Studiens utforskar med en tolkande kvalitativ ansats hur militär kultur reproduceras genom taktisk utbildning av svenska arméofficerare och därmed inverkar på balansen mellan offensiv och defensiv krigföring. Genom en fördjupning av teoribildningen kring militär kultur har tre deduktivt teoretiska yttringar formats för att analysera studiens empiriska underlag. Empirins kärna utgörs av taktiska prov över ett tidsspann på 10 år från utbildningarna till fänrik, kapten och major. Studiens resultat visar att en offensiv militär kultur under 2010- talets inledning reproducerades genom officersutbildningen, vilket tolkas bidra till att forma ett offensivt tankemönster hos svenska arméofficerare. Denna tydliga offensiva strömning har dock gradvis tonats ner. Under slutet av perioden gör sig ett betydligt mer balanserat kulturellt uttryck gällande och därmed formande av ett mer flexibelt taktiskt tänkande som i större utsträckning harmoniserar mot rådande doktrin och arméns befintliga resurser. Studien belyser vikten av att förstå sin militära kultur och hur den formar officerare genom en socialiseringsprocess vid den formella utbildningssituationen samt att hela utbildningssystemet måste harmonisera för att uppnå ett flexibelt taktiskt tänkande. Studien bidrar vidare med att nyansera befintlig forskning inom området och fördjupa kunskapen om militär kulturs inverkan på taktiskt agerande genom officersutbildning.

The Russian way of conducting war has been a topic of discussion during a long time. Several theories have tried to conceptualize the Russians means and methods during conduct of war. Some claim one can describe it as hybrid warfare, some claim it is nothing new and others claim they have brought a theory which can describe it better than the hybrid concept. One of the new theories is the Full- Spectrum Conflict which tries to explain Russian actions during the conflict in 2014. Analysis using this theory could help to understand whether the actions by Russia against Georgia 2008 can be explained by this new theory. This would support the understanding of if the Russian way of conducting war is something new or if it is something they have been doing before the conflict in 2014. The aim of the study was to test the theory Full-Spectrum Conflict to investigate if Russia’s means and methods in Georgia can be understood by using this theory This was a conflict taking place earlier than 2014 but still in the modern era. The study design is a qualitative case-study examining the Russian actions during the conflict in Georgia. The result of this study shows that the theory Full-Spectrum Conflict can be applied to and explain the Russian actions in Georgia 2008. The result also shows that the Russian way of conducting war may not be anything new. Thus, the theory can be used to explain Russia’s action during conflicts. This may be of interest to the western nations in order to gain a better understanding of Russian actions in the future.

In asymmetric warfare the focus is often about irregular warfare and little about regular warfare. This study focuses on asymmetric regular warfare and Arreguín-Tofts theory about how the weak win wars. His theory has a hypothesis that in asymmetric wars, with direct methods, the strong actor would win directly and decisive over the weak actor. The purpose of this study is to examine if combat engineering can provide the weak defensive actor with time. The study uses case study of the Swedish definition of combat engineering, to examine if it did occur during the Winter War. And if combat engineering did, had it any effect on the results of the Winter War. The overwhelming purpose of this study is to contribute to a discourse about combat support. Also illustrate that combat engineering is not always an established determinant, despite its effect in the results of war. The findings of the study are that combat engineering did occur during the Winter War. Combat engineering did provide the Finnish soldier with protection against artillery fire and delayed the attack of the Soviets tanks during the winter war.

Since 1949, irregular conflicts have been the primary type of conflict. Although the Swedish government has found that a restructuring of focus from international operations to national defence is fundamental for Swedish security policy, the Swedish Armed Forces are still engaged in several irregular conflict arenas around the globe.By applying a theoretical framework based on counterinsurgency theory, this study ventures to explore whether this theory has been implemented in the main Swedish armed forces policy documents. The purpose of this is to facilitate an understanding for the potential strengths and weaknesses that these documents have when implementing counter insurgency in irregular conflicts.This study finds that there exists an implementation of counter insurgency theory in these policy documents as a prerequisite for Swedish operations in irregular conflicts. Furthermore, this proves a correlation between theory and policy something that may be a positive prerequisite for this kind of operations.Furthermore, this study finds that future studies in to the relevance of COIN theory in potential conflicts to come.

In the aftermath of operation iraqi freedom, the world has seen the rise and fall of an entirely new kind of enemy, the islamic state. The field of research can be viewed as divided and a discrepancy can be seen upon whether to face this threat with counterinsurgency-campaigns or conventional means depending on if the islamic state is to be considered a proto-state or not.   This thesis aims at establishing a profound understanding on how the fall of this organization could be understood in accordance with the coalition and U.S foreign policy including its decisionmaking. This has been achived by examining the U.S strategy towards ISIS in order to gain understanding on wheter David Galulas theory on COIN or David J. Lonsdales theory on conventional strategy is the preferred means to an end on such organizations.     The result of the analysis shows that the coalition was successful fighting ISIS with conventional means and not due to well conducted COIN. Although it could be argued that the coalition reached the first step of a COIN-campaign, the U.S has declined a long-term commitment in the middle-east. The contributions made with this study lays mainly in the understanding of strategic concepts and assessing the opponent.

Vilken plats har vilseledning inom svensk krigföring eller svensk militär kultur och hur påverkar demokratiska normer förståelsen av vilseledning?  Genom en kvalitativ undersökning, byggd på intervjuer och analys av myndighetsdokument, undersöks förutsättningarna för strategisk militär vilseledning i den demokratiska institutionen Försvarsmakten. Befintlig vilseledningsteori kompletteras med teori från andra samhällsvetenskapliga fält, varpå uppsatsen tar en teoriutvecklande ansats. Med ett teoretiskt ramverk byggt på institutionalism och militär kultur analyseras empirin genom template analysis, en form av tematisk analys. Syftet är att utforska en potentiell utförare av vilseledning och därmed komplettera vilseledningsforskningen, och samtidigt påvisa handlingsförslag till Försvarsmakten på hur strategisk militär vilseledning ytterligare kan integreras i svensk krigföring.

Ever since the Russian annexation of the Crimean Peninsula there has been an intense scientific debate about how the Russian way of war should be defined and explained. Some argue that the way Russia is acting is something new and maybe could be defined for example as hybrid warfare. Others are not so convinced and argue that it is something old that the Russians have been doing before. After the annexation, a new concept emerged called full-spectrum conflict whose purpose was to define the Russian way of war in Ukraine.  The purpose of the thesis is to investigate Russia’s actions during the Georgian conflict 2008, to see if it is possible to trace the use of full-spectrum conflict there. This is to create a clearer picture of whether the Russian way of war is of innovative nature or if the actions in Ukraine were already used during the previous conflict. The method used in this investigation is a qualitative text analysis to either reject or support the theory. The results of the survey show that the Russian way of conducting warfare is presumably evolution of prior ways to conduct warfare and is nothing new. However, more research must be conducted to enhance this statement since a single survey cannot capture everything and needs to be strengthened for the result to be more representative.

Research in the area of irregular naval warfare has been found to be deficient. Therefore, this essay aims to contribute to broaden the theorizing within this area. Arreguin- Toft´s Strategic interaction theory in force- asymmetric conflicts, involves the use of irregular warfare as a relatively weak actor in an asymmetric conflict. This theory, along with essential element of Sea Power theory, creates the theoretical framework. To examine its explanatory power in an naval context, the study was conducted as a theory testing case study. The to cases are the Tanker War 1984-1988 and the Battle at Okinawa, Ryukyu Islands, 1945. The results showed that the Strategic interaction theory, to some extent, possessed the ability to explain the outcome in both cases. One conclusion that can be made, is that a relatively weak naval actor can benefit from the use of irregular strategies to prevent a relatively strong navy’s attempt to secure command of the sea.

The increased probability that future battles will take place in cities can leave military organizations unprepared for future conflicts. Urban warfare requires a different tactical approach than battles in other terrain due to its unique complexity. Previous research on urban warfare tends to agree that combined arms contribute to urban tactical success but lacks on explanations for how it carries into effect inside cities.   This study will examine how combined arms can lead to tactical victory, in a theory-testing approach, by analyzing the U.S assaults on Aachen in 1944 and Fallujah in 2004 during Operation Phantom Fury. Since the Swedish Armed Forces can be considered tactically influenced by Robert Leonhards theory on combined arms, the purpose of this study is to examine the theory’s ability to explain tactical success in urban terrain. The results show that an attacking combined arms force with superior firepower can put the defending enemy in a dilemma. However, the dilemma creates unfavorable conditions for the Alcyoneus principle of the theory to explain why the attacking forces succeeded.

This essay examines whether the tactics training during the officers' program is in line with the current research situation based on protection against firepower, the effects of weapons and also masking, and whether it provides a sufficient training position for the cadets for future positions at the tactical level. The purpose of the study is to take an inventory of the cadets' training position in tactics and if there are any background variables that have a causal relationship with the explicit educational level, and what they would be. The survey is motivated by the officer’s professional requirements for contemporary and scientifically based training and the objectives for the officers’ program, which aim to give the cadet's a basic ability to work as an officer in stressful environments based on military expertise. The results of the survey come from statistical analysis with data collected through questionnaires that included collection of: background variables, statements about tactics courses and four tactical scenarios, where the respondent in the role of platoon leader, would prioritize tactical measures based on given enemy conditions and associated threats. The outcome shows that the cadets have a basic and sufficient educational level and understanding in tactics. However, all of them need further education regarding protection against firepower and the effects of weapons, as well as masking, as measures for these are not fully prioritized, but only in certain cases and then in a limited way. However, the tactical training has given the cadets a perceived feeling that the competence acquired is sufficient to be able to work as an officer in the future.