The diploma thesis describes accession of Croatia and Macedonia to the European union. It analysis their economic situation in context of comparison with EU member states. The information about competitiveness are brought. The goal of the thesis is to clarify readiness of both countries for integration within the EU. Their economy and competitiveness will be evaluated. Integration process is described from two point of view: European union as well as Croatia and Macedonia. There is overview of actual status and negotiation progress of both countries on their way to the EU.

Le sujet de cette thèse est la politique culturelle grecque dans l'Europe occidentale ainsi que le développement des efforts sur l'approche et l'intégration dans la famille européenne, du lendemain de la Seconde Guerre mondiale jusqu’à l’adhésion de la Grèce à la CEE. Dès sa fondation, pour l’État néo-hellénique, son passé historique et glorieux constituait le point central de référence. Dans ce cadre, la question qui se pose est celle de savoir quand et pourquoi le leadership politique décida d’exploiter ce passé au niveau politique. La politique culturelle utilise l’histoire et la civilisation d’une nation au profit de la politique. Dans la plupart des cas quant à la Grèce, les ‘messages’ de la politique culturelle ont pour ‘destinataires’ les Européens, phénomène notamment visible pendant la période des négociations d’adhésion. Couvrant l’ensemble de ces tentatives, à partir d’un niveau théorique par un groupe d’intellectuels (par exemple Tsatsos, Canellopoulos) à un niveau pratique par le monde politique (par exemple Caramanlis), l’ampleur de cette période, comprenant plus de trente ans, permet d’examiner et de mettre en valeur l’évolution des relations entre la Grèce et l’Europe ainsi que les initiatives et l’organisation de la politique culturelle de manière globale, dans un contexte européen et international. La politique culturelle extérieure que la Grèce exerça face aux Européens jusqu’en 1979, renvoie aux idées d’identité nationale, au sentiment d’appartenance, voire à l’image approfondie de l’Europe, mais, parallèlement, dans la mesure où elle fait partie de la politique européenne de la Grèce, inextricablement liée à l’histoire de l’intégration européenne. / This thesis discusses Greek cultural policy in Western Europe as well as its place in the country’s effort to participate in European integration from the aftermath of the Second World War until the accession of Greece to the EEC. From its foundation, the neo-Hellenic state used its historic past as a central point of reference. In this context, the question arises as to when and how the political leadership decided to project this past on the level of its political relations with the post-war European institutions. Cultural policy uses the history and civilization of a nation for the benefit of politics. In most cases involving Greece, the 'messages' of its cultural policy were 'addressed' to the Europeans, a phenomenon that is particularly visible during the period of accession negotiations. This was projected both at the intellectual level (for example by people such as Tsatsos, Kanellopoulos) and at the realm of practical politics by the political world (for example Karamanlis). This study, extending to a period longer than thirty years, examines the development of cultural relations between Greece and Europe, the initiatives and organization of Greek cultural policy within a European and international context as well as the role of cultural policy and Greece’s cultural arguments in the effort to achieve accession to the EEC.The foreign cultural policy that Greece exercised towards the Europeans until 1979 refers to national identity, the sentiment of belonging, the cultural connotations of the European project. Thus, to the extent that it is part of Greece's European policy, it is inextricably linked to the history of European integration.

La politique d’intégration de l’Union européenne offre de nouvelles possibilités aux travailleurs migrant dans le marché interne. Néanmoins, et malgré toutes les stratégies européennes, des entraves à l’intégration semblent persister. Comment peut-on repenser l’intégration à l’heure de la crise de légitimité de l’Europe ? Derrière ces défis nous retrouvons la manière dont les uns perçoivent les autres. Le stéréotype, largement médiatisé du « plombier polonais » nous en donne ici un exemple. Ce symbole du dumping social est apparu en France en 2005 à la veille du référendum sur le traité constitutionnel européen. Il incarnait l’angoisse de la société occidentale devant le flux migratoire de l’Europe de l’Est menaçant les postes de travail. Dès lors, nous pouvons nous poser la question suivante : qui est ce travailleur immigré ? Ce stéréotype affecte-t-il l’intégration des travailleurs européens en France aujourd’hui ? Nous nous focaliserons sur les obstacles à l’intégration européenne. L’objet de cette recherche consiste en particulier à étudier les représentations sociales et leurs impacts sur les pratiques sociales, ce qui distingue notre recherche d’autres études sur la migration et l’intégration. Nous proposons dans notre démarche de nous placer du point de vue de l’individu. Notre attention se porte sur les immigrés polonais en France employés dans les métiers peu qualifiés et leur expérience migratoire face aux stéréotypes. Nous saisirons les éventuels stéréotypes présents chez les clients, les collègues ou les employeurs français en examinant le discours et le vécu de l’immigré polonais. Puis, à travers les représentations sociales nous souhaitons identifier les conséquences des politiques de l’Union européenne sur le monde du travail. Ainsi, notre recherche implique trois dimensions afin de comprendre l’univers des représentations étudiées et leur impact sur l’intégration : le travailleur polonais vis-à-vis du milieu polonais en France, le travailleur polonais vis-à-vis de la société française et le travailleur polonais vis-à-vis de l’Union européenne. Cette analyse relève deux points capitaux : l’ouverture du marché et des frontières a provoqué un changement de conscience des Polonais en œuvrant à l’émergence d’un sentiment d’égalité et de liberté ; la possibilité d’un choix permet à l’immigré de construire un projet pour l’avenir, en France ou en Pologne, qui détermine la motivation à s’adapter et à s’intégrer à la société hôte. / The European Union integration policy offers new opportunities for its citizens in the community labour market. Nevertheless, despite all EU strategies to achieve it, resistance to European integration is inevitable. It is important to ask the question of whether or not problems concerning EU integration can be solved during current crises in Europe. One of the most important reasons for resistance to integration may be due to the way different EU member state populations perceive one another in a social context. The stereotype of the "Polish plumber", one that was widely propagated by the French media, gives us one such example. This symbol of social dumping appeared first in France in 2005, just before the referendum on EU Constitution. Behind this depiction, is the western EU’s anxiety of mass immigration from EU Central and Eastern European member states. Here it is important to closely examine the European immigrants and whether or not the societal portrayal of them has had an effect on their societal integration in France today. We focus on the obstacles of the European integration. The purpose of this research is particularly to study social representations and their impact on social practices, which distinguish our analysis from other migration and integration studies. The worker’s own perception of himself within French society should be taken into consideration as a response to the supranational structure of the European Union. The focus of this research will be placed on Polish immigrants in France who are entirely employed in low-skilled labour and the stereotypes they currently face. The stereotypes of Polish workers in France are then tabled and analysed in order to better understand the impact certain stereotypes and depictions have on the process of integration into French society. This research will also identify the societal consequences that certain EU policies have had as well on integration. The research involves three different approaches in order to understand the power of social representations and their impact on the integration process: a Polish worker and the Polish social circle in France, a Polish worker and the French society and a Polish worker and the European Union. Our analysis identifies two crucial points: the European market and the borders opening caused the Polish workers’ consciousness changing towards the emergence of a sense of equality and freedom; the possibility of choice allows the Polish immigrant to construct a project for the future, in France or in Poland, which determines the motivation to adapt and to integrate into the host society.

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the role of identity when it comes to European integration. Specifically, the citizen of the European Union’s identity as exclusive national or as transnational. What does the social constructivist theory say when it comes to the role of EU-citizens identity and European integration? I also want to contribute to strengthen the social constructivist theory in political science and international politics. I will examine this through a discourse analysis on four different selected materials. A campaign webpage from the Vote Leave group who ran a campaign to make the Great Britain leave the European Union, an interview the German newspaper der SPIEGEL did with Marine Le Pen who is the party leader of the French right-winged party Rassemblent National, a debate article written by the French president Emmanuel Macron and the Swedish party Liberalernas webpage campaign for the European Parliament elections 2019. I analyse how the discourse these four examples shape and creates the feeling of national or transnational identity and what the message connected to that identity-making says about European integration. With my discourse analysis and the theories of Thomas Risse and Catherine E. De Vries on social constructivism, identity and European integration I analyse and see that those who identify exclusively with a national identity are less keen on solidarity between nations, common policies and have a xenophobic view as oppose to those who have a transnational identity who are positive towards solidarity between nations, want a closer European integration and are not hostile towards migrants. I come to the conclusion that the identity of the EU-citizens is a major factor in human action, political mobilization, political action as in choosing and voting for a party, the EU-institutions way of negotiating on common political issues, public opinion and election outcomes. This means that feeling of an exclusive national or transnational identity is an important factor of European integration.

Grenzregionen und grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit gelten in der jüngeren Regionalforschung häufig als Symbole einer neuen Qualität innerhalb der zwischenstaatlichen Beziehungen und als Ausdruck guter Nachbarschaft zwischen den Staaten. Zudem werden sie als Beweis für eine zunehmende Regionalisierung politischer Entscheidungsprozesse und eine Transnationalisierung der internationalen Beziehungen angeführt. Damit wird ihnen politische Bedeutung jenseits des grenzregionalen Bezugs zugesprochen. Solche Überlegungen ignorieren jedoch bestehende Abhängigkeitsverhältnisse sowie Entwicklungen, die das Image von Grenzregionen als Defizitgebiete und Problembereiche verstärken. Zudem wird die Gestaltung von Staatsgrenzen weiterhin durch klassische Sicherheitsfragen beeinflusst und durch traditionelle Träger der Außenbeziehungen bestimmt. Hinzu kommen neue grenzüberschreitende Fragestellungen aufgrund komplexer Interdependenzen, die sowohl grenzregionale, nationale wie auch supranationale oder internationale Bedeutung haben. Das Untersuchungsdesign dieser Arbeit wurde in diesem Sinne ausgeweitet, um folgend Fragen zu analysieren: Inwieweit dezentrale Grenzkoalitionäre langfristig in die Gestaltung der zwischenstaatlichen Beziehungen einbezogen werden; ob sie selbstständig aktiv werden können, welchen Einfluss sie auf eine zunehmend integrativ gestaltete Außenpolitik haben, welche Politikfelder dabei im Vordergrund stehen. Ausgangspunkt der Analyse sind unabhängige Variablen, die jenseits der lokalen und regionalen Bedürfnisse und Ansprüche die Rahmenbedingungen grenzüberschreitender langfristiger Vernetzungen ergeben. Dazu gehören die Qualität der zwischenstaatlichen Beziehungen, nationale und transkontinentale Integrationskonzepte, die sozio-kulturelle Ausgangssituation in der Grenzregion sowie der politische Wille, langfristig binationale Mehrebenennetzwerke zu etablieren. Als Fallbeispiele dienen die deutsch-polnische sowie die US-mexikanische Grenzregion. Ziel ist es, den tatsächlichen Radius der grenzregionalen Spielräume jenseits lokaler und regionaler Fragestellungen zu definieren. Untersucht wird dies anhand zweier Themenkomplexe die traditionell in nationalstaatliche Kompetenz fallende Sicherheitspolitik und die der Regionalpolitik zuzuordnenden Felder Infrastruktur, regionale Wirtschafts- sowie Umweltpolitik. Besonderes Augenmerk wird auf die zwischen Europa und Nordamerika stark unterschiedlichen Integrationsanstöße und Entwicklungslogiken gelegt. / New studies on regionalism often regard border regions and cross-border cooperation as symbols of a new quality within international relations. Since this is seen as proof of the growing decentralization of political decision-making processes and the transnationalization of foreign relations, increasing political clout is being attributed to transboundary interaction. However, such research approaches tend to ignore existing dependencies and developments which strengthen the negative image of border regions as conflict-prone and problematic. At the same time, the handling of border policies continues to be dominated by classical security-related concerns and is still decided by traditional diplomatic stake-holders. Furthermore, new border-related questions surface, based on complex interdependencies between regional and national levels as well as in the supranational and international realms. In response, this study expands the general research parameters to determine the following questions: if and how decentralized border coalitions act within the range of binational relations; whether or not they can intervene independently; what influence they have on increasingly integrated foreign policies; and in which political arenas cooperation is most likely. Independent variables beyond the local and regional level are used as points of reference regarding lasting cross-border networks. These include the state of bilateral relations, national and transcontinental integration concepts, socio-cultural conditions, and the degree of political drive towards establishing binational multileveled networks. The German-Polish and the U.S.-Mexican border regions serve as case studies. The goal is to define the political playing field, and to outline the depth and limitations of border-regional coalitions beyond local and regional demands. Two unique policy-fields are analyzed security issues which are traditionally handled by state actors on the one hand, and infrastructure, regional development, and environmental issues on the other. Special attention is given to the different strategies of European and Northamerican integration initiatives and developments.

RésuméCette thèse a pour but de contribuer à l'histoire des communautés européennes et à la compréhension du processus de prise de décision au sein de cette coopération. Elle a pour objectif de clarifier l'importance du choc pétrolier pour la coopération européenne. Plus particulièrement, elle vise à comprendre quels effets immédiats et à court terme cette crise eut sur le développement d'une politique énergétique commune : La crise pétrolière fut-elle un levier ou une barrière au développement d'une politique énergétique commune? D'un côté, il se peut que le choc pétrolier ait accéléré le processus de prise de décision parce qu'il créa une urgence à traiter les problèmes d'approvisionnement du moment et à changer la dépendance européenne envers le pétrole du Moyen-Orient sur le long terme. D'un autre côté, il se peut que le choc pétrolier ait ralenti l'évolution d'une politique énergétique commune en intensifiant une confrontation entre les perspectives divergentes des Neuf, bloquant ainsi tout compromis. Dans ce contexte, des questions se posent quant aux raisons pour lesquelles les états membres recherchaient une coopération dans le domaine énergétique sans chercher de compromis au niveau de leurs intérêts divergents.Cette thèse a donné un aperçu sur différents aspects du processus de prise de décision dans les communautés européennes. La Commission européenne apparait dans cette recherche comme intervenant activement dans le développement d'une politique énergétique commune après la fusion de l'exécutif des communautés en 1967. L'échec de consensus en mai 1973 prouve toutefois que le besoin d'une coopération énergétique commune des gouvernements nationaux ait été moins fort que les différences d'intérêt mutuelles. En outre, on peut en conclure que les Neuf jugèrent l'OCDE comme un organisme plus approprié pour faire face aux tensions du moment du marché pétrolier.Après le début du choc pétrolier la coopération au niveau supranational fut considérablement minimisée. Il est certain que la Commission ne resta pas apathique face aux problèmes pétroliers lors du choc pétrolier. L'institution réagit vivement aux déclarations des pays producteurs de pétrole par des propositions de juridiction sur une politique pétrolière à court terme et des lettres insistant sur une position commune face aux problèmes d'approvisionnement en pétrole. Au sein de la Commission plusieurs comités et groupes furent créés, ou se rencontrèrent plus fréquemment, et se concentrèrent sur différents aspects du choc pétrolier.Le choc pétrolier ne fut pas un accélérateur du traitement des juridictions au niveau commun. Toutefois, il y a quelques remarques à faire. Il convient de mentionner que le Groupe de l'énergie du Conseil permit, curieusement, un forum pour la discussion d'actions communes possibles pour traiter les problèmes pétroliers du moment. En outre, la création du Comité de l'énergie signifiait un changement important dans le processus européen de prise décision. Troisièmement, l'OCDE a eu un rôle plus important que constaté avant en tant qu'acteur important du processus de prise de décision européen au niveau de l'énergie.Lors du choc pétrolier il ne fut pas donné à la Commission européenne de rôle d'élaboration de politique concernant les problèmes pétroliers du moment. Dans une première phase, le Conseil refusa ce rôle à la Commission à cause des mesures arabes sur les réductions de production et par crainte d'aggraver la situation. Mais même si cet argument n'était plus valable, les propositions pour des politiques à court termes de la Commission ne furent pas acceptées. Par contre, à cette époque, il fut confié à la Commission la tâche d'élaborer un programme à moyen et long terme pour une politique énergétique commune jusqu'en 1985. À cet égard, le choc pétrolier semble avoir été le catalyseur d'une politique énergétique commune. / This thesis aims to contribute to the history of the European communities and to the understanding of the decision-making process within this cooperation. More specifically, it seeks an answer to the question of what immediate and short-term effects he oil shock had on the development of a common energy policy: Was the oil crisis a lever or a barrier for the development of a common European energy policy? On the one hand, the oil shock may have possibly accelerated the decision-making process because it created an urgency to deal with the current supply problems and to change the European dependency on Middle Eastern oil on the longer term. On the other hand, the oil shock may have slowed down the development of a common energy policy by escalating a confrontation between the diverging perspectives of the Nine, blocking, in this way, a compromise. In this context, questions arise about the reasons why member states were searching for cooperation in the field of energy without searching for a compromise for their diverging interests.This thesis gives insight into different aspects of the decision-making process at the European communities. The European Commission emerges from the research as an active actor in the development towards a common energy policy after the merger of the communities' executives in 1967. The failure to reach consensus in May 1973 shows, however, that the need from national governments for a joint energy cooperation was less significant than the mutual differences of interest. Moreover, it might be concluded that the Nine deemed the OECD a more appropriate body to face the current tensions in the oil market. Two weeks after the Energy Council, they had committed themselves to the consumer cooperation at the OECD, just like the other member countries of this organisation. The idea for such a closer cooperation had been pushed by the United States since 1972. Within the OECD's Oil Committee, the theme of a worldwide apportionment scheme was being discussed as well as the danger of outbidding prices. The most important questions of the time were thus already discussed within this forum which maintained the large advantage of including the United States.After the start of the oil shock, cooperation at supranational level was significantly minimised, although the Commission did certainly not remain apathetic towards the oil problems. The institution swiftly reacted to the oil producer countries' announcements with new proposals for jurisdiction on short-term oil policy and letters insisting on a joint position faced with the oil supply problems. Within the Commission several committees and groups were created, and existing committees met more regularly, and focused on different aspects of the oil shock. The oil shock was not an accelerator for the processing of jurisdiction at common level. Noteworthy is the fact, however, that the Energy Group of the Council surprisingly provided a forum for the discussion of possible common actions to counter the current oil problems. Moreover, the creation of this Energy Committee signified an important change within the European decision-making process. Thirdly, the OECD had a more important role than assumed in other studies in this field, as an actor in the European decision-making process on energy.During the oil shock the European Commission was not attributed a role in the policy making concerning the current oil problems. In a first phase, the Council refused to such a role for the Commission because of the Arab measures on production cuts and a fear to aggravate the situation. But even when this argument no longer applied the proposals for jurisdiction of the Commission were not accepted. By contrast, at that time the Commission was given the assignment of elaborating a mid- and long-term programme for a common energy policy until 1985. In that respect, the oil shock seems to have been a catalyst for a common energy policy.

My doctoral project investigates the impact of Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative on transatlantic relations during the period 1983-86. The dissertation focuses on the three main European powers, namely Britain, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany, and examines their reaction to SDI both individually and comparatively. The study exploits SDI’s position at the intersection of nuclear strategy, political ideology, Cold War diplomacy, and industrial politics to offer a multifaceted, multi-national, and primary source-based analysis of US-European relations during the Reagan Presidency. The picture of the transatlantic relationship which emerges from the dissertation is a complex and nuanced one. On the one hand, the analysis argues that relations across the Atlantic during the Reagan era cannot be reduced to a scenario of accelerating ‘drift’ between the United States and Western Europe. Instead, on SDI as well as on other matters, moments of acute friction alternated with a constantly renewed search for dialogue, cooperation, and compromise on the part of the Europeans and also, if to a lesser degree, of the Americans. On the other hand, the ‘exceptionalist’ ideology and worldview underpinning SDI, the prevailing indifference in Washington to its implications for NATO, and most importantly the persistent anti-nuclear rhetoric and ambitions associated with the initiative revealed a distinct lack of sensitivity to European interest by the Reagan administration. As the dissertation shows, the anti-nuclear drive inherent in SDI, which both reflected and reinforced Reagan’s deep-seated interest in nuclear abolition, constituted the most disruptive aspect of the initiative from the viewpoint of European leaders. In these respects, the SDI controversy epitomises the unilateral tendencies and increasingly divergent priorities from those of the European allies which characterised much of the Reagan administration’s foreign policy – making the 1980s a decade of recurrent tensions in transatlantic relations.

<p>European cities of today are under the challenge to find ways to stay competitive and flourish in a rapidly changing world, where the old patterns of centrality and periphery not necessarily holds true. New and improved communication networks, a changed political geography in Europe, and the globalisation of not only the financial and industrial markets but also to a certain extent the globalisation of people, have all led to great challenges for cities and regions.</p><p>In a changed spatial reality the classic monocentric models are challenged by newer models of urbanisation. The polycentric urban region is one such model which has been used to describe urban regions like the Randstad in the Netherlands and the Rhein-Ruhr region in Germany. Regions which lack the single dominant central city of the monocentric models of old, and instead shows a high degree of more equal-sized and sometimes more specialised cities in regional cooperation. The polycentric urban region is in that aspect a possible model for how other urbanised regions in Europe may act to be able to position themselves as attractive urban regions and regional hubs in the European urban network.</p><p>Polycentric urban regions are not a universal solution, though. For such regions to work there are a number of prerequisites to be filled, something that makes it a possible future for regions like Haute-Normandie in France, where the two cities of Le Havre and Rouen have the possibility to form one urban region and already show signs of heading in that direction, while a region like Dolnośląskie in Poland – where the city of Wrocław is the dominant city in what makes for a more classic monocentric region – has much less opportunity to use a polycentric strategy on the regional level to become competitive. On the other hand such a city and region can instead benefit from the fact that Poland is to a high degree a polycentric nation, and as one of the larger cities in such an environment, Wrocław has the opportunity to position itself as a hub in the European urban network in a way that Le Havre and Rouen cannot, due to their physical location close to the giant European urban region of Paris.</p> / <p>Dagens europeiska städer står inför en utmaning att finna sätt att förbli konkurrenskraftiga och framgångsrika i en snabbt föränderlig värld, där de gamla mönstren vad gäller centralitet och periferi inte längre nödvändigtvis gäller. Nya och förbättrade kommunikationsnätverk, en förändrad politisk geografi i Europa, globaliseringen av inte bara de finansiella och industriella systemen, utan även till viss del en globalisering av människorna, har alla lett till stora utmaningar för städer och regioner.</p><p>I en förändrad rumsgeografisk verklighet utmanas de klassiska monocentriska modellerna av nyare urbaniseringsmodeller. Den polycentriska urbana regionen är en sådan modell som har använts för att beskriva urbana regioner som Randstad i Nederländerna och Rhein-Ruhrregionen i Tyskland. Regioner som saknar den ensamt dominierande centrala staden från de klassiska monocentriska modellerna, och istället uppvisar en hög grad av mer jämnstora och ibland mer specialiserade städer i regionalt samarbete. Den polycentriska urbana regionen är mot den bakgrunden en möjlig modell för hur andra urbaniserade regioner i Europa kan agera för att positionera sig själva som attraktiva urbana regioner och regionala nav i det Europeiska urbana nätverket.</p><p>Polycentriska urbana regioner är däremot inte någon universallösning. För att sådana regioner ska fungera krävs att ett antal punkter är uppfyllda, något som gör det till en möjlig framtid för regioner som exempelvis Haute-Normandie i Frankrike, där de två städerna Le Havre och Rouen tillsammans kan bilda en urban region och redan visar tecken på att gå i den riktningen, medan en region som Dolnośląskie i Polen – där staden Wrocław är den dominerande staden i vad som utgör en mer traditionell monocentrisk region – har betydligt mindre möjlighet att använda sig av en polycentrisk strategi på det regionala planet för att bli konkurrenskraftig. Å andra sidan kan en sådan stad och region istället utnyttja det faktum att Polen är en ovanligt polycentrisk stat, och som en av de större städerna i en sådan miljö har Wrocław möjligheten att positionera sig själv som ett nav i det europeiska urbana nätverket på ett sätt som Le Havre och Rouen inte kan, till följd av deras fysiska lokalisering nära den gigantiska europeiska urbaniserade regionen Paris.</p>

European cities of today are under the challenge to find ways to stay competitive and flourish in a rapidly changing world, where the old patterns of centrality and periphery not necessarily holds true. New and improved communication networks, a changed political geography in Europe, and the globalisation of not only the financial and industrial markets but also to a certain extent the globalisation of people, have all led to great challenges for cities and regions. In a changed spatial reality the classic monocentric models are challenged by newer models of urbanisation. The polycentric urban region is one such model which has been used to describe urban regions like the Randstad in the Netherlands and the Rhein-Ruhr region in Germany. Regions which lack the single dominant central city of the monocentric models of old, and instead shows a high degree of more equal-sized and sometimes more specialised cities in regional cooperation. The polycentric urban region is in that aspect a possible model for how other urbanised regions in Europe may act to be able to position themselves as attractive urban regions and regional hubs in the European urban network. Polycentric urban regions are not a universal solution, though. For such regions to work there are a number of prerequisites to be filled, something that makes it a possible future for regions like Haute-Normandie in France, where the two cities of Le Havre and Rouen have the possibility to form one urban region and already show signs of heading in that direction, while a region like Dolnośląskie in Poland – where the city of Wrocław is the dominant city in what makes for a more classic monocentric region – has much less opportunity to use a polycentric strategy on the regional level to become competitive. On the other hand such a city and region can instead benefit from the fact that Poland is to a high degree a polycentric nation, and as one of the larger cities in such an environment, Wrocław has the opportunity to position itself as a hub in the European urban network in a way that Le Havre and Rouen cannot, due to their physical location close to the giant European urban region of Paris. / Dagens europeiska städer står inför en utmaning att finna sätt att förbli konkurrenskraftiga och framgångsrika i en snabbt föränderlig värld, där de gamla mönstren vad gäller centralitet och periferi inte längre nödvändigtvis gäller. Nya och förbättrade kommunikationsnätverk, en förändrad politisk geografi i Europa, globaliseringen av inte bara de finansiella och industriella systemen, utan även till viss del en globalisering av människorna, har alla lett till stora utmaningar för städer och regioner. I en förändrad rumsgeografisk verklighet utmanas de klassiska monocentriska modellerna av nyare urbaniseringsmodeller. Den polycentriska urbana regionen är en sådan modell som har använts för att beskriva urbana regioner som Randstad i Nederländerna och Rhein-Ruhrregionen i Tyskland. Regioner som saknar den ensamt dominierande centrala staden från de klassiska monocentriska modellerna, och istället uppvisar en hög grad av mer jämnstora och ibland mer specialiserade städer i regionalt samarbete. Den polycentriska urbana regionen är mot den bakgrunden en möjlig modell för hur andra urbaniserade regioner i Europa kan agera för att positionera sig själva som attraktiva urbana regioner och regionala nav i det Europeiska urbana nätverket. Polycentriska urbana regioner är däremot inte någon universallösning. För att sådana regioner ska fungera krävs att ett antal punkter är uppfyllda, något som gör det till en möjlig framtid för regioner som exempelvis Haute-Normandie i Frankrike, där de två städerna Le Havre och Rouen tillsammans kan bilda en urban region och redan visar tecken på att gå i den riktningen, medan en region som Dolnośląskie i Polen – där staden Wrocław är den dominerande staden i vad som utgör en mer traditionell monocentrisk region – har betydligt mindre möjlighet att använda sig av en polycentrisk strategi på det regionala planet för att bli konkurrenskraftig. Å andra sidan kan en sådan stad och region istället utnyttja det faktum att Polen är en ovanligt polycentrisk stat, och som en av de större städerna i en sådan miljö har Wrocław möjligheten att positionera sig själv som ett nav i det europeiska urbana nätverket på ett sätt som Le Havre och Rouen inte kan, till följd av deras fysiska lokalisering nära den gigantiska europeiska urbaniserade regionen Paris.

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