Tenu dans un contexte international de démocratisation et d’aspiration à la liberté de peuples africains subsahariens, la décision phare du sommet de La Baule de juin 1990 fut la résolution de la France de conditionner son APD aux efforts démocratiques des pays d’Afrique subsaharienne. Avec cette décision, Paris entend: 1. Encourager l’ouverture démocratique des Etats africains, condition sine qua non à l’instauration de la paix et à la réalisation du développement économique ; 2. Défendre et promouvoir des valeurs de la démocratie libérale qu’il estime universelles. Par contre, la flagrance de la relation démocratie-développement est relative. Le relativisme culturel pose souvent problème au principe de l’universalité des valeurs démocratiques et des droits humains. Des potentats africains invoquent d’ailleurs le relativisme culturel pour innocenter leur mauvaise foi démocratique. Il reste encore beaucoup d’efforts à réaliser pour l’implantation d’un véritable Etat de droit en Afrique subsaharienne, en dépit d’une tendance de normalisation des processus électoraux sur le continent. La stratégie de conditionnalité politique de la France poursuivant cet objectif en Afrique subsaharienne n’est pas toujours fidèle à l’esprit de La Baule dans sa mise en œuvre. La personnalisation des relations étatiques, la primauté des intérêts géostratégiques de la France, etc. prennent souvent le dessus sur l’idéal démocratique de La Baule. La France demeure très présente en Afrique subsaharienne où ses multinationales ont une très forte implantation. Les leviers de commande de l’économie sont contrôlés par la France à travers ses multinationales comme Bolloré, Orange et Areva. Cependant, au-delà de cette apparence, il est constaté une régression de l’influence française sur le continent. Ce recul est lié à des dynamiques endogènes telles que des opinions publiques nationales et d’un leadership politique apparemment conscients des enjeux géostratégiques que représente dorénavant l’Afrique subsaharienne sur la scène internationale. A cela s’ajoutent des dynamiques exogènes relatives notamment à la percée de la Chine dont l’orientation stratégique de sa politique internationale africaine porte atteinte à l’efficacité de la conditionnalité politique de la France. / Made in against the international backdrop of democratization and aspiration for the freedom of sub-Saharan African peoples, the landmark decision of the La Baule summit of June 1990 was France's commitment to conditioning its ODA to the democratic efforts of sub-Saharan African countries. Paris took this decision with a view to: 1. Encouraging the democratic opening of African States as a prerequisite for peace and economic development.2. Defending and promoting values of liberal democracy that she considers universal. On the other hand, the flagrance of the relationship between democracy and development is relative. Cultural relativism often poses a problem to the principle of the universality of democratic values and human rights. Moreover, African potentates invoke cultural relativism to exonerate their bad democratic faith. Despite a trend towards the normalization of electoral processes on the continent, a lot of work is yet to be done to establish genuine Rule of Law in sub-Saharan Africa. As regards its implementation, France’s poltitical conditionnality strategy pursuing this objective in sub-Saharan Africa is not always true to the spirit of La Baule. The personalized state relations, the primacy of the geostrategic interests of France, etc., often get the upper hand over the democratic ideal of La Baule. France remains very present in sub-Saharan Africa where its multinationals are very strongly settled. France has a hold over the control levers of the economy through its multinationals like Bolloré, Orange and Areva. However, beyond this appearance, there is a regression of French influence on the continent. This decline is linked to endogenous dynamics such as national opinions and political leadership seemingly aware of the geostrategic stakes that now represent sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, there are exogenous dynamics, particularly related to the breakthrough of China, whose strategic orientation in its African policy undermines the effectiveness of France's political conditionality

Au lendemain de la seconde guerre mondiale, avec le retour à la souveraineté, le Japon commença aussitôt à planifier la reconstruction de son économie et la création de nouveaux liens en Asie. C'est ainsi qu'il déclencha son « avancée vers le sud », à la recherche de matières premières et de marchés pour ses produits. Cependant le processus de pénétration de l'Asie du Sud-est ne fut pas seulement de nature économique mais aussi politique, et la valeur de la région dans la recherche d'une nouvelle position stratégique fut claire dans l'approche au problème indochinois, surtout après l'intensification de la guerre du Vietnam. Le Japon, désireux de contribuer de manière significative à une reconstruction régionale « après-­Vietnam », à la fin des années soixante lança une première série d'initiatives diplomatiques et de coopération dans la région entière. Ensuite les « tournants » de l'ordre bipolaire des années soixante-dix, surtout le « Nixon choc » et la chute de Saigon, ainsi qu'une majeure sensibilité vers le pays de la région, amenèrent de Tokyo à la systématisation de son approche et donc à la planification de la doctrine Fukuda. Cette première codification de la politique japonaise vers l'Asie du Sud-est est basée sur la fonction intra-régionale du Japon visant à lutter contre les tentatives hégémoniques de Pékin et Moscou et à profiter du désengagement militaire occidentale, afin de remodeler les relations avec les grandes puissances et assumer un rôle international de premier plan. / In the aftermath of World War II, after Japan had regained its sovereignty, the government started immediately planning the economic recovery and the creation of new ties in Asia. Thus it launched its "southern expansion", focused on the search of raw materials and markets for Japanese products. However, the penetration in Southeast Asia was not only an economic process, but also a political one. In the search of a new strategic role, the importance of the region became evident for Tokyo when facing the Indochinese problem, especially after the intensification of the Vietnam War. With the aim to provide a significant contribution to the regional reconstruction, even more important in the perspective of a "post-Vietnam", in the late l960s Japan launched a first set of diplomatic and economic initiatives in the whole region. The "turning points" of the Cold War in the 1970s, i.e. the "Nixon shock" and the fall of Saigon, combined to a closer attention to the expectations of Southeast Asian countries, eventually led Tokyo to the systematization of its regional approach and to the definition of the Fukuda Doctrine. In this first attempt to codify its policy towards Southeast Asia, Japan conceived its intra-regional role in opposition to the hegemonic moves of Beijing and Moscow and in connection to the Western military withdraw from the region, with the ambition to reshape its relations with the Great Powers and enhance its political standing in world affairs.

Aid is an important topic in development sector current discussions are polarised thereby creating a need for further research. This essay assesses the role that Malawi and Zambia plays in realising its development outcomes including in the area of health. There is a need to appreciate the variables that contribute to the inability of most countries in sub-Saharan Africa to finance their domestic expenditure related to healthcare. In this situation, foreign aid which has received marked interest by scholars over the past decade and is used to supplement incomes of developing countries like Malawi and Zambia. Debate on the effectiveness of aid is polarised, while highly concerned scholars see aid as ineffective and a contributor to the poor performance of economies in developing countries, others see it as essential in the achievement of development outcomes. This thesis explores the extent to which development assistance contributes to dependency in Malawi and Zambia. It further examines the link between aid and the Malawian and Zambian health sectors. The study similarly considers the role of development assistance for health in realising outcomes related to maternal health in line with SDG 3.1. By identifying two countries in sub-Saharan Africa, this essay underscores the similarities between Malawi and Zambia analysed through a historical context, health systems structures, child and maternal mortality rates and health programme models. The essay concludesthat social, political and economic barriers present challenges in financing healthcare in Malawi and Zambia. Aid contributes to dependency in the study countries.

This dissertation deals with the Official Development Assistance. The purpose of this dissertation was, first of all, to find out whether the target aid is focused on the poorest countries of the world. The theoretical part concentrates primarily on the institutional history of the Official Development Assistance and also on the development of mainstream theories which influenced it to the highest degree. In the analytical part the dissertation draws particularly from the database of the Development Assistance Committee under the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. From the global point of view, the dissertation is focused especially on the quantitative analysis of the changes in the allocation of the Official Development Assistance in the period from 1989 to 2008. From the geographical point of view, the spatio-temporal change in territorial priorities of important bilateral and multilateral donors and also the dependence of their expenditure on the socio-economic maturity of aid beneficiaries was analysed. The ability to clearly define the territorial priorities and on their basis to effectively target the development assistance is in national context analysed on the example of the Czech Republic. From the local point of view, the dissertation gives a brief description of the...

The Master's thesis deals with China's increased engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa after 2000 and its impact on U.S. political and economic interests on the continent. In the first decade of the new millennium, China's search for natural resources, especially oil, to satisfy its growing demand, need to find new markets for exports, as well as China's aspiration to enhance its position at the international stage led Beijing to pay greater attention to Africa. China started to engage African countries through a combination of development assistance with no strings attached, except for the one-China principle, and high-profile diplomacy. The United States has become concerned that China might jeopardize its programs on democratization and governance and become a fierce economic competitor in Africa. In the first two chapters, the thesis describes the interests of China and the U.S, respectively, the main actors involved in the countries' respective Africa policies, and strategies and concrete policies these two world powers implement in Africa. The third chapter compares the U.S. and China's engagement in three case studies - on Nigeria, Angola and Sudan. The fourth chapter provides a comparison of the general features of the American and the Chinese policies towards Sub- Saharan Africa. The chapter...

This study set out to explore how Official Development Assistance was practised in South Africa. An exploratory narrative design was followed to uncover the ‘strategy in the skin’ of strategy practitioners in the unit of analysis and to respond, therefore, to the research questions. This study has contributed to the body of knowledge in that it has brought together an alternative confluence of three theoretical perspectives of strategy as practice; complex adaptive systems and organisational hypocrisy and has explored the impact of the practice lens on these standpoints. While there has been extensive research on each of the theoretical perspectives, there has not yet been a study that has drawn together the three perspectives in relation to an empirical unit of analysis such as Official Development Assistance practices and practitioners. The study responded to a knowledge gap in relation to how public sector organisations, such as government units and the strategy practitioners of such units, practice strategy beyond the reified, formalised conceptions of strategy and in relation to their inhabiting complex, political organisational systems. The study arrived at two central theoretical findings. Firstly, that strategising represents a calibration of strategic practices towards strategic outcomes through the activities of complex adaptive practitioners v within the more politically inclined organisation. Secondly, that beyond the text of strategy, there is sub-text that is equally part of the micro strategy towards strategic outcomes.The skilful and sometimes delicate balancing act, that strategists perform to legitimise the calibrated combinations of action and politics in organisational strategy, equally needs nuanced, subtle and more complex forms of organisational communication. The study, therefore, makes the claim that complex adaptive systems and the characteristics of political organisations (as not being geared to action) are inherently broadened through the multiple dimensions of the practice turn and strategy as sub-text. The research confirmed that strategy as practice is a useful lens to understand strategy beyond the formally documented scripts and espoused pronouncements of strategy within organisational studies / Business Management / D.B.L.

There is always competition between regions when it comes to their needs after facing a conflict, disaster, or long-term crisis. Donors allocating ODA or Humanitarian Assistance must decide to whom they want to allocate their support. While the literature broadly identifies the motivation for sending allocation to specific recipients and not to others, it has not yet researched the processes of the opposite, the reduction or break-off of aid allocation. This thesis researches the topic at the level of Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA). The question focuses on donors of bilateral HMA allocation and their motives of decision-making, when under financial pressure and forced to shorten their overall HMA budget. Using a most-different in-depth case study based on two steps on the cases of Australia and Germany, the question is researched, if the donors base their decisions and priorities on the needs of people when they have to reduce HMA budgets. The findings show that HMA rarely is documented separately and mostly connected either with ODA or Humanitarian Assistance. To get clear answers about the thoughts and motivations of decision-makers when it comes to the reduction or cut of HMA allocation, deeper research including interviews is needed.

Foreign aid as an economic policy was previously widely accepted as a way to assist least developed economies to achieve economic growth. Over the years, aid effectiveness has been questioned, whilst aid dependency has continued to rise. To assist in aid reduction, various economists have proposed aid exit strategies that countries could adopt to reduce aid dependency. However, the adoption of these strategies has been rather slow. The purpose of this study was to review and assess the current literature on the different proposed foreign aid exit strategies, in terms of their feasibility and ease of implementation, taking into account the current state of African economies. The analysis focused on the exit strategies recommended by Tandon (2008), Moyo (2009) and Fee (2012). The main finding of this study suggests that the aforementioned exit strategies are feasible, but not necessarily easy to implement, due to the limitations faced by many least developed countries. / Economics / M. Com. (Economics)

Au cours de cette étude, nous avons cherché  à déterminer le niveau et les moyens de la puissance sud-coréenne. Nous nous sommes demandés si la Corée du Sud ne pourrait pas se présenter comme un État pivot capable de faire le lien entre des états ou des partenaires antagonistes, aussi bien en Asie du Nord-Est qu’en Asie du Sud-Est. Aussi après avoir examiné les moyens de la puissance sud-coréenne nous avons conclu que le pays était une puissance moyenne traditionnelle n’ayant pas encore acquis le statut de puissance régionale et qu’en ce sens elle constituait une puissance atypique. Confrontée aux trois grandes puissances que sont la Chine, les Etats-Unis et le Japon, la Corée du Sud ne dispose que d’une marge de manœuvre très étroite pour affirmer sa présence internationale. Le développement de sa présence en Asie du Sud-Est est donc devenu en l’espace de quelques années un impératif de sa politique étrangère du pays. A l’instar du Japon d’après-guerre, le Sud-Est asiatique constitue une aire d’apprentissage privilégiée pour la diplomatie sud-coréenne et pour son action extérieure. / In this study, we tried to determine the exact level and means of the South Korean power. We wondered if South Korea could present itself as a pivotal state that is able to bridge antagonistic partners, both in Northeast and Southeast Asia. After considering the aspects of the South Korean power we concluded that the country is a traditional middle size power that has not yet acquired the status of regional power. In that sense the country is an untypical power. Facing three major powers such as China, the United States and Japan, South Korea has only a very narrow latitude to establish its international presence. Therefore developing its presence in Southeast Asia has become in just a few years an priority of its foreign Policy. For South Korea Southeast Asia is a privileged place where to learn and to develop its own external action, like it was for the post war Japan. Eventually, a unified Korea with the North Korean nuclear arsenal could weigh as much as demographically declining Japan. However as long as the anachronism of the separation will remain, South Korea will continue to grow alone regionally and in the international stage and will seek for external alliances.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-29T13:48:37Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Karen dos Santos Honorio.pdf: 1504304 bytes, checksum: 48d75b952b72a26ca23cb7824829f083 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-05-24 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / This work aims to understand the meaning of the South America Iniciative for Integration of Regional Infrastructure (IIRSA), in the 21st regionalism in South America and also evaluate Brazil s participation on it. Our goal is the compreension of this object through a analytical description since its origins until the incorporation at the Conselho Sul-Americano de Infraestrutura e Planejamento (COSIPLAN) in 2009, seeking to understand how IIRSA worked and how countries and banks participated, focusing our analysis in Brazil. It was also our intention to go beyond the analysis of the IIRSA s project in 2000 and evaluate what this proccess can tell us about the regional integration in South America. We point that IIRSA did not forge any new arrangement regarding to the regional integration and instead, re-forced the tendency of a bilateral regionalism without supra-national charge. Each country participated and acted according to their own capacity, without a concerted action that could achieve , in terms of implementation, what were proposed / Este trabalho busca entender o significado da Iniciativa para a Integração da Infraestrutura Regional Sul-Americana ( IIRSA) no cenário do regionalismo sul-americano do século 21, bem como avaliar a participação brasileira nessa iniciativa. Nosso objetivo é o entendimento desse objeto por meio de uma descrição analítica desde seu surgimento até sua incorporação ao Conselho Sul-Americano de Infraestrutura e Planejamento (Cosiplan)em 2009, procurando entender como a IIRSA funcionou e como os países e órgãos financiadores participaram dela, focando nosso trabalho no Brasil. Nossa intenção é ir além da análise do projeto proposto no começo do ano 2000 (período em que reside grande parte das análises) e avaliar, em perspectiva, qual o presente estágio desse processo, ao longo dos dez anos, e o que ele nos indica sobre o atual momento da integração regional na América do Sul. Apontamos que a IIRSA não forjou nenhum arranjo inovador de integração na região e que a iniciativa reforça a tendência de um regionalismo pautado em relações bilaterais sem carga de institucionalidade supranacional, no qual o protagonismo das decisões fica a cargo de cada país através de seu corpo técnico participante das reuniões, agindo dentro desse âmbito cada um deles conforme seus interesses/capacidades políticas e econômicas, sem coordenação conjunta que efetive avanços em termos de implementação do que é proposto.