Mémoire numérisé par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.

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Der Beitrag nimmt seinen Ausgangspunkt bei der Analyse eines Papiers der Konrad Adenauer-Stiftung, das einen Werkekanon für den Musikunterricht vorschlägt. Er führt zu dem Schluss, dass Musik eine besondere Art der ästhetischen Praxis ist, die kulturabhängige Wahrnehmungsinteressen, Vollzugsweisen und dementsprechend gestaltete Musikstücke umfasst. Am Beispiel einer Profiloberstufe wird gezeigt, warum in musikalisch bildender Praxis nicht ethische oder historische, sondern ästhetische Praxis bestimmend sein sollte. / What should be the subject of music education? The article takes its starting point at analysing a paper of the Konrad Adenauer-Stiftung, that suggests an opus- canon. The proposal of the article is, that music is a special kind of aesthetic practice including different ways of perception, which depends on cultural experiences. The example of a general school points out, why aesthical and not ethical or historical practice should dominate the practice of music education.

Der Beitrag nimmt seinen Ausgangspunkt bei der Analyse eines Papiers der Konrad Adenauer-Stiftung, das einen Werkekanon für den Musikunterricht vorschlägt. Er führt zu dem Schluss, dass Musik eine besondere Art der ästhetischen Praxis ist, die kulturabhängige Wahrnehmungsinteressen, Vollzugsweisen und dementsprechend gestaltete Musikstücke umfasst. Am Beispiel einer Profiloberstufe wird gezeigt, warum in musikalisch bildender Praxis nicht ethische oder historische, sondern ästhetische Praxis bestimmend sein sollte. / What should be the subject of music education? The article takes its starting point at analysing a paper of the Konrad Adenauer-Stiftung, that suggests an opus- canon. The proposal of the article is, that music is a special kind of aesthetic practice including different ways of perception, which depends on cultural experiences. The example of a general school points out, why aesthical and not ethical or historical practice should dominate the practice of music education.

Les années 1948-55 sont décisives pour le regain de la souveraineté ouest-allemande et l’intégration de la République fédérale à l’Ouest. Au cours de cette période, on observe la transformation des trois zones placées sous l’autorité suprême des alliés occidentaux en un Etat (quasi) souverain, membre de l’OTAN. Wilhelm Grewe, professeur de droit international, s’engage dès la première heure en faveur d’une base juridique pour les relations avec les Alliés sous forme d’un statut d’occupation (en rédigeant notamment Ein Besatzungsstatut für Deutschland en 1948).En 1951, Konrad Adenauer lui confie la direction de la délégation chargée de négocier le Traité Général sur l’Allemagne (« Deutschlandvertrag »). Wilhelm Grewe use d’astuces juridiques et de pragmatisme politique afin de réaliser les objectifs du chancelier. Les discussions portent essentiellement sur les questions de la souveraineté allemande, de l’autorité suprême, des droits réservés des Alliés, ainsi que sur une garantie de sécurité pour la République fédérale. Le traité, intrinsèquement lié à celui de la CED, est signé en mai 1952.La ratification des deux traités mène à des débats houleux au « Bundestag », notamment sur les questions de la nation allemande et du réarmement. Wilhelm Grewe est alors chargé de la défense juridique des traités devant le parlement et la Cour constitutionnelle. Il joue de nouveau un rôle important lors de la renégociation du Traité Général à la suite de l’échec de la CED. En mai 1955, un « Deutschlandvertrag » remodelé entre en vigueur, le statut d’occupation est aboli, et la République Fédérale rejoint les rangs de l’OTAN et de l’UEO. / The period from 1948 to 1955 was crucial for West Germany's attempts to regain her sovereignty and to achieve her integration into the West. During that time the three zones placed under the Supreme Authority of the Western Allies gradually progressed to becoming a (quasi) sovereign state and a full member of NATO.Wilhelm Grewe, a German professor of international law, was one of those who at a very early stage pleaded for a Statute of Occupation (in 1948, he published Ein Besatzungsstatut für Deutschland) in order to create a legal framework for the relations between the Allies and Germany.In 1951 Konrad Adenauer appointed him Head of delegation for the negotiation of the General Treaty on Germany (“Deutschlandvertrag”). With his legal expertise and his political pragmatism Wilhelm Grewe tried to fulfill the Chancellor’s objectives. The negotiations focused on German sovereignty, supreme authority, the reserved rights of the Allies and a security guarantee for the Federal Republic. This treaty, which was coupled with the EDC, was signed in May 1952.The ratification of both treaties gave rise to stormy debates in the “Bundestag”, concentrating especially on the questions of German reunification and rearmament. Grewe was then entrusted with the legal defence of the treaties vis-à-vis Parliament and the Constitutional Court.He was again called to play an important role when the General Treaty had to be renegotiated after the EDC had failed. In May 1955 a revised “Deutschlandvertrag” entered into force, the Statute of Occupation was abolished and the Federal Republic of Germany became a member of NATO and of the WEU.

Fondés en 1848 à Mayence par un ecclésiastique, Mgr Adam Franz Lennig, afin de défendre les libertés religieuses, les Katholikentage – littéralement « Congrès des Catholiques » ou « Journées des Catholiques » – rassemblaient à l'origine les représentants des principales associations catholiques et des personnalités en vue. Au cours des quelque vingt années suivantes, ils jouèrent un rôle majeur dans la mobilisation politique des laïcs. Le Kulturkampf prussien (1872-1878) resserra les liens entre le Zentrum, créé en 1870, et les Katholikentage qui firent progressivement office de congrès annuel du parti. Vers 1900, ils devinrent des assemblées de masse groupant plusieurs dizaines de milliers de participants dans le but de démontrer la solidarité des populations à la fois avec la hiérarchie ecclésiastique et avec les dirigeants du Zentrum. Après une interruption de huit ans, Francfort-sur-le-Main accueillit en 1921 le premier Katholikentag national d'après-guerre et inaugura la reprise des Congrès, organisés ensuite annuellement jusqu'en 1933, à l'exception du Katholikentag prévu en 1923 à Cologne et interdit par les forces d'occupation. Sous la République de Weimar, les Congrès furent les plus grandes assemblées de masse ayant lieu régulièrement : 250.000 personnes assistèrent à la messe dominicale de celui d'Essen, en 1932. Leur influence dépassa largement le nombre de participants, grâce au soutien du clergé au niveau local et national, ainsi qu'à celui du réseau d'associations catholiques et à la presse. <br /><br />Alors que le Zentrum a fait l'objet de nombreuses monographies, les Katholikentage ont été jusqu'à présent négligés par les historiens. Les quelques articles consacrés à la question ne retiennent souvent que la période antérieure à 1914 ou celle postérieure à la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Ils mettent en avant le caractère démocratique des Congrès considérés comme les précurseurs de la Démocratie chrétienne incarnée par Konrad Adenauer après 1945. L'un des objectifs de cette thèse est de montrer les ambiguïtés liées à la dépolitisation officielle des Katholikentage sous la République de Weimar, période qui a été jusque-là soigneusement ignorée. Elle cherche à vérifier entre autre l'interprétation selon laquelle la séduction exercée par les régimes autoritaires sur les élites et les populations notamment européennes pendant la période de l'entre-deux-guerres n'aurait pas influencé les catholiques allemands avant le 30 janvier 1933. <br /><br />Les comptes rendus publiés des Katholikentage sont des sources officielles qui ont constitué la première étape de mon travail. Celui-ci a ensuite été complété par les archives privées des principaux dirigeants des Congrès et des associations catholiques. Comme le Comité central ne possède aucun fonds pour la période antérieure à 1952, j'ai dû rassembler des sources réparties dans les archives ecclésiastiques et civiles de chacune des villes où un Congrès a été organisé entre 1921 et 1933. Au total, 42 fonds d'archives différents ont été consultés.<br /><br />La thèse est divisée en trois parties. La première a pour objet d'analyser la reprise des Congrès au lendemain de la Première Guerre mondiale, leur organisation, leur financement et la nature de leur cérémonial. La seconde partie étudie le contenu et l'esprit des discours tenus aux Katholikentage de Francfort-sur-le-Main en 1921, de Munich en 1922 et de Hanovre en 1924. La troisième partie est consacrée aux messages délivrés par les conférenciers à partir du Katholikentag de Stuttgart en 1925 jusqu'au Katholikentag d'Essen en 1932. <br /><br />Pendant les années vingt, aux Katholikentage, l'épiscopat et le prince Alois zu Löwenstein, à la tête du Comité central chargé de l'organisation des Congrès, contribuèrent contre leur gré à la consolidation du système républicain car ils cherchèrent avant tout à préserver et à étendre les acquis obtenus par la minorité catholique grâce à la Constitution de Weimar. Certes, les propos tenus par de nombreux conférenciers contre la politique économique, sociale et culturelle du gouvernement étaient des critiques à peine voilées du Zentrum. De plus, la symbolique utilisée accordait une place centrale à la transcendance en politique. Elle proposait un système global d'interprétation du monde tendant vers l'absolu, en rupture avec le pluralisme républicain : l'unité était à réaliser en Christ et non sur le terrain du consensus. Cependant, cette opposition ne s'incarna pas dans la pratique car les Congrès s'efforcèrent de préserver l'image de l'unité comme ils l'avaient fait avant la Première Guerre mondiale. <br />Pour préserver cette unité, la plupart des intervenants aux Katholikentage adoptèrent une attitude de repli, arc-boutés sur la défense des valeurs chrétiennes. En un sens, cette attitude les protégea au début des années trente de la séduction exercée sur beaucoup par les nationaux-socialistes. Toutefois, elle les empêcha de s'allier durablement à d'autres forces politiques, en particulier aux socialistes, pour lutter efficacement contre les nationaux-socialistes.

第二次世界大戰於1945年結束後，德國由同盟國加以接管，並遭分割為四個佔領區 (美、英、法、蘇) 而喪失國家主權。直至1949年5月，西德在西方同盟國的許可下，制定了作為立國基礎的「基本法」(das Grundgesetz)，使其重新獲得國家主權以及治權，國家所需要的政治體系，如政府、國會、政黨、選舉制度等儼然成型；由此，包含美、英、法三國佔領區的德國領土在穩定中建立了符合西方民主體制精神的「德意志聯邦共和國」(Bundesrepublik Deutschland，以下簡稱「西德」)。 西德建國後之首任總理艾德諾 (Konrad Adenauer) 被賦予艱鉅的任務，帶領著已成為斷垣殘壁的國家和人民朝向嶄新的民主社會前進。在成立西德外交體系時，艾德諾面臨專業外交人員短缺之窘境，故仍須延攬前納粹時期之外交官員，卻因此等官員於大戰期間曾直接參與違反人道和戰爭之罪刑，使得新政府在民主化的過程中出現不穩定的因子。立基於西方民主制度的西德任用此等人士，除了衍生外交部的人事問題外，艾德諾政府另須就德國的國家主權以及未來在國際社會中的地位周旋於同盟國之間，此有別於一般的「雙層賽局」(Two-Level Games – 即國內政治與外交之間的相互影響)，而可謂身處「三層賽局」(Three-Level Games) – 即國際、國家及組織內部之間即競爭又合作，且錯綜複雜的交互作用關係。 此外，戰勝的四個同盟國之間彼此為了鞏固在德國及歐陸的勢力各懷鬼胎，對未來的德國亦抱持著不同的態度。同盟國與艾德諾政府之間就戰犯處置和政府人事規劃所達成的協議甚或妥協，不僅對日後德國的政局發展有關鍵性的影響力，在東西兩大陣營之間的零和遊戲中也扮演了既微妙且重要的角色。 本文將針對西德外交部成立初期之人事政策以及艾德諾之德國和外交政策做一深入探討，並就西德建國後之發展，包含自同盟國的掌控當中取回國家主權以及因應西德加入「北大西洋公約組織」(NATO) 而重新建軍的過程進行分析；此外亦將由西德、美國、英國、法國及蘇聯的立場，來分析諸此國家在中歐地區的地緣戰略，並評論艾德諾內政及外交政策上的得失。 / After the World War II in 1945 Germany had been occupied by the Allies (USA, Great Britain, France and USSR) and dismembered into four occupation zones which led to the lost of the Germany’s sovereignty. With the consent of the Allies Germany developed the “Grundgesetz” (Basic Law) in May 1949 as the foundation of an independent state with sovereignty and the right to rule; a complete political institution of a nation with a government, parliament, political parties and election system was neatly arranged, hence the Federal Republic of Germany, also called West-Germany, which consisted of the occupation zones of the USA, Great Britain and France, was built up with western democratic ideals in a stable period. The first Germany’s chancellor Konrad Adenauer was assigned to lead the people and the desolate country towards a democratic society. While he was about to re-construct the foreign affairs the lack of professional diplomats was such of remarkable critical that a recruitment of former Nazi-diplomats was inevitable who were directly or indirectly involved in crimes against humanity or in war crimes and symbolized an unstable factor in the Germany’s democratic development for Adenauer. Besides these personnel problems, Adenauer had also to negotiate the sovereignty and the future international status of West Germany with the Allies which seems not to be an usual “Two-Level Games” (i. e. the two-way influence between the domestic politics and the foreign policy) but a so-called “Three-Level Games” which means one more party (the governmental organizations) to the “Two-Level Games” with competitive-cooperative and complicated complex of influences. On the other hand, the four great powers of the Allies held different attitudes on the future of Germany and they had their each own to consolidate the force in the respective occupation zone and on the European continent. The agreements or even compromises between the Allies and Adenauer’s administration on the punishment of war criminals and on the government’s personnel planning not only affected the West-Germany’s continuing political development but also played a profound and important role in the zero-sum-game between the western and eastern camps. The themes of this research focus on the personnel, the Deutschlandpolitik (the Germany-Policy) and foreign policy of Adenauer after the establishment of the West German government and the process of re-building the national sovereignty combining the re-armament of West Germany through the accession to the NATO. Furthermore, the Geo-politics of the countries West Germany, USA, Great Britain, France and USSR in the central European continent, and the gains and losses of the domestic and foreign policies of Adnenauer will be discussed and analyzed.

Pretendendo evidenciar uma leitura jurídico-política sobre o começo da integração europeia - iniciada por meio da fundação jurídica da CECA, esta Tese visa a responder à pergunta: quando, como e por meio de quais instituições, países europeus tradicionalmente opostos em termos militares estabeleceram entre si, após o término da Segunda Guerra Mundial, de maneira inédita e inaudita em sua História, um novo modo de relações responsável por tornar impossível e impensável a deflagração de nova Guerra regional? Para responder a essa pergunta, o presente trabalho assume a perspectiva de uma Pesquisa interdisciplinar em Direito, recorrendo não apenas ao Direito Positivo, mas também a outras áreas do conhecimento, tais como a Filosofia Política Antiga e Contemporânea e a História Contemporânea da Europa. O objetivo consiste em formular um aparato discursivo racional conceitual a partir de matriz de leitura fornecida pela Filosofia Política Antiga e Contemporânea para, em seguida, aplicá-lo sobre elementos da experiência histórica e jurídico-normativa positiva da CECA. A chave de leitura conceitual formada a partir de contribuições da Filosofia Política tem sua origem principalmente na aproximação das reflexões de POLÍBIO e de Claude LEFORT. O trabalho evidencia a importância de normas jurídicas institucionalmente previstas para lidar com oposições escalares na construção e na manutenção de um sistema de relações jurídico-Politicamente organizado, de maneira a que tensões entre distintas dimensões existenciais - institucionalmente absorvidas e encaminhadas - não possam significar a ruptura violenta desse sistema. Este aparato racional conceitual pode ser aplicado sobre os elementos da experiência histórica e normativa originária (Tratado de Paris de 1951) da CECA, o que permite diferenciar histórica e institucionalmente esta iniciativa em particular dos demais Projetos de Europa Unida do imediato pós-Segunda Guerra Mundial. Para os fundadores da CECA (Konrad ADENAUER, Jean MONNET e Robert SCHUMAN), um regime juridicamente regulado de simples cooperação política (Unionismo Europeu) não era considerado como suficiente para instaurar um novo modo de relações na Europa. Ao mesmo tempo, eles não visavam à construção jurídica de uma Unificação Política da Europa em torno de um Estado Federal Europeu (Federalismo Europeu). Nesse sentido, a CECA pode ser entendida como exemplo histórico singular de organização jurídico-Política de países europeus. Foram criados pelo Tratado da CECA órgãos comunitários supranacionais e intergovernamentais voltados a compartilhar com os Estados-Membros e com os respectivos povos europeus a formação do sentido normativo que deveria ser impresso sobre questões concretas sensíveis tornadas comuns. A nenhum deles foi atribuída uma posição central na nomogênese comunitária. A leitura jurídico-política da integração europeia iniciada com a CECA se mostra possível assim a partir da constatação de que a arquitetura das instituições do Tratado desta Organização Internacional mesmo das instituições que se referiam a normas jurídico-econômicas - foi responsável pela afirmação e pela conservação de um novo modo de relações entre os países europeus. Buscava-se, não um Estado Europeu, nem uma singela cooperação intergovernamental institucionalizada, mas um meio termo de organização jurídico-Política: um sistema de relações estruturado por um engenhoso mecanismo institucional orientado para promover, por meio de freios e contrapesos, de forma ininterrupta, oposições entre os participantes da vida comunitária. / Aiming to unveil a legal-political reading of the beginning of European integration - initiated by the legal foundation of the ECSC, this Thesis intends to answer the question: when, how and through which institutions, European countries traditionally opposed militarily established between themselves, after the end of the Second World War - unprecedentedly and unparalleled in their history, a new kind of relationship, which was responsible for making impossible and unthinkable the outbreak of new regional war? In order to answer this question, this study follows the path of an interdisciplinary Research in Law, resorting not only to Positive Law, but also to other fields of knowledge, such as Ancient and Contemporary Political Philosophy and Contemporary History of Europe. The objective is to read experience elements given by ECSCs History and positive legal rules through lens framed according to a rational conceptual apparatus grounded on Ancient and Contemporary Political Philosophy. The hermeneutical key framed according to Political Philosophy has its main origins in the conjoint discussion of POLYBIUS thought and Claude LEFORTs contributions. This work highlights the importance of legal institutions dealing with dimensional oppositions within the construction and maintenance of a legal-Politically organized relationships system, by which tensions institutionally absorbed and addressed - between different existential dimensions do not disrupte violently this system. This conceptual apparatus can be applied to understand ECSCs historical and and normative (Treaty of Paris, 1951) experience and helps differentiating from both a historical and institutional perspective this peculiar initiative from alternative European Union Projects immeadiately proposed after the Second World War. For ECSC founding fathers (Konrad ADENAUER, Jean MONNET and Robert SCHUMAN), a mere legal regime of political cooperation (European Unionism) was not regarded as sufficiently capable of creating a new kind of relationship in Europe. At the same time, they did not pursue a legal Political Unification of Europe within a European Federal State (European Federalism). In this sense, the ECSC can be seen as an unique historic example of a legal-Political organization of European countries. Supranational and intergovernmental community bodies were created by ECSCs Treaty in order to share with its own member-States and their respective peoples the construction of the normative sense which would conduct issues concerning sensitive common problems. To none of them was assigned a central position in Communitys normative process. A legal-political reading of European integration - started with the ECSC - seems possible because the institutional framework whithin its Treaty - even when referred to legal and economic rules - was responsible for the affirmation and preservation of a new kind of relationship between European countries. It was envisaged, neither a European State, nor an institutionalized intergovernmental cooperation, but a middle-way legal-Political organization: a relationship system erecte by an ingenious institutional mechanism conceived to promote - through checks and balances - nonstop oppositions between participants of Communitys life.

Pretendendo evidenciar uma leitura jurídico-política sobre o começo da integração europeia - iniciada por meio da fundação jurídica da CECA, esta Tese visa a responder à pergunta: quando, como e por meio de quais instituições, países europeus tradicionalmente opostos em termos militares estabeleceram entre si, após o término da Segunda Guerra Mundial, de maneira inédita e inaudita em sua História, um novo modo de relações responsável por tornar impossível e impensável a deflagração de nova Guerra regional? Para responder a essa pergunta, o presente trabalho assume a perspectiva de uma Pesquisa interdisciplinar em Direito, recorrendo não apenas ao Direito Positivo, mas também a outras áreas do conhecimento, tais como a Filosofia Política Antiga e Contemporânea e a História Contemporânea da Europa. O objetivo consiste em formular um aparato discursivo racional conceitual a partir de matriz de leitura fornecida pela Filosofia Política Antiga e Contemporânea para, em seguida, aplicá-lo sobre elementos da experiência histórica e jurídico-normativa positiva da CECA. A chave de leitura conceitual formada a partir de contribuições da Filosofia Política tem sua origem principalmente na aproximação das reflexões de POLÍBIO e de Claude LEFORT. O trabalho evidencia a importância de normas jurídicas institucionalmente previstas para lidar com oposições escalares na construção e na manutenção de um sistema de relações jurídico-Politicamente organizado, de maneira a que tensões entre distintas dimensões existenciais - institucionalmente absorvidas e encaminhadas - não possam significar a ruptura violenta desse sistema. Este aparato racional conceitual pode ser aplicado sobre os elementos da experiência histórica e normativa originária (Tratado de Paris de 1951) da CECA, o que permite diferenciar histórica e institucionalmente esta iniciativa em particular dos demais Projetos de Europa Unida do imediato pós-Segunda Guerra Mundial. Para os fundadores da CECA (Konrad ADENAUER, Jean MONNET e Robert SCHUMAN), um regime juridicamente regulado de simples cooperação política (Unionismo Europeu) não era considerado como suficiente para instaurar um novo modo de relações na Europa. Ao mesmo tempo, eles não visavam à construção jurídica de uma Unificação Política da Europa em torno de um Estado Federal Europeu (Federalismo Europeu). Nesse sentido, a CECA pode ser entendida como exemplo histórico singular de organização jurídico-Política de países europeus. Foram criados pelo Tratado da CECA órgãos comunitários supranacionais e intergovernamentais voltados a compartilhar com os Estados-Membros e com os respectivos povos europeus a formação do sentido normativo que deveria ser impresso sobre questões concretas sensíveis tornadas comuns. A nenhum deles foi atribuída uma posição central na nomogênese comunitária. A leitura jurídico-política da integração europeia iniciada com a CECA se mostra possível assim a partir da constatação de que a arquitetura das instituições do Tratado desta Organização Internacional mesmo das instituições que se referiam a normas jurídico-econômicas - foi responsável pela afirmação e pela conservação de um novo modo de relações entre os países europeus. Buscava-se, não um Estado Europeu, nem uma singela cooperação intergovernamental institucionalizada, mas um meio termo de organização jurídico-Política: um sistema de relações estruturado por um engenhoso mecanismo institucional orientado para promover, por meio de freios e contrapesos, de forma ininterrupta, oposições entre os participantes da vida comunitária. / Aiming to unveil a legal-political reading of the beginning of European integration - initiated by the legal foundation of the ECSC, this Thesis intends to answer the question: when, how and through which institutions, European countries traditionally opposed militarily established between themselves, after the end of the Second World War - unprecedentedly and unparalleled in their history, a new kind of relationship, which was responsible for making impossible and unthinkable the outbreak of new regional war? In order to answer this question, this study follows the path of an interdisciplinary Research in Law, resorting not only to Positive Law, but also to other fields of knowledge, such as Ancient and Contemporary Political Philosophy and Contemporary History of Europe. The objective is to read experience elements given by ECSCs History and positive legal rules through lens framed according to a rational conceptual apparatus grounded on Ancient and Contemporary Political Philosophy. The hermeneutical key framed according to Political Philosophy has its main origins in the conjoint discussion of POLYBIUS thought and Claude LEFORTs contributions. This work highlights the importance of legal institutions dealing with dimensional oppositions within the construction and maintenance of a legal-Politically organized relationships system, by which tensions institutionally absorbed and addressed - between different existential dimensions do not disrupte violently this system. This conceptual apparatus can be applied to understand ECSCs historical and and normative (Treaty of Paris, 1951) experience and helps differentiating from both a historical and institutional perspective this peculiar initiative from alternative European Union Projects immeadiately proposed after the Second World War. For ECSC founding fathers (Konrad ADENAUER, Jean MONNET and Robert SCHUMAN), a mere legal regime of political cooperation (European Unionism) was not regarded as sufficiently capable of creating a new kind of relationship in Europe. At the same time, they did not pursue a legal Political Unification of Europe within a European Federal State (European Federalism). In this sense, the ECSC can be seen as an unique historic example of a legal-Political organization of European countries. Supranational and intergovernmental community bodies were created by ECSCs Treaty in order to share with its own member-States and their respective peoples the construction of the normative sense which would conduct issues concerning sensitive common problems. To none of them was assigned a central position in Communitys normative process. A legal-political reading of European integration - started with the ECSC - seems possible because the institutional framework whithin its Treaty - even when referred to legal and economic rules - was responsible for the affirmation and preservation of a new kind of relationship between European countries. It was envisaged, neither a European State, nor an institutionalized intergovernmental cooperation, but a middle-way legal-Political organization: a relationship system erecte by an ingenious institutional mechanism conceived to promote - through checks and balances - nonstop oppositions between participants of Communitys life.

This thesis entitled "Transformation through Trade. The pioneers of the New Eastern Policy in the 50s and 60s." examines the efforts of the German entrerpreneurs during the Cold War to revive trade relations with the Sowjetunion and to the states within its sphere of power. Because Europe was divided politically into two antagonistic systems, and due to the embargo imposed on West Germany by the Allied Powers, the entrepreneurs encountered extreme difficulties in their attemps to renew trade. The determined efforts of the economic diplomats, which were fundamental in creating conditions for the new eastern policy, reached their peak in 1970 when the Gas Pipeline Deal was concluded. Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)