Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2016-08-16T12:32:54Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Carlos Eduardo Corrêa de Morais.pdf: 1176567 bytes, checksum: 258a5d3f0f3c494636d60fddae515e86 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-08-16T12:32:54Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Carlos Eduardo Corrêa de Morais.pdf: 1176567 bytes, checksum: 258a5d3f0f3c494636d60fddae515e86 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-04-27 / This paper has as main scope to identify and establish the consequences arising from the delayed analysis of the necessary requirements for acceptance of the reviews appeals that were discontinued by the Regional Labor Court, proceeding that will take place only after the appeal that represents the dispute is judged by the Superior Labor Court, in accordance with the Law No. 13,015, of July 21, 2014, which included the Article 896-C in the Brazilian Labor Code, regulated by the Act No. 491/SEGJUD.GP of September 23, 2014, deep diving into the possibility of applying a predominant thesis or Court Precedent to the discontinued appeals or without the proper observance of the legal requirements established in the legal model. Therefore, it firstly presents the main relevant characteristics of the res judicata and the cases in which there is irradiation effects with their flexibility, followed by the analysis of the judgment of the repeated appeal to determine, with proportionality, weighing the constitutional principles of legal security and isonomy, in thesis, colliding with the proposed analysis. The considerations presented are anchored in doctrine, as well as recent and controversial understanding of Regional Labor Courts and Superior Labor Court on the subject. By last, the conclusions are intended to systematize those cases where even not admitting an appeal, should be overcome formal obstacle, perhaps the immutability arising from the final judgment, so that the stir receives similar solution as established by the Superior Labor Court / O presente trabalho tem como escopo precípuo identificar e estabelecer os reflexos decorrentes da análise diferida de admissibilidade dos recursos de revista sobrestados nos Tribunais Regionais de origem, procedida somente depois do julgamento do recurso de revista representativo da controvérsia perante o Tribunal Superior do Trabalho, na forma prevista pela Lei nº13.015, de 21 de julho de 2014, que incluiu o artigo 896-C, da CLT, regulado pelo Ato nº491/SEGJUD.GP, de 23 de setembro de 2014, afunilando a possibilidade de aplicação da tese prevalecente ou súmula de jurisprudência aos recursos inadmissíveis ou sem a observância de pressuposto recursal estabelecido pelo modelo legal. Para tanto, apresentam-se inicialmente as características relevantes da coisa julgada e as hipóteses em que há irradiação de seus efeitos, seguindo-se à análise do regime de julgamento de recurso de revista repetitivo para fixar, então, com fulcro na proporcionalidade, a ponderação entre os princípios constitucionais da segurança jurídica e da isonomia, em tese, colidentes na análise proposta. As considerações apresentadas ancoram-se na doutrina e no entendimento recente e ainda controvertido dos Tribunais Regionais e Superiores acerca da matéria. Por derradeiro, as conclusões pretendem sistematizar aqueles casos em que mesmo não admitido o recurso de revista, deverá ser superado o empecilho formal, quiçá a imutabilidade advinda da autoridade imanente do trânsito em julgado, a fim de que a demanda receba solução idêntica àquela estabelecida pelo Tribunal Superior do Trabalho

Submitted by Marlene Aparecida de Souza Cardozo (mcardozo@pucsp.br) on 2016-11-24T15:48:22Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Pedro Pierobon Costa do Prado.pdf: 1758086 bytes, checksum: 4fc6c5d909c7e1911d70844cb05ac13f (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-11-24T15:48:22Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Pedro Pierobon Costa do Prado.pdf: 1758086 bytes, checksum: 4fc6c5d909c7e1911d70844cb05ac13f (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-10-26 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / The res judicata, as well as other institutes of procedural law, had their understanding changed with passage of time. Although it represents expression of legal certainty regarding lawsuits, as a Democratic State manifestation in judicial functions, intensive discussions about the possibility to relativize such institute are not recent, even without express statutory permission. The existence of a considerable number of precedents obtained by fraud, and others absurd, unjust, illegal and even unconstitutional means justify, according to legal experts, the positioning for withdrawal of res judicata protective mantle, in order to enable the case new discussion. On the other side, many are reticent about that, because preserving stability in legal and social relations. This study aims to examine arguments favorable and against, and the means available for claim preclusion disregard / A coisa julgada, assim como outros institutos do direito processual, teve a sua compreensão alterada com o decorrer dos tempos. Embora seja expressão da segurança jurídica no âmbito do processo, oriunda da manifestação do Estado Democrático de Direito no desempenho da função jurisdicional, não são recentes os debates sobre a possibilidade de sua relativização, mesmo sem expresso permissivo legal. A constatação da existência de um número considerável de sentenças obtidas mediante fraude e outras tantas absurdas, injustas, ilegais e até mesmo inconstitucionais justificaram o posicionamento de grandes juristas pela retirada do manto protetor da coisa julgada nesses casos, de modo a se possibilitar a rediscussão da causa. De outro lado, outros se mostraram reticentes sobre a relativização, sob o argumento da preservação da estabilidade das relações jurídicas e sociais. Este trabalho se propõe a analisar os argumentos favoráveis e contrários à relativização, bem como os meios dispostos para sua desconsideração

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:22:59Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Cezar Augusto Pinheiro de Almeida.pdf: 1315880 bytes, checksum: 1224d055ea86d55eee80343f2632d54d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-08-14 / This work firstly makes revisiting the Institute of res iudicata under the classic civil procedure bias - concept, legal, limits, assumptions of incidence, and sums up the causes and means of removal - to subsequently introduce it forward to the new branch of law, in which oversee metaindividual interests. That focus on further brief clarification of collective suits, considering its origin, the relevant aspects and comparisons of the traditional civil procedure, including the study of parties and their legitimation. In conclusion, the collective res judicata, erected the protagonist, is analyzed according to the legal provisions, the doctrinal and jurisprudential investigations that address and problematize. Moreover, through theoretical and empirical analysis, were sought on the law, doctrine and jurisprudence homeland, the best results concerning the most suitable for the purpose of metaindividual guardianships results, allying the premises of Collective Law, Civil Procedure Law of the traditional and judged collective thing, and a deductive exposition on this last technique / O presente trabalho, inicialmente, faz a revisitação do instituto da coisa julgada, sob o viés do direito processual civil clássico conceito, natureza jurídica, limites, hipóteses de incidência, importâncias e até as causas e meios de afastamento para, posteriormente, apresentá-lo diante ao novo ramo do Direito, em que se tutelam interesses metaindividuais. Enfocam-se, ainda, breves esclarecimentos acerca do Direito Processual Coletivo, considerando-se sua origem, aspectos relevantes e comparações quanto ao processo civil tradicional, inclusive com o estudo das partes e suas respectivas formas de legitimação. No desfecho, a coisa julgada coletiva, erigida à protagonista, é analisada conforme as previsões legais, as investigações doutrinárias e as jurisprudenciais que a abordam e problematizam. Outrossim, mediante uma análise teórico-empírica, buscaram-se na lei, na doutrina e na jurisprudência pátria, os melhores resultados quanto ao resultados mais adequados ao propósito das tutelas metaindividuais, aliando-se as premissas do Direito Coletivo, do Direito Processual Civil tradicional e da coisa julgada coletiva, numa técnica expositiva e dedutiva acerca dessa última

L’autorité de la chose jugée est consubstantielle à l’idée même de justice. Si l’arbitrage est une justice privée et contractuelle mais une «justice quand même», elle doit logiquement composer avec l’autorité de la chose jugée. Il faut d’abord que les décisions issues de cette justice puissent bénéficier d’une telle autorité ; il faut ensuite que les juridictions arbitrales respectent l’autorité des décisions qui ont été rendues antérieurement. C’est ce second point qui est le cœur de notre étude.Du point de vue de l’arbitre du commerce international, la question de l’autorité des décisions, qu’elles soient arbitrales ou étatiques, présente des difficultés originales qui tiennent, pour l’essentiel, à la position autonome de l’arbitre. Investi d’une mission juridictionnelle ponctuelle par la volonté des parties, l’arbitre n’est a priori pas tenu par les considérations relatives à la cohérence d’un ordre juridique précis, à la paix sociale, à la bonne administration de la justice… Autrement dit, le seul caractère juridictionnel de sa mission ne lui impose pas nécessairement la prise en compte de la chose précédemment jugée. Tout bien analysé, il s’avère que c’est la volonté des parties à l’arbitrage qui conduit l’arbitre à reconnaître la normativité des décisions puis à leur attribuer une certaine autorité, à cette fin, il devra d’abord s’assurer de leur régularité avant de s’interroger sur l’étendue de leur autorité.Le fondement subjectif de l’obligation pour l’arbitre de respecter l’autorité de la chose déjà jugée et l’absence de contrôle étatique conduisent toutefois à reconnaître à l’arbitre une vaste liberté dans le choix des règles ou principes applicables. Nous verrons toutefois qu’à condition de distinguer les différentes formes empruntées par l’autorité de la chose jugée, le traitement de l’autorité de la chose jugée par les arbitres internationaux, s’il n’est pas homogène, est loin d’être aussi chaotique que l’on pourrait le croire, mieux encore, il apparaît que des pratiques raisonnables peuvent souvent être distinguées. / The force of res judicata is consubstantial with the very idea of justice / is an integral part of the idea of justice. If arbitration is private and contractual justice – but “justice nonetheless” – it logically needs to deal with the force of res judicata. Firstly, the decisions issued by arbitrators need to benefit from this force; secondly; arbitral tribunals need to respect the force of previous judicial decisions. Our study focusses on the latter aspect. From the point of view of the international commercial arbitrator, the question of the res judicata effect of arbitral or court decisions poses interesting questions and presents challenges, primarily with regards to the autonomous position of the arbitrator entrusted with an ad hoc judicial task in accordance with the intention of the parties, the arbitrator is not a priori bound to considerations regarding the coherence of a specific legal order, social peace or the sound administration of justice… In other words, the jurisdictional character of the arbitrators’ mission alone does not necessarily force them to take into account the force of res judicata. All things considered, it appears that it is the intention of the parties in the arbitration process which leads the arbitrator to acknowledge the normativity of the decisions, and to attribute them a certain force. To this end, the arbitrator will be required to check their conformity before reflecting upon the scope of their force. The subjective basis for the arbitrator’s obligation to respect the force of res judicata and the absence of state control nevertheless invite to consider the arbitrator’s significant amount of leeway in choosing which rules and principles to apply. However, we will show that, provided that a distinction is made between the different forms taken by the force of res judicata, the treatment of the force of res judicata by international arbitrators, if not exactly homogeneous, is far from being as chaotic as one might think, indeed, it appears that reasonable practices can even be observed.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-03-15T19:34:02Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Alex Antonio Mascaro.pdf: 1238327 bytes, checksum: 740e7f5b75f62902391ca191709f65b2 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007-03-06 / The loosening of the res judicata with the current tendencies of flexibilization creates problems whose approach reaches not only the procedural area, but also the philosophy of law, the sociology of law, the constitutional law and, therefore, the exercise of citizenship, in what concerns the constitutional guarantees of juridical security. The question involves delicate aspects, mainly under the argument of the justice of the decisions, because the mistakes that may come to be committed by the Judiciary and covered under the mantle of the res judicata have no possibility of correction. However, the question of flexibilization of the res judicata can not be seen only through the philosophical shock of justice versus juridical security. It is necessary to analyze the res judicata through the sociological eye and the way in which its mitigation affects the formal guarantees of citizenship and politicizes the Judiciary in a harmful manner. / O afrouxamento da coisa julgada com as atuais tendências de flexibilização cria problemas, cuja abordagem atinge não só a área processual, mas também a filosofia do direito, a sociologia do direito, o direito constitucional e, por conseguinte, o exercício da cidadania, no que tange às garantias constitucionais de segurança jurídica. A questão envolve aspectos delicados, principalmente sob o argumento da justiça das decisões, pois os erros que porventura são cometidos pelo Judiciário e cobertos sobre o manto da coisa julgada estão impossibilitados de correção. Porém, a questão da flexibilização da coisa julgada não pode ser vista somente através do embate filosófico da justiça versus segurança jurídica. É necessário que se analise a coisa julgada pelo olhar sociológico e a forma que sua mitigação atinge as garantias formais de cidadania e politiza o Judiciário de maneira nociva.

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2018-01-19T10:48:13Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Fernando Rey Cota Filho.pdf: 1022291 bytes, checksum: 7d344b38f1f6a2a93246e61d682a326d (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-01-19T10:48:13Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Fernando Rey Cota Filho.pdf: 1022291 bytes, checksum: 7d344b38f1f6a2a93246e61d682a326d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-12-19 / Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa e Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico - CNPq / This dissertation aims to investigate deeply the so calles dispositive principle ain order to check if the Brazilian Civil Procedure Code, enacted in 2015, has changed or not (and in which way) the classic definition of the abomementioned principle. In order to do that, it is necessary do establish the premises that will be the object of investigation, starting by the res judicata and its modern concept. Subsequently, the dissertation will then investigate the scope of the civil process, passing through important definition, such as the party request, lide, accion, the congruence principle, and how these institutes have evolved since the enactment od the Brazilian Civil Procedure Code of 1939 until now. All of this in order to seek the possible relevant changes made by the previewsly civil procedures legislations. Then, we will investigate ths objectives limits of res judicata, also from a historical perspective in previews Brazilians procedures code, from 1939, passing by 1973 and then to check how does the current civil procedure code got into this institute. It will also be analysed others institutes that have influence over the abovementioned conception. And then the final chapter will clarify how does the dispositive principle (or even the voluntariness principle) has to be understood by the current civil procedure code. It will be studied if there was any influence from the mentioned institutes on its conception, in order to check if there was any kind of change on its scope and meaning for the CPC/15. The present work seeks to understand what the dispositive principle means, which institutes influence its definition, all that lightened by the objective limits of res judicata as it is on CPC/15 / Trata o presente trabalho da investigação sobre o princípio dispositivo e se sua concepção se alterou com o advento do CPC/15. Para tanto, necessário antes disso estabelecer as premissas que serão objeto da investigação, sendo que traremos primeiras linhas sobre a coisa julgada e algumas conceituações necessárias. Posteriormente, investigaremos o objeto do processo, passando pelo pedido, lide, ação, princípio da congruência e a evolução constante desses aspectos nos sistemas processuais de 1939 e 1973, para que se possa chegar ao atual sistema processual. Ato contínuo, investigaremos os limites objetivos da coisa julgada, também sob uma perspectiva histórica nos sistemas processuais pretéritos de 1939 e 1973 para que também se verifique o contemporâneo sistema, assim como alguns institutos que influenciam essa concepção. E então chega-se à investigação sobre o princípio dispositivo, como foi compreendido, como se dava sua acepção de acordo com o sistema que se investiga, para então poder concluir se houve alteração ou não sobre seu alcance e significado para oCPC/15. Busca-se com o presente trabalho entender o que significa o princípiodispositivo, de quais institutos recebe influência, e se houve, de acordo com os limites objetivos da coisa julgada, alteração em sua acepção para o CPC/15

O presente trabalho tratou do erro na ação rescisória, compreendendo tanto o erro de fato como o erro de direito, apontando eventuais equívocos e acertos da doutrina e jurisprudência sobre o tema. Na primeira parte do estudo estabeleceu-se as premissas necessárias para as demais, iniciando-se por uma breve introdução a respeito da prestação jurisdicional e seus escopos, pois a ação rescisória não só é meio de prestação jurisdicional, como também é meio de revisão dessa mesma tutela prestada pelo Estado, passando-se, posteriormente, a uma sucinta apresentação da garantia da coisa julgada. Em seguida, ingressando já no tema da ação rescisória, na parte segunda traçou-se um panorama geral acerca do instituto, estabelecendo as principais diferenças entre a ação rescisória e os demais meios de impugnação das decisões judiciais, nos quais se insere a ação rescisória, dando ênfase à excepcionalidade do instituto ora em estudo, justamente por ser meio de revisão da coisa julgada, que goza de proteção constitucional. Na terceira parte, analisou-se o objeto da ação rescisória, que são as sentenças de mérito transitadas em julgado, apontando as possíveis decisões que podem abrir oportunidade ao manejo da ação rescisória, inclusive tratando de questão atual, que concerne à nova definição de sentença de mérito, concluindo-se pela impossibilidade de cisão formal da sentença, bem como examinou-se as principais divergências existentes no que tange às demais decisões, terminando, ainda, com uma breve abordagem do tratamento conferido à ação rescisória no anteprojeto do Código de Processo Civil. Finalmente, na quarta parte, foram feitas considerações sobre as principais questões que surgem em relação ao erro na ação rescisória à luz da doutrina nacional e italiana, bem como acerca dos erros e acertos da jurisprudência dos tribunais superiores a respeito do tema. Demonstrou-se que, para a ação rescisória por erro de fato exige-se apenas a existência de um requisito, qual seja, a ausência de controvérsia sobre ponto a respeito de que a sentença teve que se pronunciar ou teria que se pronunciar. Quanto ao erro de direito, concluiu-se que, para fins da ação rescisória, não é necessário nem que a norma seja clara, nem que a violação se dê contra a literalidade da norma, pois, dificilmente um órgão julgador irá contrariar uma norma de forma clara e frontal. / This paper addresses the error in actions for reversal of judgment, including both errors in fact and errors at law, and points out some possibly mistaken and correct understandings of legal scholars and case law on the subject. The first part of this study lays down the premises required for its other parts, beginning with a short introduction regarding jurisdictional relief and its scopes, since an action for reversal of judgment is not only a means of seeking jurisdictional relief, but also a means of revising such relief as provided by the State. Then, a brief presentation is given on the assurance of res judicata. Next, now entering the realm of actions for reversal of judgment, its second part provides an overview of their institution, setting forth the main differences between actions for reversal of judgment and other means of challenging court rulings, wherein actions for reversal of judgment are included, emphasizing the exceptional nature of the institution studied herein, precisely because such actions are a means of revising a res judicata, which enjoys constitutional protection. Its third part analyzes the subject-matter of actions for reversal of judgment, aimed at judgments on merit that have become res judicata, pointing out rulings that possibly can afford an opportunity for pursuing an action for reversal of judgment, including in dealing with a current issue, which concerns a new definition of judgment on merit, and then it concludes for the impossibility of formally splitting a judgment. It also examines the main existing divergences as regards other rulings, and it closes, furthermore, with a brief discussion of the treatment given to actions for reversal of judgment in the preliminary bill of law for the Code of Civil Procedure. Finally, in its fourth part, some comments are made on the main issues that arise in connection with errors in actions for reversal of judgment, in light of Brazilian and Italian legal scholarship, and on some mistaken and correct understandings in the case law of higher courts regarding the subject. It is demonstrated that for an action for reversal of judgment upon an error of fact, only one existing requirement is called for, namely, the absence of any dispute over a point that had to be heard, or would have to be heard, in the judgment. As for errors at law, the conclusion is reached that for the purposes of an action for reversal of judgment, it is neither necessary for the rule to be clear nor for the violation to be against the literalness of the rule, because a judging authority will hardly contradict a rule in a clear and outright manner.

Syftet med min uppsats är, dels att utreda vilka huvudsakliga konsekvenser som 2013 års praxis angående ”Ne bis in idem” föranlett för den svenska skatteprocessen, dels att analysera vilka resningsmöjligheter som föreligger för enskilda som drabbats av Sveriges konventions­överträdelser. Ett ytterligare syfte med uppsatsen är att analysera huruvida lagförslagen i SOU 2013:62 uppfyller grund­läggande rättssäkerhetskrav samt att föreslå ändringar till nyss nämnda lagförslag. Innan år 2013 bedömde Högsta domstolen att systemet med dubbla sanktioner inom ramen för skilda förfaranden var förenligt med principen ”Ne bis in idem”, eftersom det saknades ”klart stöd” för att underkänna hela det svenska systemet. I NJA 2013 s. 502 fann Högsta domstolen att det numera finns ”tillräckligt stöd” för att underkänna hela det svenska systemet. Högsta domstolens nya ställningstagande innebär att såväl mervärdeskatt som inkomstskatt och arbetsgivaravgifter omfattas av förbudet mot dubbelbestraffning och dubbelprövning av lagöverträdelser som grundar sig på samma faktiska omständigheter och som riktats mot samma rättssubjekt. I förevarande framställning har jag därför utrett vad 2013 års praxis innebär respektive vilka sammanhängande frågor som fortfarande söker svar. I NJA 2013 s. 746 fann Högsta domstolen dessutom att rättsläget förändrades redan den 10 februari 2009. Att rättsläget förändrades vid nyss nämnda brytpunkt har i efterföljande avgöranden vid såväl Högsta domstolen som vid Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen visat sig vara avgörande för huruvida personer beviljats resning. I denna framställning har jag därför analyserat vilka omständigheter som enligt 2013 års praxis varit avgörande för att resning ska beviljas vid Högsta domstolen respektive Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen. I september 2013 lämnades betänkandet av utredningen om rättssäkerhet i skatteförfarandet (RIS-utredningen) över till regeringen som en direkt följd av 2013 års förändrade rättsläge. Flertalet remissinstanser bl.a. Ekobrottsmyndigheten, Domstolsverket och Skatteverket har lämnat remissyttranden med tudelad kritik. Förevarande framställning innehåller en konsekvens­analys av RIS-utredningens lagförslag. Framställningen innehåller även en analys av huruvida lagförslagen uppfyller grundläggande rättssäkerhetskrav om förutsebarhet och lika­behandling. Jag har i min framställning kommit fram till att lagförslaget inte uppfyller kraven på förutsebarhet eller att lika fall ska behandlas lika. I framställningen föreslår jag därför utifrån ett de lege ferenda-resonemang hur några utvalda risker som ett genomförande av SOU 2013:62 skulle innebära kan undanröjas.

Univ., Diss.-2005--Regensburg, 2004. / Literaturverz. S. [335] - 348.

L’exécution des décisions juridictionnelles internationales soulève l’une des questions, sinon la question fondamentale qu’implique l’autorité des arrêts rendus par la plus haute instance juridictionnelle des Nations Unies : comment assurer de manière effective, en droit comme en fait, la mise en oeuvre de sentences dont l’autorité juridique est indéniable certes, mais évidemment assujettie à la (bonne) volonté des États ? D’ordinaire deux réponses semblent possibles : par l’exécution spontanée ou l’exécution forcée. Pourtant, l’expérience de la mise en œuvre de l’arrêt rendu le 10 octobre 2002 dans l’affaire de la Frontière terrestre et maritime entre le Cameroun et le Nigeria se démarque de ce schéma classique. Elle n’est ni spontanée, ni forcée mais provoquée. Devant le caractère dérisoire des sanctions possibles en cas d’inexécution, le réalisme diplomatique vient au secours de l’effectivité de la chose jugée. En effet, l’ONU (l’organe judiciaire principal et le Secrétaire général) met en place un dispositif de provocation de la négociation dans l’exécution du futur arrêt, pour n’avoir pas à intervenir sur le fondement de l’article 94 § 2 de la Charte. Dans cette hypothèse la plus sensible dans le domaine de l’exécution des arrêts de la CIJ : celle où la Cour attribue un territoire disputé à un État alors qu’un autre État l’occupe en fait, l’alchimie entre procédure juridictionnelle et procédure négociée s’avère efficace. L’exécution de l’arrêt revêt en outre une dimension originale supplémentaire grâce aux mécanismes sui generis tels que la Commission mixte Cameroun Nigeria et l’accord post-juridictionnel parrainé par l’ONU et les puissances tutrices. On ne peut avoir meilleure illustration de la contribution de l’Afrique à l’effectivité des décisions de la CIJ, comme au règlement pacifique des différends internationaux. / The implementation of international judicial decisions raises one of the questions, if not the fundamental one related to the authority of the decisions rendered by the highest Court of the United Nations. In fact the question is How to ensure effectively, the implementation of sentences whose legal authority is undeniable, but certainly and obviously depending of the (good) will of the States, in law and in fact. Usually two answers seem possible: spontaneous implementation or enforcement. However the experience of the implementation of the Judgment in Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria disregard this classic pattern. This is a preventive and early implementation by the parties and third parties, and then a delayed but effective implementation. It led to a probably unique approach in the settlement of judicial disputes. Indeed it is the first time that the UN (i. e ICJ which is the main judicial organ and the Secretary General) without delay for the foreseeable implementation’s difficulties to get involved under Article 94 § 2 of the Charter establishes an early and preventive diplomatic system of implementation. In the view of the ridiculous nature of possible sanctions for non-compliance, the diplomatic realism came to the rescue of the effectiveness of the res judicata. In this most sensitive field in implementing the judgments of the ICJ, the hypothesis in which the Court assigns a disputed territory to a state while another state occupies it in fact and of the hostility of the local populations to the change of the sovereign de facto, the merge between judicial procedure and negotiated procedure is effective. The implementation of this judgment is also original because of its sui generis mechanisms in implementing the decision such as the United Nations Joint Commission or the post-jurisdictional Agreement sponsored by the UN and witnesses States. There is no better example of the African contribution to the effectiveness of the decisions of the ICJ, as far as the peaceful settlement of international disputes is concerned.