This diploma thesis deals with the Thomas Aquinas´s Conception of Natural Law. The fundamental content of thesis is the Czech translation and critical Commentaries of English written articles. Thesis is divided into three parts. There is a theoretical foundation for Natural Law Conception and Thomas Aquinas themes in the first part, the Critical Commentaries of translated articles in the second part and the translated articles in the third part of diploma thesis. Translated articles are the philosophy studies of Natural Law and its relation to the Lawmaking, the Logic of Ethical Discourse and the Human Rights. There are copies of original English written articles as diploma thesis attachments.

Comentadores de várias tendências se dividem quanto a como situar o pensamento político do Doutor de Aquino frente à religião. Seria possível fazer uma interpretação naturalista da política em Tomás de Aquino? Ou o seu pensamento político se encontra influenciado por uma esfera superior necessária para que se possa compreender em profundidade o que o autor propõe? No intuito de se posicionar sobre esse antigo debate, pretendemos pesquisar o pensamento de Tomás para buscar entender o conceito de lei, e daí os limites para a lei humana e alguma possível influência do elemento religioso. Para lançar luz sobre o problema, analisaremos as questões sobre o conceito de lei, a lei eterna, a lei natural e a lei humana presentes na Primeira Parte da Segunda Parte da Suma de Teologia, em comparação com outros escritos de Tomás, notadamente a Primeira Parte da Suma de Teologia, a Suma Contra os Gentios e o opúsculo De Regno. Os comentadores divergem a respeito e a pesquisa busca, a partir da releitura das obras de Tomás e dos principais comentadores do século XX e XXI, uma clara tomada de posição clara a respeito, concluindo pela dependência do pensamento político de Tomás de Aquino de uma ordem superior à esfera humana. / Commentators of several trends split themselves as how to situate the political thought of Doctor Aquinas regarding religion. Would it be possible to do a naturalistic interpretation of politics in Thomas Aquinas? Or is his political thought under the influence of a superior sphere necessary to understand in depth what the author proposes? Aiming to set a position about this ancient debate, we attempt to research the thought of Thomas in order to search understanding of the concept of law, and so forth the limits for the human law and any possible influence of the religious element. To bring light on this matter, we will analyse the questions about the concept of law, the eternal law, the natural law and the human law which are enclosed in the First Part of the Second Part of The Summa Theologica, in comparison with the other writings of Thomas, mainly the First Part of the Summa Theologica, the Summa Contra Gentiles and the opuscule De Regno. The commentators disagree in this respect and the research aims, through the carefull reading of the works of Thomas and of the main commentators of the XX and XXI centuries, a clear view in this respect, concluding for the dependency of the political thought of Thomas Aquinas of a superior order above the human sphere.

Segundo Tomás de Aquino, a forma é o que instancia a substância em determinada natureza; sem ela, a substância não seria o que é. Saliente-se que definir o que é (quid est) algo não é o mesmo que afirmar que ele é, pois, neste caso, o que é afirmado é sua existência, não sua natureza. Isso indica que a existência não é posta pela forma da substância, mas por algo outro, que, em sua Exposição aos Ebdomadibus de Boécio, Tomás chama de ato de ser (actus essendi). Imiscuído na substância que é seu sujeito , o ato de ser concede-lhe existência, tornando-a um ente, o qual possui um vínculo com o próprio ser (ipsum esse), que é deus. O aquinatense chama esse vínculo de participação, donde o ente participa do ser tal como o efeito de sua causa. O problema é instaurado quando se passa do plano ontológico ao gnosiológico, isto é, quando o intelecto busca inteligir a participação do ente no ser. Nessa intelecção, a limitação do intelecto humano se evidencia: a participação do ente no ser é entendida não como tal, mas como a do concreto no abstrato. O ente é significado em concreto, pois nele o ato de ser se encontra concretizado; a dificuldade, contudo, apresenta-se quando o intelecto tenta abstrair o ato de ser do ente: nessa abstração, o ato de ser não é inteligido enquanto tal, mas enquanto abstrato. Diante disso, torna-se inevitável levantar as seguintes questões: qual o modo de abstração que tenta obter o ato de ser do ente? Por que o intelecto não é capaz de inteligir o ser enquanto ser, mas apenas enquanto abstrato? O ato de ser, inconcebível pelo intelecto humano, é de fato superior à forma substancial? A participação do concreto no abstrato corresponde à do ente no ser? São estas as principais questões que, neste estudo, buscaremos responder. / According to Thomas of Aquinas, form is that which instantiates substance in a determinate nature; without it, substance would not be what it is. It should be emphasized that defining what something is (its quid est) is not not the same as to assert that it is, for in this case what is asserted is its existence, not its nature. That indicates that existence is not given by the form of the substance, but by something else, which in his Exposition to the Boethius\'s Ebdomadibus, Thomas calls act of being (actus essendi). Mingling in the substance its subject , the act of being gives it its existence, turning it into an entity, which is vinculated to being itself (ipsum esse), or God. The Aquinate calls this nexus participation, whence the entity participates in being as the effect of its cause. The problem is set when one traverses the ontological level to the gnoseological, that is, when the intellect tries to grasp the participation of the entity in being. In this intellection, the limits of the human intellect become clear: the participation of entity in being is understood not as such, but as the concrete in relation to the abstract. The entity is signified in concrete, for in it the act of being is found concretized; the difficulty, however, reveals itself when the intellect tries to abstract the act of being from the entity: in this abstraction, the act of being is not grasped as such, but as abstract. Thus it becomes inevitable to formulate the following questions: which is the mode of abstraction which tries to obtain the act of being of the entity? Why is the intellect not able to grasp being as being, but only as abstract? Is the act of being, inconceivable to the human intellect, in fact superior to the substantial form? And does participation of the concrete in the abstract correspond to that of the entity in being? These are the main questions that this study aims to answer.

Lorsque Thomas d’Aquin lit la Bible comme enseignant à l’université, il entre dans le texte de la même manière que dans les autres textes profanes qu’il commente. Pourtant la lecture biblique est chargée par l’Aquinate d’un rôle particulier dans la doctrine sacrée considérée comme science : c’est par cette lecture qu’une participation à la sagesse de Dieu est acquise, ce qui permet au théologien de forger les principes dont il a besoin pour argumenter scientifiquement. Cela donne un statut particulier au commentaire biblique qui est alors conçu comme un prolongement homogène du texte de l’Écriture où Dieu se révèle. Le Commentaire de l’évangile de Jean est un bon témoin de cela dans l’œuvre du dominicain. Un modèle de ce chemin intellectuel parcouru par la lecture biblique est la Samaritaine qui écoute le Christ puis l’annonce conduisant les habitants à venir au Christ. Elle écoute les mots humains de Dieu, cherche à les pénétrer, elle peut alors prendre à son tour la parole et transmettre la profondeur de la sagesse qu’elle a découverte. / When Thomas Aquinas reads the Bible as a university teacher, he enters the text as any other secular text he comments. Yet biblical reading is given a special role by Aquinas in sacred doctrine, considered as a science: this reading enables a participation to God's wisdom and allows the theologian to elaborate the principles he needs in order to argue in a scientific manner. This gives a particular status to biblical commentary which is then designed as a homogenous extension of the sacred text where God reveals himself. The Commentary on the Gospel of John provides good evidence of this in the work of the Dominican. A model of this intellectual approach of biblical reading is the Samaritan woman who listens to the Christ, then announces it, conducting inhabitants to come to the Christ. She listens to the human words of God, seeking to penetrate them, being then in a position to speak herself and convey the depth of this wisdom she discovered.

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This thesis provides an historical and intellectual summary of the role of the concepts of 'substance,' and 'participation,' in the making of the doctrine of the Trinity. In the concluding chapter, a study is made of the assumptions of deconstruction, which are somewhat hostile to a substance paradigm. We argue for an appreciation of the importance of both substance and participation for the Trinity, and philosophy generally. Chapters are dedicated to individuals who have in some way contributed to perceptions of these two terms, as they pertain to the Christian notion of the Trinity. Additionally, we seek to define some philosophical problems that accompany a Trinitarian metaphysics of 'substance,' and 'participation.' The problems include those of deconstruction: issues such as 'Logocentrism,' and 'Presence.' Finally, we investigate how Trinitarian ontology can provide answers to many of the questions Derrida raises conceming the problematic future of metaphysical thinking. / Philosophy and Systematic Theology / M.Th. (Systematic Theology)

Cette thèse vise à mener une étude détaillée sur la manière dont les penseurs du XIIIème siècle ont appréhendé et utilisé le fameux dictum d’Aristote du De anima II : « l’âme est l’acte premier du corps organique qui est potentiellement en vie » En effet, nous examinons les modalités philosophiques qui ont poussé Bonaventure et Thomas d’Aquin à proposer chacun une lecture originale de ce passage tout en admettant tous les deux que l’âme humaine et le corps ne sont pas à prendre comme deux substances distinctes, mais comme deux parties qui constituent l’essence d’une personne humaine. Nous tentons ainsi de décrire, dans leur processus d’élaboration et de mise en œuvre, ces théories qui visent à nous démontrer l’unité naturelle de l’être humain, ce qui constitue au final des solutions aux problèmes issus de la « two substances view », c'est-à-dire celui du dualisme des substances. / The objective of this thesis is to understand how 13th century thinkers have adopted the famous dictum of Aristotle's De anima II that “the soul is the first act of the organic body potentially having life”. In this perspective, this thesis examines the way in which Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas, each with his own creativity, elaborated to establish the unity of human being that consist in their claim that the human soul and body are not two distinct substances, but two essential parts of the human nature or a human person. In so doing, this thesis analyses the concepts like “substance”, “hoc aliquid”, “intellective soul” “intellect” etc and their meaning in respective contexts where Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas give us relevant solutions that can deal with problems arising from the "two substances view", or substance dualism.

Nous entendons, dans ce mémoire, préciser le sens d'actus essendi par l’analyse de l’emploi du terme par Thomas d’Aquin. Bien que la notion d’acte d’être soit sousjacente à nombre de développements philosophiques et théologiques de l’Aquinate, elle n’est considérée pour elle-même dans aucun texte du corpus thomasien. En exposant le cadre théorique des onze unités textuelles dans lesquelles on retrouve nommément l’expression, nous explicitons les distinctions qu’opère Thomas entre l’acte d’être et les notions ontologiques corrélatives (étant, quiddité, être du jugement prédicatif et être commun). Si « actus essendi » désigne en premier lieu un principe constitutif de l’étant, il peut encore désigner le terme abstrait correspondant à cette perfection de l’étant. L’acte d’être est ainsi ce par quoi l’étant est étant; il est cependant, au plan ontologique, propre à chaque étant singulier tandis que, au plan conceptuel, le même terme exprime ce qui est commun à tous les étants. Une traduction des extraits du Scriptum super Sententiis, des Quæstiones de quolibet, de la Summa Theologiæ, des Quæstiones disputatæ De potentia, de l’Expositio libri De hebdomadibus et de la Expositio libri Metaphysicæ a été produite pour les fins de cette étude. / In this paper, we intend to precise the meaning of actus essendi by analyzing how Thomas Aquinas uses this term. If the notion of the act of being underlies a number of Aquinas’ philosophical and theological developments, it is not treated in itself in any of his writings. By exposing the theoretical framework of the eleven textual units in which the expression namely appears, we explicate how he distinguishes between the act of being and the correlative ontological notions (the being, the essence, the predicamental judgment being and common being). If « actus essendi » first designates a constitutive principle of being, it can also designate the corresponding abstract term of this perfection of being. The act of being is that by which being is being; however, it belongs, at the ontological level, to each particular being whereas at the conceptual level, the same term expresses that which is common to all beings. Extracts of the following texts have been translated in French for this purpose: Scriptum super Sententiis, Quæstiones de quolibet, Summa Theologiæ, Quæstiones disputatæ De potentia, Expositio libri De hebdomadibus and the Sententia libri Metaphysicæ.

Dans la philosophie de Thomas d’Aquin, les puissances principales de l’âme, l’intelligence et la volonté, interagissent dans les activités humaines. Une des activités les plus importantes est identifiée par le docteur comme étant la recherche de la vérité. Cette recherche s’inscrit dans la finalité ultime de l’homme. La vérité, en tant que bien de l’intelligence, est voulue par la volonté qui est un appétit rationnel. Ainsi, selon le Dominicain « la volonté veut que l’intelligence intellige ». Puisque la vérité n’est pas le seul bien proposé au libre arbitre, la volonté doit choisir de poursuivre cette fin au détriment d’autres biens concurrents. Elle doit pour se faire perfectionner les puissances de l’âme par le biais d’habitus et de vertus en plus d’éviter les vices qui conduisent à l’erreur. La recherche de la vérité est, selon Thomas d’Aquin, un acte moral. / According to the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, the main powers of the soul, the intellect and the will, interact in human activities. One of the most important activities is identified by the doctor as the search for truth. This research is part of the ultimate purpose of man. The truth, which is the good of the intelligence, is willed by the will which is a rational appetite. Thus, according to the Dominican “the will wants that the intelligence thinks.” Because the truth is not the only good proposed to the free will, the will must choose to pursue it to the detriment of other competing goods. To achieve this goal, the will must perfect the powers of the soul through habitus and virtues while avoiding the vices that lead to errors. The search for truth is, according to Thomas Aquinas, a moral act.