Ökning av bedrägerier i den finansiella rapporteringen anses ha skadat förtroendet för bolagsledningar och revisorer vilket i sin tur har lett till ett ökat krav på ansvarstagande för bolag. Svag bolagsstyrning anses vara en av de bakomliggande orsakerna till det förtroendeproblem som uppstått inom det svenska näringslivet. För att försöka återfå investerarnas förtroende har ett antal åtgärder vidtagits. Svensk Kod för bolagsstyrning uppkom delvis med syftet att stärka förtroendet för de svenska börsbolagen. Styrelsen är ansvarig för transparens och upprättandet av intern kontroll och i ett försök till att höja dess kvalitét skall styrelsen inrätta ett revisionsutskott.Som ett i led i att försöka stärka allmänhetens förtroende för bolagsledningar och revision skall revisionsutskotten säkerställa den interna och externa rapporteringen i bolagen. Detta har fört oss till vår forskningsfråga: Hur har de professionella investerarnas förtroende för de publika bolagen påverkats av införandet av revisionsutskott?För att försöka besvara vår frågeställning har vi genomfört intervjuer med professionella investerare och professionella aktörer, vilka på olika sätt har en relation till revisionsutskott. Vår empiri visar att revisionsutskotten inte har någon direkt påverkan på förtroendet eftersom revisionsutskotten inte har en direkt kommunikation ut till marknaden. Däremot kan vi genom empirin utläsa att revisionsutskotten har en positiv påverkan på den interna kontrollen inom bolagen. Således kan vi dra vår slutsats om att revisionsutskotten har en indirekt påverkan på investerarnas förtroende. / Program: Civilekonomprogrammet

我國為改善公司治理制度，於2005年12月20日立法院三讀通過大幅修正證券交易法，引進審計委員會制度。審計委員會較獨立董事更專注於財務面之監督，故本研究之研究期間為1998年至2010年，以設置審計委員會之企業為樣本，進行配對，以探討審計委員會與企業財務報表品質之關聯性。 研究結果顯示，假說一：設置審計委員會或準審計委員會之企業財務報表品質優於未設置者；及假說二：設置審計委員會或準審計委員會後之企業財務報表品質優於設置前，二者皆不成立。 設置審計委員會目前已是公司治理發展的趨勢，我國既已立法引進審計委員會制度，主管機關應評估企業設置審計委員會後實際之運作情形，是否達到預期之效果，並做必要之修改或配套措施，以使審計委員會之設置不流於形式。 / In Taiwan, for the purpose of improving the corporate governance and introducing regulation of the audit committee, the Securities and Exchange Act was revised and passed by the Legislative Yuan for the Third Reading on 20 December, 2005. This study takes companies had established the audit committee between 1998 and 2010 as a sample so as to discuss the relation between the audit committee and the quality of financial reporting. The result of our research revealed that, the first hypothesis: “the quality of the financial reporting of the company with the audit committee is superior” and the second hypothesis: ” the quality of the financial reporting of the company after establishing the audit committee is superior” were both not sustained. Establishing the audit committee has become the trend in the development of corporate governance. Besides the regulations enacted, it’s of greater importance to evaluate the substantive effectiveness than the surficial form of the audit committee in companies.

No description available.

Hochsch., Bachelor-Thesis--Wismar, 2006.

No description available.

過去研究均指出審計委員會成員若具有財務或會計專才可以提升審計委員會執行效率與效果，降低公司異常交易與內空缺失的風險，進而提升財務報表品質，並降低外部財務報表使用者與公司內部之資訊不對稱情況。本研究探討在公開發行債券過程中，若發行公司審計委員會具有財務或會計專長，債務條款是否會改變。研究結果發現，債券投資人於選擇投資債券時，確實會考量到債券發行公司審計委員會成員之會計專長，然而，沒有證據顯示財務專長在其考量範圍內，因會計專長可提高財務報表可信度，降低資訊不對稱問題，減少債券投資人所面臨的投資風險，因此，若債券發行公司之審計委員會成員具備會計專才，債券市場將給予較低的債券利率以及較優惠的條件。 / The extant literature reveals that audit committee (AC) members with financial or accounting expertise can enhance the effectiveness of AC in monitoring the financial reporting quality. In this study, I focus on the effects of financial and accounting experts on the effectiveness of AC from bondholders’ point of view, respectively. First, I find no evidence that the presence of financial experts on AC, either alone or jointly with accounting experts, are significantly related to loan terms. Second, I find that bondholders charge lower interest rate, offer longer maturity, and are less likely to require convertible bonds issuance or require collateral to firms whose AC have at least one accounting expert or only accounting experts. Third, I further find that the association between AC experts and loan terms is driven more by accounting experts than by financial experts. Given the prior results of a negative relationship between accounting experts and loan terms, firms could enhance their financial reporting quality by appropriately structuring AC with accounting experts, thereby rewarding better loan terms.

本文主要探討權益薪酬對審計委員會監督關係人交易效果之影響。本研究從美國證券交易所公開資訊EDGAR資料庫以手動蒐集關係人交易資訊，以2010年至2013年間之中小企業為樣本進行實證分析。實證結果發現關係人交易與權益薪酬交乘項與企業價值呈現顯著負相關，意即發放權益薪酬使得審計委員會極大化個人利益而過度注重短期財務績效，選擇默許管理階層不當之關係人交易安排，進而造成企業價值不利之影響。額外分析亦指出審計委員會之權益薪酬對其監督關係人交易效果有負面影響，但未發現證據指出審計委員會之現金薪酬與其監督關係人交易效果有關聯性。 / This study investigates whether equity-based compensation for audit committee members is associated with the effectiveness of their supervision on related party transactions. We hand collect the data of related party transactions for small and medium-size firms from EDGAR database for the period 2010-2013. We find that the interaction effect between related party transactions and stock compensation for audit committee members is negatively associated with firm value. It suggests that in order to maximize short-term benefits, audit committee members with stock compensation are inclined to be more tolerable to earnings management through related party transactions that are unfavorable to shareholders. Additionally, we do not find any evidence indicating that cash compensation is associated with the effectiveness of audit committee’s oversight on related party transactions.

審計公費係影響審計品質之一大因素，且中國事務所家數眾多，更易產生低價攬客的惡性競爭行為，再者，中國上市公司重編狀況近來層出不窮，因此本文以2004-2008年中國大陸A股上市公司為研究對象，欲研究重編事件對中國企業審計公費之影響。財務報表重編事件可以分為三個時間點：財務報表錯誤年度、財務報表執行重編年度以及重編後的次一年度。就財務報表發生錯誤年度而言，本研究發現該事件會伴隨較高的審計公費，但是無論是執行重編年度或次一年度，均未發現顯著提高公費的證據。除此之外，本研究也未能獲得審計委員會之設立與審計公費有統計關聯性的證據。具體而言，除了傳統審計公費的解釋變數之外，本文未能發現財務報表重編及審計委員會與審計公費有關之證據。 / Audit fees is one of the major factors affecting quality, and there are many audit firms in China, so it is easier to produce vicious competition . Furthermore, the number of Chinese listed company which has restated financial report is increasing in recent years. So, with a sample of A-share listed corporations in China from 2004 to 2008 , this dissertation develops a conceptual model for studying the relationship between financial restatement and audit fees. Financial restatement can be divided into three time points: the year when an error occurred in the financial report , the year when the financial report is restated ,and the year after the financial report is restated .In terms of the year when an error occurred in the financial report , this dissertation find the event associated with higher audit fees ,but in other two time point , this dissertation doesn’ t find the evidence of significantly increased audit fees. Moreover ,there is no statistical significant relationship between setting up an audit committee and audit fees. Specifically, in addition to the traditional explanatory variables, this dissertation can’t find the evidence that financial restatement and setting up an audit committee are related to audit fees.

This study first examines whether equity-based compensation (i.e., stocks and options) is associated with audit committees’ oversight failures. I then examine whether this association between equity-based compensation and oversight failures is affected when firms initiate the clawback provisions in their compensation contracts. I use the likelihood of restatements, the incidence of internal control weaknesses (ICW), and earnings management measures to proxy for audit committees’ oversight failures. Based on a sample of 129 firms that voluntarily adopt the clawback provisions during 2003-09 and a matched sample created from the propensity score matching technique, I find several important results. First, larger amounts and portions of stocks and options are associated with higher restatement and ICW likelihood and greater earnings management. Second, equity-based compensation appears to harm audit committees' oversight effectiveness. However, the adoption of the clawback provisions significantly mitigates such negative effect. Finally, the clawback provisions are effective in reducing restatements, ICW, and earnings management only when these provisions are triggered by "bad faith" rather than restatements. Overall, my empirical results bear policy implications on audit committees’ compensation practice and the mandatory adoption of the clawback provisions.

L’objectif de ce travail de recherche consiste à déterminer l’impact du comité d’audit sur la performance financière des PME libanaises. Ceci dit que l’objectif consiste aussi à étudier l’influence du système de gouvernance sur l’indépendance du comité d’audit. Les variables mobilisées sont relatives aux caractéristiques du conseil d’administration et du comité d’audit. A cela s’ajoute, trois déterminants qui sont relatifs à l’indépendance du comité d’audit, la structure du conseil d’administration et l’impact du système dual. A titre indicatif la rentabilité des PME est relatée notamment à partir des rapports annuels. L’échantillon comprend 58 PME libanaises et l’étude s’étale sur une période de 4 ans, à savoir entre 2011 et 2014. Les résultats font apparaître que le comité d’audit peine à avoir une indépendance totale. Cela peut être expliqué par l’apposement d’un système dual et aussi par le nombre limité au sein du comité. Dans ce sens, le comité d’audit dans les PME libanaises est réprimé notamment à travers le déploiement de ses responsabilités et de sa contribution au niveau de la revue des états financiers. Ce qui s’avère préjudiciable à une meilleure croissance de la performance financière pour les PME / The aim of this research study is to determine the impact of the audit committee on the financial performance of Lebanese SMEs. This research focuses also on the influence of the governance system on the independence of the audit committee. The variables used are related to the characteristics of the board and of the audit committee. Moreover, three other determinants are referred as the independence of the audit committee, the structure of the board and the impact of the dual system in order to bring some elements of answers to our main interrogation. As an indication, SMEs profitability is reported especially from annual reports. The sample includes 58 Lebanese SMEs and the study covers a period of 4 years, from 2011 till 2014. The results show that the audit committee hardly has a total independence. This can be explained by the appeasement of a dual system and also by the presence of a limited number within the committee. In this sense, the audit committee in Lebanese SMEs is repressed and cannot be clearly active through the deployment of its responsibilities and its contribution in reviewing the financial statements. This appears as detrimental to a better growth for the SMEs sector financial performance