processors and the three cases of jamming. The analyses included optimizations of these utility functions, subject to certain constraints, with respectto control variables (strategies) in the jammer, such as jammer power and spatial extent of jamming, and control variables in the radar, such as threshold parameter and reference window size. The utility functions were evaluated over the players’ strategy sets and the resulting matrix-form games were solved for the optimal or ‘best response’ strategies of both the jammer and the radar.
23	Nonlinear Perron-Frobenius theory and mean-payoff zero-sum stochastic games / Théorie de Perron-Frobenius non-linéaire et jeux stochastiques à somme nulle avec paiement moyen Hochart, Antoine 14 November 2016 (has links) Les jeux stochastiques à somme nulle possèdent une structure récursive qui s'exprime dans leur opérateur de programmation dynamique, appelé opérateur de Shapley. Ce dernier permet d'étudier le comportement asymptotique de la moyenne des paiements par unité de temps. En particulier, le paiement moyen existe et ne dépend pas de l'état initial si l'équation ergodique - une équation non-linéaire aux valeurs propres faisant intervenir l'opérateur de Shapley - admet une solution. Comprendre sous quelles conditions cette équation admet une solution est un problème central de la théorie de Perron-Frobenius non-linéaire, et constitue le principal thème d'étude de cette thèse. Diverses classes connues d'opérateur de Shapley peuvent être caractérisées par des propriétés basées entièrement sur la relation d'ordre ou la structure métrique de l'espace. Nous étendons tout d'abord cette caractérisation aux opérateurs de Shapley "sans paiements", qui proviennent de jeux sans paiements instantanés. Pour cela, nous établissons une expression sous forme minimax des fonctions homogènes de degré un et non-expansives par rapport à une norme faible de Minkowski. Nous nous intéressons ensuite au problème de savoir si l'équation ergodique a une solution pour toute perturbation additive des paiements, problème qui étend la notion d'ergodicité des chaînes de Markov. Quand les paiements sont bornés, cette propriété d'"ergodicité" est caractérisée par l'unicité, à une constante additive près, du point fixe d'un opérateur de Shapley sans paiement. Nous donnons une solution combinatoire s'exprimant au moyen d'hypergraphes à ce problème, ainsi qu'à des problèmes voisins d'existence de points fixes. Puis, nous en déduisons des résultats de complexité. En utilisant la théorie des opérateurs accrétifs, nous généralisons ensuite la condition d'hypergraphes à tous types d'opérateurs de Shapley, y compris ceux provenant de jeux dont les paiements ne sont pas bornés. Dans un troisième temps, nous considérons le problème de l'unicité, à une constante additive près, du vecteur propre. Nous montrons d'abord que l'unicité a lieu pour une perturbation générique des paiements. Puis, dans le cadre des jeux à information parfaite avec un nombre fini d'actions, nous précisons la nature géométrique de l'ensemble des perturbations où se produit l'unicité. Nous en déduisons un schéma de perturbations qui permet de résoudre les instances dégénérées pour l'itération sur les politiques. / Zero-sum stochastic games have a recursive structure encompassed in their dynamic programming operator, so-called Shapley operator. The latter is a useful tool to study the asymptotic behavior of the average payoff per time unit. Particularly, the mean payoff exists and is independent of the initial state as soon as the ergodic equation - a nonlinear eigenvalue equation involving the Shapley operator - has a solution. The solvability of the latter equation in finite dimension is a central question in nonlinear Perron-Frobenius theory, and the main focus of the present thesis. Several known classes of Shapley operators can be characterized by properties based entirely on the order structure or the metric structure of the space. We first extend this characterization to "payment-free" Shapley operators, that is, operators arising from games without stage payments. This is derived from a general minimax formula for functions homogeneous of degree one and nonexpansive with respect to a given weak Minkowski norm. Next, we address the problem of the solvability of the ergodic equation for all additive perturbations of the payment function. This problem extends the notion of ergodicity for finite Markov chains. With bounded payment function, this "ergodicity" property is characterized by the uniqueness, up to the addition by a constant, of the fixed point of a payment-free Shapley operator. We give a combinatorial solution in terms of hypergraphs to this problem, as well as other related problems of fixed-point existence, and we infer complexity results. Then, we use the theory of accretive operators to generalize the hypergraph condition to all Shapley operators, including ones for which the payment function is not bounded. Finally, we consider the problem of uniqueness, up to the addition by a constant, of the nonlinear eigenvector. We first show that uniqueness holds for a generic additive perturbation of the payments. Then, in the framework of perfect information and finite action spaces, we provide an additional geometric description of the perturbations for which uniqueness occurs. As an application, we obtain a perturbation scheme allowing one to solve degenerate instances of stochastic games by policy iteration. Jeux répétés à somme nulle Jeux stochastiques à paiement moyen Contrôle ergodique Opérateur de Shapley Opérateurs accrétifs Hypergraphes Zero-Sum repeated games Mean-Payoff stochastic games Ergodic control Shapley operators Accretive operators Hypergraphs
24	FÖRESTÄLLNINGAR OCH INTRESSEN : En fallstudie utifrån Advocacy Coalition Framework av en lokal policyprocess om expropriation Blomqvist, Fredrik January 2016 (has links) This paper examines the viability of the Advocacy Coalition Framework(ACF) by applying it in a single case study. The aim is to advance the framework’s theoretical understanding of the policy process and its usefulness for analyzing local policy contexts. The case addressed is a long-spun policy conflict regarding the use of compulsory acquisition of real estate by a Swedish municipality for the sake of local business development. Analyzed data consisted of the municipality diary on the issue, correspondence between actors, public statements, official and internal documents and interviews with actors and non-actors. The ACF is a good starting point for understanding this local policy process, largely because of the great flexibility of its concepts. However, its basic assumptions on beliefs cannot fully explain observed events. Relating to this, the paper has five main findings. First, although beliefs play an important role in forming policy action, so does interests. Second, a conjunction of beliefs and self-interest is an important condition for some actors’ actions. Third, coalition formation is not dependent on similarity of beliefs but on similarity of policy objectives. Fourth, policy objectives are resultant of beliefs for some actors, of self-interest for others and for yet others the result of both. Therefore, actors in coalition act to achieve the same policy objectives but not necessarily for the same reasons. Fifth, one non-actor refrained from policy action in spite of strong policy core beliefs due to the policy process not being a zero sum game for this non-actor. This paper supports recent studies proposing the incorporation of interests into the ACF. For further development of the ACF the paper suggests further research to answer two generic questions: What is the relationship betweeninterests and beliefs? Are potential actors more likely to take policy action inzero sum game policy processes? For the ACF to cope with certain conditionsin local contexts the paper suggest further research into the question: Is the level of abstraction of policy issues key in understanding the involvement of legal and natural persons and their basis for policy action? policy process policyprocess advocacy coalition framework advocacy coalition framework acf beliefs interests beliefs and interests interests and beliefs local policy municipality sweden scandinavia compulsory acquisition of real estate rule of law business trade industry business development coalition formation action policy action policy objectives objectives zero sum game policy abstraction realism constructivism policy process policyprocess advocacy coalition framework advocacy coalition framework acf påverkan koalition föreställningar intressen värderingar beliefs interests sverige realism constructivism lokal politik local policy kommunpolitik kommun näringsliv expropriation rättssäkerhet rättsstat fastighet plan och bygglagen näringslivsutveckling näringsliv koalitionsformering policyagerande action policymål objectives nollsummespel zero sum game policyabstraktion policyabstraction
25	Essays on two-player games with asymmetric information / Essai sur les jeux à deux joueurs avec information asymétrique Sun, Lan 02 December 2016 (has links) Cette thèse est une contribution à la théorie économique sur trois aspects: la dynamique de prix dans les marchés financiers avec asymétrie d’information, la mise à jour des croyances et les raffinements d'équilibre dans les jeux de signaux, et l'introduction de l'ambiguïté dans la théorie du prix limite. Dans le chapitre 2, nous formalisons un jeu d'échange à somme nulle entre un secteur mieux informé et un autre qui l'est moins, pour déterminer de façon endogène, la dynamique du prix sous-jacent. Dans ce modèle, joueur 1 est informé de la conjoncture (L) mais est incertain de la croyance de joueur 2, car ce dernier est seulement informé à travers un message (M) qui est lié à cette conjoncture. Si L et M sont indépendants, alors le processus de prix sera une Martingale Continue à Variation Maximale (CMMV) et joueur 1 peut disposer de cet avantage informationnel. Par contre, si L et M ne sont pas indépendants, joueur 1 ne révèlera pas son information pendant le processus, et il ne bénéficiera donc pas de son avantage en matière d'information. Dans le chapitre 3, je propose une définition de l'équilibre de Test d'hypothèse (HTE) pour des jeux de signaux généraux, avec des joueurs non-Bayésiens qui sont soumis à une règle de mise à jour selon le modèle de vérification d'hypothèse caractérisé par Ortoleva (2012). Un HTE peut être différent d'un équilibre séquentiel de Nash en raison d'une incohérence dynamique. Par contre, dans le cas où joueur 2 traite seulement un message à probabilité nulle comme nouvelle inespérée, un HTE est un raffinement d'équilibre séquentiel de Nash et survit au critère intuitif dans les jeux de signaux généraux mais pas inversement. Nous fournissons un théorème d'existence qui couvre une vaste classe de jeux de signaux qui sont souvent étudiés en économie. Dans le chapitre 4, j'introduis l’ambiguïté dans un modèle d'organisation industrielle classique, dans lequel l'entreprise déjà établie est soit informée de la vraie nature de la demande agrégée, soit soumise à une incertitude mesurable classique sur la conjoncture, tandis qu'un éventuel nouvel arrivant fait face à une incertitude a la Knight (ambiguïté) concernant cette conjoncture. Je caractérise les conditions sou lesquelles le prix limite émerge en équilibre, et par conséquent l'ambigüité diminue la probabilité d'entrée. L'analyse du bien-être montre que le prix limite est plus nocif dans un marché où la demande escomptée est plus élevée que dans un autre où celle-ci est moindre. / This thesis contributes to the economic theory literature in three aspects: price dynamics in financial markets with asymmetric information belief updating and equilibrium refinements in signaling games, and introducing ambiguity in limit pricing theory. In chapter 2, we formulate a zero-sum trading game between a better informed sector and a less 1nformed sector to endogenously determine the underlying price dynamics. In this model, player 1 is informed of the state (L) but is uncertain about player 2's belief about the state, because player 2 is informed through some message (M) related to the state. If L and M are independent, then the price proces s will be a Continuous Martingale of Maximal Variation (CMMV), and player 1 can benefit from his informational advantage. However, if L and M are not independent, player 1 will not reveal his information during the trading process, therefore, he does not benefit from his informational advantage. In chapter 3, I propose a definition of Hypothesis Testing Equilibrium (HTE) for general signaling games with non-Bayesian players nested, by an updating rule according to the Hypothesis Testing model characterized by Ortoleva (2012). An HTE may differ from a sequential Nash equilibrium because of dynamic inconsistency. However, in the case in which player 2 only treats a zero-probability message as an unexpected news, an HTE is a refinement of sequential Nash equilibrium and survives the intuitive Critenon in general signaling games but not vice versa. We provide an existence theorem covering a broad class of signaling games often studied in economics. In chapter 4, I introduce ambiguity in a standard industry organization model, in which the established firm is either informed of the true state of aggregate demand or is under classical measurable uncertainty about the state, while the potential entrant is under Knightian uncertainty (ambiguity) about the state. I characterize the conditions under which limit pricing emerges in equilibria, and thus ambiguity decreases the probability of entry. Welfare analysis shows that limit pricing is more harmful in a market with higher expected demand than in a market with lower expected demand. Jeux à somme nulle Information incomplète Jeux de signaux Équilibre de test d'hypothèse Jeux de dissuasion à l'entrée Raffinement d'équilibre Équilibre séquentiel de Nash Incertitude à la Knight Zero-sum games Incomplete information Signalling games Hypothesis testing equilibrium Enter deterrence games Equilibrium refinement Sequential Nash equilibrium Knightian uncertainty 519.3 330
26	Problèmes de switching optimal, équations différentielles stochastiques rétrogrades et équations différentielles partielles intégrales. / Multi-modes switching problem, backward stochastic differential equations and partial differential equations Zhao, Xuzhe 30 September 2014 (has links) Cette thèse est composée de trois parties. Dans la première nous montrons l'existence et l'unicité de la solution continue et à croissance polynomiale, au sensviscosité, du système non linéaire de m équations variationnelles de type intégro-différentiel à obstacles unilatéraux interconnectés. Ce système est lié au problème du switching optimal stochastique lorsque le bruit est dirigé par un processus de Lévy. Un cas particulier du système correspond en effet à l’équation d’Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman associé au problème du switching et la solution de ce système n’est rien d’autre que la fonction valeur du problème. Ensuite, nous étudions un système d’équations intégro-différentielles à obstacles bilatéraux interconnectés. Nous montrons l’existence et l’unicité des solutions continus à croissance polynomiale, au sens viscosité, des systèmes min-max et max-min. La démarche conjugue les systèmes d’EDSR réfléchies ainsi que la méthode de Perron. Dans la dernière partie nous montrons l’égalité des solutions des systèmes max-min et min-max d’EDP lorsque le bruit est uniquement de type diffusion. Nous montrons que si les coûts de switching sont assez réguliers alors ces solutions coïncident. De plus elles sont caractérisées comme fonction valeur du jeu de switching de somme nulle. / There are three main results in this thesis. The first is existence and uniqueness of the solution in viscosity sense for a system of nonlinear m variational integral-partial differential equations with interconnected obstacles. From the probabilistic point of view, this system is related to optimal stochastic switching problem when the noise is driven by a Lévy process. As a by-product we obtain that the value function of the switching problem is continuous and unique solution of its associated Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman system of equations. Next, we study a general class of min-max and max-min nonlinear second-order integral-partial variational inequalities with interconnected bilateralobstacles, related to a multiple modes zero-sum switching game with jumps. Using Perron’s method and by the help of systems of penalized unilateral reflected backward SDEs with jumps, we construct a continuous with polynomial growth viscosity solution, and a comparison result yields the uniqueness of the solution. At last, we deal with the solutions of systems of PDEs with bilateral inter-connected obstacles of min-max and max-min types in the Brownian framework. These systems arise naturally in stochastic switching zero-sum game problems. We show that when the switching costs of one side are smooth, the solutions of the min-max and max-min systems coincide. Furthermore, this solution is identified as the value function of the zero-sum switching game. Switching optimal Jeu à somme nulle Méthode de Perron Processus de Lévy IPDE with interconnected obstacles Multi-modes switching problem Switching zero-sum game Lévy process Perron's method Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs equation 515.35
27	以特徵向量法解條件分配相容性問題 / Solving compatibility issues of conditional distributions by eigenvector approach 顧仲航, Ku, Chung Hang Unknown Date (has links) 給定兩個隨機變數的條件機率矩陣A和B，相容性問題的主要課題包含：(一)如何判斷他們是否相容？若相容，則如何檢驗聯合分配的唯一性或找出所有的聯合分配；(二)若不相容，則如何訂定測量不相容程度的方法並找出最近似聯合分配。目前的文獻資料有幾種解決問題的途徑，例如Arnold and Press (1989)的比值矩陣法、Song et al. (2010)的不可約化對角塊狀矩陣法及Arnold et al. (2002)的數學規劃法等，經由這些方法的啟發，本文發展出創新的特徵向量法來處理前述的相容性課題。當A和B相容時，我們觀察到邊際分配分別是AB′和B′A對應特徵值1的特徵向量。因此，在以邊際分配檢驗相容性時，特徵向量法僅需檢驗滿足特徵向量條件的邊際分配，大幅度減少了檢驗的工作量。利用線性代數中的Perron定理和不可約化對角塊狀矩陣的概念，特徵向量法可圓滿處理相容性問題(一)的部份。當A和B不相容時，特徵向量法也可衍生出一個測量不相容程度的簡單方法。由於不同的測量方法可得到不同的最近似聯合分配，為了比較其優劣，本文中提出了以條件分配的偏差加上邊際分配的偏差作為評量最近似聯合分配的標準。特徵向量法除了可推導出最近似聯合分配的公式解外，經過例子的驗證，在此評量標準下特徵向量法也獲得比其他測量法更佳的最近似聯合分配。由是，特徵向量法也可用在處理相容性問題(二)的部份。最後，將特徵向量法實際應用在兩人零和有限賽局問題上。作業研究的解法是將雙方採取何種策略視為獨立，但是我們認為雙方可利用償付值表所提供的資訊作為決策的依據，並將雙方的策略寫成兩個條件機率矩陣，則賽局問題被轉換為相容性問題。我們可用廣義相容的概念對賽局的解進行分析，並在各種測度下討論賽局的解及雙方的最佳策略。 / Given two conditional probability matrices A and B of two random variables, the issues of the compatibility include: (a) how to determine whether they are compatible? If compatible, how to check the uniqueness of the joint distribution or find all possible joint distributions; (b) if incompatible, how to measure how far they are from compatibility and find the most nearly compatible joint distribution. There are several approaches to solve these problems, such as the ratio matrix method(Arnold and Press, 1989), the IBD matrix method(Song et al., 2010) and the mathematical programming method(Arnold et al., 2002). Inspired by these methods, the thesis develops the eigenvector approach to deal with the compatibility issues. When A and B are compatible, it is observed that the marginal distributions are eigenvectors of AB′ and B′A corresponding to 1, respectively. While checking compatibility by the marginal distributions, the eigenvector approach only checks the marginal distributions which are eigenvectors of AB′ and B′A. It significantly reduces the workload. By using Perron theorem and the concept of the IBD matrix, the part (a) of compatibility issues can be dealt with the eigenvector approach. When A and B are incompatible, a simple way to measure the degree of incompatibility can be derived from the eigenvector approach. In order to compare the most nearly compatible joint distributions given by different measures, the thesis proposes the deviation of the conditional distributions plus the deviation of the marginal distributions as the most nearly compatible joint distribution assessment standard. The eigenvector approach not only derives formula for the most nearly compatible distribution, but also provides better joint distribution than those given by the other measures through the validations under this standard. The part (b) of compatibility issues can also be dealt with the eigenvector approach. Finally, the eigenvector approach is used in solving game problems. In operations research, strategies adopted by both players are assumed to be independent. However, this independent assumption may not be appropriate, since both players can make decisions through the information provided by the payoffs for the game. Let strategies of both players form two conditional probability matrices, then the game problems can be converted into compatibility issues. We can use the concept of generalized compatibility to analyze game solutions and discuss the best strategies for both players in a variety of measurements. 條件機率矩陣相容性不可約化可約化不可約化對角塊狀矩陣特徵向量法最近似聯合分配兩人零和有限賽局 conditional probability matrix compatibility irreducible reducible IBD matrix eigenvector approach 2-player finite zero-sum game
28	中央與地方府際衝突之研究 / The Research on Conflicts between Central and Local Governments 高美莉, Kao, Mei Li Unknown Date (has links) 1999年地方制度法施行以來，地方極力爭取自主權，中央與地方自治團體間衍生多次衝突，爭議之層面涵括地方財政權、立法權及人事權等地方自治核心領域。針對中央地方衝突，司法院大法官作出多號解釋，惟並未定紛止爭，突顯出建立中央地方衝突解決機制之必要性。本論文選擇五個衝突個案，分別是財政衝突的統籌分配稅款及地方積欠健保政府補助款；立法衝突之行動電話基地台自治條例牴觸案及台北市里長延選案；人事權衝突之縣市警察局長任免案。先以府際關係理論進行鉅觀分析，分析其府際關係網絡圖，突顯其網絡利害關係人，如何進行聯合或對抗。次以賽局理分論析中央地方之賽局策略選擇過程，進而賽局及報酬模擬分析。期望透過各類型中央地方府際衝突個案研究，提出解決下列問題。一、釐清中央地方府際衝突之影響因素？二、究竟何為中央地方權限爭議解決機制？三、台灣府際衝突之關係網絡圖像為何？四、府際衝突賽局中之博奕過程模式為何？本研究提出四項結論。一、法律與制度變遷與府際衝突交互運作影響；二、政黨對立為府際係衝突最關鍵影響因素；三、建立多元之協調解決機制，為解決府際衝突之有效措施。四、提出全觀型府際賽局理論，以詮釋我國府際關係衝突現象。本研究並提出五項建議，有助於未來我國府際關係正向發展，一、釐清府際衝突深層網絡關係結構，二、擴大跨域合作府際關係，三、追求中央與地方府際之最適效益，四、邁向多層次之地方治理，五、體認「地方自治為憲法制度性保障」之真諦。 / Since the Local Government Act enacted in 1999, local governments strive for local autonomy; therefore some supervisory conflicts aroused between central and local government. Those conflicts related to law autonomous enactment, finance autonomous rights and personnel rights. Despite Judicial Interpretation No.550 and 553 had review above conflicts, disputes still remained unsolved, which proclaimed the importance of constructing the reconciliatory mechanism of conflicts. This study tries to analyze five conflict cases including tax redistribution fund, premium of National Health Insurance, cellular phone base management local act, the prolonged election of Taipei li-chairman and incumbency of police bureau chief. Four conclusions are drawn as below, first, legal and system change will affect the IGR conflicts mutually. Second, parties antagonism is a crucial factor for IGR conflicts. Third, multi reconciliatory mechanism of conflicts would be efficient, a holistic game theory could interpret those conflicts. The last chapter proposes recommendations such as to clarify the IGR networks structure, broaden the cross-boundary cooperation, pursuit the optimal payoffs, work towards a multi-level governance and comprehend the core meaning of “local autonomy as a system assurance”. 地方自治中央地方府際衝突地方立法權司法院大法官解釋地方財政權統籌分配稅款府際關係地方治理賽局理論零和賽局財政收支劃分 local autonomy local legislative power Judicial Review local government finance tax redistribution fund intergovernmental relations local governance game theory zero-sum game

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