Submitted by Maicon Juliano Schmidt (maicons) on 2015-06-01T18:57:25Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Gabriel Ferreira da Silva_.pdf: 2303204 bytes, checksum: dc2ab42c234ebe1473e65be76c2733ab (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-06-01T18:57:25Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Gabriel Ferreira da Silva_.pdf: 2303204 bytes, checksum: dc2ab42c234ebe1473e65be76c2733ab (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-04-07 / CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / Este trabalho tem por objetivo investigar os fundamentos da Ontologia desenvolvida pelo filósofo dinamarquês Søren A. Kierkegaard, expressa sobretudo nas obras assinadas pelo pseudônimo Johannes Climacus. Tal Ontologia fundamenta-se na radicalização do sentido de Ser qua Atualidade – expresso na noção de Existência – e na consequente distinção para com os outros sentidos de Ser. A partir daí, Kierkegaard desenvolve as demais notas constitutivas do existente enquanto Ser atual consignando seu estrato de intermediariedade e incompletude na expressão latina Inter-Esse, objeto de sua ciência ou saber existencial (Existentiel-Videnskab). Posteriormente, o trabalho mostra os desenvolvimentos da Ontologia kierkegaardiana a partir das relações entre Ser e Pensar, através da análise dos conceitos de Sistema e Lógica e, por fim, explicita as conexões entre a Ontologia de Kierkegaard e as dimensões epistemológicas, éticas e religiosas de sua obra.

The main topic of the thesis is a discussion of the contraction of esse (-st < est , -'s < -es), a widespread phenomenon in Latin comedy, generally known as ‘prodelision’. The thesis collects evidence for contracted forms from a large variety of sources (e.g. inscriptions, Sabellian languages and ancient grammarians) and analyses their transmission in the manuscript tradition of Latin authors. Contracted forms appear to be widespread but are neglected by or puzzling to editors. They are not misspellings, abbreviations, or representations of a sandhi phenomenon related to elision (‘prodelision’), but are clitic forms of the verb esse, showing phonetic reduction. The thesis discusses their linguistic significance, relying in particular on analysis of their behaviour in Terence: auxiliary or copula esse is clitic and its standard position seems to be clause-final, attached to the participle or predicate noun or adjective. Second, the thesis analyses another complex phenomenon of early Latin, the prosodical omission of final -s before a consonant (sigmatic ecthlipsis), relying on a database of all Terence's lines potentially involving it. Metrical evidence appears to be limited to cases in which a participle or predicate noun or adjective precedes a form of esse beginning with s-, thus confirming the prosodical distinctiveness of such a sequence. The evidence of sigmatic ecthlipsis thus ties in closely with that of contraction. The findings of the thesis have philological and editorial implications. First, they throw light on orthographic, phonetic, prosodic, and syntactic aspects of the verb ‘to be’ in Latin. It has a strong bond with the participle and predicate noun or adjective and may either be reduced phonetically in combination with such hosts, or participate in a simplification of -ss- which it may share with its host. Second, transmitted contracted spellings or readings betraying a misunderstanding of them should be given full consideration by editors and not disregarded. Contracted spellings might be restored in other conditions since manuscripts are often not trustworthy when transmitting uncontracted forms. Contracted forms may be stylistically motivated. They occur in comedy particularly in spoken metres, and in late Latin become a spelling archaism. Finally, sigmatic ecthlipsis in Terence occurs for certain only in restricted conditions: the editorial practice of printing it wherever it is possible even if not necessary is misleading.

Il s’agit d’une thèse sur le traité De duobus communissimis principiis scientiarum de Gérard Odon (vers 1320). Dans la première partie, nous faisons l’analyse du texte en nous centrant sur la notion d’« ens tertio adiacens ». Il s’agit de l’étant signifié par la totalité de la proposition et son vérifacteur ; il est univoquement comment à l’ens reale et à l’ens rationis et pour cette raison Odon l’identifie au sujet des principes de non-contradiction et du tiers exclu. L’ens tertio adiacens correspond aussi au premier objet adéquat de l’intellect et au sujet de la logique, entendue comme la science première. Dans la deuxième partie, nous plaçons Odon dans deux débats historiographiques : celui du réalisme propositionnel (à côté de Walter Burley, Grégoire de Rimini et Jean Wyclif) et celui des avancements de la doctrine des surtranscendantaux (à côté de Nicolas Bonet, François de la Marche et d’autres), lequel émerge de la distinction des deux sens de « res » chez Henri de Gand et ensuite chez Duns Scot. / This thesis deals with Geraldus Odonis’ treatise De duobos communissimis principiis scientiarum (ca. 1320). In the first part, we analyze the text by focusing on the concept of "ens tertio adiacens". It is the being signified by the totality of the proposition and its truthmaker; it is univocally common to ens reale and ens rationis, for this reason Odonis identifies it to the subject of the principle of non-contradiction and the principle of excluded middle. The ens tertio adiacens also corresponds to the first adequate object of the intellect and to the subject of logic, which is understood as the first science. In the second part, we place Odonis in two historiographical debates: the propositional realism (alongside Walter Burley, Gregory of Rimini and John Wyclif) and the advancements of the doctrine of supertranscendentals (alongside Nicolas Bonetus, Francis of Marchia and others), which emerges from the distinction between the two senses of "res" in Henry of Ghent and in Duns Scotus .

No description available.

The aim of this study is to optimise the acquisition and reconstruction for SPECT with 111In- pentetrotide with the iterative reconstruction software OSEMS. For 111In-pentetrotide SPECT, the uptake in the tumour is usually high compared to uptake in normal tissue. It may, however, be difficult to detect small tumours with the SPECT method because of high noise levels and the low spatial resolution. The liver is a common region for somatostatin-positive metastases, and to visually detect small tumours in the liver, as early as possible, is important for an effective treatment of the cancer disease. The study concentrates on the acquired number of projections, the subset size in the OSEM reconstruction and evaluates contrast as a function of noise for a range of OSEM iterations. The raw-data projections are produced using Monte Carlo simulations of an anthropomorphic phantom, including tumours in the liver. Two General Electric (GE) collimators are evaluated, the extended low-energy general-purpose (ELEGP) and the medium energy general-purpose (MEGP) collimator. Three main areas of reconstruction are investigated. First the reconstructions are performed for so called full time scans with the acquisition time used clinically. Also the effect of performing the examination in half-time or with half the injected activity is evaluated with the most optimal settings gained from the full time scans for both collimators. In addition images reconstructed without model-based compensation are also included for comparison. This study is a continuation of a previous study on 111In-pentetrotide SPECT where collimator choice and model-based compensation were evaluated for a cylindrical phantom representing small tumours in liver background. As in the previous study, ELEGP proved to be the better collimator. For ELEGP, the most optimal setting was 30 projection angles and a subset size of 6 projections in the OSEM reconstruction, and for MEGP optimal setting was 60 projections and 4 subsets. The difference between the different collimator settings were, however, rather small but proven significant. For both collimators the half-time scan including model-based compensation was better compared to the full-time reconstructions without model-based compensation.

No description available.

Este trabalho versa sobre o conceito de potência natural em Espinosa, sua amplitude e abrangência e seus reflexos no direito natural e na política. Procura revelar a originalidade do conceito de direito natural em Espinosa, muito diferente dos pontos de vista de Grotius, de Hobbes e de todos os demais filósofos e doutrinadores, levando-o, também, a uma visão diferente sobre a formação do Estado; e, finalmente, a sua doutrina sobre o Estado e suas diversas instituições políticas, enfatizando sempre a liberdade e a dignidade humanas como a razão de ser da criação desse mesmo Estado. Procuramos também revelar neste modesto trabalho o avanço, a novidade e a contribuição de Espinosa à ciência jurídica contemporânea. / This paper deals with the concept of natural power in Spinoza, its breadth and scope and its effects on natural law and politics. Seeks to reveal the originality of the concept of natural law in Spinoza, very different from the views of Grotius, Hobbes and all other philosophers and scholars, too, leading him to a different view of state formation; and finally, his teaching on the State and its various political institutions, always emphasizing freedom and human dignity as the reason for the creation of that State. We also seek to reveal in this modest work the advance, the novelty and contribution of Spinoza to contemporary legal science.

Este trabalho versa sobre o conceito de potência natural em Espinosa, sua amplitude e abrangência e seus reflexos no direito natural e na política. Procura revelar a originalidade do conceito de direito natural em Espinosa, muito diferente dos pontos de vista de Grotius, de Hobbes e de todos os demais filósofos e doutrinadores, levando-o, também, a uma visão diferente sobre a formação do Estado; e, finalmente, a sua doutrina sobre o Estado e suas diversas instituições políticas, enfatizando sempre a liberdade e a dignidade humanas como a razão de ser da criação desse mesmo Estado. Procuramos também revelar neste modesto trabalho o avanço, a novidade e a contribuição de Espinosa à ciência jurídica contemporânea. / This paper deals with the concept of natural power in Spinoza, its breadth and scope and its effects on natural law and politics. Seeks to reveal the originality of the concept of natural law in Spinoza, very different from the views of Grotius, Hobbes and all other philosophers and scholars, too, leading him to a different view of state formation; and finally, his teaching on the State and its various political institutions, always emphasizing freedom and human dignity as the reason for the creation of that State. We also seek to reveal in this modest work the advance, the novelty and contribution of Spinoza to contemporary legal science.

Hervé de Nédellec o.p. joua un rôle de premier plan dans la défense du patrimoine doctrinal de Thomas d’Aquin contre les effets des condamnations de la fin du XIIIe siècle et du début du XIVe siècle. Il a néanmoins défendu une position sur la distinction entre l’être et l’essence divergeant sensiblement de la distinction thomasienne, alors que cet élément se présente comme central à la pensée de l’illustre dominicain. Cette étude vérifie cette divergence et en rend compte, considérant le contexte historique et le rôle assumé par Hervé dans la défense de la pensée de son confrère. Allen (1958) caractérise la perspective hervéenne par son essentialisme et son approche sémantique, ainsi que par le rejet de la distinction réelle (Gilles de Rome et Thomas d’Aquin) et de la distinction intentionnelle (Henri de Gand). Il évoque par ailleurs l’influence de Godefroid de Fontaines, de Siger de Brabant et d’Averroès au regard de la distinction entre l’être et l’essence selon le mode de signifier retenue par Hervé. Ces observations se voient ici confirmées par l’exposé et la comparaison des principes ontologiques assumés par les différentes positions. Il est par le fait même rendu manifeste que Siger de Brabant, Godefroid de Fontaines, Hervé de Nédellec et encore Dietrich de Freiberg, tenants de la distinction sémantique, rejettent les positions adverses en raison de mêmes éléments qu’ils critiquent de celles-ci. La communauté doctrinale entre la distinction selon le mode de signifier et la théorie modiste ainsi que leur source commune dans le Commentaire à la Métaphysique d’Averroès sont par ailleurs mises au jour. Les modistes distinguent le signifié principal et les propriétés concernant (circa) le signifié principal. Dans la perspective sémantique, l’essence, l’étant et l’être sont conçus comme des propriétés concernant le signifié principal à la manière des propriétés circa de la grammaire spéculative. À l’instar des propriétés circa, « essence », « étant » et « être » diffèrent non parce qu’ils signifient différentes déterminations, mais au sens où ils signifient une même chose de différentes façons. L’analyse des objections soulevées par les tenants de la distinction sémantique et des éléments constitutifs de leur position fournit des outils nouveaux pour apprécier la distinction entre l’être et l’essence chez Thomas d’Aquin. Celle-ci se révèle procéder d’un cadre théorique inconciliable avec celui adopté par Hervé de Nédellec. Nous faisons ici valoir que cette liberté doctrinale d’Hervé de Nédellec s’explique par cela que la distinction entre l’être et l’essence n’était pas constitutive du fonds thomasien concerné par les ordonnances d’enseignement dominicaines de la fin du XIIIe siècle et du début du XIVe siècle, notamment puisqu’elle n’a pas été ciblée par les condamnations doctrinales ecclésiales ni par le correctoire de Guillaume de la Mare. / Hervaeus Natalis o.p. played a leading role in defending the doctrinal heritage of Thomas Aquinas against the effects of the condemnations of the end of the 13th and beginning of the 14th centuries. Nevertheless, he would have supported a position on the distinction between being and essence which is irreconcilable with the Thomasian distinction, even though this element is central to the thought of the illustrious Dominican. The present study verifies this discrepancy and give an account of it, considering the historical context and the role assumed by Hervaeus in the defence of the thought of his confrere. Allen (1958) characterizes the Hervean perspective by its essentialism and its semantic approach, as well as by the rejection of the real distinction (Giles of Rome and Aquinas) and the intentional distinction (Henri of Ghent). He also evokes the influence of Godfrey of Fontaines, Siger of Brabant and Averroes with regard to the distinction between being (esse) and essence according to the mode of signifying adopted by Hervaeus. These claims are here confirmed by the exposition and comparison of the ontological principles assumed by the different stances. By the same token, it is made clear that Siger of Brabant, Godefroid of Fontaines, Hervaeus Natalis and also Dietrich of Freiberg, the proponents of the semantic distinction, reject the opposing positions on the basis of the same elements that they criticize in them. The doctrinal community between the distinction according to the mode of signifying and the Modist theory, as well as their common source in the Commentary on the Metaphysics of Averroes are also brought to light. The Modists distinguish between the object signified and the properties concerning (circa) the object signified. In the semantic perspective, essence, ens and esse are conceived as properties concerning the object signified in the manner of the circa properties of speculative grammar. Like the circa properties, “essence”, “ens” and “esse” do not differ because they signify different determinations, but they differ in the sense that they signify the same thing in different ways. The analysis of the objections raised by the proponents of the semantic distinction and of the constitutive elements of their position provides new tools for appreciating the distinction between being (esse) and essence in Aquinas. It proves to proceed from a theoretical framework that is irreconcilable with that adopted by Hervaeus. We argue here that this doctrinal freedom of Hervaeus is explained by the fact that the distinction between being (esse) and essence was not constitutive of the Thomasian fund concerned by the Dominican teaching ordinances of the end of the 13th and beginning of the 14th centuries, especially since it was not targeted by the ecclesial doctrinal condemnations nor by the correctory of William de la Mare.

Cette thèse traite de la doctrine catégorielle, de l’ontologie et de la théorie de la connaissance de Dietrich de Freiberg dans le De origine rerum praedicamentalium. L’enjeu principal est d’étudier la fonction constitutive que l’intellect opère sur catégories et sur l’étant en tant que tel. La première partie replace le traité dans le contexte historique des débats à l’université de Paris à la fin du XIIIe siècle touchant au statut des catégories et à la manière d’ordonner les genres réels de l’étant. Elle confronte la dérivation essentielle des prédicaments chez Dietrich aux modèles de systématisation élaborées par ses prédécesseurs, tels qu’Albert le Grand, Thomas d’Aquin, Henri de Gand. La deuxième partie s’attache aux objets constitués par l’intellect : l’Un comme principe du nombre et de la division, la relation et le temps. La dernière partie enquête la modalité sur laquelle l’intellect opère cette activité sur l’étant et montre en définitive que le sujet de la métaphysique, l’être quiditatif des étants, se situe à la croisée de la logique et du réel / This thesis deals with Dietrich of Freiberg’s doctrine of categories, ontology and theory of knowledge, as present in the treatise De origine rerum praedicamentalium. The primary aim is to examine the constitutive function the intellect exercises on the categories and being as being. The first part of this thesis replaces the treatise in the historical background of the late 13th century debates from the University of Paris regarding the nature of categories and the manner of organizing the real genera of being. It compares Dietrich’s deduction of the categories with the systematization of some of his predecessors such as Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent. The second part of the thesis deals with the objects caused by the intellect: the One as principle of number and division, relation and time. The last part investigates the manner in which the intellect exercises its constitutive power on being and demonstrates in the final analysis that the subject of metaphysics, the quiditative being of things, is placed at the intersection of logic and reality