This study investigates an appropriate accrual-based model in detecting earnings management (EM) of Chinese firms undergoing initial public offering (IPO) process. The mainstream literatures show that state-owned enterprise (SOE) has involved with less earnings management (EM) than non-state-owned enterprise (NSOE) in pre-IPO market from 2003 to 2009. The reason is that SOE could borrow money from bank, compared to NSOE. However, SOE has been proven to conduct stronger EMs in pre-IPO market during 2011 to 2013 by manipulating with property plant and equipment (PPE), the flows of account receivable (AR) and long-term debt (LTD). Besides, I also suggest a new accrual-based model that could better fit into the unique features of Chinese firms in their process of IPO application.

「獨立董事與獨立監察人制度」對我國而言，為一種因法規強制要求而產生的新現象。2002年2月時，在台灣證券交易所股份有限公司及財團法人中華民國證券櫃臺買賣中心等單位的努力下，正式引進「獨立董事與獨立監察人制度」，規定自2002年2月22日起新申請上市上櫃的公司，需設置獨立董事至少二人，及獨立監察人至少一人，期望以此制度革除積習已久的公司治理弊端。 本研究自選任獨立董事及監察人之事前與事後，從選任席次、素質差異、專業背景差異檢視聘僱事前公司是否有特殊考量，並進一步從盈餘管理的角度，檢視選任事後獨立董事與監察人之預期功能是否對企業整體發揮實際之效用。 實證結果支持本研究認為因監察人得以單獨行使職權，故獨立監察人實際選任席次超過最低法定門檻之比例確實較獨立董事實際選任席次超過最低法定門檻的比例高，且企業所選任的獨立董監素質，因企業之規模大小不同而有顯著差異，另外，亦發現企業確實會考量職能別的差異，進而聘僱不同專業背景之專家。最後，關於獨立董事與獨立監察人在監督管理當局從事盈餘管理行為時之作用部分，未獲得實證結果支持，推測原因，可能係因我國企業於設置獨立董事與監察人後，僅將其視為專業地位崇高的「名譽」董事與監察人，但並未賦予其監督的實際權力，因而造成獨立董事與監察人未能涉入企業核心，致使其無法發揮監督管理當局之預期功能所導致。 / The institution of independent directors and independent supervisors is a new phenomenon arisen from forced enactment made by Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation and Gretai Securities Market on February 22, 2002. It claims all new listed corporations to employ at least 2 independent directors and 1 independent supervisor in order to enhance corporate governance in Taiwan. This thesis examines if enterprises have special considerations when employ independent directors and independent supervisors from the viewpoints of actual numbers, grade level and governance expertise. Furthermore, this thesis also examines the actual contributions of them to reduce the earnings management behaviors. Consistent with our hypothesis that due to the different way to oversee the management, this thesis finds that besides achieving the minimum standard threshold, it is more likely for an enterprise to employ much more independent supervisors than independent directors. Moreover, empirical results support that the bigger size of the company, the better independent directors and independent supervisors it will employ. Additionally, this study also finds that corporation will employ different kinds of experts owing to the different functions between independent directors and independent supervisors. Finally, as for reducing earnings management behaviors, this study can’t offer proper evidences. It may result from that enterprise views independent directors and independent supervisors as “reputable” experts, so they can’t have actual power to oversee managements. In other words, independent directors and independent supervisors can’t exercise the role well because of lacking actual power.

美國在2001年10月爆發了安達信(Anderson)-安隆（Enron）案，對整個企業界造成極大的衝擊，提供非審計服務究竟是否會影響財務報表品質引起廣泛討論。 因證期會於民國九十二年一月三十日新修正「證券發行人財務報告編製準則」第二十二條，使得資訊相對過往較易取得，雖因研究限制使得樣本不具良好代表性，但在某種程度上仍能提供一定的參考價值，故本研究擬仿效Frankel et al. (2002)之研究，探討在台灣會計師提供非審計服務及審計服務是否會對財務報表品質造成影響；本研究以Threshold（公司實際每股盈餘-分析師預測每股盈餘）及裁量性應計(discretionary accrual)做為財務報表品質之代理變數。 本研究發現上市公司並未因審計公費及非審計公費較高而有進行盈餘管理，但上櫃公司卻會因審計公費及非審計公費較高而進行盈餘管理。 / The collapse of Enron and the conflict of interest surrounding their auditors Arthur Anderson, particularly the effect non-audit fees on the quality of the audited financial statements, have resulted in numerous changes to the regulations effectively limiting the level of non-audit service accounting firms can offer to their clients. The Taiwan SEC enacted new regulations forcing public companies that meet certain criteria, to disclose the level of audit and non-audit fees paid to accounting firms. This resulted in the availability of information that was previously unobtainable. However, concerns still remain, as research is restricted because the number of companies reporting represents a small percentage of the companies in Taiwan. Nonetheless, this research hopes to use the data from the reporting companies to examine the relationship between the quality of the financial statement and the level of fees paid to accounting firms. We intent to use an adaptation of the Frankel et al. (2002) model to study the companies in Taiwan. Using data provided by the companies we intend to demonstrate a causal relationship between the level of non-audit fees and the quality of the accounting statement. We used Threshold and discretionary accrual to represent the quality of the financial statement. We found that for the companies listed on the TAIEX there was no relationship between the quality of the financial statements and the level of audit and non-audit fees; however for companies trading on the OTC market we found there was a causal relationship.

本研究以2002至2004年非金融業之臺灣上市櫃公司為研究對象，從經營績效、股權結構及公司治理特性等觀點，探討企業發生委託書徵求事件之決定性因素、經營績效及其與盈餘管理行為之關聯性，並進一步分析企業特質對企業從事常態性委託書徵求行為之影響。就委託書徵求事件之決定性因素而言，本研究發現，整體績效表現愈差、獲利能力愈差、現金股利發放愈少、內部人持股比率愈低、董監事質押比率愈高、最終控制者之股份控制權愈低、席次偏離股份控制權程度愈大之企業，發生委託書徵求事件之機率愈高。經營績效之實證結果顯示，徵求委託書、利用金字塔及交叉持股之控股結構、控制權偏離所有權程度愈大之企業，當期之經營績效較差。前述實證結果亦適用於常態性徵求委託書之企業。至於委託書徵求事件與盈餘管理行為之關聯性而言，委託書徵求為企業從事盈餘管理行為之誘因之一，尤其在常態性徵求委託書之情況更為顯著。企業之董監事質押比例愈高、負債比率愈高、席次控制權偏離盈餘分配權程度愈大、控股結構複雜度(金字塔結構或交叉持股)愈高，其盈餘管理幅度較高。 / Based on a sample of non-baking corporations listed on Taiwan Securities Exchange and Over the Counter over the period of 2002 to 2004, this thesis first investigates the determinants and operation performance of proxy solicitation behavior, followed by examining the relationship between proxy solicitation and earnings management. In addition, the characteristics of companies that appeal to proxy solicitation on a regular basis are also studied. The empirical results show that companies with poorer overall performance, poorer profitability, lower cash dividend payout ratio, lower insiders shareholdings, higher share pledge ratio by the board members, lower control rights, and higher deviation in control rights from cash flow rights, are more likely to apply proxy solicitation. The empirical findings also indicate that companies with proxy solicitation, pyramid and cross-holdings structures, and higher deviation in control rights from cash flow rights, tend to have worse operating performance for the current period. The findings aforementioned can also apply to the companies that repeatedly employ proxy solicitation. This research documents that proxy solicitation is strongly associated with earnings management behavior, especially for companies that apply proxy solicitation repetitively. Companies with higher share pledge ratio by the board members, higher debt ratio, higher deviation in control rights from cash flow rights and employing pyramid and cross-holdings structures, are found to be associated with higher magnitude of earnings management.

管理當局與利害關係人(stakeholders)之間，透過會計資訊的提供，可降低代理問題及資訊不對稱。惟會計資訊的提供，依管理當局介入的程度不同，會有層次上的差別。 本文即從層次開始，界定了盈餘管理(Earnings Management)與盈餘操縱(Earnings Manipulation)的不同，而透過營運政策中的營業活動(operational activities)來影響盈餘的方式地處兩者之間的灰色地帶，目前至今尚少討論。Roychowdhury(2006)則以美國市場為對象，首開先例發展了如何偵測公司透過營業活動的實質盈餘管理行為。 本文同樣選定避免報導損失為盈餘門檻，考量台灣市場的特性後，偵測台灣企業是否有真實營業活動的盈餘管行為。實證結果顯示，無論是透過銷貨操縱、降低裁決性支出還是過量生產以降低銷貨成本的實質交易操作，都得到顯著地支持。進一步分析那些特性的企業，較容易透過真實營業相關的活動來從事盈餘管理行為時發現，債務契約壓力高、成長性機會高及利害關係人緊密度高者符合預期，而製造業性質則與預期相反，盈餘管理彈性則未得到支持。另外在機構投資人持股方面，則發現高機構投資人持股可降低過量生產實質交易操作的可能，但未能有效防止降低裁決性支出的操作。 / Through providing accounting information for stakeholders , management could somewhat reduce agency problem and information asymmetry.But accounting information quality could be different depending on how management intervene in . This article begins from distinguishing between Earnings Management and Earnings Manipulation.To intervene in business policy through real operational activities is not only one way that is hard to categorize in Earnings Management or Earnings Manipulation but also receives little attention to date. Roychowdhury(2006), taking American market as observation values,was the first one who developed how to detect real operational activities earnings management. Following Roychowdhury(2006),I define avoiding reporting loss as earnings threshold to detect whether real operational activities earnings management exists in Taiwan business.There is obvious evidence suggesting sales manipulation、reduction of discretionary expenditures and overproduction to report lower cost of goods sold to improve reported margins.To go a step further,I test observation values of what characters are inclined to manipulate earnings through real operational activities. I find supporting evidence in observation values with higher debt stress、higher growth opportunity、higher connection with stakeholders and samples on non manufacturing industry.But I find no evidence in observation values with higer earnings management elasticity.In addition,I find observation values with higher instutional holding shares could abate the possibilities of overproduction to report lower cost of goods sold,but fail to avoid the manipulation of reduction of discretionary expenditures.

強制報導資產減損的目的為希冀企業能夠真實反映出資產的公平價值，使會計資訊能夠有更完整的報導。 本研究探討的主題一為上市公司選擇適用三十五號財務會計準則公報之時點是否會受到管理階層之盈餘管理動機與公司特性所影響。實證結果顯示，當上市公司有未預期的負營運績效時，管理階層會自願提前認列資產減損來達到洗大澡的目的，而一旦提前適用三十五號財務會計準則公報時，管理階層也會同時選擇認列鉅額的資產減損比例來達成盈餘管理的目的，與釋放潛在獲利改善的訊息給投資大眾。 本研究探討的主題二為上市公司認列資產減損金額比率是否會受到管理階層之盈餘管理動機與公司特性之影響。實證結果顯示，上市公司認列減損金額時，除受到管理階層洗大澡動機的影響外，也會將公司本身之固定資產比率、負債比率與公司規模等公司特性列入考量，而非只是單純的應公報要求認列資產減損而認列損失。 與三十五號財務會計準則公報的本意相反，實證結果顯示資產減損的報導在強制認列之後，似乎未使財務報表的品質提升，反映出企業的真實價值，而是給予經理人更多空間與誘因操縱盈餘。 / Accounting Research and Development Foundation in Taiwan (the Accounting Standards Setting Body in Taiwan) issued Statement Financial Accounting Standards No.35, “Accounting for the Impairment of Assets”on July 2004. Prior to SFAS No.35, accounting for assets impairment often remains room for substantial judgments and estimates without any specific regulation. The new statement was issued primarily to establish guidelines to recognize impairment of assets that reflects more true value of the enterprises. The statement was effective for fiscal year 2005. The board encouraged early application of the standard. The purposes of this research are to find out (i) if companies manage earnings by adopting SFAS No.35 earlier and what characteristics of firms will tend to adopt it earlier, and (ii) when a company recognizes impairment of assets, does the amount of the impairment affected by the motivation for earnings management of other characteristics of the company. The empirical analysis reveals “taking a big bath” of earnings management behavior and the growth of fix assets are the factors influencing the decision of early adoption of the accounting standard. Another empirical result suggests that when companies have higher unexpected losses, they tend to recognize large amount of impairment loss to improve the quality of the earnings in the future. Companies that chose to adopt SFAS No.35 earlier appeal to have a great amount of impairment loss too. Finally, the characteristics of companies such as high fixed assets ratio, high debt ratio, and small size are also the factors leading to the recognition of a larger amount of impairment loss.

本研究旨在探討內部人股票交易與盈餘管理之關聯性，並進一步檢視我國近年來為強化公司治理所引進之獨立董監事制度是否能對內部人交易與盈餘管理間之關聯性產生抑制效果。在分析時，本研究係將全部樣本區分為賣出組及買入組，並分別進行驗證。 實證結果顯示，發生內部人異常出售股票交易之樣本公司，其管理階層將於同一期進行使盈餘降低之盈餘管理。而此一結果所隱含之意義為，內部人為降低日後回補持股之成本，會於出售持股當期進行盈餘之操弄，以求影響未來股價。然而，在發生內部人異常買入股票現象之樣本公司，卻未發現如本研究所預期之內部人為極大化未來出售持股利益而從事使盈餘提高之盈餘管理的現象，本研究推測可能原因係內部人買入本公司股票之理由眾多，因此也不必然有拉抬未來股價以求自未來出售股票交易中獲利之考量。 另外，在獨立董事與獨立監察人對於內部人異常交易及盈餘管理間關係之抑制效果的部分，在買入組或賣出組均未發現顯著之抑制效果。對此，本研究認為可能之原因係獨立董監事制度在我國實施之時間尚短，且多數公司係基於法令之要求始設置獨立董監事，而在這樣的現況下，似乎難以預期獨立董監事能有效監督公司內部人之異常股票交易行為以及盈餘管理行為。 / This thesis examines if there is an association between insider trading and earnings management. Furthermore, this thesis examines whether independent directors and independent supervisors can suppress the relationship between insider trading and earnings management. In the analytical process, the whole sample is divided into two sub samples which are sell and buy sub sample. The two sub samples are examined separately. And this thesis finds that there is a negative association between insider trading and earnings management in the sell sub sample which suggests that executives will manage earnings downward in the same period of insider selling to minimize their cost of buying stocks back in the future. And this result is consistent with the hypothesis. But no proper evidence is found about the relationship between insider trading and earning management in the buy sub sample. This may result from that there are many reasons for insiders to buy stocks of their firms. And insiders do not necessarily buy stocks of their firms to make profits by selling them in the future. Besides, in the part of the suppressing effect of independent directors and supervisors, proper evidences do not exist neither in the buy sub sample nor in the sell sub sample. A possible reason is that since the independent directors and supervisors system is still new in Taiwan, and most firms with independent directors and supervisors are just enforced by regulations to set independent directors and supervisors, it's hard to expect that independent directors and supervisors to play their roles effectively.

家族企業約佔我國上市公司的80.63％，其管理權與經營權多掌握在同一家族中，家族對企業有很大的影響力。本研究探討家族企業與非家族企業多角化程度與董監質押比例之高低跟盈餘管理之關聯性。 本研究以我國1997年至2006年底之上市公司為樣本，實證結果發現：(1)家族企業較非家族企業從事盈餘管理的可能性為高；(2)當公司多角化經營程度越高時，公司有較大之誘因進行盈餘管理之行為，然而當公司為家族企業且其多角化程度越高時，反而會降低家族企業盈餘管理可能性；(3)家族企業樣本中，多角化經營程度高低，與家族企業是否從事盈餘管理並無顯著之關係；(4)公司非相關多角化經營之高低，與家族企業是否從事盈餘管理，並無顯著之關係；(5)公司董監事質押比率之高低，與家族企業是否從事盈餘管理，並無顯著之關係。 / Family firms take about 81% of the listed firms in Taiwan. This study investigates the relation between business diversification and earnings management and that between stock pledge of directors and earnings management under the family-firms/non-family -firms setting. Based on the sample of firms listed in Taiwan during 1997-2006, the empirical results show that the family companies are more apt to manipulate earnings than the non-family companies. The higher the degree of diversification, the more the companies are apt to manipulate the earnings. However, neither unrelated diversification nor stock pledge of directors is related to earning management. Contrast to non-families, well-diversified family companies may decrease the possibility of earnings management, but taking family companies as a sample, diversification is not associated with earnings management.

本研究以2002年至2007年曾發行員工認股權之國內上市(櫃)公司為研究樣本，首先從公司特性及股權結構之觀點，分析公司選擇發行員工認股權之決定性因素。此外，本研究進一步以績效調整後之盈餘管理幅度為應變數，從員工認股權佔總獎酬之重要程度，探討員工認股權、公司治理特性與盈餘管理之關聯性。 實證結果顯示，在公司發行員工認股權之決定性因素方面，公司成長機會、人力資源貢獻度、員工股票分紅比率與公司發行員工認股權之可能性呈顯著正向關係，而自由現金流量、股權結構綜合指標則與公司發行員工認股權之可能性呈顯著負向關係。在探討員工認股權、公司治理特性與盈餘管之關聯性方面，員工認股權佔總獎酬之比例與盈餘管理幅度呈顯著正向關係，而公司治理特性綜合指標則與盈餘管理幅度呈顯著負向關係。 / Based on a sample of Taiwanese companies has been issued employee stock option listed in Taiwan Securities Exchange over the period of 2002-2007. First, this thesis analyses the determinant of the company issued employee stock options of the company characteristics and ownership structure. Second, uses the performance matched discretionary accruals and the employee stock option of the total compensation to explore the impacts of employee stock options and corporate governance characteristics on the earnings management. The empirical results show that in the determinant of the company issued employee stock options, the company's growth opportunities, the contribution of human resources, employee stock bonus to total bonus and the possibility of issued employee stock options was a significant positive relationship, and free cash flow, ownership structure composite indicator the possibility of issued employee stock options was a significant negative to the relationship. In the impacts of employee stock options and corporate governance characteristics on the earnings management, the employee stock option of total compensation and earnings management was a significant positive relationship. The corporate governance and earnings management was a significant negative relationship.

為因應金融風暴所造成的金融資產巨大評價損失，國際會計準則委員會於2008年10月13日發布有關金融資產重分類的修正條文，我國財務會計準則委員會因而亦於2008年10月17日隨之修訂第34號準則，並發布金融資產重分類之新規定。然而公司管理當局是否利用對金融資產重分類而進行盈餘管理，可能隨著公司治理良窳而有不同，是一個有待實證之問題。 本研究旨是探討根據修訂之會計準則而重分類金融資產的財務報表資訊，是否仍具價值攸關性或只是淪為盈餘操縱的手段。首先，本研究探討公司管理當局是否於97年度第3季追溯對金融資產重分類。其次，本研究分析追溯重分類財務報表資訊之價值攸關性及其相對變化。 實證結果如下： （1）當公司績效愈好或愈差時，公司管理當局較不傾向對金融資產進行重分類以操縱盈餘。 （2）當公司董事會相對較獨立時，公司管理當局較不傾向對金融資產進行重分類。 （3）採用重分類之財務報表仍具價值攸關性。 關鍵字：重分類、盈餘管理、公司治理、價值攸關性 / To respond to the financial crisis that caused huge losses of financial assets to companies, the IASB announced, on October 13, 2008, amendments to IAS 39 and IFRS 7 “Reclassification of Financial Assets”. As a result, Taiwan’s FASB also announced, on October 17, 2008, amendments to its SFAS No.34. It is therefore an empirical question whether or not firms in Taiwan managed earnings by retroactively reclassifying financial assets on financial statements, that likely depends on the soundness of corporate governance. This research aims to examine the value relevance of financial statements information after the retroactive reclassification of financial assets based on the revised SFAS No. 34. Firstly, this research investigates whether or not listed firms in Taiwan retroactively adopted SFAS No. 34. Secondly, this research examines the value relevance of their reclassified financial statements and the association with corporate governance. The empirical results are as follows. Firstly, the better or worse a firm performed, the less it would be willing to retroactively adopt the revised SFAS No. 34. Secondly, the more independent its board of directors, the less it would be willing to to retroactively adopt the revised SFAS No. 34. Finally, the reclassified financial statements were still value relevant. Keywords: Reclassification, Earnings management, Value relevance, Corporate governance.